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2015 DIGILAW 770 (MP)

State of M. P. v. Krishna Bai

2015-07-27

S.C.SHARMA

body2015
ORDER : S.C. Sharma, J. Regard being had to the similitude in the controversy involved in the present cases, the writ petitions were analogously heard and by a common order, they are being disposed of by this Court. Facts of Writ Petition No. 7540/2013 are narrated hereunder. The petitioner before this Court has filed this present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India being aggrieved by the order dt. 24-2-2012, passed by the Grievance Redressal Authority in Appeal No. 1982/2006, Krishna Bai vs. Narmada Valley Development Authority. 2. Facts of the case reveal that the respondent No. 1 Krishna Bai submitted an application before the Commissioner, Rehabilitation/Field, Narmada Valley Development Authority in GRA Case No. 711-D/2006 and the application was rejected by the Commissioner by order dt. 26-7-2006. She has preferred an appeal before the Grievance Redressal Authority and the Grievance Redressal Authority has allowed her appeal and has directed the Narmada Valley Development Authority to grant all benefits of Narmada Water Award and NRR Policy including allotment of agricultural land or payment of SRP as per option. The State of Madhya Pradesh, being aggrieved by the aforesaid order has filed this present Writ Petition. 3. The project in question Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) is an Inter-State Project and a Major Dam has been constructed on the river Narmada in the State of Gujarat. An Award was passed by the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal and by virtue of statutory provisions, as contained under the Inter - State River Water Disputes Act, 1956, the Award was passed on 16-8-1978 for rehabilitation of oustees of Sardar Sarovar Project and later on a rehabilitation policy was framed by the State Government which is on record annexed as Annexure P/2. 4. As there were large number of disputes in respect of rehabilitation, payment of compensation and other benefits for which the oustees were entitled, the State of Madhya Pradesh issued a Notification in terms of NWDT Award and provisions of R and R Policy of the State of Madhya Pradesh on 30-3-2000 and by virtue of the aforesaid Notification, Grievance Redressal Authority was established for Sardar Sarovar Project affected persons resettlement in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The Grievance Redressal Authority was empowered to look into and to decide the complaints and grievance, if any, relating to resettlement and rehabilitation of the oustees. 5. The Grievance Redressal Authority was empowered to look into and to decide the complaints and grievance, if any, relating to resettlement and rehabilitation of the oustees. 5. Paragraph 15 of the aforesaid policy reads as under: 15. The decision and directions of the Authority in all matters relating to the redressal of complaints/grievances oustees (PAPs) shall be final and binding on the State of Madhya Pradesh and all concerned including the oustees and their Associations, if any. 6. The aforesaid clause makes it very clear that the decision and directions of the authority in all matters shall be final and binding upon the State of Madhya Pradesh and all concerned including the oustees and their associations. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued before this Court that the order passed by the Grievance Redressal Authority has rightly been challenged before this Court by virtue of judgment delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Another, AIR 2011 SC 1989 . He has placed reliance upon paragraphs 21, 58, 86, 181, 182, 183 and 184 and his contention is that the Apex Court has granted a liberty to the State of Madhya Pradesh as well as to other aggrieved persons to approach this Court against the order passed by the Grievance Redressal Authority and, therefore, the present Writ Petition is very much maintainable before this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court towards the interim order passed in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 328/2002 and his contention is that the liberty was also granted to the persons aggrieved to approach the Apex Court, meaning thereby, initially a liberty was granted to approach the Apex Court in the year 2002, however, later on, the Apex Court vide judgment dated 11-5-2011 has granted a liberty to approach this Court and, therefore, the Writ Petition is very much maintainable. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court towards the impugned order. He has vehemently argued before this Court that Krishna Bai was married to a Government servant and she was residing at Bhopal. The Grievance Redressal Authority has considered this aspect in order dt. 24-2-2012. Paragraphs 5 to 13 of the order reads as under: 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court towards the impugned order. He has vehemently argued before this Court that Krishna Bai was married to a Government servant and she was residing at Bhopal. The Grievance Redressal Authority has considered this aspect in order dt. 24-2-2012. Paragraphs 5 to 13 of the order reads as under: 5. The point for determination is whether the applicant is entitled to allotment of agricultural land and other benefits arising out of the Award and the R.R. Policy for herself and for her three children. 6. In the N.W.D.T. Award the definitions of "oustee" and "family" are as under:- Clause XI Sub-clause I(2) "Oustee" "An 'oustee' shall mean any person who since at least one year prior to the date of publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act, has been ordinarily residing or cultivating land or carrying on any trade, occupation, or calling or working for gain in the area likely to be submerged permanently or temporarily." Sub-clause I(3) "Family" "(i) A family shall include husband, wife and minor children and other persons dependent on the head of the family, e.g., widowed mother." "(ii) Every major son will be treated as a separate family." 