JUDGMENT : Joymalya Bagchi, J. The Reference has been made in view of the divergence of opinion between two Hon'ble Judges of this Court in the matter of disposal of the present appeal. While Banerjee, J. was of the opinion that the appellant was liable to be convicted under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, Chatterjee, J. was of the contrary view. 2. As no point for reference had been framed, I proceed to formulate that the following point of reference for opinion: "Whether the prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed rape upon the victim." 3. The factual matrix giving rise to the appeal is as follows:- 4. The victim is a deaf and dumb girl who resided with her family members at 114, Lockgate Basti, Chetla within New Alipore Police Station, Kolkata-700 027. She was aged above 17 years at the time of the incident. It is alleged that on 30.08.2004 at about 7.30 p.m. the victim left her residence with Rupees five for purchasing tiffin. On the next day, that is, on 31.08.2004 around 11 a.m. the victim returned to her home and reported that the appellant took her away on the promise of marriage and committed rape upon her in an abandoned jhupri (shack) of 113, Lockgate Basti. Thereafter, he drove her away. On the basis of the aforesaid information, Debi Naskar, the mother of the victim, lodged a FIR at New Alipore Police Station which was registered as New Alipore Police Station Case No. 170 of 2004 dated 31.08.2004 under Sections 366/376 of the Indian Penal Code against the appellant. 5. Pursuant to investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellant and the matter was committed for trial to the Court of Sessions, South 24 Parganas. Charges were framed under Sections 366 and 376 of the I.P.C. 6. In course of trial, prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited a number of documents. The defence of the appellant was one of innocence and false implication. The appellant, however, did not examine any witness in support of his defence. 7. Charges were framed under Sections 366 and 376 of the I.P.C. 6. In course of trial, prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited a number of documents. The defence of the appellant was one of innocence and false implication. The appellant, however, did not examine any witness in support of his defence. 7. In conclusion of trial, the Trial Judge by impugned Judgement and Order dated 18.05.2006 convicted the appellant for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 366 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him the rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and fine of Rupees two thousand only for the offence punishable under Section 366 of the I.P.C. and to suffer a sentence of rigorous imprisonment of ten years and a fine of Rupees two thousand only for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the I.P.C., both the sentences to run concurrently. It was further directed that the fine it realised, shall be paid to the victim. 8. In appeal, the Hon'ble Division Bench had a divergence of opinion. While Banerjee, J. was of the view that the appellant is liable to be convicted under Section 376 of the I.P.C., Chatterjee, J. was of the view that the appellant was entitled to acquittal on both scores. In view of the aforesaid divergence in opinion, the matter was referred in terms of section 392 Cr.P.C. 9. The principal issue of reference is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was raped by the appellant or not. In order to appreciate such issue, evidence of the victim, P.W. 1 is most essential. In her evidence the victim stated that she resides in a Basti in Khalpar area. The appellant called her and took her to a house. Thereafter she was assaulted, undressed and the appellant committed rape upon her twice. On the next day, she was driven out the house. She came home and disclosed the incident to her mother and thereafter the victim was medically treated in hospital. She proved her LTI on the medical examination report. She also made statement to the police. In cross-examination, she admitted that the appellant was known to her and used to reside near her residence. She also admitted that she had visited the house of the appellant before the occurrence. She proved her LTI on the medical examination report. She also made statement to the police. In cross-examination, she admitted that the appellant was known to her and used to reside near her residence. She also admitted that she had visited the house of the appellant before the occurrence. She admitted that she went to the house of the appellant as he had called her but the appellant had not used force upon her. She denied the suggestion that she had not gone to the house of the appellant or that she was not raped. She admitted that there was a talk of marriage between herself and the appellant. She further stated that she lodged the case as the appellant had refused to marry her. She stated that she made a statement before the doctor although no interpreter was present. 