JUDGMENT : J.K. Jain, J. 1. This intra-Court Appeal is against the order dated 02.03.2015 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in WP No. 10006/2011 whereby dismissed the Writ Petition of the appellant. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner/appellant being an owner of the property in question bearing house No. 17/1, South Tukoganj, Indore, applied for building permission and the same was granted on 16.12.1992. Thereafter the appellant constructed the building in consonance with the sanctioned map, however on 31.03.1993 and 16.04.1993 notices were served on the appellant stating that the appellant has constructed in excess of marginal open space portion and shops have been constructed in the basement and ground floor. The appellant preferred an appeal under Section 403 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (in brief "Act") before the Appeal Committee. The Appeal Committee in Appeal No. 241/1995 vide order dated 15.12.1995 imposed a compounding fees Rs. 5,000/- for unauthorized construction. The appellant deposited the compounding fees on 27.12.1995. Thereafter on 29.11.2011 notice was issued directing the appellant to remove the unauthorized construction within two days. On 07.12.2011, the appellant sent the reply of the notice. The appellant thereafter challenged the notice dated 29.11.2011 before the Writ Court and prayed for quashment of the same. After filing of the reply of respondent No. 1 the appellant by way of amendment pleaded that the respondents have stated that the State Govt. has cancelled the compounding order passed in favour of the petitioner/appellant under Section 421 of the Act but no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner/appellant before passing of the order by the Government and even otherwise the State Govt. has no jurisdiction to pass the orders, therefore, also challenged the order passed by the Govt. By way of rejoinder it is pleaded that the Respondents have issued notice u/s. 302 of the Act. Thus, against such notice u/s. 403 of the Act appeal is maintainable before the Appeal Committee. Hence the appeal committee has rightly entertained and allowed the appeal of the appellant. The respondents have not filed any representation to the State Govt. against the order of appeal committee. Therefore, the order of State Govt. is illegal and without jurisdiction. 2. Thus, against such notice u/s. 403 of the Act appeal is maintainable before the Appeal Committee. Hence the appeal committee has rightly entertained and allowed the appeal of the appellant. The respondents have not filed any representation to the State Govt. against the order of appeal committee. Therefore, the order of State Govt. is illegal and without jurisdiction. 2. The stand of the respondent No. 1 before the Writ Court is that the petitioner/appellant has raised illegal construction contrary to the sanctioned map causing nuisance, traffic hazards, traffic congestion, therefore, deserves to be removed. The appellant was granted permission for residential complex; however, he has constructed shops and other illegal structures on every floor. The appellant was initially served a notice on 31.03.1993 and thereafter on 16.04.1993 and 25.09.1995. The appellant preferred the appeal before the Appeal Committee. The order of the Appeal Committee was set aside by the State Govt. on 09.05.1997. The Appeal Committee has no jurisdiction to pass an order in reference to Section 307 of the Act, even otherwise it is settled principle of law that in case of compounding it is only the offence which is compounded and not the illegal structure thus the notice issued by the respondent No. 1 is well within the jurisdiction. 3. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties, Writ Court held that the appellant raised the construction which is contrary to the sanctioned lay out and respondent No. 1 has got every right to demolish the illegal construction. Accordingly the petition has been dismissed. Being aggrieved the appellant has filed this appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge has not considered the fact that before issuance of the impugned notice dated 29.11.2011, no opportunity of hearing was given to the appellant. A bare perusal of the impugned notice reflects that the said notice was based upon prior notices of the year 1993 and the order passed by the Appeal Committee compounded the alleged unauthorised construction in question. Thus, the entire procedure and action taken by the respondent No. 2 is in violation of principles of natural justice. 