JUDGMENT : Harsha Devani, J. 1. This appeal under section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) is directed against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 2nd February, 2005 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.3, Amreli in Sessions Case No. 53/2000. 2. The prosecution case is that the first informant - Tapubhai Punabhai Taank lodged a first information report stating that he was residing at Rajula and had one son and two daughters. The eldest daughter was named Anjuben who was married to one Jayantibhai Tapubhai Kumbhar. Bhavna was younger than her and was 17 years of age and his son Mahesh was younger than Bhavna and was 13 years of age. Both Bhavna and Mahesh were unmarried and were residing with the first informant. On 3rd June, 1999, the first informant had gone for some social work to Talgajarda and had returned at 4:30 in the evening at which point of time, his son Mahesh had told him that in the morning at around 10 o’clock when his mother Savitaben had gone to the brick kiln, at that time, Mahesh and his sister Bhavna were at home and Bhavna had asked for money to buy vegetables and after taking money, Bhavna had hastily gone out of the house and that finding her conduct suspicious, Mahesh had followed her. Thereafter, Mahesh had seen the accused following Bhavna and since there was no one at home, he had returned home. Thereafter, in the afternoon, when his mother returned from the kiln, Mahesh informed her and Mahesh and his mother started searching for Bhavna but they could not find her. They had also inquired at the neighbouring villages but could not trace out his daughter as well as the accused. It was further stated that the accused was staying with his brother-in-law at the house next to the first informant’s house and was engaged in the business of polishing diamonds. According to the first informant, since the life of his daughter was in question and with a view to see that her reputation in the society is not spoilt, he had tried to search her out himself and had lodged the complaint belatedly. According to the first informant, since the life of his daughter was in question and with a view to see that her reputation in the society is not spoilt, he had tried to search her out himself and had lodged the complaint belatedly. Accordingly, the first information report came to be registered against the accused for the offence punishable under sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code. Upon conclusion of the investigation, a chargesheet came to be submitted in the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rajula. Since the case was triable by the Sessions Court, it came to be committed to the Court of Sessions at Amreli (hereinafter referred to as “the trial court”) where it came to be numbered as Sessions Case No. 53/2000. 3. Before the trial court, on behalf of the prosecution, nine witnesses came to be examined and certain documentary evidence in the nature of the first information report, the scene of offence panchnama, arrest panchnama, various medical certificates, etc. came to be produced on record. The trial court, after appreciating the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge against the accused and acquitted him. 4. At this juncture it may be noted that on 4th October, 2006, at the time of admitting the present appeal, this court had passed an order in the following terms:- “Heard Mr. K.C. Shah, learned APP for the applicant – State. We have considered the submission of learned APP. He has taken us through the oral as well as documentary evidence led during the course of trial. It emerges that the girl had left voluntarily with the accused and the subsequent event was at the consent or assent of the victim girl. Even as per the birth date proved by the prosecution by tendering school leaving certificate as well as the opinion of the doctor as to the age by producing certificate Exh.43 issued by the doctor of Community Health Centre, Rajula of district Amreli dated 2.2.2001, we are of the view that there is no merit in the appeal so far as the offences under Sections 366 and 376 of Indian Penal Code are concerned. According to us, the acquittal of the accused for these two offences is concerned, it is found logical and legal and there is no element of perversity or patent illegality in the finding. So, the acquittal of the accused is not required any scrutiny by the appellate forum, that too, in an appeal against the order of acquittal. However, considering the evidence as to the age of the victim girl is concerned, the State has fairly arguable case so far as offence under Section 363 is concerned. Leave is granted and appeal is admitted so far as the acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge qua the offence under Section 363 of Indian Penal Code is concerned. Leave granted accordingly and appeal be treated as admitted for the offence under Section 363 of Indian Penal Code. Bailable warrant of Rs.5,000/- be issued against the respondent – accused and bail accepting authority shall ascertain the genuineness of the solvency certificate produced.” In the light of the above order, the scope of the present appeal is limited to the offence under section 363 of the Indian Penal Code. 5. Ms. Nisha Thakore, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, took the court through the depositions of the witnesses in great detail. Referring to the deposition of Tapubhai Punabhai Taank namely, the first informant, it was pointed out that at the time of the incident, the victim Bhavna was only 16 years of age. It was pointed out that the said witness has, in his cross-examination, stated