JUDGMENT : 1. In this appeal preferred under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the appellants have assailed the validity of the judgment dated 13.12.2011 passed by the trial Court by which the objection preferred by the appellants under Section 34 of the Act, has been rejected. 2. Facts giving rise to filing of the appeal, briefly stated, are that the respondent was awarded the work of construction of a Bridge at Bina-Maksi Section. The value of the contract was Rs.18,63,601/-. The stipulated period of completion of the work was three months. Thereafter, the respondent was granted two extensions, firstly on 8.7.2003 and secondly on 8.10.2003. The contract awarded to the respondent was terminated on 1.9.2004. The respondent by communication dated 20th September, 2004, sought settlement of the claim and appointment of an Arbitrator under Clause 64(1) of the General Conditions of Contract. 3. The appellants failed to appoint an Arbitrator, therefore, an application under Section 11(6) of the Act was filed, which was registered as M.C.C. No.440/2005 and was allowed by a Bench of this Court vide order dated 23.9.2005 and Mr. Justice K.L. Israni, a retired Judge of this Court was appointed as the sole Arbitrator. The respondent submitted the claim on 16.2.2006 before the Arbitrator. The appellants submitted its written reply. The Arbitrator passed an award dated 28.7.2007, by which, out of total 12 claims submitted by the respondent, the sole Arbitrator allowed 6 claims to the tune of Rs.12,97,000/- along with interest @ 10% on the aforesaid amount from the date of dispute till the date of Award and @ 12% from the date of Award till the date of realization. 4. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid Award, the appellants filed an objection under Section 34 of the Act. The Additional District Judge by order dated 30.12.2011 dismissed the objection preferred by the appellants on the ground that the appellants have failed to make out any ground under Section 34 of the Act. In the aforesaid factual background, the appellants have filed this appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants while inviting the attention of this Court to Clause 64(5) of the agreement submitted that the aforesaid clause expressly prohibits grant of interest, however, the Arbitrator in contravention of the aforesaid clause as contained in the agreement, has awarded interest to the respondent, which is impermissible. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants while inviting the attention of this Court to Clause 64(5) of the agreement submitted that the aforesaid clause expressly prohibits grant of interest, however, the Arbitrator in contravention of the aforesaid clause as contained in the agreement, has awarded interest to the respondent, which is impermissible. In support of aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed on decision of Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Sree Kamatchi Amman Constructions v. Divisional Railway Manager (Works), Palghat and other, AIR 2010 SC 3337 . It has further been submitted that the claims of the respondent were overlapping and therefore, they could not have been awarded by the Arbitrator. It is also urged that no reasons has been assigned by the Arbitrator for passing the Award, and the same has been passed in contravention of Section 31(3) of the Act. It is further submitted that the Arbitrator has committed jurisdictional error as he has traveled beyond the terms and conditions of the agreement. In this connection, reliance has been placed on a decision in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd., v. J.C. Budhraja, Government and Mining Contractor, (1999) 8 SCC 122 . 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that neither in the reply filed before the Arbitrator nor in the application under Section 34 of the Act, the appellants have taken the ground that in view of Clause 64(5) of the agreement, no interest can be awarded to the respondent. Therefore, the respondent cannot be permitted to raise the aforesaid plea for the first time in this appeal. In support of aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on decisions reported in State of Orissa v. Shanti Devi and others, AIR 1992 (Orissa) 144, M/s. Continental Construction Ltd., v. Food Corporation of India and others, AIR 2003 (Delhi) 32, Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd., v. Singh Construction Co. Bilaspur, 2000(2) MPLJ 473, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and another v. M.Keshava Raju, AIR 2004 (Karnataka) 109. It is further submitted that clause 16.3 of the contract, to which reference was made in the objection under Section 34 of the Act, merely states that the appellants shall not grant interest to the respondent on the amount deposited as earnest money and security deposit. It is further submitted that clause 16.3 of the contract, to which reference was made in the objection under Section 34 of the Act, merely states that the appellants shall not grant interest to the respondent on the amount deposited as earnest money and security deposit. It was urged that the aforesaid clause does not take away the power of the Arbitrator to award interest. To buttress the submission, learned counsel for the respondent has referred to a decision in the case of Port of Calcutta v. Engineers-De-Spaceage, AIR 1996 SC 2853 . While inviting the attention of this Court to the objection filed by the appellants under Section 34 of the Act as well as the order passed by the trial Court, it is pointed out that no ground under Section 34 of the Act has been made out by the appellant. 7. I have considered the respective submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. The scope of Section 34 of the Act has been defined in catena of decisions. The Supreme Court in McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd, (2006) 11 SCC 181 while taking note of the decision rendered by it in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644 wherein it was held that an arbitral award can be set aside if it is contrary to fundamental policy of Indian law; the interests of India; or justice or morality, held that public policy is a matter dependent upon the nature of transaction and the nature of statute. However, subsequently, in the case of ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 , the Supreme Court added another ground for exercise of courts' jurisdiction for setting aside the award i.e. if it is patently arbitrary. In Centrotrade Minerals & Metals Inc. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 245 it was held by the Supreme Court that if an award suffers from patent illegality, which goes to the root of the matter, the court can interfere with the award passed by the arbitrator. In Centrotrade Minerals & Metals Inc. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 245 it was held by the Supreme Court that if an award suffers from patent illegality, which goes to the root of the matter, the court can interfere with the award passed by the arbitrator. In a recent decision, in the case of Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49 , the Supreme Court after taking note of various previous judgments rendered by it with regard to scope of interference with the arbitral award held that none of the grounds contained in Section 34 (2) (a) of the Act deals with the merits of the decision rendered by an arbitrator. It is only when the award is in conflict with the public policy of India as prescribed in Section 34 (2) (b) (ii) of the Act then the merits of an arbitral award are to be looked into under certain specified circumstances. It was further held that the Court would interfere with an award passed by an arbitrator if it is in violation of statute, interest of India, justice or morality, patent illegality, contravention of the Act or terms of the contract. It was also held that the court hearing an appeal does not act as a court of appeal and consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence, to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral award. Thus, an award based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind, would not be held to be invalid on this score. 8. In the backdrop of aforesaid well settled legal position, facts of the case at hand, may be noticed. At this stage, it is appropriate to reproduce the relevant clauses of the General Conditions of Contract, namely Clauses 16.3 and 64.5 as under:- "16(3). No interest will be payable upon the Earnest Money and Security Deposit or amounts payable to the Contractor under the Contract, but Government Securities deposited in terms of Sub-Clause (1) of this clause will be payable with interest accrued thereon. 64 (5). No interest will be payable upon the Earnest Money and Security Deposit or amounts payable to the Contractor under the Contract, but Government Securities deposited in terms of Sub-Clause (1) of this clause will be payable with interest accrued thereon. 64 (5). Where the arbitral award is for the payment of money, no interest shall be payable on whole or any part of the money for any period till the date on which the awards is made" From perusal of the aforesaid clauses of the agreement, it is evident that the parties had agreed that no interest shall be payable on the amount of earnest money and security deposit and in case arbitral award is for payment of money, no interest shall be payable for whole or any part of the money for any period till the date on which the Award is made. 9. It is worth noticing that decision in case of Engineers-De-Spaceage (supra) was under the Arbitration Act, 1940, which did not contain a specific provision like Section 31(7) of the Act, which deals with award of interest by the Arbitrator. The Supreme Court in the case of Syeed Ahmad & Co., v. State of U.P., (2009) 12 SCC 26 , has held that decisions rendered under the old Act may not be of assistance to decide the validity of grant of interest under the Act; and would not apply to cases arising under the Act. The Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Sree Kamatchi Amman Constructions (supra) has held that under Section 31(7) of the Act, the Arbitrator is bound by the terms of the contract in so far as the award of interest from the date of cause of action to the date of Award is concerned. Therefore, where the parties had agreed that no interest was payable, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot award interest between the dates when the cause of action arose to the date of Award. Therefore, where the parties had agreed that no interest was payable, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot award interest between the dates when the cause of action arose to the date of Award. Section Act 31(7), reads as under:- ''31(7)- Form and contents of arbitral award.-(7)(a) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where and insofar as in arbitral award is for the payment of money, the arbitral tribunal may include in the sum for which the award is made interest, at such rate as it deems reasonable, on the whole or any part of the money, for the whole or any part of the period between the date on which the cause of action arose and the date on which the award is made. (b) A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall, unless the award otherwise directs, carry interest at the rate of eighteen per centum per annum from the date of the award to the date of payment''. Thus, it is evident that the Arbitrator cannot award interest in respect of antelite and pendentelite period, unless agreed by the parties. Thus, in view of Clauses 16(3) and 64(5) of General Conditions of Contract, the Arbitrator could not have awarded interest for antelite and pendentelite period. 10. So far as the contention made by learned counsel for the respondent that the appellants have never raised an objection that the agreement contains a bar with regard to grant of interest under clause 64(5) of the agreement and same has been raised for the first time before this Court is concerned, from perusal of paragraph 32 of the written reply, it is evident that the appellants have taken a stand that the respondent is not entitled to any interest because the respondent itself was at fault and had abandoned the work and therefore, the grant of interest is covered under excepted matters. Similarly, in the application under Section 34 of the Act, in paragraph 12, an objection has been raised that the Arbitrator has wrongly awarded the interest @ 10% p.a. And 12% p.a.. In any case, the objection with regard to grant of interest, being a pure question of law which arises for consideration on admitted facts, could be raised by the appellants in this appeal. In any case, the objection with regard to grant of interest, being a pure question of law which arises for consideration on admitted facts, could be raised by the appellants in this appeal. Therefore, in the fact situation of the case, it cannot be said that the appellants are precluded from raising the objection with regard to grant of interest before this Court. 11. So far as the submission made by learned counsel for the appellants that no reasons have been assigned by the Arbitrator while passing the Award is concerned, the same is required to be stated to be rejected, as from perusal of the Award passed by the Arbitrator, it is evident that the Arbitrator has assigned reasons for allowing 6 out of 12 claims preferred by the respondent. Therefore, the contention that the Award has been passed in contravention of Section 31(3) of the Act, cannot be accepted. 12. So far as the submission made by learned counsel for the appellants that the Arbitrator cannot act beyond the terms of the agreement is concerned, the same deserves acceptance, as in the instant case, the Arbitrator in contravention of the terms and conditions of the agreement has awarded interest to the respondent for the antelite and pendentelite period. Besides the aforesaid ground, the appellants were unable to make out any ground under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside of the Award. The trial Court has rightly rejected the objection preferred by the appellants under Section 34 of the Act, except in so far as it pertains to grant of antelite and pendentelite interest. However, the trial Court has failed to appreciate that Arbitrator while granting antelite and pendentelite interest, has traveled beyond the terms of contract. 13. In view of preceding analysis, the impugned judgment in so far as it upholds the Award of the Arbitrator with regard to interest for antelite and pendentelite period is concerned, is set aside. In the result, the Award passed by the Arbitrator in so far as it pertains to grant of interest for antelite and pendentelite period is also set aside. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. In the facts of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs. Appeal partly allowed.