Judgment : Debasish Kar Gupta , J. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order of conviction dated March 13, 2012 and sentence dated March 16, 2012 passed in Sessions Trial No.06 of 2009 arising out of Sessions Case No.161 of 2008 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track 1st Court, Hooghly. By virtue of the impugned judgment the accused Nasir Sk, Babu @ Subhas Goswami, Babai Naskar, Bubai Haldar (appellant No.1) and Sunny Goswami (appellant No.2) were convicted for commission of offence under Sections 395 and 412 of I.P.C. The appellant no.2 was also convicted for commission of offence under Section 25 (1) (b) of Arms Act. By virtue of the impugned sentence the accused, Nasir Sk, Babai Naskar, Sunny Goswami (appellant no.2), Babu @ Subhas Goswami, and Bubai Haldar (appellant no.1) were sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten years each and pay fine of Rs.10000/- each and in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for further period of six months each for commission of offence punishable under Section 395 of I.P.C. By virtue of the impugned sentence the above named accused were also sentenced to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to pay fine of Rs.10000/- each, in default to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for six months each for commission of offence under 412 of I.P.C. Sunny Goswami (appellant no.2), was also sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for two years and to pay fine of Rs.2000/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for commission of offence under Section 25 (1) (b) of Arms Act. All sentences were directed to run concurrently. All sentences were directed to run concurrently. The period of detention, if any during the investigation and trial was directed to be set off under the provisions of Section 428 of Cr.P.C. The case made out by the prosecution, in a nutshell, is as follows:- One Smt. Beauty Barui, PW 1, lodged a written complaint dated April 25, 2008 before the Officer-in-Charge, Bandel GRPS (PW 19) which was forwarded to Bandel GRPS and accordingly Bandel GRPS Case no.17/08 dated April 25, 2008 was initiated against the appellant Sunny Goswami as also the aforesaid Nasir and Babai Naskar under Section 394 of I.P.C. According to the above written complaint PW 1 boarded in a ladies compartment of Sealdah-Rampurhat train from Sealdah Railway station to reach Memari station along with her minor daughter Saini Barui on April 25, 2008 at about 13.50 hrs. When the above train had started from Mogra station one of the miscreants aged about 30/35 years wearing an ash coloured pant and yellow coloured shirt showed her a knife and directed her to hand over ear ring and other gold ornaments to him. She tried to open her ear ring. Due to delay in doing so, the above miscreant assaulted her on right hand with the help of the above knife. She sustained cut injury with bleeding on her right hand. The miscreant snatched ear ring and nose ring as also cash amounting to Rs.100/-. The above miscreant along with 2/3 other miscreants snatched away nose ring of her daughter (PW 1). They also took away ornaments and cash from some other lady passengers of the above ladies compartment. The PW 1 and other passengers of the above ladies compartment started shouting. The miscreants had got down from the train before the train reached at Pandua station. Subsequently, she came to know from others that the miscreants identified themselves as Nasir, Babai Naskar and Sunny Goswami (appellant no.2). According to the above FIR, the above miscreants snatched away the ornaments and other belongings from the other lady passengers of the above ladies compartment as follows:- (i) One Sikha Sarkar (PW 3) disclosed that gold chain and money amounting to Rs.70/- had been snatched by the miscreants from her. (ii) The miscreants snatched away a choice band ladies wrist watch, ear ring from one Mousumi Paramanick. (ii) The miscreants snatched away a choice band ladies wrist watch, ear ring from one Mousumi Paramanick. (iii) A red coloured gold coated pala, ear ring, nose ring, silver chain, a ladies wrist watch with black belt and Rs.200/- were snatched from one lady passenger named Reba Adhikary (PW 14) by the above miscreants. (iv) The miscreants snatched two ear ring and silver chain from Smt. Namita Bhowmik. (v) They snatched ear ring, nose ring and a silver chain from Sima Das, one of the lady passengers of the above ladies compartment. (vi) A ring and a nose ring were snatched by them from another lady passenger of the above ladies compartment, namely, Banful Das. The above miscreants also snatched the ornaments and belongings of other lady passengers of the above compartment. When the train arrived at Pandua Station, a number of persons gathered in front of the above ladies compartment hearing the shouting of the aforesaid lady passengers. They ran after the miscreants and managed to catch one of them who was identified as Sk Nasir. The above local people caught hold of two more miscreants within a short period of time with booties. They were identified as Babai Naskar and Sunny Goswami (appellant no.2). Some of the lady passengers of the above ladies compartment went to the Office of the Station Master, Pandua Station. The weapon of