JUDGMENT :- J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. Rule. Mr. Rohan Yagnik, the learned AGP, waives service of notice of Rule for and on behalf of the respondent No. 4-State of Gujarat. Mr. H.S. Munshaw, the learned advocate waives service of notice of rule for and on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 2. By this writ-application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner made to retire prematurely from his service has prayed for the following reliefs:- "(A) YOUR LORDSHIP may be pleased to admit this petition. (B) YOUR LORDSHIP may be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned orders dated 6/2/2014 of premature retirement of petitioner passed by the respondent No. 3 & order of Appellate authority dated /8/2014 at Annexure-A&D respectively. (C) YOUR LORDSHIP may be pleased to stay the execution, operation and implementation of the impugned orders dated 6/02/2014 of premature retirement of petitioner passed by the respondent No. 3 & order of Appellate authority dated /8/2014 at Annexure-A&D respectively, pending admission and final disposal of this Special Civil Application. (D) Be pleased to pass further relives in favor of the petitioner which may be deemed fit, just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case." 3. This is one of those few classic cases in which the object of the employer in removing from service his employee may be acceptable but the manner of such removal may not stand the scrutiny of the law. The object, therefore, gets defeated, which may have its own unpleasant reverberations on the society, but such reverberations alone may not be a reason for the Court to approve and uphold such removal of the employee. 4. The petitioner was appointed on 7th June, 1986 as the Assistant Depot Manager by the respondent No. 3. 5. The respondent No. 3 passed an order dated 6th February, 2014, of the premature retirement after giving the petitioner the pay for a period of three months in lieu of the notice which was issued by the respondent No. 3. The appeal preferred by the petitioner before the appellate authority also came to be dismissed vide order dated nil. 6. The order of premature retirement was passed on the basis of the recommendations made by the review committee in its meeting held on 16th January, 2014. 7. The appeal preferred by the petitioner before the appellate authority also came to be dismissed vide order dated nil. 6. The order of premature retirement was passed on the basis of the recommendations made by the review committee in its meeting held on 16th January, 2014. 7. The order of premature retirement dated 6th February, 2014 is worded very innocuously. The impugned order of the premature retirement states that it was not in the interest of the Corporation to continue the petitioner in service and therefore he was being made to retire prematurely. 8. The observations made by the review committee consisting of six members are as under:- (A) In pursuance of the order dated 26th June, 2003, passed by the District Manager Grade-I, Rajkot, it is found that the petitioner was taken in Police custody for four hours on account of his rude behavior. Mr. Vaghela behaved in such a manner unbecoming of an employee of the Corporation. (B) With reference to the order dated 6th February, 2008, one annual increment has been withhold on account of the misconduct and irregularities committed by Mr. Vaghela during his service at Gondal. Mr. Baldevbhai Bothabhai Vaghela, Assistant Depot Manager had been suspended due to his serious misconduct during his service at Upleta. (C) On 21st August, 2012, a charge-sheet was given to the Upleta godown Manager for the alleged misconduct. On 19th January, 2013, it was decided to initiate the disciplinary proceeding. As Mr. Bhamvadiya was sick, Mr. Vaghela was handling the affairs of the godown. The signatures of Mr. Vaghela were found on the statements made during the inquiry and on the concerned records. Mr. Vaghela was handling the affairs of the godowns entirely. He has put a stigma on the credibility of the Corporation by committee breach of trust and misconduct. Instead of working as an honest and diligent employee, he has taken undue advantage of the absence of Mr. Bhamvadiya during his sickness and committed misconduct in such a manner that on record Mr. Bhamvadiya could be held responsible. He himself is the Depot Manager of the Corporation and the misconduct committed by him shows the lack of sincerity and honesty towards the Corporation. Mr. Vaghela has shown wrongful deficit of 3,67,24,000 quintals of wheat and 4,46,00 quintals of rice respectively and the stocks were siphoned away. The value of the stock siphoned away is worth Rs. 5,59,780/-. He himself is the Depot Manager of the Corporation and the misconduct committed by him shows the lack of sincerity and honesty towards the Corporation. Mr. Vaghela has shown wrongful deficit of 3,67,24,000 quintals of wheat and 4,46,00 quintals of rice respectively and the stocks were siphoned away. The value of the stock siphoned away is worth Rs. 5,59,780/-. Mr. Vaghela was kept in preventive detention from 22nd June, 2012 to 4th August, 2012 vide order dated 7th April, 2012 passed by the District Collector, Rajkot under the Prevention of Black Marketing Act. 9. In view of the aforesaid facts, it is found that the services of Mr. Vaghela should be discontinued as it is not in the interest of the Corporation to allow him to work and therefore, it is decided by the Committee to retire him prematurely. 10. Thus, it appears from the findings recorded by the review committee on the basis of which the impugned order of premature retirement was passed is that on account of criminal breach of trust being committed while in-charge of the Depot, it was decided that the petitioner be made to retire prematurely. It appears that the preventive detention of the petitioner under the Prevention of Black Marketing Act was also taken into consideration. 11. Ms. Falguni Patel, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the respondent No. 3 committed a serious error in passing the impugned order of the premature retirement. She submitted that the power vested in the Corporation to retire its employee cannot be used as a substitute for the departmental proceeding and/or in not holding of the departmental proceeding and/or for avoiding the burden of proving the charge brought against the delinquent concerned. She submitted that in the case in hand, the very fact that the accusation was brought against the petitioner to the effect that he had committed the criminal breach of trust while in-charge of the Depot shows, that the petitioner has been removed malafide and with ulterior motives by way of compulsory retirement instead of taking the risk of proving the charge against him in a regular departmental proceeding. 12. Ms. Patel has placed reliance in support of her above contentions on the following decisions:- (i) Raju Gupta Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir and others, reported in : 2013 (3) SCC 514 ; (ii) Baikunthanath Das and another Vs. 12. Ms. Patel has placed reliance in support of her above contentions on the following decisions:- (i) Raju Gupta Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir and others, reported in : 2013 (3) SCC 514 ; (ii) Baikunthanath Das and another Vs. Chief District Medical Officer, reported in : 1992 (2) SCC 299 ; (iii) Sukhdev Vs. Commissioner, Amravati Division and another, reported in : 1996 (5) SCC 103 (iv) Vishnu Baishya Vs. State of Assam and others, reported in 2000 (2) SCC 1638; (v) Ram Ekhal Sharma Vs. State of Bihar and another, reported in : AIR 1990 sc 1368 ; (vi) Swami Sharan Sexena Vs. State of U.P., reported in : AIR 1980 SC 269 ; (vii) R: Pulhunaiaralhitham and others Vs. P.H. Pandya and other, reported in : 1996 (3) SCC 624 . 13. On the other hand, this writ-application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Munshaw, the learned advocate appearing for the Corporation and Mr. Yagnik, the learned AGP appearing for the State. Both the learned counsel appearing for the respective respondents submitted that no error, not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the respondent No. 3 in passing the impugned order based on the recommendations and findings recorded by the review committee. It has been submitted that no malafide or any ulterior motive could be ascribed to the authorities. They submitted that if an employee is not found to be efficient enough to continue in service and if the rule provides then it is always open for the employer to ask the employee to retire prematurely. Both the learned counsel submitted that having regard to the service record and the serious misconduct alleged against the petitioner the order of premature retirement may not be disturbed in the interest of the Corporation. 