JUDGMENT : Harsha Devani, J. (Oral) - By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 18.12.2013 passed by the Small Causes Court, Rajkot below Exhibit-237, to the extent the trial court has given tentative exhibit to the document and further seeks a direction to the trial court to give a permanent exhibit to the documents which are referred to in the deposition of defendant witness No. 1. 2. The respondents No. 1.1 to 1.4 are the heirs and legal representatives of the original plaintiff, whereas the petitioners are the heirs and legal representatives of the original defendant No. 2 and the respondent No. 2 is the original defendant No. 1. The original plaintiff instituted a suit being Civil Suit No. 169 of 1990 in the Small Causes Court, at Rajkot for obtaining vacant possession of the rented shop premises. The original plaintiff and the defendant No. 2 have expired during the pendency of the suit and it is their heirs who are prosecuting the proceedings. In the proceedings of the said suit, on behalf of the defendants, one Vallabhbhai Bhurabhai Pipaliya, who was discharging duties as Shop and Establishment Inspector with the Rajkot Municipal Corporation, came to be examined at Exhibit 392. In his examination-in-chief, the witness stated that he had brought the original record of 8987 with him and based upon the same, he had prepared the certified copies which bear his signature as Shop Inspector, the signature of Makwanabhai as Junior Clerk and Bhindebhai as Mukkamal. The registration has been renewed till 1989 and he has produced a true copy thereof which is prepared on the basis of the original. The learned advocate for the defendants requested that the document be exhibited. On the other hand, the learned advocate for the plaintiff objected to the same on the ground that in terms of section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act, the questions are yet to be put during the course of cross-examination and that the decision for exhibiting the document be taken after the cross-examination in respect of such document at the instance of the plaintiff is over. On behalf of the defendants, the learned advocate contended that the document was a certified copy of a public document and the original had been brought before the court. On behalf of the defendants, the learned advocate contended that the document was a certified copy of a public document and the original had been brought before the court. The document is a certified copy in terms of section 76 of the Evidence Act and has been proved by way of the oral testimony of the witness. It was submitted that the suit is pending since 1990 and the plaintiff and defendants have passed away during the pendency of the suit and in both cases, their heirs have been brought on record and hence, such baseless objection may not be taken into consideration. 3. The trial court after considering the submissions advanced by the learned advocates for the respective parties, was of the view that when an objection has been raised to exhibiting the document, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat, 2001 (2) GLH 545, the question as regards the admissibility of the document in evidence is required to be considered at the time of evaluating the evidence and that the same requires to be given a tentative exhibit. Accordingly, the document was given tentative Exhibit No. 396, which has given rise to the present petition. 4. Mr. Mrugen Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently assailed the impugned order by submitting that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court was not justified in giving the exhibit a tentative number instead of admitting the document in evidence. It was submitted that the document in question is a certified copy of public record and the original has also been produced before the court and the witness has proved the same before the court, therefore, there was no reason to give it a tentative exhibit merely because an objection had been raised against admitting the same. It was contended that in view of the provisions of Order 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"), the objections to the admissibility of the documents has to be decided at the time when such documents are tendered and should not be left for decision at the final stage of arguments in the suit. The attention of the court was invited to the provisions of rule 4 of Order 8 of the Code as well as rule 4 of Order 18 of the Code to submit that in the light of the said provisions, the court ought to have decided on the admissibility of the said documents instead of deferring the same. It was urged that in the facts and circumstances of the case the trial court was not justified in placing reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat (supra). In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Privy Council in Jadurai v. Bhubotaran Nandy, 16 Indian Appeals 148, the decisions of the Supreme Court in Javer Chand and others v. Pukhraj Surana, AIR 1961 SC 1655 , R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple and another, (2003) 8 SCC 752 , Ram Rattan (dead) by L.Rs. v. Bajrang Lal and others, (1978) 3 SCC 236 and Dayamathi Bai (Smt) v. K.M. Shaffi, (2004) 7 SCC 107 as well as the decision of a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Mr. Hemendra Rasiklal Ghia v. Subodh Mody, (2009) 1 ICC 222 (Bom) (FB). It was, accordingly, urged that the objection to the admissibility of the document is required to be decided at the earliest possible opportunity and the reason therefor, is that if the court allows the objections, the party tendering the evidence may take such steps as may be advised to get the lacuna remedied. It was submitted that in the case at hand, the documents which are produced by the witness are public documents and are relevant and duly proved in terms of the provisions of the Evidence Act and therefore, there was no valid reason for the trial court to defer the decision regarding admissibility of such documents. 5. Opposing the petition, Mr. Sandeep Bhatt, learned advocate for the respondents No. 1.1 to 1.4 (original plaintiffs) submitted that the course adopted by the trial court is in consonance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat (supra) and therefore, it cannot be said that there is any infirmity in the impugned order warranting interference by this court. It was submitted that the witness had produced a document and the plaintiff wanted to cross-examine him in respect thereof. Therefore, till such cross-examination is over, the question of giving regular exhibit number to such document would not arise. 