offence was recovered from the possession of the appellant no.2. Two seizure lists were prepared separately in respect of the articles seized from the aforesaid Babai Naskar and Sunny Goswami (appellant no.2). The PW 1 was brought to Pandua Rural Hospital on April 25, 2008 at about 14.50 hrs. with the requisition slip issued by the Station Master, Pandua Railway Station for her medical treatment. The injury of the PW 1 was repaired with the help of a number of stitches. Mr. Amalendu Biswas, the Officer-in-Charge, Bandel GRPS (PW 24) was entrusted with the responsibility of investigation of the case. The above accused persons disclosed the names of one Babu @ Subhas Goswami and Bubai Haldar (appellant no.1). On the basis of the above information PW 24 conducted a raid in the house of Babu @ Subhas Goswami situated within the police station Canning. The aforesaid accused Babu @ Subhas Goswami and Bubai Haldar (appellant no.1) were arrested from the roof of their house. On the basis of the above information PW 24 conducted a raid in the house of Babu @ Subhas Goswami situated within the police station Canning. The aforesaid accused Babu @ Subhas Goswami and Bubai Haldar (appellant no.1) were arrested from the roof of their house. Upon further interrogation articles were recovered on the basis of the information obtained from the appellant no.1. After conclusion of the investigation a charge-sheet was submitted against the aforesaid five accused for committing dacoity punishable under Section 395 of I.P.C. on January 30, 2009. Charges dated January 30, 2009, framed against the accused were as follows:- (i) Under Section 395 of I.P.C.against all the five accused for committing dacoity; (ii) Under Section412 ofI.P.C.againstaforesaid Nasir Sk for possessing the articles which had been transferred to him after commission of dacoity in the ladies compartment of the above train; (iii) Under Section 412 of I.P.C. against aforesaid Babu @ Subhas Goswami and Bubai Halder (appellant no.1)on the ground of recovery of some articles which had been transferred to them after commission of dacoity under reference; (iv) Under Section 412 of I.P.C. against Babai Naskar and Sunny Goswami (appellant no.2) for possessing some articles which had been transferred to them after commission of above dacoity; (v) Under Section 25(1) (b) of the Arms Act, against the Sunny Goswami (appellant no.2) for possessing the weapon of offence. After considering the documentary and oral evidences of 24 witnesses, record relating to examination of the aforesaid five accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence was passed by the learned Court below. It is submitted by Mrs. Anusua Sinha, appearing as Amicus Curiae, that the impugned judgment and order of conviction as also sentence cannot be sustained in law for the following reasons:- (1) The statement made by the PW 1 in FIR was differing from her deposition in Court. According to the letter of complaint, the number of miscreants were two/three but, according to her deposition, the miscreants were five in number. According to her deposition, she had not gone to the office of the Station Master, Panduah Railway Station but from the medical report it was evident that she was referred to the hospital by the above Station Master for treatment. The letter of complaint of the PW 1 had not disclosed the relevant facts which were deposed during her examination. According to her deposition, she had not gone to the office of the Station Master, Panduah Railway Station but from the medical report it was evident that she was referred to the hospital by the above Station Master for treatment. The letter of complaint of the PW 1 had not disclosed the relevant facts which were deposed during her examination. In T.I. Parade, the PW 1 identified the appellant no.2 and Sk Nasir. The appellant no.1 was not identified by the PW 1 in T.I. Parade. (2) No list of articles snatched from the lady passengers by the miscreants was prepared. (3) There was no explanation with regard to the delay of 11 days in conducting the T.I. Parade of the miscreants. Three miscreants, namely, Nasir Sk, Babai Naskar and Sunny Goswami (appellant no.2) out of five had been arrested on the date of occurrence of the incident, i.e., on April 25, 2008 and the remaining two other miscreants, namely, Babu @ Subhas Goswami and Bubai Halder (appellant no.1) were arrested on April 27, 2008. But the T.I. Parade took place on May 7, 2008. The PW 10 deposed in course of his cross-examination that though Sk Nasir, Babai Naskar and Sunny Goswami (appellant no.2) had been produced before him on April 26, 2008, no prayer for holding T.I. Parade was made. (4) PW 2, PW 14 and PW 20 were accompanied by the Investigating Officer (PW 24) and a constable at the time of attending T.I. Parade held in correctional home Hooghly Sadar on May 7, 2008. Though PW 1 was not accompanied by the Investigating Officer or any constable. She participated in the discussion in between PW 2, 14 and 20. According to the evidence adduced by PW 11 the right hand of Babu @ Subhas Goswami was amputated. No material was brought on record to show that any other person with amputation of right hand was found in course of T.I. Parade. (5) The T.I. Parade of seized articles were not conducted due to nonproduction of