10. P.W. 3 is the mother of the victim girl. She has corroborated the evidence of the victim girl. She deposed that the victim was missing since 30.08.2004. On the next day when the victim returned home, she informed her that she had been raped by the appellant. The victim also informed that the appellant had promised to marry her. P.W. 3 proved the first information report and also proved her signature on the seizure list. P.W. 3 corroborated that the victim narrated the incident before the doctor who medically examined her and the witness interpreted the statement made by the victim to the doctor. P.W. 5 is the father of the victim who also corroborated the evidence of P.W.1. P.W. 6 is the doctor who examined the victim on the date of the incident. She stated that the victim reported that the appellant had physically assaulted her and the victim identified the appellant with the help of her mother. P.W. 6 further stated that she found that the hymen of the victim was ruptured. P.W.8 is doctor who examined the victim on 07.09.2004. He also found that hymen of the victim was ruptured. The said witness also examined the appellant and found that the appellant was capable of sexual intercourse. P.W. 10 is another doctor who examined the victim for determination of her age by ossification test and deposed that the victim was above 17 years or below 19 years. P.W. 2 is the interpreter who interpreted the evidence of the victim, P.W. 1. P.W. 10 is another doctor who examined the victim for determination of her age by ossification test and deposed that the victim was above 17 years or below 19 years. P.W. 2 is the interpreter who interpreted the evidence of the victim, P.W. 1. P.W. 4 is a local witness who saw that on the date of the incident the victim with the appellant. The said witness also stated that he had seen them together 1/2 days prior to the incident. P.W. 5 and 7 are seizure list witnesses. P.W. 11 is the investigating officer of the case. 11. Analysing of the aforesaid evidence particularly that of the victim as corroborated by her parents, P.W. 3 and 5 it appears that the victim is a deaf and dumb girl aged between 17 and 19 years of age. It is also the consistent evidence on record is that on the fateful night the appellant had called the victim and taken her to jhupri (shack) of 114, Lockgate Basti. There the appellant made her lie on the bed, undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. This evidence of P.W. 1 is corroborated by P.W.3, her mother, to whom she narrated the incident immediately after returning home. It is also corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 6, the doctor, who treated her on the next day. P.W. 6 found that her hymen was ruptured and she also deposed that the victim narrated the incident of rape to her and identified the appellant in presence of her mother. 12. Apart from a bald denial that the victim had not gone to his residence on the fateful night or was not raped by him, no evidence is forthcoming from the defence by way of cross-examination or otherwise to improbabilise the fact that the victim had been taken by the appellant to the Jhupri (shack) and the appellant had sexual intercourse with her on that night. Hence, it is proved beyond doubt that the appellant had taken the victim to a Jhupri on the fateful night and had sexual intercourse with him. 13. The next question is whether such intercourse was consensual or not, Chatterjee, J. strongly relied on conduct of the victim to come to the conclusion that she was a consenting party. Hence, it is proved beyond doubt that the appellant had taken the victim to a Jhupri on the fateful night and had sexual intercourse with him. 13. The next question is whether such intercourse was consensual or not, Chatterjee, J. strongly relied on conduct of the victim to come to the conclusion that she was a consenting party. It has been opined that the victim had been seen with the appellant before and after the occurrence probabilising the fact that she had consented to the cohabitation with the appellant. It was also opined that as there was no injury on the victim and rupture of hymen merely suggests habitual sexual intercourse, the medical evidence does not support the prosecution case of rape of the victim. Evidence of P.W. 6, the doctor, was criticised on the premise that the version of the victim girl was recorded without the aid of an interpreter. 14. It is trite law that mere submission in a case of rape does not amount to consent. 15. Consent is defined under section 90 of the Indian Penal Code which read as follows : "Section 90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception. A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or Consent of insane person if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or Consent of child-unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age." 16. When consent is vitiated by fear or misconception of fact, it is not consent in the eye of law. The question whether there was consent to an act of sexual intercourse has to be viewed from various factors emanating from the facts and circumstances of each case. 17. In State of H.P. v. Mango Ram, (2000) 7 SCC 224 the Apex Court held as follows : "13. The question whether there was consent to an act of sexual intercourse has to be viewed from various factors emanating from the facts and circumstances of each case. 17. In State of H.P. v. Mango Ram, (2000) 7 SCC 224 the Apex Court held as follows : "13. ...........Submission of the body under the fear of terror cannot be construed as a consented sexual act. Consent for the purpose of Section 375 requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance and moral quality of the act but after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent. Whether there was consent or not, is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances....." 18. In Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of Goa, (2003) 8 SCC 590 the Apex Court defined consent under section 90 of the Indian Penal Code as follows : "6. .......... It has to be a conscious and voluntary act. There is a gulf of difference between consent and submission. Every consent involves a submission but the converse does not follow, and mere act of submission does not involve consent. An act of helpless resignation in the face of inevitable compulsion, quiescence, non-resistance or passive giving-in when the faculty is either clouded by fear or vitiated by duress or impaired due to mental retardation or deficiency cannot be considered to be consent as understood in law. For constituting consent, there must be exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance and the moral effect of the act." 19. Similar view has been expressed in Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 2005 SC 203 (para 18 to 30) and Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 615 (para 10 & 17). 