6. This court has considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties and has perused the record and proceedings of the case as well as the decisions cited at the bar. 7. As can be seen from the impugned order, before the trial court, on behalf of the plaintiffs, an objection was taken to admitting the document in evidence till the witness was cross-examined in the context of such document. The trial court, placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat (supra), had given the exhibit a tentative number leaving the question of admissibility of such document till the stage of appreciation of the evidence on record. Thus, while on behalf of the plaintiffs it was submitted that the question of exhibiting the document be deferred till the cross-examination is over, the trial court has gone a step further and while giving the exhibit a tentative number, has held that the admissibility thereof will be considered at the time of appreciation of the evidence. Whether the course of action adopted by the trial court is just and proper is the question that arises for consideration in the present case. 8. The facts speak for themselves. From the deposition of the witness who is a Shop and Establishments Inspector, it is clear that he has produced certified copies of the documents viz. registration and renewal certificates of Bavishi Brothers which are signed by him as well as two other persons, whose signatures he has identified. He has also deposed that the certified copies are prepared on the basis of the original and that he has also brought the original with him. It also cannot be disputed that the documents which are produced are public documents. 9. In the aforesaid backdrop, reference may be made to the law in this regard. 10. He has also deposed that the certified copies are prepared on the basis of the original and that he has also brought the original with him. It also cannot be disputed that the documents which are produced are public documents. 9. In the aforesaid backdrop, reference may be made to the law in this regard. 10. In Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the court had disposed of a special leave petition as the Special Judge who was trying the case had reported to it that he reasonably expected the trial to close within six months, permitting the petitioner to move for bail again in case the trial is not closed within six months. During the course of trial, the defence raised objection to the admissibility of certain documents and raised objections with regard to the same. The trial court disallowed the objections, but thereafter stayed the trial with a view to enable the defence to take up that order before the High Court. After the defence failed before the High Court, the trial was resumed, when once again the defence raised another objection regarding the admissibility of another document. The trial court upheld the objection and refused to admit that particular document, whereupon the prosecution proceeded to the High Court and in the wake of that proceeding, the respondent filed an application for enlarging him on bail on the strength of the earlier order passed by the Supreme Court. In this background, the Supreme Court held thus: "11. We are compelled to say that the trial judge should have shown more sensitivity by adopting all measures to accelerate the trial procedure in order to reach its finish within the time frame indicated by this Court in the order dated 31.3.2000 since he knew very well that under his orders an accused is continuing in jail as an under-trial for a record period of more than seven years. Now, we feel that the Additional Judge, whether the present incumbent or his predecessor, was not serious in complying with the directions issued by this Court, though the parties in the case have also contributed their share in bypassing the said direction. 12. Now, we feel that the Additional Judge, whether the present incumbent or his predecessor, was not serious in complying with the directions issued by this Court, though the parties in the case have also contributed their share in bypassing the said direction. 12. As pointed out earlier, on different occasions the trial judge has chosen to decide questions of admissibility of documents or other items of evidence, as and when objections thereto were raised and then detailed orders were passed either upholding or overruling such objections. The worse part is that after passing the orders the trial court waited for days and weeks for the concerned parties to go before the higher courts for the purpose of challenging such interlocutory orders. 13. It is an archaic practise that during the evidence collecting stage, whenever any objection is raised regarding admissibility of any material in evidence the court does not proceed further without passing order on such objection. But the fall out of the above practise is this: Suppose the trial court, in a case, upholds a particular objection and excludes the material from being admitted in evidence and then proceeds with the trial and disposes of the case finally. If the appellate or revisional court, when the same question is re-canvassed, could take a different view on the admissibility of that material in such cases the appellate court would be deprived of the benefit of that evidence, because that was not put on record by the trial court. In such a situation the higher court may have to send the case back to the trial court for recording that evidence and then to dispose of the case afresh. Why should the trial prolong like that unnecessarily on account of practices created by ourselves. Such practices, when realised through the course of long period to be hindrances which impede steady and swift progress of trial proceedings, must be recast or remoulded to give way for better substitutes which would help acceleration of trial proceedings. 14. Why should the trial prolong like that unnecessarily on account of practices created by ourselves. Such practices, when realised through the course of long period to be hindrances which impede steady and swift progress of trial proceedings, must be recast or remoulded to give way for better substitutes which would help acceleration of trial proceedings. 14. When so recast, the practise which can be a better substitute is this: Whenever an objection is raised during evidence taking stage regarding the admissibility of any material or item of oral evidence the trial court can make a note of such objection and mark the objected document tentatively as an exhibit in the case (or record the objected part of the oral evidence) subject to such objections to be decided at the last stage in the final judgment. If the court finds at the final stage that the objection so raised is sustainable the judge or magistrate can keep such evidence excluded from consideration. In our view there is no illegality in adopting such a course. (However, we make it clear that if the objection relates to deficiency of stamp duty of a document the court has to decide the objection before proceeding further. For all other objections the procedure suggested above can be followed.) 