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2015 DIGILAW 783 (RAJ)

Rajasthan Housing Board v. Judge, Industrial Disputes Tribunal

2015-04-07

SANDEEP MEHTA

body2015
ORDER : Sandeep Mehta, J. 1. By way of the instant writ petition, the petitioner Rajasthan Housing Board has approached this Court assailing the legality and validity of the award Annexure-12 dated 27.12.2007 passed by Industrial Tribunal, Jodhpur in Labour Case No. 152/2006 whereby the reference instituted at the instance of the respondent workman Mahendra Singh Bhati was accepted and holding his removal from service to be illegal retrenchment, he was directed to be reinstated in service without back wages. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent workman was employed as a computer operator by the petitioner on a fixed term on purely contractual basis. There is no ordered post of Computer Operator in the Housing Board at Jodhpur. 3. Assailing the legality and validity of the award, counsel for the petitioner contends that though the respondent was engaged as a contractual employee and the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act were even not applicable to his case but despite that the petitioner Board, by way of abundant caution, before terminating him from service, complied with all the mandatory requirements of the Industrial Disputes Act. He submits that the respondent workman came to the Board's office on 31.3.2004 and left immediately after submitting a leave application. On the very same day, the termination order Annexure P-4 accompanied with a compensation draft was forwarded by hand to the residence of the respondent workman with a peon after entering the same in the Peon Book. Learned counsel submits that the respondent was not found available at his residence upon which the peon attempted to offer the termination order and the demand draft to the mother of the respondent but she had been briefed in advance and refused to accept the documents. Thereafter the termination letter as well as the compensation draft were transmitted to the residence of the respondent workman through speed post on 1.4.2004. The envelope was carried by the postman to the residence of the respondent on 1.4.2004, 2.4.2004, 5.4.2004 and 6.4.2004 and on each date, it was returned back with the note that recipient was not found available at the address. Ultimately the envelope was sent back to the petitioner Board on 8.4.2004. The envelope was carried by the postman to the residence of the respondent on 1.4.2004, 2.4.2004, 5.4.2004 and 6.4.2004 and on each date, it was returned back with the note that recipient was not found available at the address. Ultimately the envelope was sent back to the petitioner Board on 8.4.2004. Thereupon the Board again sent the documents through registered A.D. post on 8.4.2004 at the address of the respondent workman but the said envelope was also returned back with the endorsement that the addressee was not found available despite four attempts. Finally the petitioner Board was constrained to effect service of the termination order through publication in a news paper on 17.5.2004. He submits that the workman, in his testimony before the Tribunal admitted that he was aware of the termination proceedings even before the documents Annexure-4 and Annexure-5 were prepared and thus as per him, the workman deliberately avoided to accept the termination order as well as the compensation draft. He thus urged that adverse inference deserves to be drawn against the workman. Learned counsel further referred to the evidence of L.R. Bishnoi, the representative of the petitioner Board who was examined before the Tribunal and urged that the witness clearly stated that the termination letter as well as the compensation draft was sent to the residence of the workman but he deliberately refused to accept the same. Learned counsel submitted that no cross examination was conducted from the witness on this aspect of his evidence, and therefore, the plea taken by the Board before the Tribunal that full compliance of provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act was made before removing the respondent workman from service ought to have been accepted. 4. Learned counsel placed reliance on the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gurmail Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Others, reported in AIR 1993 SC 1388 and submits that the only requirement of law is that the compensation should be tendered to the workman before effecting his termination and that would be a sufficient compliance of the mandate of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. He further submits that the respondent was reinstated in service pursuant to the award because the stay application preferred by the Board in the instant writ petition was dismissed. He further submits that the respondent was reinstated in service pursuant to the award because the stay application preferred by the Board in the instant writ petition was dismissed. However, he contends that the reinstatement was directed making it subject to final out come of the instant writ petition. He vehemently urged that the impugned award is grossly illegal and the writ petition deserves to be accepted and the award Annexure-12 should be quashed. Learned counsel thus submits that the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act do not apply to the respondent's case but even assuming that it is so, then too, as full compliance of the mandatory requirements of Section 25F was made before the workman's removal, he is not entitled to the relief of reinstatement and regularisation in service. He relies on the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v. Umadevi and Others, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 and Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and Others, reported in (2008) 10 SCC 1 and urges that the impugned award is grossly illegal and deserves to be set aside. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Saluja, learned counsel for the respondent workman contends that the workman was not engaged on contractual basis as is claimed by the petitioner. He further submits that as the requirement of the mandatory provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act was not made before effecting termination of the workman, the impugned award is perfectly legal and is not liable to be interfered with in the instant writ petition. He placed reliance on the decision rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anoop Sharma v. Executive Engineer, Public Health Division No. 1, Panipat, reported in (2010) 5 SCC 497 and contends that for proper compliance of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act compensation has to be actually paid to the employee on the date of his termination and mere tendering cannot amount to sufficient compliance. He further urges that the respondent workman has already been reinstated and is working on his post to the fullest satisfaction of the employer since the year 2008 and thus the impugned award should not be interfered with in order to maintain equity. He further urges that the respondent workman has already been reinstated and is working on his post to the fullest satisfaction of the employer since the year 2008 and thus the impugned award should not be interfered with in order to maintain equity. Counsel for the respondent further contends that the decision rendered in Gurmail Singh's case (supra) does not apply to the case at hand as that was a case of mass retrenchment wherein it was not possible for the employer to have actually paid compensation to the workmen who were spread through out the State. As per him, the compensation should actually be paid to the workman and mere offer is not sufficient and as in the case at hand, the termination order and the compensation were not handed over personally to the workman even though he came to the petitioner's office on 31.3.2004, there is no compliance of the mandatory requirement of mandatory provisions of the I.D. Act. Thus, he prays that the Court should adopt a view in favour of the workman and refuse to interfere in the impugned award. 