5. Learned counsel for appellant further submitted that the State Government has no jurisdiction to set aside the order of Appeal Committee without providing opportunity of hearing to the appellant. Learned Single Judge has overlooked this aspect of the matter. Thus, the entire procedure and action taken by the respondent No. 2 is in violation of principles of natural justice. 5. Learned counsel for appellant further submitted that the State Government has no jurisdiction to set aside the order of Appeal Committee without providing opportunity of hearing to the appellant. Learned Single Judge has overlooked this aspect of the matter. The State Government while exercising the powers u/s. 421 of the Act, when the matter referred to a private individual whose rights are involved, the Government is expected to give proper opportunity of hearing. For this purpose, he placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Moolchand vs. Indore Municipal Corporation, 1973 JLJ 922 . 6. Learned counsel for appellant further submits that the learned Single Judge has not considered this fact that once the Corporation has compounded the matter, then it is not open to the Corporation to start further action for demolition of the property. The finding of the learned Single Judge holding that the compounding fees is related to compounding of offence and not the construction, is in defiance of the scheme of the Act. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the learned Single Judge has erred in not giving effect to the provisions of Section 308-B of the Act before issuance of the impugned notice. In the present case, the deviations as alleged in the sanctioned map are not extreme and serious breaches of the licensing provisions which called for demolition. The building in question is not in specified area, therefore, there is no restriction in passing the order of compounding of illegal construction as per provisions of Section 308-B of the Act. Learned counsel for appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge has not considered that the respondent No. 1 issued the notice u/s. 302 of the Act, against which, an appeal u/s. 403(2) of the Act is competent and against such an order, no appeal or revision shall lie as provided u/s. 403(6) of the Act. He submitted that when the Appeal Committee has compounded the unauthorised structure, then there was no occasion for respondents to send any notice for demolition of alleged illegal construction. 8. He submitted that when the Appeal Committee has compounded the unauthorised structure, then there was no occasion for respondents to send any notice for demolition of alleged illegal construction. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 supported the order passed by learned Single Judge and submitted that the Appeal Committee acted beyond jurisdiction and allowed the appeal, whereas as per provisions u/s. 403 (2) of the Act, the Appeal Committee has no power to decide the appeal against the order passed u/s. 307 of the Act by the Building officer (respondent No. 2). Therefore, the order of Appeal Committee was a nullity and on the basis of such an order, the appellant is not entitled for any relief. He submits that the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the Appeal Committee by order dated 15.12.1995 has only compounded the offence, but not the illegal construction, therefore, the respondent No. 2 has a right to demolish the illegal and unauthorised construction. Learned counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 further submits that this is not a case in which the appellant has made some minor changes from the sanctioned map, whereas the appellant has changed the use of the building from residential to commercial and has illegally made the construction in basement which is meant for parking place. 9. Learned counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 further submits that the provisions of Section 308-B of the Act were only for limited period and now, they are not in existence. The period had already been expired and, therefore, these provisions are not applicable in the present case. It is also not correct to say that when the construction activities were being carried out, no notice was served on the appellant. The appellant was served with a notice dated 30.3.1993 stating that he has constructed in excess of marginal open space portion and shops have been constructed in the basement and ground floor. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Friends Colony Development vs. State of Orissa, 2004 AIR SCW 5932 held that deviations from sanctioned constructions being regularized by compounding only when such deviations are bona fide or attributable to some mis-understanding. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Friends Colony Development vs. State of Orissa, 2004 AIR SCW 5932 held that deviations from sanctioned constructions being regularized by compounding only when such deviations are bona fide or attributable to some mis-understanding. A professional builder is supposed to understand the laws better and deviations by such builders can safely be assumed to be deserve to be dealt with sternly so as to act as a deterrent for future. Thus, the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the petition. There is no merit in the appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed. 10. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we directed the counsel for respondent No. 1 to produce the original file of Indore Municipal Corporation in regard to building in question. 11. We have perused the record as well as the original file of the Corporation. It reveals from the original file that the appellant had applied for building permission and the same was granted on 16.12.1992. Thereafter, appellant started construction. When the construction of building was going on, respondents No. 1 and 2 on 31.3.1993 sent a notice u/s. 302(1) of the Act that the appellant has made unauthorised construction by raising RCC columns on third floor, covered the balconies from first floor to third floor and constructed shops at ground floor and, therefore, he was directed to stop the work immediately otherwise, action would be taken against him u/s. 302 (2) of the Act. The notice has been filed by the appellant with appeal as Annexure P/6. In the light of this notice, it is not correct that when the unauthorized construction was going on, no notice was given to the appellant. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant has tried to convince us that the appellant has not committed any serious breach while constructing the building in question and the Appeal Committee vide order dated 15.12.1995 had compounded the entire illegal and unauthorized construction. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant has tried to convince us that the appellant has not committed any serious breach while constructing the building in question and the Appeal Committee vide order dated 15.12.1995 had compounded the entire illegal and unauthorized construction. To appreciate the argument of learned counsel for appellant, we would like to refer the notice dated 16.4.1993 (Annexure P/5), which reads as under: ^^bankSj uxj ikfyd fuxe dk;kZy; vukf/kd`r dk;Z ckcn lwpuk ¼eŒÁŒuŒfuŒ fo/kku lu 1956 dh /kkjk 302 ds vUrxZr½ Øekad 66 fnukad 16-4-1993 uke % esŒ ,eŒ,lŒtsŒ dULVªD'ku fBdkuk IYkkV uacj 17&6&2 ,ŒlkŒ rqdksxat lnj edku esa txg ij vkius uhps crk;s eqtc fcuk btktr dke fd;k gSA fcuk btktrh dk;Z dk fooj.k lnj edku ds Lohd`r uD'kk Øekad 3280 fnukad 16-12-1992 ds f[kykQ dk;Z fd;k gSA lnj edku ds ry/kj dks ,eŒvksŒ,lŒ iks'kZu esa c<+kdj cuk;k gS rFkk ry/kj esa nqdkusa rFkk xzkm.M yksvj ij nqdkuksa dk 'ksi fn;k gS rFkk gkbZV 12 ehŒ ds LFkku ij 1-90 ehŒ ds T;knk cuk gSA xSyfj;ka lHkh ryksa ij 0-91 ehŒ ds LFkku ij 1-50 ehŒ cukbZ gS rFkk ,eŒvksŒ,lŒ iwoZ if'pe rjQ de j[kk gSA rFkk xSyfj;ksa dks doj fd;k gSA r`rh; eafty ds Åij dkye [kM+s fd;s gSA ;g dk;Z uD'ks ds f[kykQ gSA 1- /kkjk 307 ¼2½ ^v* ds vUrxZr lwpuk nsus esa vkrh gS fd vki Lo;a ;k vkids }kjk fof/kor vf/kd`r dk;Z Áfrfuf/k }kjk fnu 3 esa ;k blls iwoZ i;kZIr dkj.k fyf[kr esa cryk;s fd vukf/kd`r dk;Z D;ksa u gVk;k tk;saA 2- ;fn vkius Åij fy[ks gq, vkns'k dk ikyu ugha fd;k rks /kkjk 307 ¼3½ ds vUrxZr dk;Zokgh dh tkosxhA lgh@& okŒ vk;qDr uŒikŒfuŒ bUnkSjA** After receiving the aforesaid notice, the appellant filed an appeal and the Appeal Committee vide order dated 15.12.1995 (Annexure P/7) decided the appeal, which reads as under:- ^^v/;{k ¼vihy lfefr½ uxj ikfyd fuxe bankSj ds le{k vihy Ádj.k Øekad 241@95 ,eŒ,lŒtsŒ dkyksukbZftax ,.M yhftax dEiuh fyfeVsM }kjk lapkyd fnfXot; flag tSu firk eq[R;kjflaxth tSu] fBdkuh&17&1 lkmFk rqdksxat bankSj & vihykUV fo:} Jh vk;qDr] uxj ikfyd fuxe bankSj & fjLiksUMsV fo"k; %& fcuk btktrh dk;Z ckcnA fu.kZ; fnukad 15-12-1995 1- vihykUV us ;g vihy vk;qDr] uxj ikfyd fuxe bankSj }kjk tkjh nk[kyk Øekad 3188 fnukad 31-3-1993 ,oa nk[kyk Øekad 66 fnukad 16-4-1993 vUrxZr /kkjk 302 ,oa 