that Bhavna was born in the year 1982. It was submitted that the incident took place on 6th March, 1999 and hence, it is evident that on the date when the offence came to be committed, victim Bhavna was a minor. It was submitted that the above fact is also reiterated in the deposition of Savitaben, who is the mother of Bhavna. The attention of the court was invited to the school leaving certificate issued by Kashibai Vijkorbai Girls School No.1, Rajula to point out that the date of birth of the victim was 5th October, 1982. It was submitted that on the date of the offence, the victim was, therefore, only 16 years of age. The attention of the court was invited to the school leaving certificate issued by Kashibai Vijkorbai Girls School No.1, Rajula to point out that the date of birth of the victim was 5th October, 1982. It was submitted that on the date of the offence, the victim was, therefore, only 16 years of age. The attention of the court was also invited to the deposition of victim Bhavna to submit that in her testimony, she has clearly stated that she had gone with the accused under coercion and threat. Referring to the provisions of section 361 of the Indian Penal Code which defines “Kidnapping from legal guardianship”, it was submitted that the evidence on record clearly reveals that minor Bhavna who was under 18 years of age had been taken out of the keeping of the lawful guardian thereby constituting the offence of kidnapping a minor from lawful guardianship. It was contended that, therefore, the offence under section 363 of the Indian Penal Code has clearly been made out. 5.1 Ms. Thakore further submitted that the trial court has given more weightage to the medical certificate given on the basis of the ossification test to the effect that the age of the victim was 19 years and has chosen to disbelieve the school leaving certificate issued by the school. The attention of the court was invited to the provisions of section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which provides for the ‘Relevancy of entry in public record or an electronic record made in performance of duty’ and lays down that an entry in any public or other official book, register or record or an electronic record stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register, record or an electronic record is kept, is itself a relevant fact. The attention of the court was invited to the provisions of rule 129 and 130 of the Bombay Primary Education Rules, 1949 which make provision for ‘school leaving certificate’ and ‘age certificate’, respectively. It was submitted that a school leaving certificate clearly falls within the ambit of section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act and, therefore, any fact stated therein is a relevant fact. It was submitted that a school leaving certificate clearly falls within the ambit of section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act and, therefore, any fact stated therein is a relevant fact. Reference was also made to rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 which provides for the ‘Procedure to be followed in determination of age’ and inter alia lays down that the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or by the Board by seeking evidence by obtaining – (a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of certificate from the school (other than a playschool) first she has attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a), the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which would declare the age of the juvenile or child. 5.2 It was submitted that, therefore, more weightage has to be given to the date of birth certificate from the school and not to the medical opinion whereas, in the facts of the present case, the trial court has given more weightage to the medical opinion and has not considered the age of the victim in terms of the school leaving certificate which has been produced on record. Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263 , wherein the court in the context of rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007 has observed that even though rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining the age, even of a child who is a victim of crime. In the view of the court, there was hardly any difference insofar as the issue of minority is concerned between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. The court was, therefore, of the considered opinion that it would be just and proper to apply rule 12 of the above rules to determine the age of the prosecutrix. The court was, therefore, of the considered opinion that it would be just and proper to apply rule 12 of the above rules to determine the age of the prosecutrix. The court held that the manner of determining age conclusively has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of rule 12. Under the said provision, the age of a child is ascertained by adopting the first available option out of the number of options postulated in rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the child concerned is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, rule 12(3) envisages consideration of the date of birth entered in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the child concerned, on the basis of medical opinion. It was submitted that the approach of the trial court in giving more weightage to the medical opinion than the school leaving certificate is contrary to the law laid down in the above decision. In conclusion, it was submitted that the prosecution, through the deposition of the witnesses and the documentary evidence produced on record, has clearly brought home the charge against