14. Mr. Munshaw, the learned advocate appearing for the Corporation has placed reliance on a decision of this Court rendered by a learned Single Judge in the case of Narendra Nandlal Vria Vs. Gujarat State Civil Supplies and others (Special Civil Application No. 8518 of 2014) decided on 11th July, 2014. 15. Both the learned counsel submitted that the order of compulsory retirement is neither punitive nor stigmatic. It is based on the subjective satisfaction of the employer and a very limited scope of judicial review is available in these type of cases. Gujarat State Civil Supplies and others (Special Civil Application No. 8518 of 2014) decided on 11th July, 2014. 15. Both the learned counsel submitted that the order of compulsory retirement is neither punitive nor stigmatic. It is based on the subjective satisfaction of the employer and a very limited scope of judicial review is available in these type of cases. It was submitted that the interference is permissible only on the grounds of non-application of mind, malafide, perversity or arbitrariness or if there is breach of any statutory duty on the part of the authority. It was submitted that the power to compulsorily retire a government servant in terms of the service rules is absolute, provided the authority concerned forms a vital opinion that the compulsory retirement is in the public interest. Mr. Munshaw has placed reliance on the affidavit-in-reply filed by the Manager (Personnel) Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation. He has placed reliance on the following averments made in the affidavit-in-reply:- "2. The respondent No. 3 submits that the petitioner herein has preferred present Special Civil Application challenging the order dtd. 6.2.2014 through which he is prematurely retired from the employment of Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation as well as the order dated -8-2014 passed by the Managing Director of the Corporation rejecting his appeal. The respnt. No. 3 submits that the said orders are just and legal and, therefore, petitioner herein is not entitled to any relief in light of the facts narrated hereinafter. 3. It is submitted that the respnt. No. 1 [hereinafter referred to as the respnt. Corporation] is a Govt. company engaged in public distribution system. It is submitted that Rules and Regulations applicable to the Govt. employees are not ipso facto applicable to the respnt. Corporation unless they are adopted by the corporation. It is submitted that Rule 161[1][aa] of the Bombay Civil Service Rules empowers the State Govt. to retire a govt. servant from Govt. Service prematurely on attaining the age of 50-55 years as the case may be if the Govt. is satisfied that it is necessary to do so in the public interest. The Govt. of Gujarat has also issued Resolutions prescribing the procedure for premature retirement of Govt. servant under the said Rule 161[1][aa] of the Bombay Civil Service Rules. It is submitted that the said provision of premature retirement is adopted by the respnt. is satisfied that it is necessary to do so in the public interest. The Govt. of Gujarat has also issued Resolutions prescribing the procedure for premature retirement of Govt. servant under the said Rule 161[1][aa] of the Bombay Civil Service Rules. It is submitted that the said provision of premature retirement is adopted by the respnt. Corporation vide decision of the Board of Directors in its meeting held on 27.9.13. thereafter, the respnt. Corporation has issued circular dated 22.10.13 regarding implementation of the provisions for premature retirement in the respnt. Corporation. It is submitted that the purpose and object of the premature retirement of employees or employees whose services are no more useful from the service of the Govt., Govt. Corporation etc. as the case may be. It is submitted that premature retirement as per the said provisions/circular is distinct from the premature retirement/compulsory retirement by way of punishment. The principles of natural justice have no application in case of premature retirement for inefficient or unsatisfactory service as per the said provisions/circular since the said premature retirement is neither a punishment nor a stigma. 4. The respnt. No. 3 submits that the petitioner who was born on 5.6.63 joined the service of Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation on 7.6.86 as Asstt. Depot Manager. It is humbly stated that the petitioner herein was involved in case of physical assault on co-employee as well as in a very serious case of shortage of a huge quantity of food grains while he was posted at Upleta Depot as Asstt. Manager. It is stated that the then Depot Manager Mr. Bhanvadiya was suffering from a serious disease of cancer and therefore used to remain absent or on leave frequently and the petitioner as Asstt. Manager was handling affairs from all angles at Upleta. It is stated that the Mamlatdar, Upleta paid a surprise visit and inspected record and verified stock on 26.3.12 and found number of irregularities and shortage in stock of food grains. It is pertinent to note that the Deport Manager Mr. Bhanvadiya was on leave between 19.3.12 to 26.3.12 and as stated herein petitioner was handling the affairs of the godown. The respnt. No. 3 craves leave to add that a statement of present petitioner was taken on 28.3.12 by the officers of the corporation and he admitted several irregularities resulting in to a heavy loss to the respnt. Bhanvadiya was on leave between 19.3.12 to 26.3.12 and as stated herein petitioner was handling the affairs of the godown. The respnt. No. 3 craves leave to add that a statement of present petitioner was taken on 28.3.12 by the officers of the corporation and he admitted several irregularities resulting in to a heavy loss to the respnt. Corporation and a copy thereof is annexed as Annexure-A. The respnt. No. 3 further states that a detailed report was submitted by Deputy District Manager [Grade-2] on 29-3-12 and, therefore, a charge sheet dated 21.8.12 was issued and a copy thereof is annexed as Annexure-B. It is submitted that a full-fledged departmental inquiry was held against the petitioner while he was under suspension with effect from 31.3.12 and ultimately as the charges were held proved by the departmental inquiry officer in his report dated 18.5.13 he was issued a Second Show Cause notice on 10.6.13 and ultimately disciplinary authority passed an order for recovery of an amount of Rs. 2,79,890/- i.e. 50% of financial loss of Rs. 5,59,780/- through order dated __-2-14 and a copy of the said order is annexed as Annexure-C. 5. The respnt. No. 3 humbly states that the Review Committee as contemplated in the said circular of the corporation dated 22.10.13 is, therefore, authorized to evaluate the services of the petitioner and to take appropriate decision with regard to his premature retirement. Accordingly, the Review Committee in its meeting held on 16.1.2014 unanimously decided that considering the said record it was in the interest of the Corporation to retire the petitioner prematurely and accordingly the petitioner through order dated 6.2.14 was prematurely retired and copies of the resolution dated 16.1.14 as well order dated 6.2.14 are annexed as Annexure-D & E respectively. 6. It is submitted that the impugned order for premature retirement of the petitioner is in consonance with the said Board Resolution dated 27.9.13 and the circular of the corporation dated 22.10.13. The said order is passed in overall interest of the respond. Corporation. It is further submitted that the said impugned decision to retire the petitioner prematurely is taken by the competent reviewing committee after following the procedure laid down in the said circular of the corporation dated 22.10.13. The said decision of premature retirement of the petitioner is neither punitive nor stigmatic. The respnt. Corporation. It is further submitted that the said impugned decision to retire the petitioner prematurely is taken by the competent reviewing committee after following the procedure laid down in the said circular of the corporation dated 22.10.13. The said decision of premature retirement of the petitioner is neither punitive nor stigmatic. The respnt. Corporation was therefore not required to follow principles of natural justice or to conduct the departmental inquiry before passing the impugned order of premature retirement of the petitioner. It is therefore, submitted that there is no procedural lapse while taking the impugned decision of premature retirement of the petitioner nor the said decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, unjust or illegal. 