20. In Karthi v. State Rep. by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, AIR 2013 SC (Cri) 1740 the Apex Court held as follows : "14. .......Obtaining consent by exercising deceit, cannot be legitimate defence to exculpate an accused." 21. In the instant case, the victim is a deaf and dumb girl, aged around 17 years. She comes from an economically weak background. The appellant was known to the family of the victim. .......Obtaining consent by exercising deceit, cannot be legitimate defence to exculpate an accused." 21. In the instant case, the victim is a deaf and dumb girl, aged around 17 years. She comes from an economically weak background. The appellant was known to the family of the victim. Hence, her failure to resist when the appellant called her to accompany him cannot be treated to be an act of consent on her part but a natural unsuspecting conduct of a teenager with special needs who had no reason to suspect the evil intentions of a man who was well known to her and her family member. 22. It is true that in cross-examination the victim admitted that she was not assaulted and that there was a talk of marriage between the victim and the appellant. She also admitted that she was ready to marry the appellant and had instituted the case as he had refused to marry her. 23. It is trite law that consent on the false promise of marriage when the appellant never intended to marry the victim is no consent in the eye of law. 24. In Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) SCC (Cri.) 775 the Apex Court held that the question of consent must be considered on the basis of evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances. Each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary or was given under a misconception of facts. 25. In Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 2005 SC 203 the Apex Court held as follows : "31. Is it a case of passive submission in the face of psychological pressure exerted or allurements made by the accused or was it a conscious decision on the part of the prosecutrix knowing fully the nature and consequences of the act she was asked to indulge in Whether the tacit consent given by the prosecutrix was the result of a misconception created in her mind as to the intention of the accused to marry her. These are the questions which have to be answered on an analysis of the evidence. The last question raises the allied question, whether the promise to marry, if made by the accused, was false to his knowledge and belief from the very inception and it was never intended to be acted upon by him. These are the questions which have to be answered on an analysis of the evidence. The last question raises the allied question, whether the promise to marry, if made by the accused, was false to his knowledge and belief from the very inception and it was never intended to be acted upon by him. As pointed out by this Court in Uday's case the burden is on the prosecution to prove that there was absence of consent. Of course, the position is different if the case is covered by Section 114 A of Evidence Act. Consent or absence of it could be gathered from the attendant circumstances. The previous or contemporaneous acts or the subsequent conduct can be legitimate guides." 26. In Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) AIR (SC) (Cri.) 1389 the Apex Court made a fine distinction between the consent of the victim procured on a promise to marry which did not fructify on a future day on one hand and consent procured on a false promise of marriage which the promisee from the very inception knew that he had no intention to keep. While the former would not amount to a misconception of fact the latter would definitely vitiate consent. The Court held as follows : "18. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly, understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly, understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. .................... 21. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time, i.e. at initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term misconception of fact, the fact must have an immediate relevance." Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her." 27. Let me examine the issue of consent of the victim in the backdrop of the aforesaid propositions of law in the instant case. 28. It is the evidence of P.W. 1 and 3 that they knew the appellant from before as a neighbour. On the fateful night the appellant called the victim to the Jhupri. Let me examine the issue of consent of the victim in the backdrop of the aforesaid propositions of law in the instant case. 28. It is the evidence of P.W. 1 and 3 that they knew the appellant from before as a neighbour. On the fateful night the appellant called the victim to the Jhupri. It is version of P.W. 1 that she was made to lie down and the appellant undressed her and raped her twice. Thereafter on the next day she was driven away. Her version is substantially corroborated by P.W. 3 and 5, her parents. In cross-examination P.W. 1, however, states that there was talk of marriage between them. Such fact, however, is denied by P.W. 3, the mother. Though P.W. 3 states that P.W. 1 narrated to her that the appellant had promised to marry the victim but in cross-examination she denies that there she made talks of marriage between the appellant and the victim. 