307 e/; Áns'k uxj ikfyd fuxe fo/kku ds vlarq"V gksdj ÁLrqr dh gS ftlesa vihykFkhZ dks fcuk btktrh dk;Z fd;s tkus dh lwpuk nh xbZ gSA 2- vihykFkhZ dks vksj ls Jh ,uŒthŒ ckgsrh vf/koDrk us mifLFkr gksdj ;g rdZ fn;k gS fd mUgksaus uxj ikfyd fuxe ls fof/kor~ nk[kyk Øekad 3280 fnukad 16-12-1992 ds }kjk ekufp= Lohd`r djokdj fuekZ.k dk;Z fd;k gS] ftlesa ifjorZu djrs gq, ry/kj ds lkeus dh rjQ nqdkusa cukbZ bS rFkk Åij dh eaftyksa ij xSyfj;ksa dks doj fd;k x;k gSA fcuk vuqefr ls fd;s x;s dk;Z dks dEikmf.Mx 'kqYd ij dk;e j[kk tkosA 3- vk;qDr dh vksj ls lacaf/kr >ksuy vf/kdkjh dk dFku gS fd vihykFkhZ ds }kjk ÁLrqr ekufp= ij vkoklh; fuekZ.k dk;Z dh Lohd`fr Ánku dh xbZ rFkk lHkh eaftyksa ij Lohd`r xSyjh dks c<+kdj cuk;k x;k gSA mDr xSyjh ÁFke eafty f}rh; eafty ,oa r`rh; eafty rd fufeZr dj mlds Åij r`rh; eafty rd fufeZr fd;k gSA 4- mHk; i{kksa dk dFku Jo.k fd;k x;kA Ádj.k dk voyksdu fd;kA vihy lfefr us ekSds ij lacaf/kr vf/kdkjh ,oa vihykFkhZ dh mifLFkfr esa ekSds dk fujh{k.k Hkh fd;kA vihy lfefr dk fu.kZ; gS fd vihykFkhZ us tks lwpuk i= esa of.kZr--------------fcuk btktrh dk;Z fd;k gS mls :i;s 5000@& v{kjh :i;s ikap gtkj ek= dEikmfMax 'kqYd ij dk;e j[kk tkosA vihykFkhZ dEikmfMax 'kqYd dk vkdkj fuxe [ktkus esa 7 fnu esa tek djsA bl funsZ'k ds lkFk vihykFkhZ }kjk vihy lfefr ds le{k ÁLrqr vihy l'krZ Lohdkj dh tkrh gSA fu.kZ; ikfjrA lacaf/kr dks lwfpr gksA gLrk{kj e/kqdj oekZ v/;{k vihy lfefrA** NOTE - In the blank space, the words were written, but the same were erased in Annexure P/7. 13. From the aforesaid notice, it is clear that the appellant has unauthorisedly and against the sanctioned map constructed the shops in the basement and on other floors and balconies have been covered. The contents of the notice are admitted by the counsel for the appellant before the Appeal Committee, which is in Para 2 of the order. Thus, it is clear that the appellant has raised unauthorised and illegal construction against the sanctioned map and by constructing the shops in the basement and on other floors has changed the use of the building from residential to commercial. Therefore, there is no force in the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant has not committed any serious breach while constructing the building in question. 14. According to learned counsel for the appellant, the Appeal Committee has compounded the entire illegal construction raised by the appellant. This argument is again misconstrued and it is based on a forged order of the Appeal committee dated 15.12.1995. The operative portion of the order of Appeal committee reads as under: ^^vihy lfefr dk fu.kZ; gS fd vihykFkhZ us tks lwpuk i= esa of.kZr xSyjh dk fcuk btktrh dk;Z fd;k gS] mls :i;s 5000@& v{kjh :i;s ikap gtkj ek= dikmfMax 'kqYd ij dk;e j[kk tkosA** Whereas in the copy of the order (Annexure P/7), the word has been intentionally erased to show that the Appeal Committee has compounded the entire illegal and unauthorised construction shown in the notice dated 16.4.1993. This fact has came to our knowledge when we called the original file from the Corporation. This is a very serious matter. The appellant shown so dare to file the forged order (Annexure P/7) before this Court. Thus, it is clear from the original order of Appeal Committee that the Appeal Committee had only compounded the illegal and unauthorised construction in respect of balconies which have been covered by the appellant on every floor and not the other unauthorised construction. 15. Now we would like to examine whether the order dated 15.12.1995 was within the jurisdiction of appeal committee. Learned Counsel for the appellant misconstrued the facts that the notice dated 16.04.1993 was issued under Section 302 of the Act, therefore, appeal under Section 403(2) of the Act was competent, the said notice was issued under Section 307 of the Act. Now we would like to examine whether the order dated 15.12.1995 was within the jurisdiction of appeal committee. Learned Counsel for the appellant misconstrued the facts that the notice dated 16.04.1993 was issued under Section 302 of the Act, therefore, appeal under Section 403(2) of the Act was competent, the said notice was issued under Section 307 of the Act. As per the provisions under Section 403(2) of the Act the appeal committee can decide any notice or order issued by the Commissioner and sub ordinate officers passed under Sections 174, 193, 195 to 199, 202, 204, 205, 207 to 210, 237, 241, 243, 246 to 249, 292A, 295, 296, 299, 301, 302, 310 to 313, 315, 322, 323 or 393 of the Act. Notice dated 16.04.1993 was issued under Section 307 of the Act against which no appeal is competent before the appeal committee under Section 403 (2) of the Act. Even though the appeal committee has decided the appeal, therefore, the order is without jurisdiction and per se illegal. 