the accused and the trial court was, therefore, not justified in acquitting him. 6. Opposing the appeal, Ms. Dhwani Lakhani, learned advocate for the respondent supported the impugned judgment and order. In conclusion, it was submitted that the prosecution, through the deposition of the witnesses and the documentary evidence produced on record, has clearly brought home the charge against the accused and the trial court was, therefore, not justified in acquitting him. 6. Opposing the appeal, Ms. Dhwani Lakhani, learned advocate for the respondent supported the impugned judgment and order. The learned advocate drew the attention of the court to the deposition of Ranjanben Girdharbhai Upadhyay, Assistant Teacher at the Kashibai Vijkorbai Girls School No.1, Rajula to point out that in her cross-examination, she has clearly stated that at the time when victim Bhavna was admitted to the school, no affidavit as regards her date of birth had been obtained as there is no such procedure in their school. She further admitted that there is no supporting evidence to demonstrate as to how Bhavna’s date of birth came to be entered in the school register. It was pointed out that, therefore, the entry of date of birth in the school register was not made in accordance with law and was not based upon any affidavit made by the parents of Bhavnaben. Referring to the deposition of the first informant Tapubhai, it was pointed out that he has stated that his eldest daughter’s name was Anjuben, who was married four to five years prior to the date of the incident; that there was an age difference of only three years between Anju and Bhavna; and that at the time when Anju got married, her age was about twenty to twenty one years. It was submitted that on the basis of what has emerged from the cross-examination of the first informant, the age of the victim has to be assessed. Having regard to the fact that the marriage of Anjuben took place four to five years prior to the date of the incident and she was married at the age of twenty to twenty one, as on the date of the incident, she would be between twenty four to twenty five years of age and the age difference between Anju and Bhavna being only three years, on the date of the incident Bhavna would clearly be around twenty years of age. It was submitted that it has also come on record from the deposition of Bhavna that prior to the marriage, ossification test was carried out and a certificate of the Medical Officer was obtained, which reveals that Bhavna’s age was nineteen years. It was pointed out that even subsequently, an ossification test came to be carried out and the certificate issued by the doctor has been brought on record at Exhibit-13, in terms whereof, Bhavnaben’s age is shown to be nineteen years. Reference was also made to the deposition of Savitaben Tapubhai, Bhavna’s mother to point out that in her cross-examination, it has come out that her sister Raliyat had gone for the purpose of Bhavna’s admission to the school and that she was not aware as to what was the date of birth that Raliyatben had got entered in the school record. She has also stated that she is not aware as to what was Bhavna’s age at the time when she was given admission in the school. Ms. Lakhani submitted that, therefore, the entry of the birth date in the school register had been made without due verification of the correct age of the victim. Under the circumstances, the trial court was wholly justified in placing reliance upon the medical report as regards the age of the victim. The attention of the court was further invited to the deposition of Baldevsinh Chandansinh Solanki, the Investigating Officer, and more particularly, to his cross-examination, wherein he has admitted that he had not obtained any affidavit or any other supporting evidence to establish that the birth date of the victim as shown in the certificate (Exhibit-20) was the correct age. It was submitted that, therefore, the Investigating Officer has not verified the authenticity of the contents of the document at Exhibit-20. 6.1 Next, it was submitted that the offence alleged in the present case is under section 363 of the Indian Penal Code which provides that whoever kidnaps any person from India or from lawful guardianship, shall be punished with imprisonment as prescribed thereunder. 6.1 Next, it was submitted that the offence alleged in the present case is under section 363 of the Indian Penal Code which provides that whoever kidnaps any person from India or from lawful guardianship, shall be punished with imprisonment as prescribed thereunder. Reference was made to section 361 of the Indian Penal Code which bears the heading ‘Kidnapping from lawful guardianship’ and postulates that whoever takes or entices any minor under sixteen years of age if a male, or under eighteen years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship. It was contended that, therefore, for the purpose of falling within the ambit of section 363 of Indian Penal Code, the female has to be less than eighteen years of age. In the facts of the present case, it has come on record from the medical report that the age of the victim is nineteen years and hence, the provisions of section 363 of the Indian Penal Code would not be attracted. It was, accordingly, submitted that, the question of enticing the victim as contemplated under section 361 of the Indian Penal Code does not arise. 6.2 Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S. Varadarajan v. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942 , wherein the court held that taking or enticing away a minor out of the keeping of a lawful guardian is an essential ingredient of the offence of kidnapping. 