7. The respnt. No. 3 submits that petitioner herein preferred appeal before the Managing Director of the Corporation against the said order after careful examination of all the aspects the said appeal came to be rejected on /08-14 and a copy of the order is annexed as Annexure-F. 8. It is further submitted that the said circular of the corporation dated 22.10.13 contains different grounds/criteria for premature retirement of any employee of the corporation, which are independent of each other. The impugned order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner is based upon aforesaid past record relating to the disciplinary actions on occasions against the petitioner and not upon the confidential report. The issue whether the adverse remarks in the confidential report were communicated to the petitioner or not has therefore no relevance in the present case. 9. It is most respectfully stated that one Mr. N.N. Varia was also compulsorily retired along with petitioner herein and others and he preferred Special Civil Application No. 8518/14 before the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat challenging the same. It is most respectfully stated that the Hon'ble Court rejected the said petitioner through order dated 11.7.14 after examining all the factual and legal aspects including policy of the Corporation and a copy of the said judgment is annexed as Annexure-G. 10. The respnt. No. 3 submits that through inadvertence in stead of Gujarat Civil Service Rules it is referred as Bombay Civil Service Rules in the resolution passed by the Board of Directors in its meeting dated 27.9.13. It is stated that necessary actions are being taken for its correction." 16. The respnt. No. 3 submits that through inadvertence in stead of Gujarat Civil Service Rules it is referred as Bombay Civil Service Rules in the resolution passed by the Board of Directors in its meeting dated 27.9.13. It is stated that necessary actions are being taken for its correction." 16. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the respondent No. 3 committed any error in passing the impugned order of premature retirement. 17. The core question, which has cropped up in the instant petition, hinges on the scope of the judicial review in the matter of compulsory retirement or premature retirement. The concept of compulsory retirement or premature retirement has its origin from the doctrine of pleasure. The genesis of doctrine of pleasure relates back to the pre-independence era when the Public Servants Enquiries Act 1850 was passed, wherein a provision was envisaged that conducting an enquiry against an employee was optional and the Government had the power to dismiss its servants at pleasure. The said Provision was incorporated under the Section 25 of the Act during the era of East India Company. After the assumption of the Government of India by the Crown, this rule of English Common Law continued unaltered till 1919 when Section 96-Bwas introduced by the amendment of Government of India Act of that year. Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 96-B of 'the Government of India Act 1919 reads as under: "Subject to the provisions of this Act and of rules made thereunder, every person in the civil service of the Crown in India holds office during his Majesty's pleasure and may be employed in any manner required by a proper authority within the scope of his duty, but no person in that service may be dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed." 18. Any dismissal, removal or reversion of a public servant without following the 'procedural and substantive due process' under Article 14, 16 and 21 of Constitution would violate the Article 311(2). What matters is not the act of dismissing, removing or reverting, but the fact of terminating from service. In a given situation, if termination amounts to dismissal, removal or reversion by whatever name such termination is called, the same would be violative of Article 311(2). What matters is not the act of dismissing, removing or reverting, but the fact of terminating from service. In a given situation, if termination amounts to dismissal, removal or reversion by whatever name such termination is called, the same would be violative of Article 311(2). What would be the impact of Article 311(2) on compulsory retirement? All kinds of compulsory retirement are not punitive. Article311 would not be attracted to a case of non-punitive compulsory retirement when an employee is retired after attaining the age of superannuation as per the Rules or when an employee is not continued in service after completing certain minimum period of service in the interest of public and in the interest of service. 19. Conceptually what is compulsory retirement? Bishwanath Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar : (2001) 2 SCC 305 gives the following elucidation. "Compulsory retirement in service jurisprudence has two meanings. Under the various disciplinary rules, compulsory retirement is one of the penalties inflicted on a delinquent government servant consequent upon a finding of guilt being recorded in disciplinary proceedings. Such penalty involves stigma and cannot be inflicted except by following procedure prescribed by the relevant rules or consistently with the principles of natural justice if the field for inflicting such penalty be not occupied by any rules. Such compulsory retirement in the case of a government servant must also withstand the scrutiny of Article 311 of the Constitution. Then there are service rules, such as Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules, which confer on the Government or the appropriate authority, an absolute (but not arbitrary) right to retire a government servant on his attaining a particular age or on his having completed a certain number of years of service on formation of an opinion, that in public interest it is necessary to compulsorily retire a government servant. In that case, it is neither a punishment nor a penalty with loss of retrial benefits. Any compulsory retirement of a judicial officer or a public servant amounting to dismissal or removal cannot stand the scrutiny of Article 311(2) of Constitution of India. Even a rule, which provides for unreasonable and arbitrary power to compulsory retire an officer is invalid. In that case, it is neither a punishment nor a penalty with loss of retrial benefits. Any compulsory retirement of a judicial officer or a public servant amounting to dismissal or removal cannot stand the scrutiny of Article 311(2) of Constitution of India. Even a rule, which provides for unreasonable and arbitrary power to compulsory retire an officer is invalid. A rule which does not provide for a reasonable number of years of service for compulsorily retiring an officer or a rule which confers absolute power to retire government servant prematurely on attaining a particular age or on such employee completing/certain number of years of service cannot pass the test of constitutionality. The law is so well settled that this judgment need not be burdened with passages from reported cases. Supreme Court in Shyamlal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1954 AIR (SC) 3695 (hereafter referred to as Shyamlal), State of Bombay v. Saubhagchand, : 1958 1 SCR 571 (hereafter referred to as Saubhagchand), Motiram and Gurudev Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjab, : 1965 1 LLJ 323 SC (hereafter referred to as Gurudev Singh) laid down, reiterated and reaffirmed principle, which is now axiomatic." 