16. It is vehemently argued that no opportunity of hearing was given by the State Govt. before setting aside the order of appeal committee and this fact came to know only when the respondents have filed their return before Writ Court. One Parmanand has filed Writ Petition No. 1564 of 1996 (PIL) along with the list of cases, including the case of property in question, that the appeal committee has illegally exercised the power in compounding many unauthorised constructions. Therefore, this Court vide order dated 26.02.1997 allowed the petition and directed the Indore Municipal Corporation to examine such cases and if necessary review the matters and also directed to take action for removal of illegal constructions in accordance with the law. In the light of this order, the appellant has filed a Review Petition before the appeal committee. Meanwhile, the State Government has taken cognizance and by invoking power under Section 421 of the Act stayed the order dated 15.12.1995 passed by the appeal committee and subsequently in June, 1996 State Government has set-aside the order of appeal committee dated 15.12.1995. In the light of the order of State Government, the appeal committee vide order dated 13.05.1997 dismissed the review petition filed by the appellant. Thereafter the respondent No. 1 vide letter dated 05.07.1997, along with the copy of the order, communicated the same to the appellant. In the light of the order of State Government, the appeal committee vide order dated 13.05.1997 dismissed the review petition filed by the appellant. Thereafter the respondent No. 1 vide letter dated 05.07.1997, along with the copy of the order, communicated the same to the appellant. Thereafter on 24.07.1997 Municipal Corporation of Indore has sent a notice to the appellant that the appeal committee has dismissed review petition, therefore, it is directed to the appellant to remove his unauthorised construction within 7 days. After receiving the notice, the appellant has sent a reply dated 29.07.1997 stating that the State Government has passed the order without giving him an opportunity of hearing. In such circumstances it is incorrect that the appellant has no knowledge about the order passed by the State Government of setting-aside the order dated 15.12.1995 passed by the appeal committee. 17. From the above discussions, it is clear that the appellant was communicated the order on 05.07.1997. Thereafter notice on 24.07.1997 for removal of illegal construction has also been served on him but at that time he has not challenged the order of State Government as well as order of the Respondent No. 1. Therefore, at this juncture after lapse of so many years, the appellant cannot take a plea that he was ignorant about the order passed by the State Government and no opportunity of hearing was granted to him by the State Government. Therefore, we find no merit in this argument. 18. Now we have considered that even if the order of appeal committee stands then whether the appellant is absolved from the liability of removal of illegal construction. This Court in the case of Kaushal Kumar vs. Indore Municipal Corporation, 1993 MPLJ 228 held that in any case compounding will relate only to an offence and unless specifically provided by the Act it would not result in absolving the offender from all other consequences of his illegal Act. The Supreme Court has observed in Biswabahan Das vs. Gopen Chandra Hazarika and Others, AIR 1967 SC 895 held as under:- "If a person is charged with an offence, however, trivial it may be, then unless there is some provision for composition of it the law must take its recourse and the charge enquired into resulting either in conviction or acquittal. If composition of an offence was permissible under the law, the effect of such composition would depend on what the law provided for." 19. This Court in the case of Abdul Sattar vs. Municipal Corporation, Indore, 1994 MPACJ 271 (MP) held that the provision of Section 307(5) of the Act is independent and merely because the offence has been compounded, it does not absolve the person making illegal construction from removing the illegal construction or else all illegal constructions would be regularised by making certain payments to the Corporation. 