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2015 DIGILAW 77 (JHR)

Narendra K. Patel @ Nandu Patel v. Pratap Singh

2015-01-16

AMITAV K.GUPTA

body2015
ORDER With the consent of the parties, this appeal as well as I.A.NO.3441/2012 were heard together. In I.A.NO.3441/2012 the respondent no.13 seeks vacation of the interim order dated 11th April, 2012 passed by this Court. 2. The present appeal is directed against the order dated 03.03.2012 passed by Civil Judge, Senior Division-VII, Jamshedpur in Title(Partition) Suit no.105/2011 whereby learned court below has rejected the plaintiff-petitioner's prayer for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 C.P.C., restraining the defendant nos.3,5,13 and 14 from transferring he suit property by constructing a building or ownership thereon, till the disposal of the suit and in the meantime the defendant nos.3,5,13 and 14 be directed to maintain status quo in respect to the property of the plaint. In the said suit, the plaintiff has sought a decree for declaring the right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the suit property (Schedule B property to the plaint) and in alternative if the court finds that there was no partition amongst the vendors of plaintiffs and other co-sharers then a preliminary decree may be passed for partition of the suit property (Schedule 'A' property to the plaint) with declaration that the plaintiffs have got joint interest thereon to the extent of their share being the purchasers of the Schedule 'B' property to the plaint. Plaintiffs also prayed that a survey knowing Pleader Commissioner may be appointed to demarcate the suit property described in Schedule 'A' of the plaint and a final decree for partition be passed embodying the report of the Pleader Commissioner. Plaintiffs have also prayed for cost of the suit. 3. The appellants/plaintiffs' case, in brief, is that the properties described in Schedule 'A' property to the plaint originally belonged to and was held by one Harnam Singh, since deceased, who happened to be the common ancestor of defendant nos.1 to 12. That after the death of the said Harnam Singh and subsequently, on death of his wife, Schedule 'A' property of the plaint devolved upon his four sons namely, Gurmukh Singh (since deceased), Preet Pal Singh, Pratap Singh, Deedar Singh (since deceased) and two daughters, namely, Swarn Kaur and Harjeet Singh and each of them became joint owners of the Schedule 'A' property having 1/6th share thereon. The defendant nos.2 to 5 are the legal heirs of Late Deedar Singh and the defendant nos.9 to 12 are the legal heirs of Gurmukh Singh. The further case of the plaintiff is that the said four sons and two daughters amicably partitioned the Schedule 'A' property of the plaint amongst themselves and the defendant nos.6,8 and 9 to 12 sold their shares to the plaintiffs by means of a registered deed of Sale no.1857 dated 10.03.2011. 4. On notice, defendants appeared and except for defendant no.7 rest of the defendants filed their written statements. Defendant nos.2 to 5, 13 and 14 filed written statement contesting the suit and claimed that the plaintiffs have no right, title or interest over the said property. Contesting defendants no.3 and 5 in their show cause have stated that the suit is not maintainable in law as well as on facts. That the petition has not been properly verified as required under law. That the suit filed by the plaintiffs itself has got no merit and same is liable to be dismissed with cost as such the petition filed by plaintiffs for grant of temporary injunction is liable to be rejected out right. That in the original plaint the plaintiffs have not sought for grant of permanent injunction as such the petition filed by the plaintiffs for grant of temporary injunction is liable to be rejected on this score alone. That in the plaint filed by the plaintiff they have sought for declaration of their right, title, interest and possession over the property described in Schedule 'B' of the plaint and have filed a fixed court fee which is not permissible in law. 5. On merits defendants no.3 and 5 have denied that on the death of Harnam Singh, the suit property devolved upon his four sons and two daughters. It is stated that during the life time of Harnam Singh, the property acquired by Harnam Singh at Jamshedpur, Assam and Punjab were orally partitioned between the legal heirs and successors of Late Harnam Singh, the suit property was allotted in the joint share of Pratap Singh(D-1) and Deedar Singh( since dead). The Defendant nos.2 to 5 are the legal heirs) each having half share over the same. The Defendant nos.2 to 5 are the legal heirs) each having half share over the same. It is further stated that after the death of Harnam Singh and his wife, Pratap Singh and Deedar Singh were in joint possession over the suit building and while Harnam Singh was alive, he had constructed a double storeyed building over the same along with his two sons, Pratap Singh and Deedar