29. It is, therefore, unclear from the aforesaid evidence as to whether such promise of marriage, if at all, was made prior to the act of sexual intercourse or an assurance held out to the girl after the act of rape in order to prevent her from instituting a criminal case against the appellant. Reading the evidence of the victim girl as a whole such is the impression created in ones mind that the promise of marriage was dishonestly held out by the appellant after the incident of rape only as a mere ruse to avoid criminal liability and not as a genuine desire to marry the girl. 30. There is also no evidence on record that the appellant and the victim had cohabited earlier on the understanding that they would be marry to each other. Stray evidence of P.W. 4 that the girl was seen with the appellant 1/2 days prior to the incident cannot give rise to an inference that there was an amorous cohabitation particularly in the absence of any material on record that the parties moved about freely after the incident. On the other hand, it appears that the appellant lured the young girl with special needs into the Jhupri and taking advantage of her helpless condition raped her. In order to avoid implication in a criminal case, the appellant raised a false hope of marriage in the girl which she innocently believed. On the other hand, it appears that the appellant lured the young girl with special needs into the Jhupri and taking advantage of her helpless condition raped her. In order to avoid implication in a criminal case, the appellant raised a false hope of marriage in the girl which she innocently believed. In the light of the aforesaid factual matrix of the case, I am unable to persuade myself to come to a conclusion that the appellant genuinely intended to marry the girl at any material point of time far the less at the time of committing rape upon her. 31. That apart, in the instant case, the defence of the appellant as evident from the trend of cross-examination of prosecution witness in the course of trial and his answers to the questions put to him under section 313 Cr.P.C. is one of innocence and false implication. It is his specific defence that on the fateful night the victim had not been taken by him to the Jhupri and no rape was committed upon her. 32. In the face of such defence to fall back upon a belated plea of consensual sex arising out of an amorous relationship is nothing but an afterthought cooked up in desperation and cannot by any stretch of imagination be treated to be a convincing defence which would improbabilise the prosecution version of rape of a deaf and dumb girl. 33. Evidence of a victim of rape is to be treated with at par with an injured witness. Furthermore, sensitivity is called for when such evidence comes from the mouth of a teen aged girl with special needs. 34. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chhotey Lal, (2011) 2 SCC 550 the Apex Court while dealing with the evidence of a victim of rape held as follows :- "22. ......a woman who is a victim of sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime. Her evidence cannot be tested with suspicion as that of an accomplice. As a matter of fact, the evidence of the prosecutrix is similar to the evidence of an injured complainant or witness. The testimony of the prosecutrix, if found to be reliable, by itself, may be sufficient to convict the culprit and no corroboration of her evidence is necessary. In prosecutions of rape, the law does not require corroboration. The evidence of the prosecutrix may sustain a conviction. The testimony of the prosecutrix, if found to be reliable, by itself, may be sufficient to convict the culprit and no corroboration of her evidence is necessary. In prosecutions of rape, the law does not require corroboration. The evidence of the prosecutrix may sustain a conviction. It is only by way of abundant caution that the court may look for some corroboration so as to satisfy its conscience and rule out any false accusations. 23. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain this Court at p. 559 (para 16) of the Report said: "16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence." 24. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh this Court made the following weighty observations at pp. 394-96 and p. 403 (paras 8 & 21): "8. ... The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix ... The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case ... Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury ... Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances.... *** 21. ... Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury ... Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances.... *** 21. ... The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations." 25. In Vijay v. State of M.P., decided recently, this Court referred to the above two decisions of this Court in Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain and Gurmit Singh and also few other decisions and observed as follows: (p. 198, para 14) "14. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix." 26. The important thing that the court has to bear in mind is that what is lost by a rape victim is face. The victim loses value as a person. Ours is a conservative society and, therefore, a woman and more so a young unmarried woman will not put her reputation in peril by alleging falsely about forcible sexual assault. In examining the evidence of the prosecutrix the courts must be alive to the conditions prevalent in the Indian society and must not be swayed by beliefs in other countries. The courts must be sensitive and responsive to the plight of the female victim of sexual assault. Society's belief and value systems need to be kept uppermost in mind as rape is the worst form of women's oppression. The courts must be sensitive and responsive to the plight of the female victim of sexual assault. Society's belief and value systems need to be kept uppermost in mind as rape is the worst form of women's oppression. A forcible sexual assault brings in humiliation, feeling of disgust, tremendous embarrassment, sense of shame, trauma and lifelong emotional scar to a victim and it is, therefore, most unlikely of a woman, and more so by a young woman, roping in somebody falsely in the crime of rape. The stigma that attach is to the victim of rape in Indian society ordinarily rules out the levelling of false accusations. An Indian woman traditionally will not concoct an untruthful story and bring charges of rape for the purpose of blackmail, hatred, spite or revenge. 