JUDGMENT : Alok Aradhe, J. These appeals have preferred under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), being aggrieved by the judgments dated 19-9-2011 passed by the Additional District Judge, Bhopal by which the objections preferred by the respondent under section 34 of the Act have been allowed. As common question of law and facts arise in both these appeal, they were heard analogously and are being decided by this common judgment. In order to appreciate the appellant's challenge to the impugned judgment, few facts need mentioned, which are stated infra. The parties had entered into an agreement on 30-11-2005 for long route transportation of food grains for financial year 2006-07. The respondent did not adhere to the schedule prescribed in the agreement, as a result of which the appellant issued notice to the respondent by which it was informed that alternate arrangement of the transportation at its risk and cost shall be made. After assessment of the expenses incurred by the appellant for making arrangement for alternative transportation, the appellant issued an order of recovery for a sum of Rs. 7,16,148/- on 1-3-2007 in Arbitration Appeal No. 3/2012 whereas in Arbitration Appeal No. 4/2012 a sum of Rs. 2,71,974/- (Two Lakh Seventy One Thousand and Nine Hundred and Seventy Four Rupees Only) was directed to be recovered from the respondent. The respondent thereupon on 9-1-2009 invoked clause 14.1 of the agreement and preferred claims before the Arbitrator which were registered as Case Nos. 1080/2009 and 1081/2009. The appellant submitted a written statement with details of the notices and orders issued to the respondent. The respondent on 17-2-2002 submitted the rejoinder. The Arbitrator vide awards dated 8-4-2009 dismissed the claims preferred by the respondent. The respondent thereupon filed objections under section 34 of the Act which were registered as Arbitration Case Nos. 46/2009 and 55/2009. The appellant submitted its reply to the objections preferred by the respondent under section 34 of the Act. The Additional District Judge, Bhopal vide judgments dated 19-9-2011 allowed the objections preferred by the respondent and set-aside the awards dated 8-4-2009 passed by the Arbitrator. In the aforesaid factual backdrop that the appellant has approached this Court. 2. 46/2009 and 55/2009. The appellant submitted its reply to the objections preferred by the respondent under section 34 of the Act. The Additional District Judge, Bhopal vide judgments dated 19-9-2011 allowed the objections preferred by the respondent and set-aside the awards dated 8-4-2009 passed by the Arbitrator. In the aforesaid factual backdrop that the appellant has approached this Court. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant while inviting the attention of this Court to various clauses of the agreement, submitted that trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the awards passed by the Arbitrator. Learned counsel for the appellant referring to paragraph-11 of the judgment submitted that trial Court grossly erred in holding that the appellant had no authority to deduct the amount from the bills of the respondent until and unless there is adjudication by the Arbitrator. The aforesaid finding has been recorded in contravention of the terms and conditions of the agreement. It is further submitted that the Additional District Judge grossly erred in setting aside the awards on the grounds that the objections preferred by the respondent fall within the purview of section 34(2) of the Act. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has supported the judgments passed by the Additional District Judge. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the decisions in State of Karnataka Vs. Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills, Thirthahalli, (1987) 2 SCC 160 ; Union of India (UOI) Vs. Raman Iron Foundry, AIR 1974 SC 1265 ; B.B. Verma and Another and S.C. Batra and Another Vs. State of M.P. and Another, AIR 2008 MP 202 . 3. I have considered the respective submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and have perused the record. The Supreme Court in McDermott International Inc. Vs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and Others, (2006) 11 SCC 181 while taking note of the decision rendered by it in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. Vs. General Electric Co., AIR 1994 SC 860 wherein it was held that an arbitral award can be set aside if it is contrary to fundamental policy of Indian law; the interests of India; or justice or morality, held that public policy is a matter dependent upon the nature of transaction and the nature of statute. However, subsequently, in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. However, subsequently, in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. SAW Pipes Ltd., AIR 2003 SC 2629 the Supreme Court added another ground for exercise of Courts jurisdiction for setting aside the award i.e. if it is patently arbitrary. In Centrotrade Minerals and Metal Inc. Vs. Hindustan Copper Limited, (2006) 11 SCC 245 it was held by the Supreme Court that if an award suffers from patent illegality, which goes to the root of the matter, the Court can interfere with the award passed by the arbitrator. In a recent decision, in the case of Associate Builders Vs. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 1 SCJ 42 the Supreme Court after taking note of various previous judgments rendered by it with regard to scope of interference with the arbitral award held that none of the grounds contained in section 34(2)(a) of the Act deals with the merits of the decision rendered by an arbitrator. It is only when the award is in conflict with the public policy of India as prescribed in section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act that the merits of an arbitral award are to be looked into under certain specified circumstances. It was further held that the Court would interfere with an award passed by an arbitrator if it is in violation of statute, interest of India, justice or morality, patent illegality, contravention of the Act or terms of the contract. It was also held that the Court hearing an appeal does not act as a Court of appeal and consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral award. Thus, an award based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on this score. 4. In the backdrop of aforesaid well settled legal position, the facts of the cases at hand may be seen. Admittedly under the agreement, respondent was under an obligation to transport the foodgrains from Maksi Base Depot. The relevant clauses of agreement are reproduced below for the facility of reference:- "C1. 4. In the backdrop of aforesaid well settled legal position, the facts of the cases at hand may be seen. Admittedly under the agreement, respondent was under an obligation to transport the foodgrains from Maksi Base Depot. The relevant clauses of agreement are reproduced below for the facility of reference:- "C1. 9.2(a) - The contractor shall be liable for transportation in respect of the proposed district/districts during the period of contract as per the base depot/storage centres and districts mentioned in the schedule 1A to 1C of the tender. C1. 9.2(b) - If the contractor fails to perform as per the program of district manager, then appellant corporation shall be entitled to impose a penalty of Rs. 2 per quintal, per day of such delayed work. C1. 9.4 - If the contractor fails to perform as per the program of district manager, then appellant-Corporation shall be entitled to complete such work through any other transporter or a State agency, without terminating the agreement at the risk and cost of the transporter." 5. From perusal of the relevant clause of agreement, it is evident that under the terms and conditions of the agreement, the appellant had authority to get the work completed through any other transporter or a State agency or make arrangement for transporting the same without terminating the agreement at the risk and cost of the transporter. 6. From perusal of the claim preferred by the respondent before the Arbitrator, it is evident that the respondent had raised an objection with regard to authority of District Manager of Rajgarh to recover the amount in Question. The Arbitrator for the reasons assigned in paragraph-8 of the awards has held that alternative arrangement of transportation of foodgrains was rightly made under the provisions of the agreement at the risk and cost of the respondent and the same has rightly been recovered from the respondents. The Arbitrator further held that under the terms and conditions of the agreement District Manager, Rajgarh had authority to recover the amount in question from the respondent. 7. The Arbitrator further held that under the terms and conditions of the agreement District Manager, Rajgarh had authority to recover the amount in question from the respondent. 7. However, the trial Court in a perfunctory manner and in violation of the well settled legal position with regard to scope of section 34 of the Act as has been delineated by the Supreme Court in catena of decisions, has set-aside the awards passed by the Arbitrator holding that the appellant had no authority to deduct the amount in question from the bills of the respondent without adjudication of the dispute. While recording the aforesaid finding, the Additional District Judge, Bhopal has not taken into account the clause 9.4 of the agreement which confers authority on the appellant to make alternative arrangement in case of default by the transporter at its risk and consequences the same can be recovered and in ignorance of the same in a cavalier manner set aside the awards passed by the Arbitrator. 8. The damages may be of two types, namely, liquidated damages and unliquidated damages. Liquidated damages means an amount contractually stipulated as a reasonable estimation of actual damage to be recovered by one party if the other party breaches. The expression 'unliquidated damages' means the amount of damages not specified or determined or ascertained, the amount of damages which are to be determined by a Court rather than specified by a contract. [See: Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition]. Thus, it is apparent that in order to ascertain liquidated damages no adjudication is required whereas in order to ascertain unliquidated damages, adjudication is required. Therefore, the decisions relied by the respondent are of no assistance to it in the fact situation of the case as the same deals with cases of unliquidated damages which require adjudication. In the instant case under clause 9.4 of the agreement the appellant has authority to recover liquidated damages. 9. Thus, the Additional District Judge while passing the impugned judgments exceeded its jurisdiction while dealing with the objections preferred under section 34 of the Act. The judgments passed by the trial Court suffer from jurisdictional infirmity as well as error apparent on the face of the record. In view of preceding analysis the impugned judgments dated 19-9-2011 passed by the Additional District Judge, Bhopal are hereby set aside. The judgments passed by the trial Court suffer from jurisdictional infirmity as well as error apparent on the face of the record. In view of preceding analysis the impugned judgments dated 19-9-2011 passed by the Additional District Judge, Bhopal are hereby set aside. In the result, the awards passed by the Arbitrator are restored. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed with costs.