Singh and all of them had invested their substantial amount for construction of the super structure over the aforesaid H.No.73, Pannar Road, Sakchi, Jamshedpur. Besides the property at Pannar Road, Sakchi, Jamshedpur, aforesaid Harnam Singh, during life time, had acquired several properties at Punjab and Assam and during the life time of Harnam Singh the property acquired by him at Jamshedpur, Punjab and Assam have amicably been partitioned between his legal heirs and successors and in the aforesaid amicable partition the property standing on H.NO.73, Pennar Road, Sakchi, Jamshedpur fell in the joint share of Pratap Singh(D-1) and Deedar Singh(L.Rs.D-2 to 5). The property situated at Jugsalai, Jamshedpur fell in the share of Swaran Kaur (D-7). The property situated at Assam fell in the share of Gurmukh Singh and the property situated at Batala, Punjab fell in the joint share of Pritpal Singh(D-6) and Harjit Kaur (D-8) and after the amicable partition the legal heirs and successors of Harnam Singh were in exclusive possession of the properties allotted to their respective shares. Gurmukh Singh had married Kripal Kaur and out of their wedlock two sons namely, Sardar Surjit Singh and Sardar Harvinder Singh and two daughters, namely, Manjit Kaur and Pinky Sarna were born. After the death of Gurmukh Singh, Kripal Kaur remarried Pratap Singh(D-1) and the aforesaid Pratap Singh(D-1) and Kripal Kaur became father and mother of aforesaid Surjit Singh, Harvinder Singh, Manjit Kaur and Pinky Sarna as such all the right, title, interest of Gurmukh Singh at Assam devolved upon Pratap Singh (D-1). After the death of Gurmukh Singh, Kripal Kaur remarried Pratap Singh(D-1) and the aforesaid Pratap Singh(D-1) and Kripal Kaur became father and mother of aforesaid Surjit Singh, Harvinder Singh, Manjit Kaur and Pinky Sarna as such all the right, title, interest of Gurmukh Singh at Assam devolved upon Pratap Singh (D-1). That Pratap Singh(D-1)is still alive and he is the father-in-law of defendant no.9 and Pratap Singh(D-1) who had half interest over the suit property had transferred the same in favour of Hanspal Singh(D-3) on receipt of valuable consideration of Rs.30,00,000/-(Rupees Thirty Lakh only) which was paid to Pratap Singh(D-1) by defendant no.3 by means of an account payee cheque bearing Cheque no.1985-27 dated 28.01.2009 and the cheque given by defendant no.3 in favour of Pratap Singh(D-1) has been encashed by him as such the right, title, interest which Pratap Singh(D-1) had in the suit property vested upon the defendant no.3 and the defendant nos.6,8 and 9 to 12 had got no right, title, interest and possession over the suit property. That defendant no.6, Pritpal Singh is now residing at Canada and has migrated from India for more than 50 years and one daughter of Harnam Singh, namely, Harjeet Kaur(D-8) is now residing in USA and she has also migrated to USA for more than 35 years and both of them have taken the citizenships of the respective countries where they are now residing, as such their interest, if any, had, though not admitted, ceased, as such both of them have got no right, title, interest or possession over the suit property and the power of attorney executed by them in favour of defendant no.9 with respect to the suit property has got no legal value. Moreover, the power of attorney, if any, given by Pritpal Singh and Harjeet Kaur have not empowered defendant no.9 to sell the suit property hence the sale deed executed by defendant no.9 in favour of the plaintiff is illegal and defendant no.9 has no power or authority to execute the sale deed on behalf of defendant nos. 6. That as per the oral partition arrived at between the legal heirs and successors of Harnam Singh, Swarn Kaur(D-7) is in occupation of the properties situated at Jugsalai, Jamshedpur. 6. That as per the oral partition arrived at between the legal heirs and successors of Harnam Singh, Swarn Kaur(D-7) is in occupation of the properties situated at Jugsalai, Jamshedpur. That since the partition with respect to the properties of Harnam Singh has taken place and the persons are in occupation of the properties allotted to their respective shares as such Swarn Kaur(D-7) has also no right, title, interest or possession over the property standing on H.No.73, Pennar Road, Sakchi, Jamshedpur. Defendant nos.3 and 5 have averred that on the basis of actual ownership over the building standing over H.NO.73, Pennar Road, Sakchi, Jamshedpur, the answering defendants have executed a registered GPA (General Power of Attorney) in favour of defendant nos.13 and 14 and on the strength of POA(power of attorney) and the development agreement entered into between Defendant nos.3 and 5 on one hand and Defendant nos.13 and 14 on the other hand, Defendant nos.13 and 14 have got the building plan passed and approved from the concerned authority on 11.12.2010. After approval of the building plan, the old structures standing over suit land has already been demolished about one and half