20. In Shyamlal (supra), a Constitution Bench of Supreme Court, for the first time laid down that, "there is no element of charge or imputation in the case of compulsory retirement. Two requirements of compulsory retirement are that the officer has completed twenty five years of service and that it is in public interest to dispense with the services of an employee. It has no stigma or implication or misbehaviour or incapacity." Article 465A of Civil Service Regulations, which gave power to the Government to retire any officer after completion of twenty five years of qualifying service without giving any reasons, was tested to know whether a compulsory retirement is dismissal or removal depriving the officer of pension or it is compulsory retirement without any stigma or implication of misconduct. It was held as follows. "But an officer who is compulsorily retired does not lose any part of the benefit that he has earned. On compulsory retirement he will be entitled to the pension etc. that he has actually earned. This is no diminution of the accrued. Benefit. It was held as follows. "But an officer who is compulsorily retired does not lose any part of the benefit that he has earned. On compulsory retirement he will be entitled to the pension etc. that he has actually earned. This is no diminution of the accrued. Benefit. It is said that compulsory retirement, like dismissal or removal deprives the officer of the change of serving and getting his pay till he attains the age of superannuation and thereafter to get an enhanced pension and that is certainly a punishment. It is true that in that wide sense the officer may consider himself punished but there is a clear distinction between the loss of benefit already earned and the loss of prospect of earning something more. In the first case, it is a present and certain loss and is certainly a punishment but the loss of future prospect is too uncertain, for the officer may die or be otherwise incapacitated from serving a day longer and cannot, therefore, be regarded in the eye of the law as a punishment. The more important thing is to see whether by compulsory retirement the officer loses the benefit he has earned as he does by dismissal or removal. The answer is clearly in the negative. The second element for determining whether a termination of service amounts to dismissal or removal is, therefore, also absent in the case of termination of service brought about by compulsory retirement." 21. In Saubhagchand (supra), the Court observed that the protection of Article 311(2) is available whenever action is taken against a government servant, which entails the forfeiture of the benefits already earned by him. In such an event, the government servant ought to be heard and given an opportunity to show cause against the order. To say, in other words, where the retirement involves a stigma or imputation of misconduct or incapacity, it must be treated as dismissal. But, this principle can have no application where such order is not punishment and result is in no loss of benefit already accrued. In this case also, the test of 'deprivation of accrued benefits' was reiterated by the Court. But, this principle can have no application where such order is not punishment and result is in no loss of benefit already accrued. In this case also, the test of 'deprivation of accrued benefits' was reiterated by the Court. In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, : AIR 1960 SC 1305 , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court pointed out the two tests laid down in Shyamlal and held that, "two tests had to be applied for ascertaining whether termination of service by compulsory retirement amounted to removal or dismissal...the first test is whether the action is by way of punishment and to find that out it was necessary that a charge or imputation against the officer is made the condition of exercise of power; the second is whether by compulsory retirement the officer is losing the benefit he has already earned by dismissal or removal." 22. In Motiram (supra), a seven Judge Constitution Bench approved Shyamlal (supra) and Saubhagchand (supra). Law is laid(i) that, "a person who substantially holds a permanent post has a right to continue in service subject to the rule of superannuation and the rule as to compulsory retirement. If for any other reason, that right is invaded and he is asked to leave his service the termination of his service must invariably mean the defeat of his right to continue in service and as such it is in the nature of penalty and amounts to removal", and (ii) that, "if any rule permits appropriate authority to retire compulsorily a civil servant without imposing a limitation in that behalf that civil servant should have put in a minimum period of service, that rule would be invalidated and the so called retirement order and the said rule would amount to removal of the civil servant within the meaning of Article 311(2)". Be it noted that the Supreme Court was considering the validity of the Rules 148(3) and 149(3) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code. Both these Rules provided that the service of railway servants shall be liable to termination by notice on either side for a specified period or pay in lieu thereof. Apex Court ultimately invalidated these Rules as unconstitutional violating Articles 14 and 311(2) of Constitution. 23. The ratio in Motiram (supra) was crystallized in Gurudev Singh (supra), which comprised five Judges of the Motiram Bench. Apex Court ultimately invalidated these Rules as unconstitutional violating Articles 14 and 311(2) of Constitution. 23. The ratio in Motiram (supra) was crystallized in Gurudev Singh (supra), which comprised five Judges of the Motiram Bench. The principle is summoned up by unanimous Bench as below. The majority judgment in Motiram's case took the view that it would be inappropriate and inexpedient to reopen an issue which was covered by several prior reported decisions of the court. Besides, the point covered by the said decisions did not directly arise in the case of Motiram Deka. Even so, the majority judgment took the precaution of adding a note of caution that if a rule of compulsory retirement purported to give authority to the Government to terminate the services of a permanent public servant at a very early stage of his career, the question about the validity of such a rule may have to be examined. That is how in accepting the view that a rule of compulsory retirement can be treated as valid and as constituting an exception to the general rule that the termination of the services of a permanent public servant would amount to his removal under Article 311(2), this Court added a rider and made it perfectly clear that if the minimum period of service which was prescribed by the relevant rules upheld by the earlier decisions was 25 years, it could not be unreasonably reduced in that behalf. In other words, the majority judgment indicates that what influenced the decision was the fact that fairly large number of years had been prescribed by the rule of compulsory retirement as constituting the minimum period of service after which alone the said rule could be invoked. Therefore, it seems to us that Mr. Bhandari is right when the contends that the present article which reduces the minimum period of service to ten years, is open to challenge in the light of the majority decision pronounced in the case of Motiram Deka. The challenge in the case was to the constitutional validity of Article 9.1 of Pepsu Service Regulations, which was amended in January, 1960 conferring on Government, "an absolute right to retire any government servant after he has completed ten years of qualifying service without giving any reason in public interest on account of inefficiency, dishonesty, corruption or infamous conduct". The challenge in the case was to the constitutional validity of Article 9.1 of Pepsu Service Regulations, which was amended in January, 1960 conferring on Government, "an absolute right to retire any government servant after he has completed ten years of qualifying service without giving any reason in public interest on account of inefficiency, dishonesty, corruption or infamous conduct". Applying Motiram Principle, apex Court struck down the impugned Pepsu Article 9.1. The following observations are apposite. ...Therefore, it seems that only two exceptions can be treated as valid in dealing with the scope and effect of the protection afforded by Article 311(2), if a permanent public servant is asked to retire on the ground that he has reached the age of superannuation which has been reasonably fixed, Article 311(2) does not apply, because such retirement is neither dismissal nor removal of the public servant. If a permanent public servant is compulsorily retired under the rules which prescribe the normal age of superannuation and provide for a reasonably long period of qualified service after which alone compulsory retirement can be ordered, that again may not amount to dismissal or removal under Article 311(2)mainly because that is the effect of a long series of decision of this Court. But where while reserving the power to the State to compulsorily retire a permanent public servant, a rule is framed prescribing a proper age of superannuation, and another rule is added giving the power to the State to compulsorily retire a permanent public servant at the end of ten years of his service, that cannot, we think, be treated as falling outside Article 311(2). The termination of the service of a permanent public servant under such a rule, though called compulsory retirement, is, in substance, removal under Article311(2). 