27. This Court has repeatedly laid down the guidelines as to how the evidence of the prosecutrix in the crime of rape should be evaluated by the court. The observations made in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat deserve special mention as, in our view, these must be kept in mind invariably while dealing with a rape case. This Court observed as follows: (p. 224, para 9) "9. In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion. To do so is to justify the charge of male chauvinism in a male dominated society. We must analyse the argument in support of the need for corroboration and subject it to relentless and remorseless cross-examination. And we must do so with a logical, and not an opinionated, eye in the light of probabilities with our feet firmly planted on the soil of India and with our eyes focused on the Indian horizon. We must not be swept off the feet by the approach made in the western world which has its own social milieu, its own social mores, its own permissive values, and its own code of life. Corroboration may be considered essential to establish a sexual offence in the backdrop of the social ecology of the western world. We must not be swept off the feet by the approach made in the western world which has its own social milieu, its own social mores, its own permissive values, and its own code of life. Corroboration may be considered essential to establish a sexual offence in the backdrop of the social ecology of the western world. It is wholly unnecessary to import the said concept on a turnkey basis and to transplant it on the Indian soil regardless of the altogether different atmosphere, attitudes, mores, responses of the Indian society, and its profile. The identities of the two worlds are different. The solution of problems cannot, therefore, be identical." 28. This Court went on to observe at pp. 225-26 (para 10): "10. Without the fear of making too wide a statement, or of overstating the case, it can be said that rarely will a girl or a woman in India make false allegations of sexual assault on account of any such factor as has been just enlisted. The statement is generally true in the context of the urban as also rural society. It is also by and large true in the context of the sophisticated, not so sophisticated, and unsophisticated society. Only very rarely can one conceivably come across an exception or two and that too possibly from amongst the urban elites. Because- (1) A girl or a woman in the tradition-bound non-permissive society of India would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred. (2) She would be conscious of the danger of being ostracised by the society or being looked down by the society including by her own family members, relatives, friends, and neighbours. (3) She would have to brave the whole world. (4) She would face the risk of losing the love and respect of her own husband and near relatives, and of her matrimonial home and happiness being shattered. (5) If she is unmarried, she would apprehend that it would be difficult to secure an alliance with a suitable match from a respectable or an acceptable family. (6) It would almost inevitably and almost invariably result in mental torture and suffering to herself. (7) The fear of being taunted by others will always haunt her. (5) If she is unmarried, she would apprehend that it would be difficult to secure an alliance with a suitable match from a respectable or an acceptable family. (6) It would almost inevitably and almost invariably result in mental torture and suffering to herself. (7) The fear of being taunted by others will always haunt her. (8) She would feel extremely embarrassed in relating the incident to others being overpowered by a feeling of shame on account of the upbringing in a tradition-bound society where by and large sex is taboo. (9) The natural inclination would be to avoid giving publicity to the incident lest the family name and family honour is brought into controversy. (10) The parents of an unmarried girl as also the husband and members of the husband's family of a married woman, would also more often than not, want to avoid publicity on account of the fear of social stigma on the family name and family honour. (11) The fear of the victim herself being considered to be promiscuous or in some way responsible for the incident regardless of her innocence. (12) The reluctance to face interrogation by the investigating agency, to face the court, to face the cross-examination by the counsel for the culprit, and the risk of being disbelieved, acts as a deterrent." 35. In this backdrop, the evidence of the victim (P.W. 1) is to be read as a whole and a line from her evidence cannot be read out of context to come to a conclusion that she was a consenting party to the alleged act of rape. 36. Reading the evidence of P.W. 1 as a whole, I am of the view that submission of the victim to the act of rape of the appellant was not out of consent as alleged but one of mere helplessness. It is highly unlikely that a deaf and dumb girl would be able to fight back her aggressor with vigour and the absence of injuries on her person is therefore no ground to disbelieve the version of rape. Rupture of the hymen clearly establishes the act of sexual intercourse upon her and absence of injury on her private parts is inconsequential bearing in mind the background of the case, particularly, the young age of the girl and her inability to shout or raise alarm due to her disabilities. Rupture of the hymen clearly establishes the act of sexual intercourse upon her and absence of