6.2 Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S. Varadarajan v. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942 , wherein the court held that taking or enticing away a minor out of the keeping of a lawful guardian is an essential ingredient of the offence of kidnapping. When a girl (who though a minor, has attained the age of discretion and is on the verge of attaining majority and is a senior college student) from the house of the relative of the father where she is kept, herself telephones the accused to meet her at a certain place, and goes there to meet him and finding him waiting with his car gets into that car of her own accord, and the accused takes her to various places and ultimately to the Sub-Registrar’s office where they get an agreement to marry registered, and there is no suggestion that this was done by force or blandishment or anything like that on the part of the accused but it is clear from the evidence that the insistence of marriage came from her side, the accused by complying with her wishes can by no stretch of imagination be said to have taken her out of the keeping of her lawful guardian, that is, her father. The court observed that the fact of her accompanying the accused all along is quite consistent with her own desire to be the wife of the accused in which the desire of accompanying him wherever he went is of course implicit. Under these circumstances, no inference can be drawn that the accused is guilty of taking away the girl out of the keeping of her father. The attention of the court was invited to the deposition of Maheshbhai namely, the brother of the victim to point out that from his deposition, it is apparent that Bhavna had left the house on her own and that even he had suspected her movements. Reference was also made to the contradictions brought out in the deposition of victim Bhavnaben as well as to the deposition of the Investigating Officer, to point out that the victim in her statement before the police had clearly stated that she had gone with the accused willingly and that she had readily and willingly married him. Reference was also made to the contradictions brought out in the deposition of victim Bhavnaben as well as to the deposition of the Investigating Officer, to point out that the victim in her statement before the police had clearly stated that she had gone with the accused willingly and that she had readily and willingly married him. It was submitted that under these circumstances, even if for the sake of argument, it is accepted that the victim was a minor on the verge of attaining majority, in the facts of the case, the question of enticement does not arise. 6.3 Reliance was also placed upon the decision of a Division Bench of this court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Jivanlal Chhotalal Patel, 1985 GLH 388 , wherein the court held that the school leaving certificate for the purpose of proving the age in a criminal trial is useless. The court referred to the school leaving certificate produced at Exhibit-19 therein and observed that if the investigating agency had bothered to read the certificate from Column No.6, they would know that the girl was not admitted for the first time in that school and she came to that school from some other school and it was from the birth date found in that certificate which was brought for the purpose of getting admission in their school that the birth date was noted. The court observed that the investigating agency must find out as to in which school first she was admitted. This is necessary because under the Bombay Primary Education Act and the rules made thereunder, it is compulsory for the guardian to state the exact time of birth at the time of getting child admitted and at that time, not only produce the evidence as to how a particular date has been given to the school authorities but a statement is also filed in the school under the Act and the rules and from that statement, the investigating agency would be able to know the name of the person who got the child admitted in the school. That person is required to be examined in the court and that statement is required to be proved and that person would prove that on a particular date on which he went to the school authorities to get the child admitted, he gave the birth date from a particular source. That person is required to be examined in the court and that statement is required to be proved and that person would prove that on a particular date on which he went to the school authorities to get the child admitted, he gave the birth date from a particular source. It was submitted that in the present case, it has come on record that it was Raliyatben who had gone to the school authorities to get her niece admitted, however, she has not been examined as a witness to prove that she gave the birth date from a particular source. It was submitted that, therefore, such school leaving certificate could not have been relied upon for the purpose of ascertaining the age of the victim. 