JUDGMENT Paresh Upadhyay, J. 1. Challenge in this group of petitions is made to the orders passed by the District Judges, Bharuch and Dahod (the details of which are given here below in paras: 3.7 to 3.10) under the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, allowing the references made by the Inspecting Officers under the said Act, and thereby calling upon the applicants before it (the District Courts) to pay ad valorem court fee as prescribed under Article 7 of Schedule-I of the said Act. The applications on which the said deficit court fee is directed to be paid, are under the provisions of Section 10 of 'the Petroleum and Minerals Pipeline Act, 1962' (for short, 'the PMP Act, 1962') read with Rule 5 of 'the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Rules, 1963' (for short, ' the 1963 Rules'). 2. The point for consideration before this Court is, as to whether the State Government is empowered to charge any fee, under the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, on an application, that may be filed by any party to the District Judge, invoking Section 10 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 read with Rule 5 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Rules, 1963, and if that is so, at what rate the said fee is to be paid. 3. Relevant facts leading to filing of these petitions are as under. 3.1 For the purpose of laying pipeline for transport of gas from Dahej - Vemar - Vijapur, the Central Government, in exercise of its powers under the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 and after following due procedure, acquired right of user in the various parcels of land. This was in the year 2002. The Gas Authority of India Limited - which is now known as M/s. GAIL (India) Limited - ('GAIL' for short) is the concerned Corporation for this purpose. 3.2 On the above acquisition of the right of user, the original land owners were entitled to compensation under Section 10of the PMP Act, 1962. 3.3 The Competent Authority ordered GAIL to pay certain amount of compensation to the land owners under Section 10(1)of the PMP Act, 1962. 3.4 The claimants wanted more compensation be awarded to them. 3.2 On the above acquisition of the right of user, the original land owners were entitled to compensation under Section 10of the PMP Act, 1962. 3.3 The Competent Authority ordered GAIL to pay certain amount of compensation to the land owners under Section 10(1)of the PMP Act, 1962. 3.4 The claimants wanted more compensation be awarded to them. 3.5 For this purpose, they filed separate applications to the District Judge, Bharuch invoking Section 10(2) read with Section 10(5) of the PMP Act, 1962, read with Rule 5 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Rules, 1963. On each of such application, the court fee of Re. 1/- was paid by the respective applicant. 3.6 An issue cropped up before the District Judge, on the reference made by the Inspecting Officer appointed by the State Government under the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, as to whether the court fee of Re. 1/- on each application is proper or there is deficit in that regard. 3.7 The stand of the State Government before the District Judge, through the Inspecting Officer was to the effect that, the court fee is payable according to Article 3 or 7 of Schedule-I of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004. It is more than Re. 1/- and is ad valorem. The stand of the GAIL, standing as respondent in the said group of matters was also consistent with that of the State Government. The case of the claimants was that even Re. 1/- is not payable because in view of Section 20 (xv) of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, the applications filed by them are exempted document. The District Judge, Bharuch accepted the objection raised on behalf of the State Government through the Inspecting Officer and passed an order on 28.02.2007 directing the applicants to pay court fees accordingly. The said common order is recorded on Civil Miscellaneous Application (Court Fees Reference) (Main) No. 282 of 2004, with other 1122 cognate references. 3.8 Review Applications, being Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 41 of 2007 and cognate applications were filed before the District Judge, Bharuch by the claimants to review the above order, however, that is also rejected by the District Judge, Bharuch vide order dated 17.07.2008. 3.8 Review Applications, being Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 41 of 2007 and cognate applications were filed before the District Judge, Bharuch by the claimants to review the above order, however, that is also rejected by the District Judge, Bharuch vide order dated 17.07.2008. 3.9 It is the above two orders i.e. the orders dated 28.02.2007 and 17.07.2008 passed by the District Judge, Bharuch which are challenged in Special Civil Application No. 12052 of 2008. 3.10 Similar question cropped up before the District Judge, Dahod in the applications filed by GAIL for reduction of compensation awarded by the competent authority under the PMP Act, 1962, and there also similar order is passed on 31.08.2012 by the 4th Addl. District Judge, Dahod. The said common order is recorded on Court Fees Reference No. 01 of 2010 to 109 of 2010, Court Fee Reference No. 110 of 2010 to 888 of 2010, Court Fee Reference No. 01 of 2011 to 1568 of 2011. The said order is challenged in Special Civil Application No. 2404 of 2013. On the objection of the Registry, separate one page petitions are filed qua each claimant, which are of the year 2013, the numbers of which are noted above. 3.11 In above factual background, the question has cropped up before this Court as noted in para 2 above. 4. Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned senior advocate for the claimants has addressed the Court at length. Attention of the Court is invited to the applications of the claimants before the District Judge for enhancement of compensation and the stand of the GAIL and the Government therein qua the Court fees. Reference is also made to the applications filed by GAIL before the District Judge for reduction of compensation and its stand qua Court fees on those applications. Learned senior advocate has taken this Court through the various provisions of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 and the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Rules, 1963. The bone contention is that, nothing is chargeable by the State on the applications made by the claimants under the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 to the District Judge, since those applications are exempted documents in view of Section 20(xv) of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004. The bone contention is that, nothing is chargeable by the State on the applications made by the claimants under the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 to the District Judge, since those applications are exempted documents in view of Section 20(xv) of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004. It is submitted that the impugned orders being inconsistent with the statutory provisions, be quashed and set aside. Reliance is placed on the following decisions in support of his submissions. "(i) Decision of this Court recorded on Special Civil Application No. 13458 of 2011 and allied matters dated 13.10.2014. (ii) Lodna Colliery Co. (1920) Ltd., v. N.B. Roy and others reported in AIR 1968 Calcutta 545. (iii) C.G. Ghanshamdas and others v. Collector of Madras reported in (1986) 4 SCC 305 ." 5. Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned senior advocate for GAIL has also addressed the Court at length. Learned senior advocate has taken this Court through the various provisions of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 and the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Rules, 1963. His bone contention is also that, nothing is chargeable by the State on the applications made by the GAIL under the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 to the District Judge, since those applications are exempted documents in view of Section 20(xv) of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004. It is submitted that all the tests of the said exemption are satisfied by the applications in question. It is submitted that the impugned orders being inconsistent with the statutory provisions, be quashed and set aside. Learned advocate for the GAIL has also made alternative submissions, reference to which would be made if necessary, after the principal contention is dealt with by this Court. Reliance is placed on the following decisions in support of his submissions. "(i) Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar and others v. State of Gujarat and another reported in 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596. (ii) Late Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Hyderabad reported in 1986 (Supp) SCC 700. (iii) Lakshmi Ammal v. K.M. Madhavakrishnan and others reported in (1978) 4 SCC 15 . "(i) Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar and others v. State of Gujarat and another reported in 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596. (ii) Late Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Hyderabad reported in 1986 (Supp) SCC 700. (iii) Lakshmi Ammal v. K.M. Madhavakrishnan and others reported in (1978) 4 SCC 15 . (iv) Decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 18013 of 2005 dated 05.09.2005." 6.1 Mr. Prakash Jani, learned Additional Advocate General for the State has submitted that, the Inspecting Officer under the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004 had rightly raised an issue before the District Judge and considering the provisions of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004 and the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962, the District Judges have rightly held that the deficit court fees need to be paid by the claimants and GAIL on the applications for enhancement/reduction of the compensation awarded by the Competent Authority under the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962. Various provisions are referred to by Mr. Jani, learned Additional Advocate General to contend that, no interference be made by this Court. It is submitted that the Corporation acquires right of user only and the title continues with the original land owner and therefore as per settled position of law, the applications need to be filed with proper Court fees as stipulated under Schedule-I of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004. Specific reference is made to Article 3 and 7 thereof. It is submitted that these petitions be dismissed. 6.2 Learned Additional Advocate General has relied on the following decisions in support of his submissions. "(i) Mota Singh and others etc., v. State of Haryana and Others reported in AIR 1981 SC 484 . (ii) Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Natson Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. Reported in (1979) 1 SCC 193 (more particularly Para No. 11). (iii) Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji etc., v. State of Rajasthan and Others reported in AIR 1963 SC 1638 (1). (iv) Guru Datta Sharma v. State of Bihar and another reported in AIR 1961 SC 1684 . (v) Decision of the Bombay High Court recorded on Letters Patent Appeals No. 319 of 2008 dated 21.07.2009. (vi) Decision of the Bombay High Court recorded on Writ Petition No. 2231 of 2008 dated 21.08.2008. (vii) Lady Tanumati Girijaprasad Chinubhai Since decd. (iv) Guru Datta Sharma v. State of Bihar and another reported in AIR 1961 SC 1684 . (v) Decision of the Bombay High Court recorded on Letters Patent Appeals No. 319 of 2008 dated 21.07.2009. (vi) Decision of the Bombay High Court recorded on Writ Petition No. 2231 of 2008 dated 21.08.2008. (vii) Lady