years ago and defendant nos.13 and 14 have constructed a multi-storyed building over the same after investing the amount in crores and have succeeded in constructing a multi-storyed building which is on the verge of completion. It is further stated that on the date of the alleged execution of the sale deed by defendant no.9 in favour of the plaintiffs, no structure was in existence over H.NO.73 at Pennar Road, Sakchi, Jamshedpur as such, the portion measuring 420 Sq. ft. built up area shown in the sale deed dated 10.03.2011 are all false and motivated and the alleged sale deed is nothing but a ploy to blackmail defendants no.3 and 5 and defendants no.13 and 14 with a purpose to realise huge amount. That the defendant nos.6,8,9 and 12 have got no right, title, interest or possession over the properties standing on H.No.73, Pennar Road, Sakchi, Jamshedpur nor have they got any right or authority to sell/dispose off the same in favour of the plaintiffs who are strangers to the family of defendants no.3 and 5. That the defendant nos.6,8,9 and 12 have got no right, title, interest or possession over the properties standing on H.No.73, Pennar Road, Sakchi, Jamshedpur nor have they got any right or authority to sell/dispose off the same in favour of the plaintiffs who are strangers to the family of defendants no.3 and 5. The plaintiffs, by the aforesaid sale deed, have not acquired any manner of right, title, interest or possession over the portion of suit holding and the registered sale deed is a mere paper transaction which has not been acted upon nor the right, title, interest or possession of the defendants have been affected in any manner. That defendants no.3 and 5 have got every right to make any deal with respect to the entire suit property and to make construction over the same. That plaintiffs have got no prima facie case nor the balance of convenience for granting temporary injunction leans in their favour. On the contrary, the defendants have got good prima facie case and the balance of convenience also leans in favour of the defendants as the defendants no.3, 5 and 13, 14 are in possession of the suit property. That the plaintiffs will not suffer any irreparable loss and injury if the temporary injunction is not granted because defendant nos.13 and 14 have already invested a huge amount in crores for construction of multi-storeyed building over the Schedule 'A' property and defendant nos.13 and 14 have already constructed a multi-storeyed building over the same and the same is on the verge of completion. 6. Defendants no.13 and 14 in their reply, have stated that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is not maintainable in its present form and for the reliefs claimed. That no cause of action arose against the defendant nos.13 and 14. They have also denied that on the death of Harnam Singh, the suit property devolved upon his four sons and two daughters who became the joint owners of the same. Defendants no.13 and 14 have adopted same line of defence and reiterated what has been stated by defendant nos.3 and 5. They have also denied that on the death of Harnam Singh, the suit property devolved upon his four sons and two daughters who became the joint owners of the same. Defendants no.13 and 14 have adopted same line of defence and reiterated what has been stated by defendant nos.3 and 5. They have further stated that Pratap Singh(D-1) has sold all the properties situated in Assam to different purchasers and Pratap Singh(D-1) who had his half interest over the property standing on H.No.73, Pennar Road, Sakchi, Jamshedpur has transferred the same in favour of defendant no.3, Hanspal Singh by means of a registered sale deed, registered at District Sub-Registration Office at Jamshedpur bearing Sale Deed no.175 dated 28.01.2009 and delivered possession and since then D-3 is in occupation of the same, an absolute owner thereof, without any interference from any corner. That Deedar Singh(L.Rs.D-2 to 5) has expired in the year 2005 leaving behind defendants no.2 and 5 as legal heirs and successors. Deedar Singh had half share over the properties standing on H.No.73, Pennar Road, Sakchi, Jamshedpur and after his death, his widow(D-2), one son, Hanspal Singh(D-3) and one daughter, Pamela Sarna(D-4) have transferred their interest in favour of Satender Pal Singh, defendant no.5 of the suit by means of a registered sale deed, registered at District Sub Registration Office at Jamshedpur bearing Sale Deed No.565 dated 07.02.2009 and delivered possession and since then D-5 is in occupation of the same as absolute owner thereof. That the registered sale deed of the plaintiffs is a mere paper transaction, has not been acted upon nor the right, title, interest or possession of the defendant nos.3 and 5 have any way been affected by the aforesaid sale deed and the defendant nos.3 and 5 being the absolute owners of the suit property have rightly entered into a development agreement with respect to the entire property with the defendants 13 and 14 on the strength of the development agreement and the power of attorney which are valid and genuine. That Defendant nos.13 and 14 have almost completed the construction of multi-storeyed building by investing amount in crores and the same is on the verge of completion. 