7. In Clause 1(1.1)(v)(c) 1 and 2 of the R.R. Policy the same definition of displaced person has been incorporated. In the definition of family 'major unmarried daughter' has also been included. 8. From the definition of "oustee" it is clear that a person would be treated as oustee if he or she since at least one year "has been ordinarily residing" or cultivating land. The use of the word "or" clearly shows that it is disjunctive. One can be oustee either because (i) he has been ordinarily residing in the area or (ii) cultivating land since at least one year. It is not necessary to fulfill both the conditions. One is enough. That view has been taken by this Authority consistently since a long time. (GRA Appeal No. 266 of 2006 decided on 24-10-2007). 9. The applicant claims that she is ordinarily residing in the village. She has submitted a certificate of Tehsildar, Dharampuri issued on 4-11-2009 according to which she is resident of Pipaldagarhi. In the Rin Pustika of the lands which have been acquired she is shown as resident of this village. (GRA Appeal No. 266 of 2006 decided on 24-10-2007). 9. The applicant claims that she is ordinarily residing in the village. She has submitted a certificate of Tehsildar, Dharampuri issued on 4-11-2009 according to which she is resident of Pipaldagarhi. In the Rin Pustika of the lands which have been acquired she is shown as resident of this village. She has submitted her affidavit stating that she was living in the house given top her by her father who was former member of the Legislative Assembly. She has produced a copy of the Ration Card in her name which shows that she was drawing ration from the shop in this village. That is no doubt of the year 2006. Her name is recorded in the Voters' list. According to her affidavit most of the time she was residing in the village to look after her agricultural land. Her father has died on 9-1-2002. She used to go to Bhopal to live with her husband because he was a Government servant and posted there. There is also an affidavit of Mahendra Singh brother of the applicant in which he has sworn that her sister was most of the time living in the village. His father Thakur Kirat Singh had given a part of the house owned by him to his sister Krishnabai. Her husband has now died. As against all this material there is no document produced by the non-applicant to show that the applicant was ordinarily residing at Bhopal. 10. From the evidence on record it is clear that the applicant was having agricultural land in the village and her father was living there, her son has studied there and she is shown in the certificates mentioned above as resident of the village. Before her marriage she was undisputably residing with her father in the village. Simply because her husband was a Government Servant and was transferable to any place in the State it can not be inferred on the facts of this case that she ceased to be ordinary resident of the village. In my opinion she was ordinarily residing in the village for at least one year before the date of notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. 11. There is a circular dated 20-9-2002 of NVDA and the relevant portion of the same reads as under: 12. In my opinion she was ordinarily residing in the village for at least one year before the date of notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. 11. There is a circular dated 20-9-2002 of NVDA and the relevant portion of the same reads as under: 12. The object of the circular is that a person who is originally resident of the area of the village where he has his property which has been acquired for the Project should not be deprived of the benefits of rehabilitation policy simply on the ground that he is employed elsewhere. On the same parity of reasoning and the objective in view, the wife of a Government Servant who is originally the inhabitant of the area of submergence should not be divested of her rights arising out of the Award and R.R. Policy because at times she is required to go and live with her husband to fulfill her matrimonial and other obligations. The benefit of this circular should be extended to the wife who is resident of the area of submergence and whose land has been acquired if she is required to go and live with her husband for compelling reasons. She would continue to be "ordinary resident" of the village and entitled to the said benefits. 13. The applicant was definitely "cultivating land" belonging to her. The Khasra entries of the Panchsala Khasra on record go to show that several crops were being raised on the lands which have been acquired and which are left out. Therefore, the presumption would be that the applicant was getting the lands cultivated through servants and the relatives. The brother of the applicant has stated in his affidavit that the applicant was supervising the cultivation of her land and he also must be extending his hand in the agricultural operations on that land. She is covered by the words "cultivating land" and for that reason also she would be treated as "oustee" even if it is said that she was for some time in the year living at Bhopal. 8. She is covered by the words "cultivating land" and for that reason also she would be treated as "oustee" even if it is said that she was for some time in the year living at Bhopal. 