Tanumati Girijaprasad Chinubhai Since decd. v. SPL. Land Acq. Officer, Western Rly. A'bad reported in 1973 GLR 537 . (viii) N.V.V. Krishna v. Union of India and others reported in AIR 2004 Madras 324. (ix) The State of U.P. v. Ramkrishan Burman reported in AIR 1971 SC 87 . (x) State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose and others reported in AIR 1954 SC 92 . (xi) Urvashidevi Jaidipsinh Maharaul v. Union of India reported in 2014 (2) GCD 1234 (Guj). (xii) Trilok Sudhirbhai Pandya v. Union of India reported in AIR 2012 SC 1668 . (xiii) Decision of Kerala High Court recorded on W.A. No. 2038 of 2005 dated 11.12.2009. (xiv) Parikh Ramanlal Govindlal v. O.N.G.C. reported in 1996 (2) G.L.H. 389 . (xv) (The) Anil Starch Products Ltd. v. The Gujarat Labour Welfare Board and Another reported in 1983 G.L.H.912. (xvi) Amreli Municipality v. Inspecting Officer (Court Fees) reported in 1995 (1) G.L.H. 622 . (xvii) Kilara Power Pvt. Ltd. v. Jyoti Ltd., reported in 2004 (3) GLH 639 . (xviii) State of Gujarat v. Kantilal Prajapati reported in 1977 (0) GLHEL - HC 212066. (xix) Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Rechan Rivets reported in 1977 (0) GLHEL - HC 204088." 7. Having heard learned advocates for the respective parties and having considered the material on record, this Court finds as under. 7.1 The point for consideration before this Court, as noted in para:2 above is, as to whether the State Government is empowered to charge any fee, under the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, on an application, that may be filed by any party to the District Judge, invoking Section 10 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 read with Rule 5 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Rules, 1963. And if that is so, at what rate the said fee is to be paid. 7.2 Government derives power in this regard from Section 4 of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, which reads as under. And if that is so, at what rate the said fee is to be paid. 7.2 Government derives power in this regard from Section 4 of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, which reads as under. "Section 4: Fees on documents filed, etc. in courts or in public offices. No document of any of the kinds specified as chargeable in the First or Second Schedule annexed to this Act shall be filed, exhibited or recorded in any Court of Justice, or shall be received or furnished by any public officer, unless in respect of such document there has been paid a fee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of the said Schedules as the proper fee for such document." 7.3 The stand of the Government is that, since the application made by the land owners/claimants or GAIL, as the case may be, is either to get more compensation or for reduction of compensation, the same would be covered by Article 3 or 7 of Schedule-I of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004 and therefore, the impugned orders need to be upheld. While referring to the said articles, reference to Article 1 of the said Schedule may also be necessary. Those Articles i.e. Article Nos. 1, 3 and 7 of Schedule-I of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004 read as under. 7.4 While considering the above argument, Section 20 of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, more particularly sub-section (xv) thereof also needs to be kept in view. It reads as under. "Section 20: Exemption of certain documents. Nothing contained in this Act shall render the following documents chargeable with any fee - (i) .... (ii) .... (xiv) .... (xv) Applications for compensation under any law for the time being in force relating to the acquisition of property for public purposes, other than those chargeable under Article 15 of Schedule -I." 7.5 From the above it follows that firstly it has to be ascertained as to whether the applications in question would be covered by the above quoted exemption under Section 20(xv) of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004 and if that is so, other arguments, including as to which Article of Schedule-I of the said Act, may pale into insignificance. 7.6 There are four ingredients of the above quoted exemption under Section 20(xv) of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004. 7.6 There are four ingredients of the above quoted exemption under Section 20(xv) of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004. They are:- "(i) the application should be for compensation under any law for the time being in force, (ii) it should be relating to the acquisition of property, (iii) the said acquisition should be for public purposes, (iv) and it should be other than those chargeable under Article 15 of Schedule I." 8. The finding of this Court, qua each of the above (i) to (iv) is as under. 8.1.1 It is not in dispute that the applications in question are for compensation under the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962. They are filed under Rule 5 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Rules, 1963, invoking section 10 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962. The said rules are framed in exercise of powers under the PMP Act, 1962, the relevant sections of which are quoted hereinafter. Said Rule-5 reads as under: "Rule-5: Application to the District Judge for determination of compensation:- Any party aggrieved by the determination of the amount of compensation may prefer an application to the District Judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land or any part thereof is situated, not later than ninety days of the receipt of the intimation from the competent authority under rule 4(3)." 8.1.2 In view of above this Court finds that, the first test, that the application should be for compensation under any law for the time being in force, is answered in affirmative. 