7. That Defendant nos.13 and 14 have almost completed the construction of multi-storeyed building by investing amount in crores and the same is on the verge of completion. 7. During pendency of the suit, the appellants/plaintiffs filed a petition under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code,1908 stating inter alia, that the defendants no.3,5,13 and 14 are proceeding to allot/transfer/sale the suit property, which would affect the right of the plaintiff, as such, prayed for restraining the defendant nos.3,5,13 and 14 from transferring the Schedule 'B' property of the plaint by constructing a building, on ownershsip thereon till the disposal of the suit and in the meantime the defendant nos.3,5,13 and 14 be directed to maintain status quo in respect to the property of the plaint. 8. Learned court below, after hearing the parties and considering the facts and materials on record held that “although the plaintiffs have a good prima facie case but it is clear from the photographs of the suit property filed on behalf of the defendants that the construction of the building is almost complete. It is a multi-storeyed building and in these circumstances it is clear that the balance of convenience for granting temporary injunction bears in favour of the answering defendants i.e. defendant nos.13 and 14. Moreover, it is also clear from the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the photographs of the multi-storeyed building that the plaintiffs will not suffer any irreparable loss i.e. any loss which cannot be compensated in terms of money. Hence, taking into consideration these facts and circumstances, I find no merit in this injunction petition. Accordingly, the same stands rejected.” 9. Assailing the said order, the appellants/plaintiffs have taken almost similar ground and claimed that the appellants/ plaintiffs are entitled to be protected by issuing order of temporary injunction restraining the defendants/respondents from constructing as building on the suit land and from alienating the suit property. 10. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the learned court below, while rejecting the application for injunction, has found a prima facie case in favour of the appellants but held that the balance of convenience is not in favour of the appellants and the appellants will not suffer any irreparable loss. 10. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the learned court below, while rejecting the application for injunction, has found a prima facie case in favour of the appellants but held that the balance of convenience is not in favour of the appellants and the appellants will not suffer any irreparable loss. It is argued by the learned counsel that the aforesaid findings of the trial court are not in consonance with the facts and materials on record. That the defendant nos.3, 5, 13 and 14 have averred that Pratap Singh, defendant no.1, as owner of half of the schedule A property, has sold the same to defendant no.3 by registered sale deed dated 28.01.2009. Similarly, defendant nos.2-4, as heirs of Late Deedar Singh, sold half of schedule A property to defendant no.5 by sale deed dated 07.02.2009. That the defendants no.3 and 5 have made out a case that they are the full owners of schedule A property and they entered into development agreement with defendant no.13 and 14. It is urged that the aforesaid defence taken by defendants no.3 and 5 and their written statements and show causes stand falsified from the recitals of the aforesaid sale deeds wherein it is mentioned that Pratap Singh and Deedar Singh being the only sons and legal heirs of Harnam Singh, inherited the schedule A property whereas it is not disputed that Harnam Singh had 4 sons and 2 daughters and the recital in the sale deed regarding Pratap Singh and Deedar Singh being the only sons and legal heirs is suppression of material facts which shows that the sale deeds are illegal and defendant no.3 and 5 have not acquired full ownership in schedule A property. That defendant no.1, who is the vendor of defendant no.5 had filed a joint written statement supporting the case of the plaintiff and also filed an examination-in-chief on affidavit with a petition under Order XVIII Rules 6 and 7 of C.P.C. wherein he has admitted that his right in Schedule A property was confined to 1/6th and not half thus the sale deed purported to have been executed in favour of defendant no.3 is non-est in the eye of law. That the defendant nos.3, 5, 13 and 14 have incorrectly stated that after construction of the major part of schedule A property with the knowledge about the construction, is far from the truth as the defendant nos.3 and 5, in para 19 of show cause