24. In Takhatray Shivdatrai Mankad v. State of Gujarat, : 1970 1 SCR 244 , a Division Bench of the apex Court referring to the principles in Saubhagchand, Motiram and Gurudev Singh, observed that, "the principle is that the rule relating to compulsory retirement of a Government servant must not only contain the outside limit of superannuation but there must also be a provision for a reasonably long period of qualified service which must be indicated with sufficient clarity. To give an example, if 55 years have been specified as the age of superannuation and if it is sought to retire the servant even before that period it should be provided in the rule that he would be retired after he has attained the age of 50 years or he has put in service for a period of 25 years". Why a public servant is compulsorily retired on attaining certain age or on completion of certain years of qualifying service? Maintenance of efficiency of administration is the ultimate constitutional object of any public service (see Article 335 of Constitution). Inefficient public servants cannot burden the State exchequer. Transparent constitutional governance by rule of law cannot be ensured unless the public servants are honest with high integrity. Therefore, Courts have held that inefficient public servants subject to the protection granted by Articles 14, 16 and 311(2) of Constitution of India can be compulsorily retired provided they are not deprived of the benefits they earned during the service. When once a government servant is appointed after following the procedure laid down by the Rules made under the proviso to Article309 of Constitution, an employee acquires right to security of tenure. The enjoyment of right to security of tenure is absolutely essential for efficient administration of the State (see Gurudev Singh). This does not, however, mean that the employee who has lost the utility to the service after a certain minimum period of service must be continued, as a liability to the State. In Bishwanath Prasad Singh (supra), it was observed that, "the object of such compulsory retirement is not to punish or penalize the Government servant but to weed out the worthless, who have lost their utility for the administration by their insensitive, unintelligent or dubious conduct impeding the flow of administration or promoting stagnation". Compulsory retirement is also resorted to even in cases of corrupt officials as a compromise between interest of the State (to get rid of the corrupt official) and not to deprive such retiree of his benefits (gratuity, pension etc.). If it is shown that the charge and imputation of corruption is the motive for an order, the compulsory retirement cannot escape the rigour of Article 311(2) (See Dalip Singh). 25. If it is shown that the charge and imputation of corruption is the motive for an order, the compulsory retirement cannot escape the rigour of Article 311(2) (See Dalip Singh). 25. In Baikuntha Nath Das, (supra) a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court referred to various decisions including Shrivastava (supra) and laid down the following principles to followed while passing an order of compulsory retirement on the ground that a public servant had lost its utility, (para 34 of SCC) (i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviors. (ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary - in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order. (iv) The government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter - of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference. 26. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference. 26. In Umedbhai M. Patel, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of this Court, which set aside an order of compulsory retirement of an executive engineer. Placing reliance on Baikuntha Nath Das (supra), the Supreme Court laid down as under (para 11 of SCC) "The law relating to compulsory retirement has now crystallized into definite principles, which could be broadly summarized thus: (i) Whenever the services of a public servant are no longer useful to the general administration, the officer can be compulsorily retired for the sake of public interest. (ii) Ordinarily, the order of compulsory retirement is not to be treated as a punishment coming under Article 311 of the Constitution. (iii) For better administration, it is necessary to chop off dead wood, but the order of compulsory retirement can be passed after having due regard to the entire service record of the officer. (iii) For better administration, it is necessary to chop off dead wood, but the order of compulsory retirement can be passed after having due regard to the entire service record of the officer. (iv) Any adverse entries made in the confidential record shall be taken note of and be given due weightage in passing such order. (v) Even uncommunicated entries in the confidential record can also be taken into consideration. (vi) The order of compulsory retirement shall not be passed as a short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when such course is more desirable. (vii) If the officer was g promotion despite adverse entries made in the confidential record, that is a fact in favour of the officer. (viii) Compulsory retirement shall not be imposed as a punitive measure." 27. With the above end in view, let me first, refer to the case of Baikuntha Nath Das (Supra); wherein after considering its earlier decisions, the Supreme Court has authoritatively laid down the principles governing compulsory retirement as follows: "(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehavior. (ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehavior. (ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. Thus does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the high court or this Court would not examine the matter as an Appellate Court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) malafide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary - in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material: in short if it is found to be a perverse order. (iv) The government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter -of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential record/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a Government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks such remarks lose their sting more so. If the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference. Interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in (iii) above." 28. What the Supreme Court has laid down in Baikuntha Nath Das' case (supra) indicates that the order of compulsory retirement is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the Government and in exercise of its power of judicial review, the High Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court and may interfere only if it is satisfied that the order was passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it was based on no evidence or (c) that it was arbitrary or perverse in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given materials. 29. 29. It is also crystal clear from the principles laid down in Baikuntha Nath Das (supra) that compulsory retirement cannot be resorted to as a punishment. In other words, compulsory retirement cannot be resorted to as a substitute for, or in order to dispense, with holding of regular disciplinary proceeding against the employee concerned. 30. From what the Supreme Court laid down in Baikuntha Nath Das (supra), it also becomes clear that the government or the Screening Committee, as the case may be, shall have to consider the entire records of service before taking any decision in the matter, though it has to attach more importance to the records of performance during the later years and that the records to be considered would include entries in the confidential reports/character rolls, favourable as well as adverse. 