8.2.1 The next requirement is that, it should be relating to the acquisition of property. To examine this aspect, reference needs to be made to Sections 6, 7, 9 and 10 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962, which read as under. "6. Declaration of acquisition of right of user. 8.2.1 The next requirement is that, it should be relating to the acquisition of property. To examine this aspect, reference needs to be made to Sections 6, 7, 9 and 10 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962, which read as under. "6. Declaration of acquisition of right of user. (1) Where no objections under sub-section (1) of section 5 have been made to the competent authority with the period specified therein or where the competent authority has disallowed the objection under sub-section (2) of that section, the authority shall, as soon as may be, [either make a report in respect of the land described in the notification under sub-section (1) of section 3, or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land, to the Central Government containing his recommendations on the objections, together with the record of the proceedings held by him, for the decision of that Government and upon receipt of such report the Central Government shall, if satisfied that such land is required for laying any pipelines for the transport of petroleum or any mineral,] declare, by notification in the Official Gazette, that the right of user in the land for laying the pipelines should be acquired [and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of the land described in the notification issued under sub-section (1) of section 3, irrespective of whether one report or different reports have been made by the competent authority under this section]. (2) On the publication of the declaration under, sub-section (1), the right of user [in the land specified therein] shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. (3) Where in respect of any land, a notification has been issued under sub-section (1) of section 3but [no declaration in respect of any parcel of land covered by that notification has been published under this section] within a period of one year from the date of that notification, that notification shall cease to have effect on the expiration of that period. [(3A) No declaration in respect of any land covered by a notification issued under sub-section (1) of section 3, published after the commencement of the Petroleum Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Amendment Act, 1977 shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of such publication.] (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), the Central Government may, on such terms and conditions as it may think fit to impose, direct by order in writing, that the right of user in the land for laying the pipelines shall, instead of vesting in the Central Government vest, either on the date of publication of the declaration or, on such other date as may be specified in the direction, in the State Government or the corporation proposing to lay the pipelines and thereunder the right of such user in the land shall, subject to the terms and conditions so imposed; vest in that State Government or corporation, as the case may be, free from all encumbrances. 7. 7. Central Government or State Government or Corporation to lay pipelines (1) Where the right of user in any land has vested in the Central Government or in any State Government or Corporation under section 6-(i) it shall be lawful for any person authorised by the Central Government or such State Government or Corporation, as the case may be, and his servants and workmen to enter upon the land and lay pipelines or to do any other act necessary for the laying of pipelines: Provided that no pipeline shall be laid under- (a) any land which, immediately before the date of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 3, was used for residential purposes; (b) any land on which there stands any permanent structure which was in existence immediately before the said date; (c) any land which is appurtenant to a dwelling-house; or (d) any land at a depth which is less than one meter from the surface; [(ia) for laying pipelines for the transport of petroleum, it shall be lawful for any person authorised by the Central Government or corporation to use such land for laying pipelines for transporting any mineral and where the right of user in any land has so vested for laying pipelines for transporting any mineral, which shall be lawful for such person to use such land for laying pipelines for transporting petroleum or any other mineral; and] (ii) such land shall be used only for laying the pipelines and for maintaining, examining, repairing, altering or removing any such pipelines or for doing any other act necessary for any of the aforesaid purposes or for the utilisation of such pipelines. (2) If any dispute arises with regard to any matter referred to in paragraph (b) or paragraph (c) of the proviso to clause (i) of sub-section (1), the dispute shall be referred to the competent authority whose decision thereon shall be final. 