6. Heard and considered the arguments advanced at the bar. Perused the material available on record and the case law cited. Firstly, the argument advanced by the counsel for the petitioner Board that the respondent workman was employed on a contractual basis and thus the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act do not apply in his case needs to be examined. The appointment order dated 26.4.1999 of the respondent workman which has been placed on record as Annexure P-3 does not reflect that the respondent was appointed on contractual basis. The appointment of the respondent was made on a honorarium of Rs. 3000 for a fixed period for 180 days. The term was thereafter increased from time to time. It is not disputed that neither in the appointment order nor in the extension order is it mentioned that the initial appointment of the respondent workman was on contractual basis. The respondent workman appeared in evidence in the proceedings before the Tribunal and no question was put to him in his cross examination that he had been engaged by the petitioner Board on contractual basis. The respondent workman appeared in evidence in the proceedings before the Tribunal and no question was put to him in his cross examination that he had been engaged by the petitioner Board on contractual basis. Therefore, the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the appointment of respondent workman was not on contractual basis was arrived at after due appreciation of the material available on record and cannot be termed as baseless so as to call for any interference. 7. Now, coming to the question as to whether or not the petitioner Board complied with the mandatory requirements of the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act before terminating the respondent workman from service. Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 reads as under:- 25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until:- (a) the workman has been given one month' s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice: (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government 3 or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette]. 8. As per Section 25F(a), before terminating the services of a workman, he has to be given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or to be paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of notice. Section 25F(b) mandates that the workman is required to be paid compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. 9. The petitioner Board has specifically came out with a case that the termination order Annexure P-5 accompanied with a draft of Rs. Section 25F(b) mandates that the workman is required to be paid compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. 9. The petitioner Board has specifically came out with a case that the termination order Annexure P-5 accompanied with a draft of Rs. 13,500/- prepared after making due calculation and accounting for one month's salary as per Section 25F(a) of the notice period and the retrenchment compensation as per Section 25F(b) were entered in the peon book and forwarded by hand to the workman's residence with a peon on 31.3.2004 itself i.e. the date of his termination. A copy of the peon book has been placed on record as Annexure P-6. The petitioner's witness Mr. L.R. Bishnoi swore an affidavit wherein this fact was mentioned. No cross examination whatsoever was made from the witness Mr. L.R. Bishnoi on this issue during his cross examination. Thus, it is evident that the petitioner proved beyond all manner of doubt before the Tribunal that the termination order as well as the draft of one month's salary and retrenchment compensation were sent and tendered to the respondent workman at his admitted address. The action in sending the termination order as well as the draft through the peon was an act done in the discharge of official duty. Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act provides a presumption regarding the regular performance of the judicial and official acts. 10. The fact that the respondent workman was bent upon to avoid service of termination order and the compensation draft is visible from the admitted facts as available on record. The termination letter and the demand draft were sent to the workman's residence by hand on 31.3.2004 were refused by the mother of the respondent workman without any justification. Immediately after such refusal, the documents were transmitted by speed post and then by registered A.D. post but both were returned back with the report that the addressee was not found at his residence despite repeated efforts. Immediately after such refusal, the documents were transmitted by speed post and then by registered A.D. post but both were returned back with the report that the addressee was not found at his residence despite repeated efforts. In this view of the matter, this Court is of the firm opinion that the petitioner Board has amply established that as stipulated in Section 25F of the I.D. Act, the termination order accompanied with the draft of one month's salary period and the retrenchment compensation on the very same day were tendered to the respondent workman. The view taken by the Tribunal that the compensation should have been actually paid to the respondent workman on the very same day of the termination cannot be sustained as the same runs contrary to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gurmail Singh's case (supra). 11. Even in the case of Anoop Sharma v. Executive Engineer, Public Health Division (supra) on which much stress was laid by Mr. Saluja, the Apex Court held that the compensation should be offered to the workman before discontinuing his engagement/ employment. The Apex Court in the said case noticed that if there was any grain of truth in the employer's assertion that the compensation was offered to the workman on 25.4.1998 and he refused to accept the same, there could be no justification for not sending the demand draft by post immediately after the workman's refusal to accept the offer of compensation. In the case at hand, the petitioner Board admittedly, upon the refusal of the termination order and the demand draft by the workman's mother at his residence, immediately transmitted the same to the respondent's residence by speed post and thereafter through registered A.D. post. Thus, the decision rendered in Anoop Sharma's case is of no help to the respondent workman. 12. The argument advanced by Mr. Saluja that equities weigh in favour of the respondent workman since he has been taken back on duty and is working to the fullest satisfaction of the petitioner since 2008 is also of no avail because the order dated 23.9.2008 whereby the petitioner was reinstated in service clearly reflects that the reinstatement was being made subject to the decision of instant writ petition. It is an admitted position that there is no cadres post of Computer Operator in the petitioner Board's Jodhpur office. It is an admitted position that there is no cadres post of Computer Operator in the petitioner Board's Jodhpur office. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief on the ground of equity as well. 13. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition deserves to be and is allowed. The impugned award Annexure P-12 dated 27.12.2007 passed by the Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Jodhpur in Labour Case No. 152/2006 is quashed and set aside. No order as to cost.