20. Full Bench of this Court in the case of Dilip Kaushal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh while interpreting Section 307 (5) of the Act held that not only the Corporation but every other person has been given the right to apply to the District Court for injunction for removal or alternation of any building on the ground that it contravenes any provisions of the Act or by laws made thereunder. 21. Admittedly appellant is a builder. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Friends Colony Development Committee (Supra) while examining the issue of deviation from sanctioned construction being regularized by compounding, held as under: "25. Though the Municipal laws permit deviations from sanctioned constructions being regularised by compounding but that is by way of exception. Unfortunately, the exception, with the lapse of time and frequent exercise of the discretionary power conferred by such exception, has become the rule. Only such deviations deserve to be condoned as are bona fide or are attributable to some misunderstanding or are such deviations as where the benefit gained by demolition would be far less than the disadvantage suffered. Other than these, deliberate deviations do not deserve to be condoned and compounded. Compounding of deviations ought to be kept at a bare minimum. The cases of professional builders stand on a different footing from an individual constructing his own building. A professional builder is supposed to understand the laws better and deviations by such builders can safely be assumed to be deliberate and done with the intention of earning profits and hence deserve to be dealt with sternly so as to act as a deterrent for future. It is common knowledge that the builders enter into underhand dealings. A professional builder is supposed to understand the laws better and deviations by such builders can safely be assumed to be deliberate and done with the intention of earning profits and hence deserve to be dealt with sternly so as to act as a deterrent for future. It is common knowledge that the builders enter into underhand dealings. Be that as it may, the State Governments should think of levying heavy penalties on such builders and there from develop a welfare fund which can be utilised for compensating and rehabilitating such Innocent or unwary buyers who are displaced on account of demolition of illegal constructions." 22. In the present case, the appellant who is a builder, after receiving the notice dated 31.3.1993 that he has made unauthorised construction and he was directed to stop the work immediately, even though he ignored the notice and continued the illegal construction work. In such a situation, when the appellant has altogether changed the purpose of the building from residential to commercial, such construction cannot be regularised. 23. Now, we have considered the objection in regard to Section 308-B of the Act. Section 308A has been inserted in the Act w.e.f. 30.05.1994 and Section 308-B which is a relaxation from the provisions of Section 308A, inserted w.e.f. 25.8.2003. These provisions have no application to the present case as the construction of building in question was already completed in the year 1993. Thus, there is no force in the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that appellant is entitled for the benefit of Section 308-B of the Act. 24. With the aforesaid, we are of the view that before issuing the impugned notice dated 29.11.2011, proper opportunity of hearing was given to the appellant and he was served with many notices i.e. dated 31.3.1993, 16.4.1993, 25.9.1995, 24.7.1997, but the appellant has not paid any heed to these notices and now he has taken a false plea that he had no knowledge about the order passed by the State Government u/s. 421-A of the Act. The appellant cannot be absolved from the liability of removal of illegal construction. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that there is no substance in this appeal and learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition. We are in full agreement with the order passed by learned Single Judge. The appellant cannot be absolved from the liability of removal of illegal construction. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that there is no substance in this appeal and learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition. We are in full agreement with the order passed by learned Single Judge. Thus, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.