9. Restrictions regarding the use of land (1) The owner or occupier of the land with respect to which a declaration has been made under sub-section (1) of section 6, shall be entitled to use the land for the purpose for which such land was put to use immediately before the date of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 3. Restrictions regarding the use of land (1) The owner or occupier of the land with respect to which a declaration has been made under sub-section (1) of section 6, shall be entitled to use the land for the purpose for which such land was put to use immediately before the date of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 3. Provided that, such owner or occupier shall not after the declaration under sub-section (1) of section6- (i) construct any building or any other structure; (ii) construct or excavate any tank, well, reservoir or dam; or (iii) plant any tree, on that land. (2) The owner or occupier of the land under which any pipeline has been laid shall not do any act or permit any act to be done which will or is likely to cause any damage in any manner whatsoever to the pipeline. (3) Where the owner or occupier of the land with respect to which a declaration has been made under sub-section (1) of section 6, (a) constructs any building or any other structure, or (b) constructs or excavates any well, tank, reservoir or dam, or (c) plants any tree, on that land, the court of the District Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such land is situate may, on an application made to it by, the competent authority and after holding such inquiry as it may deem fit, cause the building, structure, reservoir, dam or tree to be removed or the well or tank to be filled up, and the costs of such removal or filling up shall be recoverable from such owner or occupier in the same manner as if the order for the recovery of such costs were a decree made by that court. 10. Compensation (1) Where in the exercise of the powers conferred by section 4, section 7, or section 8 by any person, any damage, loss or injury is sustained by any person interested in the land under which the pipeline is proposed to be, or is being or has been laid, the Central Government, the State Government or the Corporation, as the case may be, shall be liable to pay compensation to such person for such damage, loss or injury, the amount of which shall be determined by the competent authority in the first instance. (2) If the amount of compensation determined by the competent authority under sub-section (1) is not acceptable to either of the parties, the amount of compensation shall, on application by either of the parties to the District Judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land or any part thereof is situated, be determined by the District Judge. (3) The competent authority, or the District Judge while determining the compensation under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), as the case may be, shall have due regard to the damage or loss sustained by any person interested in the land by reason of (i) the removal of tress or standing crops, if any, on the land while exercising the powers under section 4, section 7 or section 8; (ii) the temporary severance of the land under which the pipeline has been laid from other lands belonging to, or in the occupation of, such person; or (iii) any injury to any other property, whether movable or immovable, or the earnings of such persons caused in any other manner: Provided that in determining the compensation no account shall be taken of any structure or other improvement made in the land after the date of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 3. (4) Where the right of user of any land has vested in the Central Government, the State Government or the Corporation, as the case may be, shall, in addition to the compensation; if any, payable under sub-section (1), be liable to pay to the owner and to any other person whose right of enjoyment in that land has been affected in any manner whatsoever by reason of such vesting, compensation calculated at ten percent of the market-value of that land on the date of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 3. (5) The market-value of the land on the said date shall be determined by the competent authority and if the value so determined by that authority is not acceptable to either of the parties, it shall, on application by either of the parties to District Judge referred to in sub-section (2), be determined by that District Judge. (5) The market-value of the land on the said date shall be determined by the competent authority and if the value so determined by that authority is not acceptable to either of the parties, it shall, on application by either of the parties to District Judge referred to in sub-section (2), be determined by that District Judge. (6) The decision of the District Judge under Sub-section (2) or sub-section (5) shall be final." 8.2.2 On conjoint reading of the above statutory provisions, it is clear that, the compensation paid to the claimant is towards the heads enumerated in Section 10 quoted above. It is towards what is acquired by the State and also towards what the land owner is deprived of. 8.2.3 True it is, that the title of the land is not vested in the Government or the Corporation and it continues with its original owner, but whatever is lost by the owner and whatever is acquired by the Government can be termed to be 'property' or not, is the test for the ingredient (ii) noted above. In this regard, reference needs to be made to the above quoted sections of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962. 8.2.4 The above provisions need to be read keeping in view the observations of Honourable the Supreme Court of India in the following decisions. 8.2.4.1 In the case of Late Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Hyderabad reported in (1986) (Supp.) SCC 700, Honourable the Supreme Court of India has observed (in para:34) as under. "In Aiyer's Law Lexicon of British India, 1940 edn. Page 128, it has been said that the property belonging to a person has two meanings- (1) ownership; (2) the absolute right of the user. The same view is reiterated in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary 4th edn. Page 260. The expression: 'property belonging to' might convey absolute right of the user as well as of the ownership. A road might be said, with perfect propriety, to belong to a man who has the right to use it as of right, although the soil does not belong to him." 8.2.4.2 In the case of Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat reported in (1995) (Supp.) 1 SCC 596, Honourable the Supreme Court of India has observed (in para: 42) as under. "Property in legal sense means an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by