8. This Court has carefully gone through the aforesaid order and it establishes mat the respondent-Krishna Bai has submitted Certificate from Tehsildar and other documents establishing that she was ordinarily residing at the village in question and she was an oustee and, therefore, keeping in view the definition of 'Oustee', as she was cultivating the land in question, the order has been passed directing grant of benefits of NWDT Award and R and R Policy including allotment of agricultural land or payment of SRP at her option. No documentary evidence was produced by the State of Madhya Pradesh before the GRA to establish that Smt. Krishna Bai was residing at Bhopal and in those circumstances, based upon the documentary evidence produced by Krishna Bai, the impugned order has been passed. The finding of fact arrived at by the GRA are based upon cogent material which was placed before the GRA. 9. The Apex Court in the case of Natha Singh & Ors. Vs. The Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1053 has held as under: 5. With regard to the first contention advanced on behalf of the appellants, it is sufficient to observe that it has been time and again observed by this Court that in dealing widi a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court cannot exercise the jurisdiction of an Appellate Court and cannot re-examine or disturb the findings of fact arrived at by an inferior Court or a tribunal in the absence of any error of law. 10. The Apex Court in the aforesaid case has held that the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction of an Appellate Court and cannot re-examine or disturb the findings of fact arrived at by the inferior Court or a tribunal in absence of any error of law. 11. In the present case, undisputedly there is no error of law and, therefore, the question of interference by this Court in respect of the order passed by the GRA does not arise. 12. The Apex Court in the case of Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash, AIR 2004 SC 3892 in paragraph 4 has held as under: 4. 11. In the present case, undisputedly there is no error of law and, therefore, the question of interference by this Court in respect of the order passed by the GRA does not arise. 12. The Apex Court in the case of Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash, AIR 2004 SC 3892 in paragraph 4 has held as under: 4. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the Appellate Court, the respondent preferred a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under Article 226 and alternatively under Article 227 of the Constitution. It was heard by a learned Single Judge of the High Court. The High Court has set aside the judgment of the Appellate Court and restored that of the Trial Court. A perusal of the judgment of the High Court shows that the High Court has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the judgment of the Appellate Court. Though not specifically stated, the phraseology employed by the High Court in its judgment, goes to show that the High Court has exercised its certiorari jurisdiction for correcting the judgment of the Appellate Court. In Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and Others, AIR 2003 SC 3044 this Court has ruled that to be amenable to correction in certiorari jurisdiction, the error committed by the Court or Authority on whose judgment the High Court was exercising jurisdiction, should be an error which is self-evident. An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging into a long-drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other, cannot be called a patent error. As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai (supra) that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging into re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a Court of appeal. The High Court has itself recorded in its judgment that "considering the evidence on the record carefully" it was inclined not to sustain the judgment of the Appellate Court. The High Court has itself recorded in its judgment that "considering the evidence on the record carefully" it was inclined not to sustain the judgment of the Appellate Court. On its own showing, the High Court has acted like an Appellate Court which was not permissible for it to do under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution. 13. The Apex Court again held that the High Court cannot act as an Appellate Court and re-appreciate the evidence while exercising supervisory jurisdiction. 14. The Apex Court in the case of Shama Prashant Raje Vs. Ganpatrao and Others, AIR 2000 SC 3094 in paragraph 5 has held as under: 5. In view of the rival submissions we have carefully scrutinised the orders of the Controller, that of the Appellate Authority under the Control Order and the order of the learned Single Judge which has been affirmed by the Division Bench. Undoubtedly, in a proceeding under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a competent Tribunal. The jurisdiction of the High Court, therefore, is supervisory and not appellate. Consequently Article 226 is not intended to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of Appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or order to be made. But notwithstanding the same on a mere perusal of the order of an inferior Tribunal if the High Court comes to a conclusion that such Tribunal has committed manifest error by misconstruing certain documents, or the High Court comes to the conclusion that on the materials it is not possible for a reasonable man to come to a conclusion arrived at by the inferior Tribunal or the inferior Tribunal has ignored to take into consideration certain relevant materials or has taken into consideration certain materials which are not admissible, then the High Court will be fully justified in interfering with the findings of the inferior Tribunal. Then again the two questions on which the Tribunal under the Rent Control Order were required to give finding, namely, habitual defaulter and subletting are not pure questions of fact but can be held to be mixed questions of fact and law. Then again the two questions on which the