31. In S. Ramchandra Raju v. State of Orissa, : AIR 1995 SC 111 , the Apex Court, after referring to the principles laid down in the case of Baikuntha Nath Das (supra), further held as follows:- "It is thus settled law that though the order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment and the government employee is entitled to draw all retrial benefits including pension, the government must exercise its power only in the public interest to effectuate the efficiency of the service. The dead wood need to be removed to augment efficiency. Integrity in public service need to be maintained. The exercise of power of compulsory retirement must not be a haunt on public servant but must act as a check and reasonable measure to ensure efficiency of service and free from corruption and incompetence. The officer would live by reputation built around him. In an appropriate case, there may not be sufficient evidence to take punitive disciplinary action of removal from service. But his conduct and reputation is such that his continuance in service would be a menace in public service and injurious to public interest. The entire service record or character rolls or confidential reports maintained would furnish the back drop material for consideration by the Government or the Review Committee or the appropriate authority. On consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances alone, the government should form the opinion that the government officer needs to be compulsorily retired from service. The entire service record or character rolls or confidential reports maintained would furnish the back drop material for consideration by the Government or the Review Committee or the appropriate authority. On consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances alone, the government should form the opinion that the government officer needs to be compulsorily retired from service. Therefore, the entire service record more particularly the latest, would form the foundation for the opinion and furnish the base to exercise the power under the relevant rule to compulsorily retire a government officer." 32. Thus, in S. Ramachandra Raju (supra) too, the Supreme Court reiterated that the entire service records, more particularly the latest ones, should form the foundation for the opinion for exercising the powers under the relevant rules to compulsorily retire a government officer. In this decision, the Supreme Court held that the exercise of power by the Government to compulsorily retire S. Ramchandra Raju was arbitrary, because the government had not taken into consideration his total records of service, but had taken only solitary adverse report of 1987-88 existing against him as the foundation to compulsorily retire him from service and accordingly, the Apex Court quashed the order of compulsory retirement. 33. In State of Gujarat v. Suryakanta Chunilal Shah, : (1999) 1 SCC 529 , the Apex Court, after discussing, at length, its earlier decisions on compulsory retirement including the decision in the case of Baikuntha Nath Das (supra), found that although there was no entry in the character roll of the government officer that his integrity was doubtful, the Review Committee, on it own, probably on the basis of the FIR lodged against him that he had granted permits to vague and bogus institutions, formed the opinion that he was a person of doubtful integrity and should be compulsorily retired from service and the Supreme Court held that there was no material on the basis of which a reasonable person could form the opinion that the government servant had outlived his utility as a government servant or that he had lost his efficiency and had become a dead wood. In this decision, the Apex Court further held that the order of compulsory retirement, in the face of the facts of that case, was punitive in nature having been passed for a collateral purpose of his immediate removal rather than public interest and the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in directing reinstatement of the government servant. 34. Thus, the case of Suryakanta Chunilal Shah (supra) affirms the principle that the order for compulsory retirement cannot be punitive in nature and the power to compulsorily retire a government servant cannot be exercised for solitary lapse and/or for collateral purpose of removing the government servant from service as an easier course rather than doing the needful in consonance with the provisions of Article 311(2) for inflicting punishment of removal from service. 35. In the case of Ram Ekbal Sharma (supra), the Apex Court clarified the position of law further by laying down that even though the order of compulsory retirement is couched in innocuous language without making any imputations against the government servant, who was directed to be compulsorily retired from service, the Court in appropriate cases can lift the veil to find out whether the order is based on any misconduct of the government servant or the order has been made bona fide and not with any oblique or extraneous purposes. 36. The principle that a government servant cannot be retired compulsorily as a tool of convenience to remove him from service instead of inflicting punishment in a regularly drawn disciplinary proceeding has been reiterated in the case of Iswar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana : (1999) 4 SCC 579 and on finding in this case that the conclusion of the Full Court of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana to compulsorily retire Shri Iswar Chand Jain was based on the allegation of misconduct which was the subject-matter of enquiry before a judge of the High Court, the Apex Court held that the impugned order of compulsory retirement of Shri Jain, though innocuously worded, was, in fact, an order of removal from service and cannot be sustained. 37. It is worth noticing that in Dinesh Chandra Sangma (supra) the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the provisions of FR 56(b) on the ground that it does not amount to removal/dismissal by way of punishment. 37. It is worth noticing that in Dinesh Chandra Sangma (supra) the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the provisions of FR 56(b) on the ground that it does not amount to removal/dismissal by way of punishment. Hence, it logically follows, as a corollary, that FR 56(b) cannot be resorted to by way of punishment, particularly, for one lapse in service career -no matter how grave the lapse was. 38. I am also tempted to refer to the case of Anoop Jaiswal v. Govt. of India, : AIR 1984 SC 636 , wherein the Apex Court has succinctly laid down the law on the subject as follows:- "It is, therefore, now well settled that where the form of the order is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct it is always open to the Court before which the order is challenged to go behind form and ascertain the true character of the order. If the Court holds that the order though in the form is merely a determination of employment is in reality a clock for an order of punishment, the Court would not be debarred, merely because of the form of the order, in giving effect to the rights conferred by law upon the employees." 39. From the decisions of the Apex Court catalogued above, it will be clear that the High Court, in exercise of its powers of judicial review, cannot examine the matter relating to the compulsory retirement as an appellate court but can, undoubtedly, interfere with such order if it finds that the order of compulsory retirement is arbitrary or perverse. Further, where the government or the Review/Screening Committee, as the case may be, does not consider the entire service records including the entries in the confidential reports/character rolls of the government servant, the order of compulsory retirement may become arbitrary. This is so, because it is only on consideration of the entire service records of the government servant that a reasonable person can form the requisite opinion that the government servant is inefficient or a dead wood and has outlived his utility or that he is of a doubtful integrity. This is so, because it is only on consideration of the entire service records of the government servant that a reasonable person can form the requisite opinion that the government servant is inefficient or a dead wood and has outlived his utility or that he is of a doubtful integrity. Furthermore, even where the order of compulsory retirement is couched in a innocuous language and does not make any imputation against the government servant sought to be compulsory retired from service, the Court has, in appropriate cases, the power to lift the veil and look into the relevant materials and if the Court finds that the order of compulsory retirement is actually punitive in nature, it is not bona fide and is based on the allegation of misconduct against the government servant and has been passed for the collateral purpose of immediately removing him from service, the Court will set aside the order of compulsory retirement. Hence, the mere form and language in which the order is worded is not material. What is material is as to why really the order has been passed. 