law. It extends to every species of valuable right and interest, more particularly, ownership and exclusive right to a thing, the right to dispose of the thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude everyone else from interfering with it. The dominion or indefinite right of use or disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or subjects is called property. The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing is property in legal parameters. Therefore, the word 'property' connotes everything or which is subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal; everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate or status. Property, therefore, within the constitutional protection, denotes groups of rights inhering citizen's relation to physical thing, as right to possess, use and dispose of it in accordance with law. In Ramanatha Aiyar's The Law Lexicon, Reprint Edn. 1987 at pa. 1031, it is stated that the property is the most comprehensive of all terms which can be used, inasmuch as it is indicative and descriptive of every possible interest which the party can have. The term property has a most extensive signification, and, according to its legal definition, consists in free use, enjoyment, and disposition by a per so of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land. In Dwarkadas Shrinivas case this Court gave extended meaning to the word property. Mines, minerals and quarries are property attracting Article 300-A." 8.2.4.3 In the case of Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke and Chemicals Ltd. reported in (2007) 8 SCC 705 , Honourable the Supreme Court of India has observed that even if nothing is acquired by the State but if the land owner is deprived of its use, the way in which he wishes, is also depriving him of his property. The observations in para: 77 of the said decision are as under. The observations in para: 77 of the said decision are as under. "To accept that it is open to the town development authority to declare an intention to formulate a town development scheme even without a development plan and ipso facto bring into play a freeze on usage of the land under Section 53 would lead to complete misuse of powers and arbitrary exercise thereof depriving the citizen of his right to use the land subject to the permitted land use and laws relating to the manner of usage thereof. This would be an unlawful deprivation of the citizen's right to property which right includes within it the right to use the property in accordance with the law as it stands at such time. To illustrate the absurdity to which such an interpretation could lead it would then become open to the town development authority to notify an intent to formulate a town development scheme even in the absence of a development plan, freeze all usage of the property by an owner thereof by virtue of Section 53 of the Act, and no development plan should be finalized within 3 years, such scheme would lapse and the authority thereupon would merely notify a fresh intent to formulate a town development scheme and once again freeze the usage of the land for another three years and continue the same ad-infinitum thereby in effect completely depriving the citizen of the right to use his property which was in a manner otherwise permitted under law as it stands." 8.2.5 On conjoint consideration of the above quoted statutory provisions and the preposition of law, it is held that, in the present case, what the land owner is deprived of is the 'property' and further what the State acquires is also 'property', though not 'title' and therefore the application for compensation in question is relating to the acquisition of property, and thus the second requirement of Section 20(xv) of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004 also stands satisfied. 8.3.1 Coming to the third ingredient, it is to be ascertained as to whether the said acquisition is for public purpose. In this regard, reference needs to be made to Section 3 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962, which reads as under. "3. 8.3.1 Coming to the third ingredient, it is to be ascertained as to whether the said acquisition is for public purpose. In this regard, reference needs to be made to Section 3 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962, which reads as under. "3. Publication of notification for acquisition: (1) Whenever it appears to the Central Government that it is necessary in the public interest that for the transport of petroleum or any mineral from one locality to another locality pipelines may be laid by that Government or by any State Government or a corporation and that for the purpose of laying such pipelines, it is necessary to acquire the right of user in any land under which such pipelines may be laid, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare its intention to acquire the right of user therein. (2) Every notification under sub-section (1) shall give a brief description of the land. (3) The competent authority shall cause the substance of the notification to be published at such places and in such manner as may be prescribed." 8.3.2 The above is the starting point of the exercise of power by the Government. If it is not for public purpose, the very acquisition of right of user would be illegal. Thus, the test for stipulation (iii) also is answered in affirmative. 8.4.1 The stipulation (iv) is that, the said acquisition should be other than the one referred to in Article 15 of Schedule-I of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004. The said Article reads as under. 