15. The above procedure, if followed, will have two advantages. First is that the time in the trial court, during evidence taking stage, would not be wasted on account of raising such objections and the court can continue to examine the witnesses. The witnesses need not wait for long hours, if not days. Second is that the superior court, when the same objection is re-canvassed and reconsidered in appeal or revision against the final judgment of the trial court, can determine the correctness of the view taken by the trial court regarding that objection, without bothering to remit the case to the trial court again for fresh disposal. We may also point out that this measure would not cause any prejudice to the parties to the litigation and would not add to their misery or expenses. 16. We, therefore, make the above as a procedure to be followed by the trial courts whenever an objection is raised regarding the admissibility of any material or any item of oral evidence." 11. 16. We, therefore, make the above as a procedure to be followed by the trial courts whenever an objection is raised regarding the admissibility of any material or any item of oral evidence." 11. In a subsequent decision in the case of Dayamathi Bai (Smt) v. K.M. Shaffi, (2004) 7 SCC 107 , the Supreme Court held thus: "13. We do not find merit in this civil appeal. In the present case the objection was not that the certified copy of Ex.P1 is in itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof was irregular and insufficient. Objection as to the mode of proof falls within procedural law. Therefore, such objections could be waived. They have to be taken before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record (See: Order 13, Rule 3 of Code of Civil Procedure). This aspect has been brought out succinctly in the judgment of this Court in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple & Another reported in [ (2003) 8 SCC 752 ] to which one of us, Bhan, J., was a party vide para 20: "20. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondent has relied on Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1457 , in support of his submission that a document not admissible in evidence, though brought on record, has to be excluded from consideration. We do not have any dispute with the proposition of law so laid down in the above-said case. However, the present one is a case which calls for the correct position of law being made precise. Ordinarily, an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes: (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as "an exhibit", an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as "an exhibit", an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be taken when the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The latter proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables the court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the evidence. Such practise and procedure is fair to both the parties. Out of the two types of objections, referred to herein-above, in the latter case, failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in a superior court." 14. To the same effect is the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Gopal Das & Anr. v. Sri Thakurji & Ors. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in a superior court." 14. To the same effect is the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Gopal Das & Anr. v. Sri Thakurji & Ors. AIR 1943 PC 83 in which it has been held that when the objection to the mode of proof is not taken, the party cannot lie by until the case comes before a Court of appeal and then complain for the first time of the mode of proof. That when the objection to be taken is not that the document is in itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof was irregular, it is essential that the objection should be taken at the trial before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record. Similarly, in Sarkar on Evidence, 15th Edition, page 1084, it has been stated that where copies of the documents are admitted without objection in the trial Court, no objection to their admissibility can be taken afterwards in the court of appeal. When a party gives in evidence a certified copy, without proving the circumstances entitling him to give secondary evidence, objection must be taken at the time of admission and such objection will not be allowed at a later stage. 15. In the present case, when the plaintiff submitted a certified copy of the sale deed (Ex.P1) in evidence and when the sale deed was taken on record and marked as an exhibit, the appellant did not raise any objection. Even execution of Ex.P2 was not challenged. In the circumstances, it was not open to the appellant to object to the mode of proof before the lower appellate Court. If the objection had been taken at the trial stage, the plaintiff could have met it by calling for the original sale deed which was on record in collateral proceedings. But as there was no objection from the appellant, the sale deed dated 14.11.1944 was marked as Ex.P1 and it was admitted to the record without objection." (Emphasis supplied) 12. In Mr. But as there was no objection from the appellant, the sale deed dated 14.11.1944 was marked as Ex.P1 and it was admitted to the record without objection." (Emphasis supplied) 12. In Mr. Hemendra Rasiklal Ghia v. Subodh Mody (supra), a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court was considering the question as to whether it is necessary for the court to decide about the admissibility of documents before they are exhibited in evidence or whether the admissibility of evidence and proof thereof should be reserved until judgment in the case is given. After considering the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat (supra) as well as the above referred decision and various other decisions, the court held that: (i) objection to the document sought to be produced relating to the deficiency of stamp duty must be taken when the document is tendered in evidence and such objection must be judicially determined before it is marked as exhibit; (ii) objection relating to the proof of document of which admissibility is not in dispute must be taken and judicially determined when it is marked as exhibit; and (iii) objection to the document which in itself is inadmissible in evidence can be admitted at any stage of the suit reserving decision on question until final judgment in the case. The court further observed that the court while trying the suit or