JUDGMENT : S.R. Brahmbhatt, J. Heard learned advocate Shri Vasavada for the applicants and Shri Mankad, who assisted the Court as he used to appear in earlier occasion for the workman in earlier proceedings and workman had not objected to his assistance being rendered to the Court. 2. The applicants have taken out this application for the following prayers : "(A) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit and allow present application. (B) Your Lordships may be pleased to recall the judgment and order dated 4.12.2007 which is at Annexure - E and further be pleased to pass the order in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties and hold that the provisions of ID Act would not be applicable in view of the award passed by the Labour Court. (C) Any other and further relief/s as may be deemed fit and proper may please be granted.” 3. The chequered history leading to filing this application as could be gathered from the documents placed on record would indicate that present applicants had to challenge an order and award dated 5.2.2004 passed by the Labour Court in Reference (LCA) No. 20 of 1990, where-under, the Court had awarded reinstatement with 40% back-wages from 4.3.1997 to the date of reinstatement of workman respondent here in above. 4. The Special Civil Application being Special Civil Application No. 4620 of 2004 was preferred, which came to be disposed of by this Court on 4.12.2007, where under, after recording elaborate reasoning the Court recorded that as there was no challenge to the reinstatement and the challenge was confined to the order of Labour Court qua granting of the back-wages from a particular date was modified and this Court directed that the workman was entitled to receive 40% back-wages from 4.3.1997 to 1.10.2012 and that back-wages was to be paid within a period of 6 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the order. In order to indicate the reasoning and consideration on the part of the court, it would be most appropriate to take out relevant observations of that order and reproduce the same here in below in the same wording as under: "6. In order to indicate the reasoning and consideration on the part of the court, it would be most appropriate to take out relevant observations of that order and reproduce the same here in below in the same wording as under: "6. Since the petitioner is not challenging the award qua reinstatement, short question a rising for consideration of this court is, whether the respondent workman is entitled for back-wages or not and if yes, then, for how much period, he is entitled for the same? 7. Looking to the facts as emerging from the record, the services of the respondent workman were terminated on the basis of the allegation that while he was on duty, two gold ornaments worth Rs.1002.00 had been received by way of donation for which the second party workman had not issued receipt and no any intimation about receipt of the donation had been given to the Manager and when the information about the said donation had been received from the donour, on 19.6.1989, upon inquiry, second party workman had made admission about t he receipt of the article and amount and therefore, based upon the said allegation, services of the respondent workman were terminated by t he petitioner trust against which the workman raised industrial dispute which was i n turn referred to for adjudication to the labour court. 8. Labour court considered that in respect of the allegation made against the second party workman, no show cause notice was served on the respondent by the petitioner. Therefore, ultimately, labour came to the conclusion that the termination is contrary to the principles of natural justice as no departmental inquiry was initiated against the respondent. No doubt, on facts, labour court is having finding that on the date on which the donour donated the amount and gold ornaments, Manager/Munim was on leave. However, the question which is relevant is the ground on which the labour court set aside the order of termination of services of the respondent workman and that is, that the termination was effected without departmental inquiry and, therefore, it has been held that the order of termination is passed in breach of the principles of natural justice and, therefore, based upon such findings, labour court passed the award in question. However, since the petitioner is not challenging that part of the a ward as submitted by learned Advocate Mr. However, since the petitioner is not challenging that part of the a ward as submitted by learned Advocate Mr. Sachin D. Vasavada, therefore, this quest ion i s not material, to be decided by this court as that part is not challenged by the petitioner and, therefore, this court is confirming the award in question in so far as it relates to rein statement of the workman. However, I am examining the question of back-wages in light of the f act that the termination has been held to be invalid because it was violative of the principles of natural justice. While examining this aspect of the matter, labour court has observed that in the matter of the year 1990, workman had given deposition in the form of affidavit on 4.3.1997 and thus, second party workman has given such deposition before the labour court after seven years from the date of filing of reference before the labour court deposing that he has been unemployed. No oral and/or documentary evidence was produced by the petitioner before the labour court to show that the workman had been gainfully employed during the interim period and, therefore, second party is entitled for getting back-wages from the first part y with effect from 4.3.1997. Thus, no back wage s for the period prior to 4.3.1997 have not been awarded by the labour court. It is relevant to be noted that if the workman would have been really unemployed and had been facing hardship/starvation, then, he should no t have waited for a period upto 7 years for giving evidence before the labour court but he ought to have rushed immediately before the labour court because deposition in the form of affidavit was given by the workman before the labour court in 1997. Thus, workman remained silent for about seven years, meaning thereby, he was happy with the situation and not bothered f or the unemployment. Similarly, that logic would apply to subsequent period from 1997 onward as per the affidavit filed by the petitioner pointing out the fact that the workman was permanent employee of Sheth Narshi Natha Charitable Trust Fund with effect from st 1 October, 2002 . Similarly, that logic would apply to subsequent period from 1997 onward as per the affidavit filed by