8.4.2 It is not in dispute that, the acquisition in question is not the land acquisition under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In fact, it is the case of the State itself that the title of the land in question continues with the land owner and this is not the case of land acquisition. Thus, the application in question is not, which is referred to in Article 15 of Schedule-I of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004. For this reason, even the test (iv) is answered in affirmative, going by the case of the State itself. Thus, the application in question is not, which is referred to in Article 15 of Schedule-I of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004. For this reason, even the test (iv) is answered in affirmative, going by the case of the State itself. 8.5 In view of above, the only conclusion at which this Court can arrive at is that, all the ingredients of exemption provided in sub-section (xv) of Section 20 of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, exist in the applications in question. Consequently, nothing would be chargeable under the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, on the applications in question. By the impugned orders, however, the District Judges have directed the applicants before them to pay court fees under the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004 and therefore those orders need to be quashed and set aside. 8.6 In view of above findings, there is no doubt that the Court fee is not chargeable under the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, on the applications in question, however even if there was any doubt in that regard, the observations of Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in the case of Lakshmi Ammal v. K.M. Madhavakrishnan reported in (1978) 4 SCC 15 , would come in play. Para-2 of the said decision reads as under. "It is unfortunate that long years have been spent by the courts below on a combat between two parties on the question of court fee leaving the real issues to be fought between them to come up leisurely. Two things have to be made clear. Courts should be anxious to grapple with the real issues and not spend their energies on peripheral ones. Secondly, the court fee, if it seriously restricts the rights of a person to seek his remedies in courts of justice, should be strictly construed. After all access to justice is the basis of the legal system. In that view, where there is a doubt, reasonable, of course, the benefit must go to him who says that the lesser court fee alone be paid." (emphasis supplied) 8.7 Further, it is the settled position of law that the provisions of the statute like the court fees have to be strictly construed in favour of the litigant. The source of power to the State for this purpose must be unambiguous. The source of power to the State for this purpose must be unambiguous. Reference in this regard can be made to the observations of Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in the case of Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Natson Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. reported in (1979) 1 SCC 193 . 8.8 Thus, viewing from any angle, this Court finds that the only conclusion at which in the present case one can reach is that, all the ingredients of exemption under sub-section (xv) of Section 20 of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004 exist in the applications in question and consequently nothing would be chargeable under the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, on the applications in question and therefore the impugned orders need to be quashed and set aside. 9. Though learned advocates have addressed this Court at length on various dimensions of the matter, since the point at issue is as noted above and the same having been answered by this Court in above terms, dealing with other arguments would be academic and therefore the same are not gone into. 10.1 Though learned advocates have referred to various authorities, dealing with all of them would be unnecessary, since all are not on the point at issue noted and answered above. It is noted that, reliance placed by learned Additional Advocate General on the authorities in the case of Anil Starch Products Ltd. (supra), Amreli Municipality (supra), Kilara Power Pvt. Ltd. (supra), State of Gujarat v. Kantilal Prajapati (supra), Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Rechan Rivets (supra), are on the point, as to when ad valorem court fees is to be paid. The question of any of the Articles of Schedule I of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004 coming into play would crop up only if, exemption under Section 20(xv) of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004 is not attracted. Since it is held that, the present case falls under the said exemption, those judgments would not take the case of the Government any further. 10.2 It is also noted that, heavy reliance is placed on the decisions of the Bombay High Court recorded on Writ Petition No. 2231 of 2008 dated 21.08.2008, as confirmed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 39 of 2008 vide judgment dated 21.07.2009. 10.2 It is also noted that, heavy reliance is placed on the decisions of the Bombay High Court recorded on Writ Petition No. 2231 of 2008 dated 21.08.2008, as confirmed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 39 of 2008 vide judgment dated 21.07.2009. In this regard, it is noted that, erection of telephone polls in somebody's land in exercise of powers under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 and consequential compensation claimed by the land owner was the point for determination before the Court. The same would therefore not be applicable ipso facto in this case. Further, para: 15 of the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in that case reads as under. "15. As already stated above, the provisions of Indian Telegraphic Act, 1885, nowhere contemplate acquisition and appellate - plaintiff is seeking compensation with a contention that his land has been acquired by invoking Section 16(3) of the Telegraph Act. The compensation for damages sustained by him is already tendered to him by respondent No. 1 and its adequacy is in dispute. Thus, questions whether it is acquisition as understood in any law or then whether the appellant is entitled to claim market value of property as compensation under Telegraph Act, 1885 and lastly the adequacy or otherwise of the amount of compensation paid to him towards loss/damages need to be gone into by District Judge. In all three judgments referred to above, such type of adjudication was not necessary and the obligation whether statutory or contractual was required to be discharged. The above-mentioned judgments are not, therefore, relevant in present matter." (emphasis supplied) For this reason, the said decisions would also not take the case of the State any further. 