Tribunal under the Rent Control Order were required to give finding, namely, habitual defaulter and subletting are not pure questions of fact but can be held to be mixed questions of fact and law. In this view of the matter, on going through the Appellate order passed by the District Collector as well as the order of the learned Single Judge, we are not in a position to hold that the High Court exceeded the parameters prescribed for interference with the findings of an inferior Tribunal. Under Clause 13(3)(ii) Controller has to be satisfied that the tenant is habitually in errors with the rent. The expression habitually would obviously connote some act of continuity. Under the Lease Deed dated 8-4-1982 between the landlord and the tenant Clause 4 made it obligatory for the tenant to pay the rent before 10th day of each English Calendar month, and under Clause 9 in the event of arrears of rent over 3 months is not paid then the landlord was entitled to give notice and then if the matter is not settled within one month from the date of the notice then the landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy. Reading the aforesaid two Clauses it would not be correct, as contended by Mr. Verma, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, that under the agreement itself 4 months period has been provided to enable the tenant to pay the rent. If a tenant, notwithstanding the obligation of paying the rent by 10th day of each English calendar month continuously makes a default of paying the rent for the first month by two months thereafter, and pays the rent in similar manner, then he must be held to be habitually in arrear with the rent in question. This being the position, the fact that the rent for September to November, 1984 was paid in December only after the Distress Warrant was issued and that again from December, 1984 to March, 1985 the rent had not been paid and were deposited within the 10th of next month, as stipulated in the lease agreement would constitute the tenant to be habitually in arrear within the meaning of section 13(3)(ii) of the Control Order. The Appellate Authority under the Control Order was obviously in error in interfering with the well reasoned conclusion of the Controller on this score, and the High Court was fully justified in correcting the said error by interfering with the finding of the lower Appellate Authority on the question of applicability of section 13(3)(ii) to the case in hand. Similarly, on the question of subletting, there is no dispute with the proposition that the two ingredients; namely, parting with the possession and some consideration therefor, had to be established. The conclusion of the lower Appellate Authority on this score was obviously on a misconstruction of the document Exhibit N2 and the High Court, therefore, was entitled to correct the error which was based upon a construction of the aforesaid document. The different Clauses of the lease deed unequivocally indicates that the sum of Rs. 1,500/- p.m. was the consideration money for parting with the possession of the premises and allowing the Singer Sewing Machine to do business in the premises. 15. The Apex Court in the aforesaid case has held that in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a competent Tribunal. The jurisdiction of the High Court, is therefore, supervisory and not appellate, meaning thereby, the Apex Court has held that the findings of fact unless and until they are perverse findings, cannot be interfered with. 16. In the case of Sangram Singh Vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya, AIR 1955 SC 425 in paragraphs 12 and 13 has held as under: 12. But this, also, is no longer open to question. The point has been decided by three Constitution Benches of this Court. In Hari Vishnu vs. Ahmad Ishaque the effect of section 105 of the Representation of the People Act was not considered, but the Court laid down in general terms that the jurisdiction under Article 226 having been conferred by the Constitution, limitations cannot be placed on it except by the Constitution itself: see pages 238 and 242. Section 105 was, however, considered in Durga Shankar Mehta vs. Raghuraj Singh and it was held that that section cannot cut down or affect the overriding powers of this Court under Article 136. Section 105 was, however, considered in Durga Shankar Mehta vs. Raghuraj Singh and it was held that that section cannot cut down or affect the overriding powers of this Court under Article 136. The same rule was applied to Article 226 in Rai Krushna Rose vs. Binod Kanungo and others and it was decided that section 105 cannot take away or whittle down the powers of the High Court under Article 226. Following those decisions we hold that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not taken away or curtailed by section 105. 13. The jurisdiction which Articles 226 and 136 confer entitles the High Courts and this Court to examine the decisions of all Tribunals to see whether they have acted illegally. That jurisdiction cannot be taken away by a legislative device that purports to confer power on a tribunal to act illegally by enacting a statute that its illegal acts shall become legal the moment the tribunal chooses to say they are legal. The legality of an act or conclusion is something that exists outside and apart from the decision of an inferior tribunal. It is a part of the law of the land which cannot be finally determined or altered by any tribunal of limited jurisdiction. The High Courts and the Supreme Court alone can determine what the law of the land is vis-a-vis all other Courts and tribunals and they alone can pronounce with authority and finality on what is legal and what is not. All that an inferior tribunal can do is to reach a tentative conclusion which is subject to review under Articles 226 and 136. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 with that of Supreme Court above them remains with fullest extent despite section 105. Raj Krushna Bose Vs. Binod Kanungo and Others, AIR 1954 SC 202 . A similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in the case of Jt. Registrar of Co-operative Societies Madras & Ors. Vs. P.S. Rajagopal Naidu & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 992 and paragraph 10, reads as under: 10. We have been taken through the material parts of the orders of the Registrar and the Joint Registrar and we do not find any such infirmities in them which would justify interference by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Vs. P.S. Rajagopal Naidu & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 992 and paragraph 10, reads as under: 10. We have been taken through the material parts of the orders of the Registrar and the Joint Registrar and we do not find any such infirmities in them which would justify interference by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court could not act as an Appellate Court and reappraise and re-examine the relevant facts and circumstances which led to the making of the orders of super session as if the matter before it had been brought by way of appeal. The limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 when a writ in the nature of certiorari is to be issued are well-known and well-settled by now and it is pointless to re-state the grounds on which any such writ or direction can be issued. We are satisfied that there was no justification whatsoever for quashing the orders of the Joint Registrar and that of the Registrar in appeal. The appeals are consequently allowed with costs and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The writ petitions are ordered to be dismissed. One hearing fee. 17. The Apex Court in the aforesaid case has held that the High Court cannot act as an Appellate Court and re-appreciate the evidence while exercising supervisory jurisdiction. 18. The Apex Court in the case of Veerappa Pillai Vs. Raman and Raman Ltd. and Others, AIR 1952 SC 192 has held as under: 20. Such writs as are referred to in Article 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made Mr. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made Mr. Daphtary, who appeared for the respondent, said nothing to controvert this position. His argument was that if all along the authorities and the Government had proceeded upon a particular footing and dealt with the rights of the parties on that basis, it was not open to them afterwards to change front and give the go-by altogether to the conception of the rights of parties entertained by them till then. According to him, there was manifest injustice to his client in allowing them to do so and this was the reason which impelled the High Court to make the order which is the subject-matter of challenge in this appeal. 21. The Motor Vehicles Act is a statute which creates new rights and liabilities and prescribes an elaborate procedure for their regulation. No one is entitled to a permit as of right even if he satisfies all the prescribed conditions. The grant of a permit is entirely within the discretion of the transport authorities and naturally depends on several circumstances which have to be taken into account. The Regional Transport Authority and the Provincial Transport Authority are entrusted under section 42 with this power. They may be described as administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions in the matter of the grant of permits. Under Rule 8 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules the Regional Transport Authority is called the Road Traffic Board and the Provincial Transport Authority is called the Central Road Traffic Board. These bodies or authorities are constituted by the Provincial Government. The matters which are to be taken into account in granting or refusing a stage carriage permit are specified in section 47. By delegation under Rule 134 A, the Secretary of the Road Traffic Board may exercise certain powers as regards the grant or refusal of stage carriage permits and under Rule 136 there is an appeal to the Board from these orders. Similar powers of delegation are vested in the Secretary to the Central Board and an appeal lies to the Central Board under Rule 148(1). Similar powers of delegation are vested in the Secretary to the Central Board and an appeal lies to the Central Board under Rule 148(1). From an original order of the Road Traffic Board there is an appeal to the Central Board and from the original orders of the Central Board to the Government, vide Rules 147 and 148, an amendment introduced by the Madras Act XX of 1948 and found as section 64-A in the Act vests a power of revision in the Provincial Government. Besides this specific provision, there is a general provision in section 43-A that the Provincial Government may issue such orders and directions of a general character as it may consider necessary to the Provincial Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority in respect of any matter relating to road transport; and such transport authority shall give effect to all such orders and directions. There is, therefore, a regular hierarchy of administrative bodies established to deal with the regulation of transport by means of motor vehicles. 22. Thus we have before us a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant, and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. The remedies for the redress of grievances or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and it is to these remedies that resort must generally be had. As observed already, the issue or refusal of permits is solely within the discretion of the transport authorities and it is not a matter of right. 