dated 17.01.2012, have categorically stated that at the time when the plaintiff purchased the schedule B property, the same was vacant. Such an admission proves the fact that defendant nos.13 and 14 were aware of the transfer of schedule B property in favour of the plaintiffs and despite such knowledge they erected illegal construction thereon. That the trial court failed to appreciate this aspect and passed the impugned order observing that since the construction is almost complete, so the defendants cannot be constrained in completing the same. Although the learned court held that the appellants had got a good prima facie case, on the said ground, it is submitted that it is well settled that when a property is in lease, the status quo of the same should be preserved and a wrong doer should not be given indulgence to gain wrongfully at the cost of legitimate right of another. It is argued by the learned counsel that this court, while issuing notice in the present appeal, had restrained the defendants/respondents from alienating the property, which has continued for almost two and half years and if the respondents/defendants are permitted to sell the property, then the entire suit would become infructuous, as in the event if the plaintiff succeeds, then it would be impossible for him to get the 3rd fruits of decree. That during the pendency of suit, creation of party interest in the suit property would invite multiplicity of litigation as the persons who would purchase the property would be put to peril and jeopardy. 11. In support of the contention, learned counsel has relied on the decisions in the case of Maharwal Khewaji Trust(registered) vs. Baldeo Dass, reported in (2004) 8 SCC 488 has submitted that in the said case, the Apex Court has held that the court should not permit the nature of the property to be changed by alienation or transfer of the property, which may lead to loss or damage being caused to the party, who may ultimately succeed and may further lead to multiplicity of proceedings. He has also referred to the decision in the case of N. Srinivasa Vs. Kuttikaran Machine Tools Ltd., reported in (2009) 5 SCC 182 and submitted that in the said case, the Apex Court had granted status quo on the ground that if the property in dispute is sold to a third party, complications will arise on creation of third party interest as the award, if any passed, would become nugatory. Learned counsel has also placed reliance on the decision in Julian Educational Trust Vs. Saurendra Kumar Roy, reported in (2010) 1 SCC 379 and submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that when there is a prima facie case in favour of the party then in the light of the principles of balance of convenience and inconvenience interim relief should be granted to the party in whose favour prima facie case is made out. 12. It is urged that on the basis of the material facts of the case and the judicial pronouncements, the ad-interim injunction granted by order dated 11.04.2012 be confirmed and the impugned order of the trial court be set aside. 13. Mr. Manjul Prasad, learned Senior counsel, on behalf of respondents no.3 and 5 and Mr.Lalit Kumar Lal, on behalf of respondents no.13 and 14 have submitted that the Title (Partition) Suit no.105/2011 was filed on 22.11.2011 seeking relief for declaration of right, title and interest of the plaintiff over schedule B property and in alternative, if the court finds that there was no partition among the vendors of the plaintiff and other co-sharers described in schedule A of the plaint, declaring that the plaintiffs have got joint interest thereon to the extent of their share being the purchasers of schedule B property and Survey Knowing Pleader Commissioner be appointed to demarcate the suit property described in Schedule A and a final decision for decree be passed. It is argued that no relief of permanent injunction was sought for in the original plaint or the amended plaint till date. It is urged that there was amicable partition between the heirs of Late Harnam Singh in which the property standing in H.NO.3, Pennar Road, Sakchi, Jamshedpur was acquired by Harnam Singh from M/s. TISCO Ltd. from father of defendant no.2 and grandfather of defendant nos.3-5 whereafter a double storeyed building was constructed by Harnam Singh and his two sons viz. It is urged that there was amicable partition between the heirs of Late Harnam Singh in which the property standing in H.NO.3, Pennar Road, Sakchi, Jamshedpur was acquired by Harnam Singh from M/s. TISCO Ltd. from father of defendant no.2 and grandfather of defendant nos.3-5 whereafter a double storeyed building was constructed by Harnam Singh and his two sons viz. Pratap Singh and Deedar Singh on investment made by all of them for constructing this superstructure. That besides the property at Pennar Road , Sakchi, Jamshedpur, Harnam Singh had acquired several properties in Punjab and Assam. The property at Jugsalai, Jamshedpur fell in the share of Swarn