sufficient and adequate number of articles/ornaments. (6) The depositions of PW 1, 2 and 3 and the doctor Ujjayini Roy (PW 23) were taken into consideration by the learned Court below to hold that commission of offence by the accused was proved beyond doubt. (5) The T.I. Parade of seized articles were not conducted due to nonproduction of sufficient and adequate number of articles/ornaments. (6) The depositions of PW 1, 2 and 3 and the doctor Ujjayini Roy (PW 23) were taken into consideration by the learned Court below to hold that commission of offence by the accused was proved beyond doubt. (7) According to the evidence of the I.O. (PW 24), one Prosanta Halder, a resident of area concerned was witness of the seized articles and his name was also mentioned in the charge-sheet for adducing evidence as prosecution witness. But the above Prosanta Halder was not examined as prosecution witness. (8) The learned trial court did not take into consideration the age of the appellants as disclosed by them at the time of recording their statements under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. The impugned judgment and order of conviction under Sections 395 and 412 of I.P.C. cannot be passed simultaneously on the basis of the settled principle of law. Mrs. Anusua Sinha relied upon the decision of Provash Kumar Bose & Anr. vs. The King, reported in AIR (38) 1951 Cal. 475, Wakil Singh & Ors. vs. State of Bihar, reported in 1981 (Supp) SCC 28, Satrughana @ Satrughana Parida vs. State of Orissa, reported in 1995 Supp (4) SCC 448, Surinder Kumar vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2011) 10 SCC 173 and Vijay Singh vs. State of Delhi, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 763 in support of her above submissions. Adopting the above submissions made by Mrs. Sinha, Mr. J.N. Chatterjee, learned advocate appearing for the appellants, submitted that some of the articles were also seized from the convicts who were not caught red handed. Therefore, the commission of offence could only be proved by holding T.I. Parade of those articles/ornaments. According to Mr. Chatterjee, the presence of appellant no.1 at the place of occurrence at material point of time was not proved.According to Mr. Chatterjee, the order of conviction could not be passed under Sections 395 and 412 of I.P.C. simultaneously. Without prejudice to the above submissions, it is submitted by him that considering the ages of the appellants as also the nature of commission of offence, the period of suffering imprisonment may be reduced. Mr. Chatterjee relied upon the decisions of Samar Roy @ Kallu vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 2009 (1) CHN 925 and Sk. Without prejudice to the above submissions, it is submitted by him that considering the ages of the appellants as also the nature of commission of offence, the period of suffering imprisonment may be reduced. Mr. Chatterjee relied upon the decisions of Samar Roy @ Kallu vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 2009 (1) CHN 925 and Sk. Eklash vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 2010 (2) E Cr. N (CAL) 842 in support of his above submission. On the other hand it is submitted by Mr. Pawan Kumar Gupta, Junior Government Advocate, High Court, Calcutta, that the commission of offence by the appellant amongst others was proved on the basis of the evidences as many as five eyewitnesses, i.e., PW 1, 2, 3, 14 and 15 as also evidences of five post occurrence witnesses. It is also submitted by Mr. Gupta that the articles seized from PW 1, 2 and 3 respectively were returned back to them in compliance of the orders passed by the learned Court below on the basis of their respective applications. Those applications were accompanied by the receipts of purchase of those articles. According to him, the identifications of the articles and return of the same to the respective persons was not performed in casual manner as alleged. With regard to T.I. Parade of the accused including the appellants, it is submitted by Mr. Gupta that such T.I. Parade is not necessary in case of miscreants caught red hand. It is further submitted by Mr. Gupta that the allegation of bringing eyewitnesses for identification of the accused in T.I. Parade had no basis in view of the fact that neither the Investigating Officer nor any constable was present at the time and place of T.I. Parade. It is also submitted by Mr. Gupta that the alleged delay in conducting the T.I. Parade cannot be sustained in law considering the nature of offence committed by the accused. With regard to framing of charges, it is submitted by Mr. Gupta that separate charges were framed under Sections 394, 395 and 412 of I.P.C., but he reserved his submission with regard to framing of charge and conviction for commission of offence under Section 412 of I.P.C. Mr. With regard to framing of charges, it is submitted by Mr. Gupta that separate charges were framed under Sections 394, 395 and 412 of I.P.C., but he reserved his submission with regard to framing of charge and conviction for commission of offence under Section 412 of I.P.C. Mr. Gupta relied upon the decisions of State of H.P. vs. Lekh Raj, reported in 2000 SCC (Cri) 147, Anil Kumar vs. State of U.P., reported in (2003) 3 SCC 569 and Nar Singh vs. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 2015 (SC) 310 in support of his above submissions. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties. We have considered the facts and circumstances of this case on the basis of the documentary and oral evidences carefully. Now, it is the time to adjudicate the propriety of the impugned judgment and the grievances of the appellants one after another. The proposition of law with regard to the effect of infirmities in between the first information report and evidence adduced by the de facto complainant in Court has already been settled. If the aforesaid infirmities threw grave doubt on the veracity of the prosecution case against the appellants, the evidence of the prosecution witness in regard to the incident could not be accepted in its face value and the same could not be relied upon implicity for the purpose of founding the conviction of the appellants. Reference may be made to the decision of Mitter Sen vs. State of U.P., reported in (1976) 1 SCC 723 (at paragraph 5). Therefore, it is necessary to take into consideration the infirmities for ascertaining whether those infirmities threw grave doubt on the veracity of the prosecution case against the appellants. Again, it is now well settled that there bound to be some discrepancies between the depositions of different witnesses when they speak in details, and unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirety. But discrepancy has to be distinguished from contradiction. While minor discrepancy or variance in evidence will not make the prosecution’s case doubtful, contradiction in the statement of witness is fatal for the case. Reliance is placed on the decision of State of H.P. vs. Lekh Raj, reported in (2000) 1 SCC 247 and the relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:- “7. While minor discrepancy or variance in evidence will not make the prosecution’s case doubtful, contradiction in the statement of witness is fatal for the case. Reliance is placed on the decision of State of H.P. vs. Lekh Raj, reported in (2000) 1 SCC 247 and the relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:- “7. In support of the impugned judgment the learned counsel appearing for the respondents vainly attempted to point out some discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix and other witnesses for discrediting the prosecution version. Discrepancy has to be distinguished from contradiction. Whereas contradiction in the statement of the witness is fatal for the case, minor discrepancy or variance in evidence will not make the prosecution's case doubtful. The normal course of the human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident there may occur minor discrepancies, such discrepancies in law may render credential to the depositions. Parrot-like statements are disfavoured by the courts. In order to ascertain as to whether the discrepancy pointed out was minor or not or the same amounted to contradiction, regard is required to be had to the circumstances of the case by keeping in view the social status of the witnesses and environment in which such witness was making the statement. This Court in Ousu Varghese v. State of Kerala held that minor variations in the accounts of the witnesses are often the hallmark of the truth of their testimony. In Jagadish v. State of M.P. this Court held that when the discrepancies were comparatively of a minor character and did not go to the root of the prosecution story, they need not be given undue importance. Mere congruity or consistency is not the sole test of truth in the depositions. This Court again in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki held that in the depositions of witnesses there are always normal discrepancies, however, honest and truthful they may be. Such discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence, and the like. Such discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence, and the like. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal and not expected of a normal person.” (Emphasis supplied) In the case in hand, the difference of number of the accused mentioned by PW 1 in her letter of complaint with the number mentioned was minor in nature. Her absence in the office of the Station Master concerned on the date of occurrence of the incident was not an infirmity of such a nature that there was no possibility of recommending her for medical treatment on that date, amongst other injured persons, by the above Station Master. Disclosure of facts in course of adducing evidence in Court for the first time which had not been mentioned in the FIR is not an exceptional feature to prompt us to exercise our discretionary power to scrutinise or to go into her evidence. Non-identification of the appellant by the PW 1 in course of T.I. parade must not be a ground to disturb the finding of fact of the Court of first instance on the testimony at face value which had been corroborated by some other evidences. Nor it could be considered as a case of departure of the trial court from the rule of prudence. So, above discrepancies were not so vital to interfere with the findings of the Court of first instance considering the same were not contradictions of a material dimension. With regard to the non-preparation of list of articles snatched from the lady