40. In the aforesaid context I must look into the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajendra Singh Verma and others v. Lieutenant Governor and others reported in : (2011) 10 SCC 1 on which strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. The observations made in paragraphs Nos. 143 and 145 have been relied upon:- "143. Compulsory retirement from service is not considered to be a punishment. Under the relevant rules, an order of dismissal is a punishment laid on a government servant when it is found that he has been guilty of misconduct or the like. It is penal in character because it involves loss of pension which under the rules has accrued in respect of the service already put in. An order of removal also stands on the same footing as an order of dismissal and involves the same consequences, the only difference between them being that while a servant who is dismissed is not eligible for reappointment, one who is removed is. An order of removal also stands on the same footing as an order of dismissal and involves the same consequences, the only difference between them being that while a servant who is dismissed is not eligible for reappointment, one who is removed is. A compulsory retirement is neither dismissal nor removal and differs from both of them, in that it is not a form of punishment prescribed by the rules and involves no penal consequences, inasmuch as the person retired is entitled to pension and other retiral benefits, proportionate to the period of service standing to his credit. 145. So far as the present cases are concerned, this Court finds that there are no words in the orders of compulsory retirement, which throw any stigma against the two appellants and the deceased officer. Therefore, it is not necessary for this Court to make inquiry into the government files to discover whether any remark amounting to stigma could be found in the files. The reason is that it is the order of compulsory retirement, which alone is for examination. If the order itself does not contain any imputation or charge against the two appellants and the deceased officer, the fact that considerations of misconduct or misbehaviour weighed with the High Court in coming to its conclusion to retire them compulsorily does not amount to any imputation or charge against them. It is not established from the order of compulsory retirement itself that the charge or imputation against the appellants was made a condition for exercise of the power. Therefore, the orders of retirement cannot be considered to be one for dismissal or removal in the nature of penalty or punishment." 41. By relying on the afore-noted decision of the Supreme Court it was submitted very vehemently that I should look into only the impugned order and not the findings recorded by the screening committee or its recommendations. It was submitted that the impugned order does not contain any imputation or charge against the petitioner and therefore, the order of compulsory retirement should not be considered to be one for dismissal or removal in the nature of penalty or punishment. 42. It is no doubt true that such submission of the learned counsel appearing for the respondents definitely gets support from what has been observed by the Supreme Court in paragraph No. 145 referred to above. 42. It is no doubt true that such submission of the learned counsel appearing for the respondents definitely gets support from what has been observed by the Supreme Court in paragraph No. 145 referred to above. However, I am unable to accept such submission in view of plethora of decisions of the Supreme Court rendered prior in point of time then the case of Rajendra Singh Verma (supra). 43. It appears that the attention of the Hon'ble Court in the case of Rajendra Singh (supra) was not drawn to a larger bench decision in the case of L. Michael and another v. Johnson Pumps Ltd., reported in : AIR 1975 SC 661 . In paragraph No. 16 the Supreme Court observed thus:- "The manner of dressing up an order does not matter. The Court will lift the veil to view the reality or substance of the order." 44. I may also quote the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Iqbal Sharma v. State of Bihar, : AIR 1990 sc 1368 . Although I find reference of this decision in Rajendra Singh's decision yet there appears to be no discussion in that regard. The Supreme Court in paragraph No. 27, 28 and 29 observed thus:- "27. This judgment has been followed in the case of Anoop Jaiswal v. Govt. of India, : AIR 1984 SC 636 . It has been observed that (para12):- "It is, therefore, now well settled that where the form of the order is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct it is always open to the Court before which the order is challenged to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. If the Court holds that the order though in the form is merely a determination of employment is in reality a cloak for an order of punishment, the Court would not be debarred, merely because of the form of the order, in giving effect to the rights conferred by law upon the employees." It has also been observed that (para 13):- "Even though the order of discharge may be noncommittal, it cannot stand alone. Though the nothing in the file of the Government may be irrelevant, the cause for the order cannot be ignored. Though the nothing in the file of the Government may be irrelevant, the cause for the order cannot be ignored. The recommendation of the Director which is the basis or foundation for the order should be read along with the order for the purpose of determining its true character. If on reading the two together the Court reaches the conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for that incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order of discharge should fall to the ground as the appellant has not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Art. 311(2) of the Constitution." 28. On a consideration of the above decisions the legal position that now emerges is that even though the order of compulsory retirement is couched in innocuous language without making any imputations against the Government servant who is directed to be compulsorily retired from service, the Court, if challenged, in appropriate cases can lift the veil to find out whether the order is based on any misconduct of the Government servant concerned or the order has been made bona fide and not with any oblique or extraneous purposes. Mere form of the order in such cases cannot deter the Court from delving into the basis of the order if the order in question is challenged by the concerned Government servant as has been held by this Court in Anoop Jaiswal's case. This being the position the respondent-State cannot defend the order of compulsory retirement of the appellant in the instant case on the mere plea that the order has been made in accordance with the provisions of R.74(ii) of the Bihar Service Code which prima facie does not make any imputation or does not cast any stigma on the service career of the appellant. But in view of the clear and specific averments made by the respondent-State that the impugned order has been made to compulsorily retire the appellant from service under the aforesaid Rule as the appellant was found to have committed grave financial irregularities leading to financial loss to the State, the impugned order cannot but be said to have been made by way of punishment. As such, such an order is in contravention of Art.311 of the Constitution of India as well as it is arbitrary as it violates principles of natural justice and the same has not been made bona fide. 29. In the premises aforesaid we hold that the impugned order has not been made bona fide but for collateral purposes and on extraneous consideration by way of punishment. The impugned order is, therefore, illegal and unwarranted and so it is liable to be quashed and set aside. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order. We further direct the respondents to reinstate the appellant in service forthwith with full back wages. The respondents will pay costs to the appellant." 