injury on her private parts is inconsequential bearing in mind the background of the case, particularly, the young age of the girl and her inability to shout or raise alarm due to her disabilities. Narration of the incident to P.W. 6 immediately after the incident as interpreted by the mother of the victim, P.W. 3, leads much credence to the truthfulness of prosecution case. 37. I am of the view that absence of an interpreter before P.W. 6 is immaterial inasmuch as it is the evidence of P.W. 3 that she interpreted the victim's version to P.W. 6. P.W. 3 being the mother of the victim is acquainted with the latter's expressions and is, therefore, the most natural and probable person who is in the most advantageous position to interpret the same to another. Under such circumstances absence of a qualified interpreter in my considered opinion cannot militate against the acceptability of such evidence as the mother of the victim had interpreted the latter's expressions to P.W. 6 in the course of the interrogation. This version of P.W. 3 was also not assailed in cross-examination. 38. There is also no evidence on record that there was any animosity between the appellant and the family of the victim. Accordingly, I find no reason to believe that PWs 1, 3 and 5 would falsely implicate the appellant in the instant case. The plea that the appellant was implicated in this case as he refused to marry the victim appears to be a desperate afterthought and is of little credence. 39. There is no evidence on record that the appellant had promised marriage prior to the incident or they had cohabited together on such understanding. There is also no legally admissible evidence that they were seen together after the incident. Evidence of P.W. 4 that they were seen together 1/2 days before the incident cannot give rise to the conclusion that there was talk of marriage, prior to the incident of rape particularly, in view of the evidence of P.W. 3, the mother, who in cross-examination categorically denied that she had not made any talk of marriage between the appellant and the victim. One cannot lose sight of the fact that the appellant was a neighbour and was known to the victim and her family. One cannot lose sight of the fact that the appellant was a neighbour and was known to the victim and her family. Such acquaintance explains her conduct in not raising objection and accompanying him when he called her on the fateful night. Reading the evidence of P.W. 1 in this factual backdrop there is no escape from the irresistible conclusion that the appellant utilised his acquaintance to take her to an abandoned shack and taking advantage of her helplessness and disability raped her. Thereafter, to avoid the consequences of his wrongful act, he made a false promise of marriage to her which the latter was gullible enough to accept. Rape by an acquaintance is a commonplace phenomenon in India. Reference may be made in this regard to the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) publication titled "Crimes in India-2013" at page 83 which, inter alia, records: "In most rape cases offenders are known to the victim. During 2013, offenders were known to the victim in as many as in 94.4% of rape case (31,807 out of 33,707 cases)." 40. Similarly, 2012 NCRB report shows that 98% of rape offenders were close relatives and acquaintances of the victim. When an act of sexual predation flows from a person who is known to the victim and stands in a position of trust, it is most natural she would be taken unawares by the sudden unexpectedness of such attack and may not be in a position to immediately react and vigorously resist. To treat such lack of resistance as consent on her part instead of a stunned inaction of a perplexed mind is to add insult to the injured psyche of the victim of rape. Judged from such angle, I find no unnaturalness in the conduct of the victim, a young girl with special needs, in her inability to resist vigorously when she was raped by the appellant, a neighbour and a close acquaintance of her family. 41. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Naushad, (2013) 16 SCC 651 the Apex Court while dealing with a rape offender who was related to the victim and had betrayed her trust and ravished her on the false promise of marriage held as follows : "19. In the present case, the accused had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix by giving false assurance to the prosecutrix that he would marry her. In the present case, the accused had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix by giving false assurance to the prosecutrix that he would marry her. After she got pregnant, he refused to do so. From this, it is evident that he never intended to marry her and procured her consent only for the reason of having sexual relations with her, which act of the accused falls squarely under the definition of rape as he had sexual intercourse with her consent which was consent obtained under a misconception of fact as defined under Section 90 IPC. Thus, the alleged consent said to have been obtained by the accused was not voluntary consent and this Court is of the view that the accused indulged in sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix by misconstruing to her his true intentions. It is apparent from the evidence that the accused only wanted to indulge in sexual intercourse with her and was under no intention of actually marrying the prosecutrix. He made a false promise to her and he never aimed to marry her." 42. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the opinion that the prosecution case has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I respectfully concur with the opinion of Banerjee, J. that the appellant was rightly convicted of the offence of rape punishable under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. 43. The reference is accordingly answered in the affirmative.