Judgment : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The moot question involved in the present petition is as to whether the petitioner can enforce the orders passed under the provisions of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) against the so called legal heirs of her deceased husband Desh Raj. 2. Petition under Section 12 of the Act was filed by the petitioner against her husband, Desh Raj, and the following order came to be passed:- “i) I hereby pass the Protection order in favour of the applicant (aggrieved person) and prohibit the respondent from committing any act of Domestic Violence in future; ii) Respondent shall not interfere into the room as provided to the applicant as the case may be without the consent of the applicant (aggrieved person); iii) Respondent shall not disturb or interference with peaceful enjoyment of residence; iv) Both the parties shall use as common to all the surrounding and foot path peacefully;” 3. The petitioner not being satisfied with the order so passed, preferred an appeal under Section 29 of the Act, which came to be allowed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Hamirpur who vide his order dated 30.9.2011 allowed the claim of the petitioner for return of the articles to the appellant and the deceased Desh Raj was also directed to restore the possession of the articles, i.e. ‘Dogri Nath’ etc. as per the details given in the memo prepared by the Protection Officer. 4. The aforesaid order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court was challenged before this Court by way of Cr. MMO No. 239 of 2011. However, before the same could be taken up for final hearing, the husband of the petitioner died and this Court on 16.4.2013 passed the following order:- “During the pendency of the present petition, original respondent has expired. As such, present petition stands abated so also, the pending application(s), if any.” 5. The petitioner thereafter preferred an execution petition under Section 19 of the Act, against the legal heirs of her husband, for restoration of her ‘Istri-Dhan’/Jewellery etc. as had been directed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Hamirpur on 30.9.2011. As such, present petition stands abated so also, the pending application(s), if any.” 5. The petitioner thereafter preferred an execution petition under Section 19 of the Act, against the legal heirs of her husband, for restoration of her ‘Istri-Dhan’/Jewellery etc. as had been directed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Hamirpur on 30.9.2011. The learned Judicial Magistrate dismissed the application on the ground that earlier orders had been passed by the Court in exercise of the powers conferred upon it under the Code of Criminal Procedure and since the so-called legal heirs of deceased, Desh Raj, were not parties, therefore, the order could not be executed against them. It was also held that the legal heirs of the deceased, Desh Raj, could not be proceeded against in view of the provisions contained in 394 Cr. P.C. and accordingly the application was dismissed. 6. The order passed by the Judicial Magistrate was challenged in revision before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Hamirpur, who vide his judgment dated 10.7.2014 dismissed the petition by holding that there was no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which entitled the petitioner to maintain the execution petition against the legal heirs of deceased, Desh Raj. It was further observed that there may be various remedies available to the petitioner under different laws but this application was not maintainable. 7. The petitioner has questioned both these orders on the ground that the same are illegal and arbitrary. The learned Courts below have wrongly come to the conclusion that the execution petition was not maintainable. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and have also gone through the records of the case. 9. It cannot be disputed that the Act does not contain any provisions for prosecuting the legal heirs of a party. Needless to say that the provisions of the Act are self contained enactment and wherever there is some provision lacking, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure will have to be pressed into service. 10. In Smt. Bupinder Lima and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, 2000 (Vol.99) Company Cases, 424, the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was seized of the matter relating to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, where the accused had died and criminal liability was sought to be fastened on his legal heirs. In Smt. Bupinder Lima and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, 2000 (Vol.99) Company Cases, 424, the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was seized of the matter relating to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, where the accused had died and criminal liability was sought to be fastened on his legal heirs. It was held that the criminal liability could not be fastened on the heirs and the legal heirs of a person who is said to have been guilty of the offence in question. It was held as under:- “It is inconceivable that criminal liability can be fastened on the heirs and the legal representatives of the person who is said to have been guilty of the offence in question. I have no doubt in my mind that the petitioners herein cannot be prosecuted for the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for the alleged failure of the late A.V. Lima in meeting the liability to pay the amount covered by the cheque which was dis-honoured in response to the notice sent by the complainant.” 11. A similar question came up before the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Smt. Kamla and others Vs. C.P. Bhardwaj, 2006 (3) PLR (Vol.144), 174, in which the Court has held as under:- “4. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that no complaint under Section 138 of the Act could have been filed against the petitioners, who are the legal heirs of deceased Brahm Parkash. He submits that from the plain reading of Section 138 of the Act, it is clear that no proceeding alleging offence under Section 138 of the Act can be filed against the legal heirs. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon the following judgments of various High Court: (i) Bhupinder Lima v. State of A.P. 1999 (4) All. M.R. (Journal) 20 (Andhra Pradesh). (ii) Draupadi Devi v. State of Rajasthan 2000 (4) Recent Criminal Cases 257 (Rajasthan). (iii) Girja v. K. Vinay 2004 (1) Recent Criminal Cases 458 (Ker.). (iv) Savita H.Sorle v. Rajesh Damindar Sarode, 2006 (3) Recent Criminal Reports 216 (Bombay). 5. M.R. (Journal) 20 (Andhra Pradesh). (ii) Draupadi Devi v. State of Rajasthan 2000 (4) Recent Criminal Cases 257 (Rajasthan). (iii) Girja v. K. Vinay 2004 (1) Recent Criminal Cases 458 (Ker.). (iv) Savita H.Sorle v. Rajesh Damindar Sarode, 2006 (3) Recent Criminal Reports 216 (Bombay). 