45. In the affidavit-in-reply of the Corporation itself it is made clear that what weighed with the authority in passing the order of compulsory retirement was the finding recorded by the review committee. I may at the cost of repetition once again quote the averments made in paragraph No. 5 of the affidavit-in-reply as under:- "The respondent No. 3 humbly states that the Review Committee as contemplated in the said circular of the corporation dated 22.10.13 is, therefore authorized to evaluate the services of the petitioner and to take appropriate decision with regard to his premature retirement. Accordingly, the Review Committee in its meeting held on 16.01.14 unanimously decided that considering the said record it was in the interest of the Corporation to retire the petitioner prematurely and accordingly the petitioner through order dated 6.2.14 was prematurely retired and copies of the resolution dated 16.1.14 as well order dated 6.2.14 are annexed as Annexure-D & E respectively." 46. Thus, I have reached to the conclusion that the impugned order of compulsory or premature retirement was 'founded' on the report of the screening committee and its recommendations. What is motive :what is 'foundation': what is the difference between the two: has been well explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Chandra Prakash Sahi v. State of U.P. Reported in : (2000) 5 SCC 152 . After noticing various precedents, the Supreme Court observed in paragraphs Nos. 28 and 29 as under:- "28. What is motive :what is 'foundation': what is the difference between the two: has been well explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Chandra Prakash Sahi v. State of U.P. Reported in : (2000) 5 SCC 152 . After noticing various precedents, the Supreme Court observed in paragraphs Nos. 28 and 29 as under:- "28. The important principles which are deducible on the concept of 'motive' and 'foundation' concerning a probationer, are that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his services can be terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of probation on account of general unsuitability for the post in question. If for the determination of suitability of the probationer for the post in question or for his further retention in service or for confirmation, an inquiry is held and it is on the basis of that inquiry that a decision is taken to terminate his service, the order will not be punitive in nature. But, if there are allegations of misconduct and an inquiry is held to find out the truth of that misconduct and an order terminating the service is passed on the basis of that inquiry, the order would be punitive in nature as the inquiry was held not for assessing the general suitability of the employee for the post in question, but to find out the truth of allegations of misconduct against that employee. In this situation, the order would be founded on misconduct and it will not be a mere matter of 'motive'. 29. 'Motive' is the moving power which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently, 'motive' is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action? If it was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the action would be upheld in law. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action? If it was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the action would be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of serious misconduct against the employee and a preliminary inquiry is held behind his back to ascertain the truth of those allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to other circumstances, would be founded on the allegations of misconduct which were found to be true in the preliminary inquiry." 47. In Rajendra Singh's case it appears that nothing was on record as regards the confidential record of the judicial officer. In such circumstances, the Court thought fit to look into only the order of the compulsory retirement and declined to make any inquiry into the government files to discover whether any remark amounting to stigma could be found in the files. In the case in hand, the recommendations and the findings of the review committee are very much on record and as stated earlier the same weighed with the authority who passed the impugned order. Keeping this in mind the judgment in the case of Rajendra Singh (supra) is distinguishable. 48. Upon perusal of the report of the committee, it transpires that what weighed with the committee was the act of the criminal breach of trust alleged to have been committed by the petitioner while he was in-charge of the Depot and other acts of misconduct. Taking into consideration the same according to the assessment of the committee the petitioner had outlived his utility and had brought disgrace to the department concerned and accordingly, the committee recommended the premature retirement. It also appears that the order of the premature retirement came to be passed during the period of suspension of the petitioner. 49. What logically follows from the above is that in the instant 'case, although the impugned order of compulsorily retirement, dated 6th February, 2014 is innocuously worded and does not impute any motive against the petitioner yet the Corporation accepted the said recommendation, because the petitioner was allegedly involved in the aforesaid scandal. 49. What logically follows from the above is that in the instant 'case, although the impugned order of compulsorily retirement, dated 6th February, 2014 is innocuously worded and does not impute any motive against the petitioner yet the Corporation accepted the said recommendation, because the petitioner was allegedly involved in the aforesaid scandal. The impugned order of the compulsory retirement is really an order of removal of the petitioner from the service for the charge of misconduct:- it is, thus, punitive in nature and could not have been passed without following the procedure laid down in the Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 50. What, thus, crystallizes from the above discussion is that the order compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service is wholly illegal and cannot be allowed to stand good on record. At the same time, however, I must hasten to add that this conclusion does not mean that at no future time, the petitioner can be removed from service. 51. The decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court relied upon is of no avail to the respondents as the same was rendered in the facts of that case. I may quote the observations made in paragraph No. 11 of the said judgment as under:- "Insofar as the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M. Patel (supra) is considered, in the opinion of this Court, the present case does not fall into any of the categories which are enumerated in paragraph-11 of the said decision. In the present case, from the averments made in the memorandum of the petition, there is nothing to reveal that any proceedings for initiating departmental inquiry had been either initiated or were contemplated at the time when the order of compulsory retirement was passed. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the order of compulsory retirement had been passed as a short cut to avoid departmental inquiry." 52. The above is the distinguishing feature. The learned Single Judge recorded that there was nothing to show that any departmental inquiry had been initiated or was contemplated at the time when the order of compulsory retirement was passed. In such circumstances, the learned Single Judge observed that there was no reason to believe that the order of compulsory retirement had been passed as a shortcut to avoid the departmental inquiry. In such circumstances, the learned Single Judge observed that there was no reason to believe that the order of compulsory retirement had been passed as a shortcut to avoid the departmental inquiry. In the present case, it appears from what has been recorded in the impugned order that the petitioner was under suspension while the order was being passed, may be because of contemplated departmental inquiry. 53. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this writ-application succeeds. The impugned order dated 6th February, 2014 and the order passed by the appellate authority are set aside and quashed. The position of the petitioner in service as on the date of the order of the compulsory retirement is restored. If any disciplinary proceedings are to be initiated the same be undertaken as may be permissible under the law. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Application Allowed.

Baldevbhai Bothabhai Vaghela v. Managing Director