passengers by the miscreants, Chapter XII of Cr.P.C. deals with information to the police and their powers to investigate. Sub-section (1) of Section 154 of Cr.P.C. provides that every information relating to the commission of cognizable offences, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it. After considering the first information report, we find that the same contained the descriptions of seized articles which had been snatched from the lady passengers. After considering the first information report, we find that the same contained the descriptions of seized articles which had been snatched from the lady passengers. Therefore, our interference with the impugned judgment is not required on the above ground. Regarding delay in conducting test identification parade of the accused, it is well settled that no time limit could be fixed for holding a test identification parade. Generally, with lapse of time memory of witnesses would get dimmer. So, earlier test identification parade inspires more faith. However, there are circumstances for creating impressing upon the mind of a victim which would not diminish or disappear for a considerable period of time. Therefore, consideration of the facts and circumstances are relevant for ascertaining as to whether lapse of the period in conducting test identification parade in that particular case may erase the facial expression of the accused from the mind of victim. In the case of Anil Kumar vs. State of U.P., reported in (2003) 3 SCC 569 , lapse of 47 days to conduct test identification parade was not considered sufficient to erase the facial expressions from the minds of witnesses. The relevant portion of the above judgment is quoted below:- “14. In the present case also Manoj was attacked by Chaman as well as the appellant. He had a clear look at his assailants. Thereafter his younger brother came to save him and in that process got killed. Manoj also received serious injuries. These are circumstances which would impress upon the mind of Manoj the facial expressions of the assailants. This impression would not diminish or disappear within a period of 47 days. Similar is the case of the father and one of the father and the mother of Manoj. They have seen the assailants attacking their sons and one of the sons getting killed. In their memory also the facial expressions of the assailants would get embossed. A mere lapse of 47 days is not going to erase the facial expressions from their memory. 15. All these witnesses have identified the appellant. We are in agreement with the trial court as well as the appellate court that their evidence is believable. In this view of the matter we see no infirmity in the impugned judgment. We see no reason to interfere. 15. All these witnesses have identified the appellant. We are in agreement with the trial court as well as the appellate court that their evidence is believable. In this view of the matter we see no infirmity in the impugned judgment. We see no reason to interfere. The appellant should be taken in custody forthwith to serve out the remaining period of sentence.” (Emphasis supplied) In the case in hand the identification of the accused by the victim ladies (PW 2, PW 14 and PW 20) held after a lapse of 11 days did not throw any doubt on the genuineness of identification parade taking into consideration the circumstances of snatching their ornaments by the accused from a ladies compartment of a train and sustaining injury of one of those victims (PW 2) therefor. With regard to the allegation raised against the Investigating Officer (PW 24) of accompanying the PW 2, PW 14 and PW 20 at the time of attending test identification parade, it appeared from the evidence of PW 3 (one of the victims) that she had identified the appellant no.1 in test identification parade. Admittedly, she was not accompanied by the Investigating Officer (PW 24) at the time of attending the test identification parade held on May 7, 2008. Credibility of the evidence and identification of the PW 1 depends on corroboration with other evidences on record but presumption based on her participation in discussion with the PW 2, PW 14 and PW 20 at the material point of time leads to absurdity. It cannot be treated as an occasion for us to interfere with the impugned judgment. So far as the next ground for challenge is concerned, acceptability of the identification of the appellant no.1 by PW 3 (one of the victims) in Court and that of appellant no.2 by PW 1 in test identification parade was not dependent upon the identification of another co-accused, namely, Babu @ Subhas Goswami due to his amputed right hand in absence of any person having such marks mixed up with the aforesaid co-accused as alleged. So, there was no infirmity or impropriety in the impugned judgment requiring our interference. So, there was no infirmity or impropriety in the impugned judgment requiring our interference. Regarding failure to hold identification parade for identification of recovered ornaments, it is well settled that such failure is not fatal when the recovered ornaments are recognised by close relations and gold-smith as decided in the matter of Nagappa Dondiba Kalal vs. State of Karnataka, reported in 1980 (Supp) SCC 336, the relevant portion of which is quoted below:- “3. We have gone through the