Kaur. The property situated at Assam was given the share of Gurmukh Singh whereas the property of Batala, Punjab fell in the joint share of Pritpal Singh and Harjeet Kaur. That Pratap Singh, defendant no.1, father-in-law of defendant no.9 and grandfather of defendant nos.10-12 were having half share in the property standing over H.NO.73, Pennar Road, Sakchi, Jamshedpur transferred the same in favour of Hanspal Singh, defendant no.3, for a consideration of Rs.30,000,00/-which was paid through A/C payee cheque no.1985-27 dated 28.01.2009. Accordingly, the interest in the suit property of Pratap Singh vested upon defendant no.3 and defendant nos.6,8,9-12 have no right, title, interest or possession over the suit building. That after the purchase of the suit property, the defendants entered into development agreement with defendant nos.13 and 14 on 07.02.2009. The defendant nos.13 and 14, after completing the required formality started constructing a multi-storeyed building over the schedule A property in the month of August 2009. It is pointed out by the learned counsel that the plaintiff has made out a case that defendant nos.6,8 and 9-12 sold their respective portions of the suit property by a registered sale deed no.1857 dated 10.03.2011. It is urged that the said defendants did not have any right and they sold imaginary respective portions of the suit property to create hindrance in the construction of the suit property which was on the verge of completion and the vendy/plaintiffs were never in possession of the vended shares of vendors. It is urged that the said defendants did not have any right and they sold imaginary respective portions of the suit property to create hindrance in the construction of the suit property which was on the verge of completion and the vendy/plaintiffs were never in possession of the vended shares of vendors. That after 5 months of the said transaction, the plaintiffs filed the aforesaid partition suit praying for relief, as mentioned above and after about a month i.e. on September, 2011, they filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 C.P.C. for grant of temporary injunction restraining defendant nos.3, 5, 13 and 14 from transferring the Schedule B property of the plaint by constructing a building on ownership till disposal of the suit. That the learned Sub-Judge rejected the prayer of the plaintiffs, for grant of temporary injunction holding that though the plaintiffs have a good prima facie case, but since the building is almost complete, as such the plaintiff have no balance of convenience in their favour and further held that the plaintiffs should not suffer any irreparable loss which cannot be compensated in terms of money. It is urged by the learned counsel that mere observation of a prima facie case is not enough for grant of temporary injunction if other two ingredients i.e. balance of convenience and irreparable loss do not lean in favour of the party seeking injunction and the said principle of law has been propounded in the case of M/s. N/S Best Seller Retails (I) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s. Aditya Birla Nuvo Ltd. and others, reported in 2012 S.A.R (Civil) 606(SC). It is submitted by the learned counsel that in the decision, in the case of Maria Margarida Segueira Fernandes and others vs. Erasmo Jack-de-Segueira, reported in (2012) 5 SCC 370 , the Supreme Court has held that if no relief for mandatory injunction has been sought for, then no interim injunction can be granted. 14. Learned counsel has also contended that it would be evident from the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. read with 151 C.P.C. filed by the appellants/plaintiffs praying that defendants 3,5,13 and 14 be restrained from transferring Schedule B property whereas the evidence has been brought on record that a multi-storeyed building has already been constructed/completed over the suit land long prior to the filing of the title suit. That the appellants/plaintiffs have moulded their prayer for restraining the defendant from constructing a building over the suit land whereas the fact is that a multi-storeyed building has already been constructed even before passing the impugned order. It is argued that the appellants have adopted a vacillating tactics and they have been changing their stand at every stage which is impermissible under law at least for grant of any interim relief. That the trial court has rightly refused the prayer taking into account the fact that the multi-storeyed building has already been completed prior to passing of the order whereas the prayer was made for restraining the defendants from transferring the Schedule B land. 15. It has been argued on behalf of defendant nos.13 and 14 that after due examination of the right, title and interest of defendant nos.3 and 5 over Schedule 'A', the property based on registered sale deed no.175 dated 28.01.2009 and registered sale deed no.565 dated 07.02.2009 bona-fidely entered into the development agreement