6.4 Lastly, it was urged that the trial court after duly appreciating the evidence on record has given cogent, convincing and sufficient reasons in support of its conclusion and that in the absence of any perversity in the findings recorded by the trial court, there is no warrant for interference by this court in exercise of powers under section 378 of the Code. 7. This court has considered the submissions advanced by the learned advocates for the respective parties and has also perused the impugned judgment and order and the record of the case. 8. As noticed earlier, in the light of the order dated 4th October, 2006 which was passed at the time when the appeal came to be admitted, the scope of the present appeal is limited to the offence under section 363 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code provides for ‘Punishment for kidnapping’ and lays down that whoever kidnaps any person from India or from lawful guardianship, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. As to what is kidnapping from lawful guardianship is provided under section 361 of the Indian Penal Code. The following factors are required to be satisfied so as to attract the provisions of section 361 of the Indian Penal Code. Firstly, the minor should be under sixteen years of age, if a male, or under eighteen years of age, if a female. The following factors are required to be satisfied so as to attract the provisions of section 361 of the Indian Penal Code. Firstly, the minor should be under sixteen years of age, if a male, or under eighteen years of age, if a female. Such male or female should have been enticed by the accused out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor without the consent of such guardian. 9. In the light of the provisions of section 363 read with section 361 of the Indian Penal Code, the first question that arises for consideration is as to whether the age of the victim was under eighteen years at the time of the incident so as to fall within the ambit of section 361 of the Indian Penal Code. The evidence on record reveals that a school leaving certificate came to be produced at Exhibit-20 wherein the birth date of the victim is shown to be 5th October, 1982. In the present case, the alleged offence is stated to have been committed on 6th March, 1999. Therefore, if the age of the victim is computed on the basis of the age as stated in the school leaving certificate, she is clearly below eighteen years of age. However, the record further reveals that prior to getting married to the accused, an ossification test of the victim and the accused had been carried out which reveals that the age of the victim was nineteen years. Subsequently, a medical test of the victim came to be carried out and as per the medical report (Exhibit-13), the victim was nineteen years of age. The trial court, in the impugned judgment has chosen to place reliance upon the medical report rather than school leaving certificate. What is required to be, therefore, examined is as to whether the trial court was justified in giving more weightage to the medical certificate at Exhibit-13 rather than the school leaving certificate. 10. The record reveals that the school leaving certificate at Exhibit-20 has been produced on record by one Ranjanben Girdharbhai Upadhyay, Assistant Teacher at the Kashibai Vijkorbai Girls School No.1, Rajula. The said witness has deposed that the date of birth of the victim as entered in the school register is 5th October, 1982. 10. The record reveals that the school leaving certificate at Exhibit-20 has been produced on record by one Ranjanben Girdharbhai Upadhyay, Assistant Teacher at the Kashibai Vijkorbai Girls School No.1, Rajula. The said witness has deposed that the date of birth of the victim as entered in the school register is 5th October, 1982. During the course of her cross-examination, she has admitted that no details with regard to how the victim came to be admitted have been stated in the register. She has also admitted that at the time when she came to be admitted, no statement on oath with regard to Bhavna’s birth date has been obtained because there is no such practice in their school. She has further admitted that there is no supporting evidence to show as to on what basis Bhavna’s birth date had been entered in the school register. 11. Thus, from the testimony of the said witness, it is evident that there is no material on the record of the school to indicate as to on what basis, the birth date came to be entered in the school register. From the testimony of Savitaben Tapubhai, mother of the victim, it emerges that her sister – Raliyatben was the first wife of her husband, however, since for thirty five years, she (Raliyatben) did not bear any children, her parents had got her (Savitaben) married to Tapubhai. She has further deposed that Raliyatben had gone for Bhavna’s admission to the school and it was she who had given her birth date. She has further deposed that she is not aware as to what was Bhavna’s age at the time when she was admitted in the school. Thus, from the evidence of the said witness, what emerges is that at the time when the victim came to be admitted in the school, it was Raliyatben who had gone for the purpose of her admission. Under the circumstances, in the light of the principles enunciated by this court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Jivanlal Chhotalal Patel (supra), Raliyatben was required to be examined in the court so as to prove that on a particular date, she had gone to the school authorities to get the victim admitted and that she had given the birth date from a particular source. However, Raliyatben has not been examined in the present case to prove the basis on which she had given the birth date of the victim. 