10.3 Heavy reliance is placed also on the decision of this Court in the case of Lady Tanumati (supra). The Courts below have also based their impugned orders, inter alia on the said decision. In this regard it needs to be recorded that, the said decision pertains to the Court fees in the event of compensation in case of land acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court in that perspective had held that ad valorem Court fee is payable in those cases. In this regard it needs to be recorded that, the said decision pertains to the Court fees in the event of compensation in case of land acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court in that perspective had held that ad valorem Court fee is payable in those cases. In view of Article 15 of Schedule-I of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, there can not be any dispute in that regard, however, as noted above, the point at issue in the present case is as to whether any of the Articles of the said Schedule would come in play at all. As held above, the applications in question in the present case are exempted in view of Section 20(xv) of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004 and therefore, the said decision would not held the State in any manner. 11.1 There is one glaring aspect which needs a mention. It is noted that, the GAIL has taken inconsistent stand before the District Court, so also before this Court. When the applications were filed by the claimants, GAIL had taken stand that the court fees are required to be paid by those claimants, as asked for by the State. Those applications are opposed by GAIL before the District Court and in the petition before this Court being Special Civil Application No. 12052 of 2008, which is filed by the claimants. Reference can be made to the contents of the affidavit-in-reply dated 06.10.2009 filed by GAIL, which is on record. 11.2 While GAIL was opposing the claimants before the District Court and before this Court as noted above, soon thereafter it became necessary for GAIL itself to challenge the order of the Competent Authority under the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 before the District Court, contending that it was on a higher side. Though it is a Public Sector Undertaking, its stand was like any other ordinary litigant. The order of the District Court asking GAIL to pay court fees, as asked for by the State, is challenged in Special Civil Application No. 2404 of 2013. Both the petitions are heard together by this Court. Though it is a Public Sector Undertaking, its stand was like any other ordinary litigant. The order of the District Court asking GAIL to pay court fees, as asked for by the State, is challenged in Special Civil Application No. 2404 of 2013. Both the petitions are heard together by this Court. Learned advocate for the GAIL was asked to make its stand clear in this regard, and in response thereto it is submitted that, the exemption under Section 20(xv) of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004 is attracted qua the claimants and GAIL both. In view of this, the stand of the GAIL as the respondent in the petition filed by the claimants being Special Civil Application No. 12052 of 2008, is inconsistent with its own stand taken in Special Civil Application No. 2404 of 2013 as the petitioner. Though this would show lack of bona fide of GAIL, while deciding the question of law, this Court can not be swayed away by this and therefore this is left at this stage. 12. For the reasons recorded above, more particularly in para: 8 of this judgment, this Court arrives at the judgment and passes the order as under. 12.1 It is held that, the State Government is not empowered to charge any fee, under the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004, on an application, that may be filed by any party to the District Judge, invoking Section 10 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 read with Rule 5 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Rules, 1963, since it is exempted under Section 20(xv) of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004. 12.2 The impugned common order dated 28.02.2007 passed by the District Judge, Bharuch on Civil Miscellaneous Application (Court Fees Reference) (Main) No. 282 of 2004, with other 1122 cognate references, is quashed and set aside. The order dated 17.07.2008 passed by the District Judge, Bharuch on Review Applications, being Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 41 of 2007 and cognate applications, would not survive and the same also is quashed and set aside. The order dated 17.07.2008 passed by the District Judge, Bharuch on Review Applications, being Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 41 of 2007 and cognate applications, would not survive and the same also is quashed and set aside. 12.3 The impugned common order dated 31.08.2012 passed by the 4th Additional District Judge, Dahod on Court Fees Reference No. 01 of 2010 to 109 of 2010, Court Fee Reference No. 110 of 2010 to 888 of 2010 and Court Fee Reference No. 01 of 2011 to 1568 of 2011, is also quashed and set aside. 12.4 All these petitions are accordingly allowed and rule is made absolute in each petition, with no order as to costs.