proceeding as far as possible is expected to decide the admissibility or proof of document as indicated herein-above. The court added a word caution that while exercising discretion judiciously for the advancement of the cause of justice for the reasons to be recorded, the court can always work out its own modality depending upon the peculiar facts of each case without causing prejudice to the rights of the parties to meet the ends of justice and not to give a handle to either of the parties to protract litigation. The aim should always be to prevent miscarriage of justice and expedite trial, which is the dire need of the time. 13. The aim should always be to prevent miscarriage of justice and expedite trial, which is the dire need of the time. 13. Thus, the position of law that emerges from the above decisions is that: (i) Whenever an objection is raised during evidence taking stage regarding the admissibility of any material or item of oral evidence, the trial court can make a note of such objection and mark the objected document tentatively as an exhibit in the case (or record the objected part of the oral evidence) subject to such objections to be decided at the last stage in the final judgment. If the court finds at the final stage that the objection so raised is sustainable, the Judge or Magistrate can keep such evidence excluded from consideration. There is no illegality in adopting such a course. However, if the objection relates to deficiency of stamp duty of a document, the court has to decide the objection before proceeding further. For all other objections, the procedure suggested above can be followed. (ii) Objection as to the mode of proof falls within procedural law. Therefore, such objections can be waived. They have to be taken before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record (see Order 13, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure). (iii) Ordinarily, an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes: (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as `an exhibit', an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as `an exhibit', an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be taken when the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The latter proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. (iv)(i) objection to the document sought to be produced relating to the deficiency of stamp duty must be taken when the document is tendered in evidence and such objection must be judicially determined before it is marked as exhibit; (ii) objection relating to the proof of document of which admissibility is not in dispute must be taken and judicially determined when it is marked as exhibit; and (iii) objection to the document which in itself is inadmissible in evidence can be admitted at any stage of the suit reserving decision on question until final judgment in the case. 14. 14. Thus, while the Supreme Court in Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat (supra) has held that except in a case where the objection relates to deficiency of stamp duty of a document, in all other cases whenever an objection is raised during evidence taking stage regarding the admissibility of any material or item of oral evidence, the court can make a note of such objection and mark the objected document tentatively as an exhibit in the case (or record the objected part of the oral evidence) subject to such objections to be decided at the last stage of final judgment, the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court in civil cases have classified such objections into two categories, viz., (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first category of cases, the view is that such objection can be raised and dealt with at any stage of the proceedings and hence, can be dealt with at the last stage of final judgment. However, insofar as the second category is concerned, such objection would be required to be raised and dealt with at the time when such document is sought to be admitted in evidence for the reason that if such objection, if taken and dealt with at the appropriate point of time, it would enable the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. 15. 15. Therefore, by reconciling the above decisions, what emerges is that when a case falls within the first category of cases, viz., when an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence, is raised, the procedure laid down in Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat (supra) can be followed and the court can give a tentative exhibit number to such document and deal with the admissibility thereof at the final stage of judgment; however, when a case falls within the second category, viz., where the objection which is raised does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient, such objection has to be decided at the time when it is raised as the same would enable the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. 16. In the case at hand, what is sought to be produced is certified copies of public documents of which even the original have been produced before the court. The case, therefore, clearly falls within the second category of cases, viz., where the objection which is raised does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. Under the circumstances, such objection is required to be decided at the appropriate time when it is raised. The approach adopted by the trial court in giving the document a tentative exhibit and deferring the decision on the admissibility thereof to the last stage of final judgment would cause immense prejudice to the petitioners, inasmuch as, if ultimately it is held that such document is not admissible in evidence, the petitioners would not be in a position to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. 17. The upshot of the above discussion is that the impugned order passed by the trial court giving tentative exhibit number to the document produced by the witness, cannot be sustained. 18. For the foregoing reasons, the petition succeeds and is, accordingly, allowed. 17. The upshot of the above discussion is that the impugned order passed by the trial court giving tentative exhibit number to the document produced by the witness, cannot be sustained. 18. For the foregoing reasons, the petition succeeds and is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order dated 18.12.2013 passed by the Small Causes Court, Rajkot in Exhibit-237, giving tentative exhibit number to the documents produced by the defendants' witness, is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the trial court shall hear the parties on the question of admissibility of the document and decide the same in accordance with law. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.