12. Apart from the above, a perusal of the provisions of the Bombay Primary Education Rules and more particularly, rule 130 thereof, reveals that every child seeking admission for the first time into an approved school is required to produce a certificate of age signed by its parents. In the case of illiterate parents, the certificates are required to bear their thumb impression attested by a literate person other than a teacher of the school to which the child seeks admission. It is the date of birth given in this certificate which is required to be entered in the school (General) Register. Thus, at the time when the child seeks admission for the first time into an approved school, the birth date is required to be entered on the basis of a certificate of age signed by its parents. In the facts of the present case, from the testimony of Ranjanben Girdharbhai Upadhyay, it is evident that no such certificate signed by the parents of the victim had been obtained at the time when admission was sought in the school. Under the circumstances, the entry made in the school register with regard to the date of birth of the victim is not in consonance with the provisions of Bombay Primary Education Rules. 13. On the other hand, other evidence has come on record for the purpose of establishing the age of the victim, which is in the nature of the ossification test carried out by the Medical officer, a certificate whereof has been produced at Exhibit-13, which reveals that the age of the victim was approximately nineteen years at the time of the incident. Under the circumstances, considering the nature of the evidence which has come on record as regards the birth date of the victim, firstly, the school leaving certificate in which the birth date has been recorded without following the due procedure in accordance with the Bombay Primary Education Rules and without proving the facts entered in the school leaving certificate, as Raliyatben who had accompanied the minor at the time of her admission in the school has not been examined to prove the basis on which she had given the date of birth of the victim; and secondly, the report of the Medical Officer to the effect that the age of the minor is nineteen years, in the opinion of this court, since the veracity of the birth date given in the school leaving certificate which has been produced on record was itself not established, it cannot be said that the trial court committed an error in giving more weightage to the medical certificate given by the doctor at Exhibit-13 rather than placing reliance upon the school leaving certificate which was produced on record. 14. Insofar as the reliance placed on behalf of the prosecution upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana (supra) is concerned, what has been held therein is that matriculation or equivalent certificate of the child concerned is the highest rated option in the scheme of rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2007 Rules”). In case the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules envisages consideration of the date of birth entered in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. If such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration for determining the age of the child concerned, as the certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. If such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration for determining the age of the child concerned, as the certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules postulates the determination of the age of the child concerned, on the basis of medical opinion. Examining the facts of the present case in the light of the principles enunciated in the above decision, the highest rated option namely, matriculation or equivalent certificate of the child concerned has not been produced on record. What is produced is the school leaving certificate which is the second option and it has been held that the date of birth detected therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive and no other material is to be relied upon. What is observed in the above decision has to be considered in the context of the provisions of the Bombay Primary Education Rules which provide for the manner in which the birth date is required to be entered in the school register. What is envisaged in the above judgment is the entry of date of birth in the school register made in the mode and manner provided therefor. In the present case, the date of birth has not been entered by following the procedure as provided under the relevant rules. Under the circumstances, the school leaving certificate issued by the concerned school which has been prepared without following the procedure as provided, under the Bombay Primary Education Rules, cannot be said to be proper certificate on which reliance can be placed as envisaged under rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules. No birth certificate issued by the panchayat or by the municipal corporation has been produced on record. Therefore, the only option left is determination of the age of child on the basis of medical opinion. In these circumstances, in the opinion of this court, the trial court was wholly justified in placing reliance upon the medical opinion determining the age of the victim rather than on the school leaving certificate which was produced on record. 15. Therefore, the only option left is determination of the age of child on the basis of medical opinion. In these circumstances, in the opinion of this court, the trial court was wholly justified in placing reliance upon the medical opinion determining the age of the victim rather than on the school leaving certificate which was produced on record. 