judgment of the High Court and we find ourselves in complete agreement with the reasons given by the High Court for holding that the identity of the ornaments recovered at the instance of the appellant which belonged to the deceased Pashyabi had been fully established. It was also proved that she had been wearing these ornaments when she left the house on the night of April 10, 1973. The recoveries were made on April 13, 1973 that is to say within three days of the occurrence. PWs 7, 8, 16 and 17 who are close relations of the deceased and who had full opportunity to see her wearing these ornaments have identified the ornaments. Their evidence is further corroborated by two golsmiths PWs 9 and 10 who had prepared these ornaments. In these circumstances therefore, the High Court was fully justified in acting on the evidence of these witnesses and in rejecting the argument of the accused that as no test ientification parade was held, the identity could not be established. Taking however the evidence as it stands, there is nothing to connect the appellant with the murder of the deceased or even with any assault the accused may have committed on the deceased or having robed her of her ornaments. At the utmost as the ornaments have been proved to be stolen property received by the appellant knowing that they were stolen property. The accused call thus be convicted on the basis of presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act and under Section 411 of Indian Penal Code as a receiver of stolen property knowing the same to be stolen.” (Emphasis supplied) In the case in hand, the PW 1 submitted an application annexing the receipt obtained from gold-smith thereto (Exbt.-17) apart from recognising her ornaments. The claims for returning the ornaments of PW 2 and PW 3 were corroborated with the evidence of seizure list witness. The claims for returning the ornaments of PW 2 and PW 3 were corroborated with the evidence of seizure list witness. Therefore, the propriety of the impugned judgment cannot be questioned on the above ground. We find no substance in the submission made on behalf of the appellants that the learned Court below was in error in holding that commission of offence by them had been proved beyond doubt on the basis of the evidences of PW 1, PW 3, PW 4 and the doctor who had treated the injuries sustained by the victims. Our attention has not been drawn towards any evidence, either documentary or oral in this regard for which the impugned judgment can be interfered with. With regard to non-examination of one Prosanta Halder, natural witness of seized articles, the time honoured rule that the law of evidence does not require a particular number of witnesses to be examined to prove a given fact. Where the Court finds that the testimony of witnesses is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable in a given set of facts, it may seek corroboration but disbelieving of reliable testimony on the ground that a natural witness has not been examined is to do complete injustice to the prosecution. Reference may be made to the decision of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Krishna Master, reported in (2010) 12 SCC 324 and the relevant portion of the above judgment is quoted below:- “47. It is a well-known principle of law that reliance can be placed on the solitary statement of a witness if the court comes to the conclusion that the said statement is the true and correct version of the case of the prosecution. The courts are concerned with the merit and the statement of a particular witness and not at all concerned with the number of witnesses examined by the prosecution. The time-honoured rule of appreciating evidence is that it has to be weighed and not counted. The law of evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact. The time-honoured rule of appreciating evidence is that it has to be weighed and not counted. The law of evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact. However, where the court finds that the testimony of the solitary witness is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, it may, in a given set of facts, seek corroboration, but to disbelieve reliable testimony of a solitary witness on the ground that others have not been examined is to do complete injustice to the prosecution. (Emphasis supplied) Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances on the basis of which the impugned judgment is passed, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment need not require interference on the above ground in view of the settled proposition of law as discussed hereinabove. In order to adjudicate the next issue involved in this case that the appellants were minor at the point of time, the provisions of Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice Protection (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act, 2000) are quoted below:- “7A. Procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is raised before any court. – (1) Whenever a claim of juvenility is raised before any court or a court is of the opinion that an accused person was a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence, the court shall make an enquiry, take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) so as to determine the age of such person, and