with defendant nos.3 and 5 thereafter completed the construction of the building. That the building plan was approved by the competent authorities of M/s. Tata Steel and Jamshedpur Notified Area Committee(JNAC) and other concerned authorities. That the defendants no.13 and 14 invested huge amount of money running in crores which includes the advance taken from the prospective purchasers of residential/commercial flats and the defendant nos.13 and 14 are bound by the terms of the said agreement and they will suffer irreparable loss if injunction is granted in the matter. It is argued that in the present case, the plaintiffs have admitted in para 11 of the plaint that they came to learn that defendants no.13 and 14 are contemplating to erect a building over entire area of the suit land after demolishing the existing dilapidated house but they did not claim any relief for grant of permanent injunction against demolition of the said dilapidated house or against the erection of the said multi-storeyed building, neither have they claimed for grant of injunction against demolition of the existing house in the belated injunction petition filed by them. It is submitted that the plaintiffs did not deny the statement of the defendants. It is submitted that the plaintiffs did not deny the statement of the defendants. That the dilapidated house standing over the suit land had been demolished about one and half years ago i.e. much before the institution of the suit which shows that the plaintiffs have suppressed the material facts and intentionally omitted to claim the relief of permanent injunction against the demolition of existing house or against the erection of multi-storeyed building. It is contended that the plaintiff have not come with clean hands hence the injunction should be refused and the trial court has rightly considered these aspects and refused to grant the injunction. 16. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsel, it is well settled that for granting or refusing an interim order of injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of C.P.C., the court is required to consider (I) whether there is a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff; (ii) whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of the party claiming such injunction and (iii) whether the plaintiff and the party will suffer irreparable loss and injury if an order of injunction is not granted. 17. In view of the settled principles it is well settled that injunction or relief can be granted on considering the facts and circumstances of the particular case and the decisions relied upon by the parties are on the principles enshrined depending on the facts of the case and they cannot be applicable as judgment in rem. In the instant case, on considering the facts and materials on record and the pleading of the parties, it is admitted that the suit property belonged to Late Harnam Singh. Appellants/plaintiffs' case is that after the death of Harnam Singh and his wife, Schedule A property devolved upon his four sons and they have purchased the suit property from defendants no.6,8,9-12, who sold their shares to them by means of a registered sale deed no.1857 dated 10.03.2011 . On the other hand, the respondent/defendants no.3 and 5 have denied that on the death of Harnam Singh, the suit property devolved upon his four sons and two daughters. On the other hand, the respondent/defendants no.3 and 5 have denied that on the death of Harnam Singh, the suit property devolved upon his four sons and two daughters. The respondent/defendants' case is that during the lifetime of Harnam Singh, the property acquired by Harnam Singh at Jamshedpur, Assam and Punjab were orally partitioned amongst and between the legal heirs and successors whereby the suit property was allotted to the joint share of Pratap Singh (D-1) and Deedar Singh (since dead) (defendant nos.2 and 5 are the legal heirs of Late Deedar Singh) each having half share over the suit property. That after the death of Harnam Singh and his wife, Pratap Singh and Deedar Singh were in joint possession of the suit property. That during his lifetime, Harnam Singh had constructed a double storeyed building alongwith his two sons, Pratap Singh and Deedar Singh and all of them had invested a considerable amount of money in the suit property i.e. H.NO.73, Pennar Road, Sakchi, Jamshedpur. That after the amicable partnership, the legal heirs and successors of Harnam Singh were in exclusive possession of their respective shares in the property. It is the case of the defendant that Pratap Singh(D-1) is still alive and is the father-in-law of defendant no.9. That Pratap Singh, who had half interest over the suit property, transferred the same in favour of Hanspal Singh(D-3) for valuable consideration of Rs.30,00,000/-(Thirty lakhs only) which was paid by defendant no.3 through account payee cheque no. 1985-27 dated 28.01.2009 for which a registered sale deed was entered into on the said date. That