23. We are accordingly of opinion that this was not a case for interference with the discretion that was exercised by the Transport Authorities paying regard to all the facts and the surrounding circumstances. 24. Further, it will be noticed that the High Court here did not content itself with merely quashing the proceedings, it went further and directed the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, "to grant to the petitioner permits in respect of the five buses in respect of which a joint application was made originally by the petitioner and Balasubramania Pillai and that in case the above buses have been condemned, the petitioner shall be at liberty to provide substitutes within such time as may be prescribed by the authorities." Such a direction was clearly in excess of its powers and jurisdiction. 25. 25. For the reasons given above, the appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court set aside. Each party will bear their own costs of these proceedings throughout. Appeal allowed. 19. The Apex Court in the case of Shankara Co-op Housing Society Ltd. Vs. M. Prabhakar and Others, AIR 2011 SC 2161 in paragraph 90 has held as under: (90) We are of the view that the High Court has not committed an error while entertaining a writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, wherein the proceedings under section 7 of the Evacuee Property Act was questioned. We say so for the reason that under the Evacuee Property Act, there is specific bar for the civil Court to adjudicate on the issue whether certain property is or is not evacuee property. This issue can be decided only by the custodian under the Act. Any person aggrieved by the findings of the custodian can avail the other remedies provided under the Act. The findings and the conclusion reached by the authorities under the Act in an appropriate case can be questioned in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution even it involves disputed questions of facts. This issue, in our view, is no more res integra in view of three Judge Bench decision of this Court in Jafran Begum's case (supra). 20. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court has held that the High Court in its writ jurisdiction will not enquire into complicated questions of facts and will not sit in appeal over the decision of an authority whose orders are challenged in the proceedings. The high Court can only see whether the authority concerned has acted with or without jurisdiction. The High Court can also act when there is an error of law apparent on the face of record and the High Court can also interfere when there is no legal evidence. 21. In the present case, there was ample legal evidence before the GRA and the GRA, based upon the legal evidence, has passed the impugned order dt. 24-2-2012. The High Court can also act when there is an error of law apparent on the face of record and the High Court can also interfere when there is no legal evidence. 21. In the present case, there was ample legal evidence before the GRA and the GRA, based upon the legal evidence, has passed the impugned order dt. 24-2-2012. Not only this, the order is in consonance with the statutory provisions and the GRA was having jurisdiction in the matter to decide the appeal preferred by Krishna Bai and, therefore, in the light of the judgment delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Shankara Co-operative Housing Society (supra), the question of interference by this Court does not arise. 22. In the light of the aforesaid judgments, the reasoned findings of fact arrived at by the G.R.A., in absence of any other cogent material produced by the State Government either before the G.R.A., or before this Court, the question of interference does not arise. 23. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner-Narmada Valley Development Authority has drawn attention of this Court towards the order dt. 4-5-2010 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 7269/2006, Shyam Singh Thakur s/o. Shri Bhaiyalal Thakur vs. State of M.P. 24. In the aforesaid case also the order dt. 20-7-2005 passed by the Grievance Redressal Authority, Indira Sagar was under challenge. In the aforesaid case, it was alleged that the petitioner therein Shyam Singh was having a Tea Shop in the township of Jabalpur and he was not residing under the submergence area. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the Writ Petition of Shri Shyam Singh on the ground that he was not carrying out his business, vocation or earning during the period or for last one year and he was not cultivating the land under the submergence area. The learned Single Judge has upheld the order passed by the Grievance Redressal Authority. 25. This Court has carefully gone through the aforesaid judgment. The facts of the aforesaid judgment are distinguishable. 26. In the present case, Krishnabai was having agricultural land. A certificate of the Tehsildar is on record that she was cultivating the land, she was ordinarily residing under the submergence area and, therefore, the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is of no help to the petitioners. 27. 26. In the present case, Krishnabai was having agricultural land. A certificate of the Tehsildar is on record that she was cultivating the land, she was ordinarily residing under the submergence area and, therefore, the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is of no help to the petitioners. 27. The State of Madhya Pradesh has failed to produce the material/evidence before the GRA and has also not produced any material by which any inference can be drawn that Krishnabai was not residing or cultivating the land under the submergence area and, therefore, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the order dt. 24-2-2012. Accordingly, the Writ Petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The other connected Writ Petitions also fails and are accordingly hereby dismissed.