shall record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be: Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any court and it shall be recognised at any stage, even after final disposal of the case, and such claim shall be determined in terms of the provisions contained in this Act and the rules made thereunder, even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of this Act. (2) If the court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence under sub-section (1), it shall forward the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate order, and the sentence if any, passed by a court shall be deemed to have no effect.” According to the provision of sub-section (1) of Section 7A of the said Act, 2000, consequent upon raising a claim of juvenility before any Court or a Court is of the opinion that an accused person was a juvenile on the date of commission of offence, the Court shall make an enquiry to determine the age of such person. According to the provisions of proviso to Section 7A of the said Act, 2000, the claim of juvenility shall be determined in terms of provisions contained in the said Act, 2000 and the rules made thereunder. Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules, 2007) provides the procedure to be followed in determining of age in every case concerned. The provisions of sub-Rule (3) of Rule 12 of the said Rules, 2007 are quoted below:- “12 (3). In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the committee by seeking evidence by obtaining – (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either sub-clause (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his age on lower side within the margin of one year; (c) and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of subclauses (i), (ii) or (iii) of clauses (a) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law.” In the instant case, claim of juvenility of the appellant had never been raised before the learned Court below. No evidence as prescribed in sub-Rule (3) of Rule 12 of the said Rules, 2007 is available on record on the basis of which the Court may arrive at a prima facie opinion that an enquiry is required to be conducted to ascertain as to whether any of the appellants was a juvenile at the time of commission of offence. Only our attention is drawn towards the age of the appellants recorded on top of the statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. to make a half hearted prayer for examining as to whether an enquiry is to be conducted for ascertaining the age of the appellants at the time of commission of offence. Therefore, taking into consideration the above fact and circumstances, we are of the opinion that there is no necessity to proceed under the provisions of Section 7A of the said Act, 2000 read with Rule 12 of the said Rules, 2007 for ascertaining the age of the appellants at the time of commission of offence. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, the impugned order of conviction for commission of offence under Section 395 of I.P.C. and sentence thereof as also conviction of the appellant no.2 for commission of offence under Section 25 (1) (b) of the Arms Act, do not require our interference. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, the impugned order of conviction for commission of offence under Section 395 of I.P.C. and sentence thereof as also conviction of the appellant no.2 for commission of offence under Section 25 (1) (b) of the Arms Act, do not require our interference. For adjudication of propriety of the impugned order of simultaneous conviction for commission of offences under Sections 395 and 412 of I.P.C., we find that aforesaid former provision deals with punishment for dacoity. And the latter provision deals with punishment for dishonestly receiving property stolen in the commission of a dacoity. We are of the considered view that one cannot be convicted with both dacoity and for receiving or retaining stolen property. It is an absurd proposition that after commission of dacoity, a person can receive for himself or a person does assist himself in concealing the same. A Division Bench of this Court held in the matter Sk. Eklash vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 2010 (2) E Cr.N (Cal) 842 that simultaneous conviction for robbery and receiving or retaining stolen property by commission of robbery is not permissible. We are of the opinion that the above proposition of law is also applicable in a case of simultaneous conviction for dacoity and receiving or retaining stolen property by commission of dacoity. In view of the observations and discussions made hereinabove, the impugned order of conviction passed by the learned Trial Court for commission of offence punishable under Section 395 of I.P.C. and sentence thereof as also for commission of offence by the appellant no.2 punishable under Section 25 (1) (b) of the Arms Act, and sentence thereof are affirmed. However, the impugned order of conviction for commission of offence punishable under Section 412 of I.P.C. as also sentence thereof are quashed and set aside. This appeal is allowed partially up to the extent mentioned hereinabove. Let the Lower Court’s records be sent back expeditiously. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties, on priority basis. I agree.