the petitioner pointing out the fact that the workman was permanent employee of Sheth Narshi Natha Charitable Trust Fund with effect from st 1 October, 2002 . Therefore, considering entire matter while keeping in mind the object of the trust and activities carried out by the trust and also considering the fact that the trust is receiving donations and having no other income and the workman is also working with the trust and he had remained unemployed from 1990 to som e extent according to my opinion, award of back-wages made by the labour court is required to be modified by this court as per the decision of the apex court in Divisional Controller GSRTC and Kadarbhai J. Suthar, reported in 2007-ILLJ page 1046. In para 6, 7 and 8 of the said decision, apex court observed as under: 6. When fixing the back-wages, several factors need to be noted. It is a well settled position in law that on the finding that termination was not lawful, there is no automatic entitlement to full back-wages. In Hindustan Tin Works P. Ltd. v. Employees of Hindustan Tin Works P. Ltd. and ors. AIR 1979 SC 75 , a three Judge Bench of this Court laid down at p. 478 of LLJ: '11. In the very nature of things there cannot be a straight-jacket formula for awarding relief of back-wages. All relevant considerations will enter the verdict. More or less, it would be a motion addressed to the discretion of the Tribunal. Full back-wages would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure. At that stage, the Tribunal will exercise its discretion keeping in view all the relevant circumstances. But the discretion must be exercised in a judicial and judicious manner. The reason for exercising discretion must be cogent and convincing and must appear on the face of the re cord. When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authority, that something is to be done according to the rules of reasons and justice, according to law and not humour. It is not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular (See Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield (1981) AC 173, 179). 7. When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authority, that something is to be done according to the rules of reasons and justice, according to law and not humour. It is not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular (See Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield (1981) AC 173, 179). 7. In PGI of Medical Education and Research Chandigarh v. Rajkumar AIR 2001 SC 479 , this Court found fault with the High Court in setting aside the award of the Labour Court which restricted the back-wages to 60% and directing payment of full back w ages. It was observed thus: The Labour Court being the final Court of facts came to a conclusion that payment of 60% back wage s would comply with the requirement of law. The finding of perversity o r being erroneous or not in accordance with law shall have to be recorded with reasons in order to assail the finding of the Tribunal or the Labour Court. It is not for the High Cougrotinttoo the factual aspects of the matter and there is an existing limitation on the High Court to that affect. Again at paragraph 12, this Court observed at p. 548 of LLJ: "12. Payment of back-wages having a discretionary element involvement in it has to be dealt with in the facts and circumstances of each case and no s trait jacket formula can be evolved,tho ugh, however, there is statutory sanction to direct payment of back-wages in its entirety.' [See Hindustan Motors v. Tapan Kumar Bhattacharya and anr. 2002 II LLJ 1156 (SC)]. 8. Additionally, the Labour Court had taken note of the previous acts of misconduct by the workman while denying the back-wages. That aspect was completely lost sight of by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench. Merely because the Corporation did not challenge the order of reinstatement, that does not lead to a conclusion that it accepted any illegality in the departmental proceedings. As am after of fact, the Labour Court clearly not ed that the workman admitted the legality and propriety of the inquiry held against him. 9. Merely because the Corporation did not challenge the order of reinstatement, that does not lead to a conclusion that it accepted any illegality in the departmental proceedings. As am after of fact, the Labour Court clearly not ed that the workman admitted the legality and propriety of the inquiry held against him. 9. Therefore, in view of the peculiar fact s of the present case wherein the petitioner was not vigilant enough for assisting the labour court to examine the case appropriately on the question of back-wages and also considering the decision of the apex court as referred to above, there cannot be any straight jacket formula for granting back-wages for interim period be cause it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, therefore, considering the entire matter and the back ground and also keeping in mind the cordial relationship to be maintained between the petitioner and respondent, according to my opinion, it would be just and proper if back-wages from the date of evidence 4th March, 1997 to st 1 October, 2002 is award ed at the rate of 40 % instead of full back-wages as has been awarded by the labour court from 4th March, 1997 and that would met ends of justice between the parties. Accordingly award mad e by the labour court in Reference No. 20/90 dated 5th February, 2004 is hereby modified t o the effect that the reinstatement granted by the labour court has been confirmed by this court and petitioner shall have to pay 40 per cent back-wages for interim period from 4th March, 1997 t o 1st October, 2002 as expeditiously as possible, preferably within the period of six wee ks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Rule is made absolute to the extent indicated herein above with no order as to costs. After completion of this order, request was made by the learned Advocate Mr. R.P. Mankad on behalf of the respondent workman that let the petitioner may think over about transfer of the petitioner. As and when the vacancy and work is available at Palitana, I hope that the petitioner will definitely consider the request of the learned Advocate Mr. R.P. Mankad as and when such occasion arise. " 5. R.P. Mankad on behalf of the respondent workman that let the petitioner may think over about transfer of the petitioner. As and when the vacancy and work is available at Palitana, I hope that the petitioner will definitely consider the request of the learned Advocate Mr. R.P. Mankad as and when such occasion arise. " 5. This order was carried out into Letters Patent Appeal being Letters Patent Appeal No. 621 of 2008, by present applicants, where under, on 21.7.2008, the Division Bench passed the following order: "Appeal admitted. Learned advocate Mr. Satta, on instructions from the appellants, states that the appellants do not press this Appeal so far as the order relating to reinstatement is concerned." 