15. In the light of the above discussion, the first requirement so as to fall within the ambit of section 363 read with section 361 of the Indian Penal Code is clearly not satisfied, viz., the age of the victim was not less than eighteen years at the time of commission of the alleged offence. Apart from the fact that the victim is not found to be below the age of eighteen years, as is evident from the cross-examination of the victim, deposition of Mahesh the brother of the victim, as well as the deposition of the Investigating Officer, the victim had willingly, on her own, gone with the accused. From the deposition of Maheshbhai, who has been examined at Exhibit-9, what emerges is that on the date of the incident, he was at home with his sister, at which point of time his sister had told him that she was going to buy vegetables and had asked him for money and, therefore, he had given some money from his purse. That after giving her money, his sister had hurriedly gone away and, therefore, he had followed her and accused Mahesh was also following her. That since there was no one at home, he had returned home after some time. Therefore, from the testimony of the said witness, what emerges is that Bhavna had left the house on her own and that he suspected her actions and, therefore, followed her. That since there was no one at home, he had returned home after some time. Therefore, from the testimony of the said witness, what emerges is that Bhavna had left the house on her own and that he suspected her actions and, therefore, followed her. From the deposition of victim Bhavnaben and more particularly, the contradictions brought out between her testimony and the version given before the police as well as from the deposition of the Investigating Officer – Girishbhai Haribhai Patel, who has clearly stated that before him, Bhavna had stated that she had gone and met the accused as well as advocate Hananibhai and they had all gone to Amreli where the advocate had got her marriage with the accused solemnised and a certificate had been given by the court and thereafter, they had taken a luxury bus from Amreli to Surat; that Mahesh had not enticed her but that since they were in love, she wanted to get married with him and had willingly gone with Mahesh namely, the accused. From the cross-examination of the victim as well as the testimony of the Investigating officer, it clearly emerges that the victim had, on her own, gone with the accused. The trial court in the impugned order has recorded that from the record, it is established that victim Bhavna has, on her own, willingly gone with the accused. Not only that, she had gone with full preparation, viz., she had also asked the accused to take a house on rent at Surat and hence, it cannot be believed that she had been enticed by the accused. Testing the facts of the present case on the anvil of the principles enunciated in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S. Varadarajan v. State of Madras (supra), even if for the sake of argument, it is assumed that the victim was less than eighteen years of age, it cannot be gainsaid that she was, therefore, on the verge of attaining majority. From the record of the case, it is evident that she had willingly accompanied the accused consistent with her own desire to be the wife of the accused. Under the circumstances, the trial court was wholly justified in not drawing an inference that the accused was guilty of taking the girl out of the keeping of her lawful guardian i.e., her father. Under the circumstances, the trial court was wholly justified in not drawing an inference that the accused was guilty of taking the girl out of the keeping of her lawful guardian i.e., her father. Moreover, the medical certificate produced at Exhibit-13 shows the age of the victim to be around nineteen years; no injury was seen on the body of the victim and hence, the trial court was of the view that there was no reason not to believe the medical certificate. The trial court was of the view that having regard to the circumstances under which the incident had taken place, it would not be safe to place reliance upon the school leaving certificate alone for the purpose of considering the birth date. The trial court has observed that in the facts and circumstances of the case, had there been a birth certificate issued by the Gram Panchayat or the Municipal Corporation, that would have been a different matter. In the facts of the present case, the birth date has been entered in the school register at the convenience of the person who had gone to get her admitted. Moreover, the witnesses namely, the father and mother of the victim have not been able to give any clear birth date of the victim. It is in the light of the aforesaid findings recorded by it, that the trial court has come to the conclusion that the offence under section 363 of the Indian Penal Code has not been made out. 16. In the light of the above discussion, it is evident that the trial court has based its conclusions on findings of fact recorded after appreciation of the evidence on record. As discussed hereinabove, in the light of the facts and circumstances which have come on record, the trial court was wholly justified in giving more weightage to the medical certificate as compared to the school leaving certificate which was produced on record. For the reasons stated hereinabove, this court is of the view that it cannot be said that the findings recorded by the trial court suffer from any legal infirmity or that the same are in any manner perverse to the record of the case. For the reasons stated hereinabove, this court is of the view that it cannot be said that the findings recorded by the trial court suffer from any legal infirmity or that the same are in any manner perverse to the record of the case. Under the circumstances, in the absence of any perversity in the findings recorded by the trial court, even if on the same set of facts, it were possible to take a different view, the same would not warrant interference by this court in exercise of powers under section 378 of the Code. 17. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.