5. The Karnataka High Court, in Girja v. K. Vinay (supra), has observed as under:- “…on careful perusal of the relevant statutory provisions of law, it is clear that the intention of the legislature was not to make the provisions for prosecuting the legal heirs of the drawer of a cheque, in the event of dishonour under the provisions of Negotiable Instruments Act. It is needless to say that the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act are a self contained enactment and wherever there is lacking, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure will have to be pressed into service. As stated earlier, there are absolutely no statutory provisions made under the Negotiable Instruments Act to cover the situation like this. Under the provisiosn of Section 394 of the Cr. P.C., it is seen that the said section deals with the abatement of appeals filed under Section 377 or 378 of the Cr. P.C. This provision cannot be pressed into service for the reason that the Trial Court or this Court has not been dealing with an appeal under the said provisions. It is also necessary to mention that the provisions of Section 256 of the Cr. P.C. deal with the situation that arises after the death of the complainant. In the case in hand, the drawer of the cheque, the accused in a proceeding of this nature, had died even earlier to the presentation of the complaint. Such being the case, the provisions of Section 256 of the Cr. P.C. also cannot come to the aid of the complainant. From this aspect, it is clear that the statute law in this regard is totally silent to meet the situation. When this be the intention of the Legislature, the Courts of law will have to interpret the law, keeping in mind, the golden rules of interpretation and the Courts should always interpret the law keeping in view the letter and spirit of law and such an interpretation should advance the purpose of legislation. When this be the intention of the Legislature, the Courts of law will have to interpret the law, keeping in mind, the golden rules of interpretation and the Courts should always interpret the law keeping in view the letter and spirit of law and such an interpretation should advance the purpose of legislation. It is needless to say that if the Courts do not resort to this exercise, the result thereon will not only be irregular and also illegal, so as to vitiate the entire proceedings.” 6. Learned counsel for the respondent could not controvert the aforesaid factual and legal position. Thus, in view of the aforesaid admitted facts and legal position, I am of the opinion that filing of the complaint by the complainant as well as the process issued by the Magistrate against the petitioners is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court. On the plain reading of Section 138 of the Act, it is clear that the proceedings in the complaint alleging offence under Section 138 cannot be initiated against legal heirs of the person, who had issued the cheque.” 12. In Mcleod Russel India Limited Vs. Reg. Provident Fund Commissioner, Jalpaiguri and others, AIR 2014 Supreme Court 2573, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the criminal liability remains steadfastly fastened to the actual perpetrator and cannot be transferred. The relevant observations read thus:- “10. There is no gainsaying that criminal liability remains steadfastly fastened to the actual perpetrator and cannot be transferred by any compact between persons or even by statute.” 13. Apart from the above, it would be seen that the Act was never intended to be enforced against any other person except the accused. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.R. Batra and another Vs. Taruna Batra (Smt), 2007 (3) Supreme Court Cases 169 was seized of the matter where the wife had sought to enforce her right in ‘shared household’ against the property belonging to her in-laws and the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- “26. If the aforesaid submission is accepted, then it will mean that wherever the husband and wife lived together in the past that property becomes a shared household. It is quite possible that the husband and wife may have lived together in dozens of places e.g. with the husband’s father, husband’s paternal grandparents, his maternal parents, uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces, etc. It is quite possible that the husband and wife may have lived together in dozens of places e.g. with the husband’s father, husband’s paternal grandparents, his maternal parents, uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces, etc. If the interpretation canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent is accepted, all these houses of the husband’s relatives will be shared households and the wife can well insist in living in all these houses of her husband’s relatives merely because she had stayed with her husband for some time in those houses in the past. Such a view would lead to chaos and would be absurd. 27. It is well settled that any interpretation which leads to absurdity should not be accepted. 28. Learned counsel for the respondent Smt. Taruna Batra has relied upon Section 19(1)(f) of the Act and claimed that she should be given an alternative accommodation. In our opinion, the claim for alternative accommodation can only be made against the husband and not against the husband’s (sic) in-laws or other relatives.” 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.R. Batra’s case (supra) has categorically held that a right to claim separate or alternative accommodation can only be made ‘against the husband’ and not against the husband’s (sic) in-laws or other relatives. 16. The case can be looked into from another angle. It is more than settled that while executing an order, the Executing Court cannot go behind the order or aid or subtract anything in the order sought to be executed. The liability was personal to the deceased, Desh Raj and there is no finding whatsoever recorded by either of the Court that it is the legal heirs who have taken the ‘Istri-Dhan’ or other articles of the petitioner because no such occasion arose. 17. Therefore, the petitioner in the execution petition cannot claim a fresh trial against the respondents’, that too, under the garb of executing an order which has admittedly attained finality but only against deceased, Desh Raj alone. 18. Having said so, it can safely be concluded that the learned Courts below committed no error in dismissing the execution application preferred by the petitioner. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition and the same is, therefore, dismissed. 19. 18. Having said so, it can safely be concluded that the learned Courts below committed no error in dismissing the execution application preferred by the petitioner. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition and the same is, therefore, dismissed. 19. However, the dismissal of this petition would not preclude the petitioner from enforcing her claim against the respondents by resorting to a remedy which may be available to her in law.