6. It is submitted that on the very same day in Civil Application for stay, there was an interim relief against granting of back-wages only. 7. It is submitted that during the pendency of said Letters Patent Appeal, the settlement was arrived at between the parties, where under, the workman gave up the claim qua back-wages as could be seen from the documents produced at page no. 50 annexed to the compilation, which is said to have been dated 17.12.2011. The said Letters Patent Appeal came to be disposed of by this Court vide order dated 22.1.2014 by passing the order, which is reproduced here in above: "The present appeal has been filed challenging the order dated 4th December 2007 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 4620 of 2004. In light of the recent decision dated 26th December 2013 of the Larger Bench of this court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 596 of 2008 and cognate appeals, the present appeal is not maintainable as the appellant has not made the concerned Tribunal as a party in the writ petition. We, however, clarify that this Court has not examined the appeal on merits and the appellant shall be at liberty to challenge the impugned order of the learned Single Judge before the appropriate forum and the delay occurred in challenging the impugned order of the learned Judge before the Appellate Authority would not come in the way of the appellant. With these observations, the present appeal is disposed of. Interim relief, if any, stands extended for a period of 12 weeks from today." 8. With these observations, the present appeal is disposed of. Interim relief, if any, stands extended for a period of 12 weeks from today." 8. The present application appears to have been presented on 21.8.2014, where under, this Court (Coram: N.V. Anjaria, J.) on 5.2.2015 issued Rule, which was made returnable on 4th March, 2015. 9. The Court vide order dated 6.4.2015 recorded that the respondent workman needs legal aid and hence for doing the needful at the end of Legal Aid Committee, the matter was adjourned. During the course of hearing, it transpires that Shri Mankad, had appeared and workman agreed to take Shri Mankad's assistance in the matter and accordingly, Shri Mankad assisted the Court and there was some settlement talk re-appreciated again in this proceedings also. However, the same did not yield any result on account of various defects on the part of both the sides and there was insistence on the part of the workman to dispose of this application without adjourning the same. 10. Shri Mankad learned advocate has placed on record his own communication dated 1.11.2011, which was addressed to the Registrar of this Court in the proceedings of Letters Patent Appeal No. 621 of 2008 indicating that he was asked to retire from the proceedings. 11. Learned advocate Shri Vasavada for the applicants submitted that settlement on the record is arrived at without any compulsion on the workman. The document is also produced by the workman himself and contents of settlement would persuade this Court to recall or review the order, which is sought to be recalled or reviewed in this proceedings. Shri Vasavada, learned advocate for the applicants, could not point out the provisions of law under which such recall application is maintainable when the appeal proceedings are concluded, as could be seen from the order of Letters Patent Appeal. 12. This Court is of the considered view that present Misc. Shri Vasavada, learned advocate for the applicants, could not point out the provisions of law under which such recall application is maintainable when the appeal proceedings are concluded, as could be seen from the order of Letters Patent Appeal. 12. This Court is of the considered view that present Misc. Civil Application is not maintainable for the following reasons namely, the order of Single Judge has been subject matter of examination by the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 621 of 2008 and as could be seen from the order of Letters Patent Appeal, both the sides were present and appeal was disposed of and in that proceedings also, when the Court has disposed of Letters Patent Appeal on 22.1.2014, the factum of settlement, if at all, was in existence, had not been brought in any manner nor had the applicant held the Court for reserving the liberty to make use of settlement at any other time. The settlement was found existing, was not pressed into service before the Appellate Court, where the Appellate Court while rejecting the Appeal reserved the right to challenge the order of Single Judge before the appropriate forum and therefore, Shri Mankad in his submission is correct, when he submitted that the order of Single Judge could be said to have been merged into that of the Appellate Bench, though Bench has clearly observed that the Appellate Bench is not observing anything on merit but that itself is not sufficient to cloth this Court's order to recall the order, as the same would otherwise not permissible as the only remedy available was to file appropriate proceedings challenging the order of the Appellate Court or Single Judge in the superior Court. The recalling of the order in these situation, after lapse of these many years, would otherwise also would not be maintainable. 13. This Court is mindful of the fact that the respondent workman has not placed on record his version on oath denying the settlement in any manner. The respondent workman is in fact served and is present in the Court on number of occasions and in few hearing, he is being represented by learned advocate Shri Mankad. The Court, therefore, is not inclined to make any observation qua veracity of settlement dated 17.12.2011 but suffice it to say that on the strength of said settlement, the present application is not maintainable. The Court, therefore, is not inclined to make any observation qua veracity of settlement dated 17.12.2011 but suffice it to say that on the strength of said settlement, the present application is not maintainable. This would not preclude the applicants from taking out appropriate proceedings or taking up appropriate defence in appropriate proceedings on the basis thereupon. 14. With these observations, the Misc. Civil Application is dismissed as having no merits. Rule is discharged. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.