the cheque was encashed by D-1 and the right, title and interest of Pratap Singh vested upon defendant no.3 and defendant nos.6,8 and 9-12 have got no right, title,interest and posses ion over the suit property. Accordingly, the power of attorney executed by defendant nos.6 and 8 to defendant no.9 with respect to the suit property has got no legal value. That the power of attorney, if any, given by Pritpal Singh and Harjeet Kaur has not empowered defendant no.9 to sell the suit property. Consequently the sale deed executed by defendant no.9 in favour of appellant/plaintiff is illegal and defendant no.9 had no power or authority to execute the sale deed on behalf of defendant nos.6 and 8. That the power of attorney, if any, given by Pritpal Singh and Harjeet Kaur has not empowered defendant no.9 to sell the suit property. Consequently the sale deed executed by defendant no.9 in favour of appellant/plaintiff is illegal and defendant no.9 had no power or authority to execute the sale deed on behalf of defendant nos.6 and 8. It is the case of the respondent/defendant that as per oral partition, Swarn Kaur(D-7) is in occupation of the properties situated at Jugsalai, Jamshedpur and the legal heirs and successors are in occupation of the properties allotted to their respective shares, as such Swarn Kaur(D-7) has also no right, title, interest or possession over the property situated at H.NO.73, Pennar Road, Sakchi, Jamshedpur. It is averred that on the basis of actual ownership of the aforesaid building, the defendants executed a registered general power of attorney in favour of defendant nos.13 and 14 and both the parties entered into development agreement, whereafter defendant nos.13 and 14 got the building plan passed and approved from the competent authorities on 11.12.2010. That after approval of the building plan, the old structure was demolished about one and half years ago and defendant nos.13 and 14 have constructed a multi storeyed building investing crores of rupees and the said multi storeyed building is on the verge of completion. 18. These are the questions that need to be decided during trial. Prima facie, from the aforesaid averments, it is clear that appellants/plaintiffs have neither established prima facie title to the suit property nor they are in possession of the property in spite of the sale deed. On the other hand, the contesting defendants, after purchasing the suit property, have taken steps to develop the property. Respondents/defendants have also made constructions on the suit property as noted by the learned court below in the impugned order. The court below has recorded the finding that it is clear from the photographs of the suit property filed on behalf of the defendants that the construction of the building is almost complete and it is a multi-storeyed building. For all these years appellants/plaintiffs never raised any objection whatsoever and for the first time filed the suit for declaration of their right and title in the property without praying for possession of the property which is not in their possession as is clear from the plain reading of the plaint. For all these years appellants/plaintiffs never raised any objection whatsoever and for the first time filed the suit for declaration of their right and title in the property without praying for possession of the property which is not in their possession as is clear from the plain reading of the plaint. The suit has been valued at Rs.20,00,000(Rupees Twenty Lakhs Only). Plaintiffs have not paid ad valorem court fee on the suit value neither have they been able to show their possession over the land. 19. In view of the discussions above and materials on record, in the opinion of this Court, the appellants/plaintiffs, only on the basis of the sale deed of the year 2011 and without actual demarcation of the property and delivery of possession, cannot be said to have a prima facie case or balance of convenience in their favour or any sufficient cause to restrain the defendants from dealing with the property by issuing an injunction. 20. So far as the claim of suffering injury or loss by any apprehended transfer during pendency of the suit is concerned, if the plaintiffs/appellants succeed in their suit, they can take advantage of the principle of dependence and can also be compensated in terms of money. Appellants/plaintiffs, therefore, cannot be conferred the benefit of an order of injunction in their favour in absence of any ingredient which can be held to be the determining factor for grant of an order of injunction. 21. I.A.NO.3441 of 2012 filed by the respondents for modifying/vacating the interim order dated 11.04.2012 is accordingly allowed. Interim order dated 11.04.2012 passed by this Court stands vacated. This appeal, is accordingly, dismissed. Let the court below be informed. 22. It goes without saying that the trial court shall not be prejudiced by any observations made above and decide the suit on its own merits. Appeal dismissed.