ORDER 1. This petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution challenges the order dated 24.6.2015, whereby the registration of petitioner hospital is cancelled by respondent No.4. 2. Shri R.N. Singh, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner hospital was registered under Madhya Pradesh Upcharyagriha Tatha Rujopchar Sambandhi Sthapanaye (Registrikaran Tatha Anugyapan) Adhiniyam, 1973 (for brevity, the 'Adhiniyam') on 16.8.2010. On 9.3.2015, one Manoj Upadhyay made a complaint (Annexure P-5) to the Collector. In turn, the Collector directed the CMHO for enquiry in relation to complaint preferred by Manoj Upadhyay. the CMHO, in turn, appointed a two-member committee comprising of Dr.Sunil Agarwal and Dr. Prabhat Kaushal. On 18.3.2015 (Annexure P-7) and 23.3.2015 (Annexure P-7), statements of Dr. Shivhare and Manoj Upadhyay were recorded by the committee. The committee submitted its report on 31.3.2015 (Annexure P-7). On 10.4.2015 (Annexure P-8), a show cause notice was issued on the basis of said enquiry report. On 15.4.2015 (Annexure P-9), the petitioner made request to respondent No.4 to supply him copy of the report. In addition, extention of time was prayed for. On 11.4.2015 (Annexure P-10), the petitioner preferred a representation for relocation of enquiry. Another representation dated 23.4.2015 (Annexure P-10) was filed by the petitioner to respondents No.1 and 2 for relocation of enquiry. Shri Singh, learned senior counsel submits that on 25.4.2015 the Collector summoned all including CMHO to remain present on 28.4.2015. On 26.4.2015 the petitioner made a request to CMHO for referring the enquiry to State Leval Higher Centre. On 2.5.2015 the petitioner made a request to CMHO to keep the proceedings in abeyance. On 24.6.2015, the impugned order is passed, whereby registration of petitioner hospital is cancelled. 3. Shri R.N. Singh criticized this order by contending that the decision making process, adopted by the respondents is vitiated/polluted. The same were not in consonance with principles of natural justice. The full, reasonable and adequate opportunity of defence was not provided to him. He reiterated his stand which was taken before this Court on 17.7.2015 which was recorded in extenso by this Court in the said order dated 17.7.2015. 4. To elaborate, Shri Singh, learned senior counsel submits that copy of enquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner along with show cause notice. This deprived the petitioner to file an effective reply in the matter. 4. To elaborate, Shri Singh, learned senior counsel submits that copy of enquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner along with show cause notice. This deprived the petitioner to file an effective reply in the matter. One Seema Shivhare's statement was recorded in the enquiry but in final order there is no whisper about her statement. 5. During the course of argument, Shri Singh fairly submits that although there exists an appellate remedy as per section 6 of the Adhiniyam, the petitioner cannot be relegated to avail the said remedy for twin reasons. Firstly, the decision making process suffers from serious procedural impropriety and violation of principle of natural justice. Hence, as per (2003)2 SCC 107 (Harbanslal Sahnia and another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others), the alternative remedy is not a bar. Secondly, when said Adhiniyam was initially brought into force, as per section 6(3), State Government was the appellate authority. In the year 2008, by way of M.P. Adhiniyam 16 of 2008, section 2(a) was inserted. Similarly, in section 6(3), the words "State Government" were substituted by the word "appellate authority". He submits that the Government has placed reliance on notification dated 30.3.2007, whereby Secretary of Department of Health and Family Welfare is appointed as appellate authority. The said order/notification is of no assistance to the other side because in the year 2007, admittedly the State Government was the appellate authority. Section 2(a) was inserted for the first time in 2008. There is no notification appointing any appellate authority after 2008. Hence, earlier notification dated 30.3.2007 cannot be treated to be a valid order/notification appointing the appellate authority. In nutshell, he submits that although there exists a statutory remedy of appeal, presently no appellate authority exists in accordance with law. Hence, the question of preferring appeal does not arise. In addition, it is contended that although sections 2(a) and 6(3) of the Adhiniyam have undergone a change/modification, no change was made in rule 20 of Madhya Pradesh Upcharyagriha Tatha Rujopchar Sambandhi Sthapanaye (Registrikaran Tatha Anugyapan) Rules, 1997 (for brevity, the 'Rules'). He submits that State Government is still an appellate authority as per rule 20. Hence, this petitioner may be directly entertained. 6. Shri Singh, learned senior counsel, during the course of argument fairly admitted that the petitioner is not challenging the competence of respondent No.4 in passing the impugned order, Annexure P-1. He submits that State Government is still an appellate authority as per rule 20. Hence, this petitioner may be directly entertained. 6. Shri Singh, learned senior counsel, during the course of argument fairly admitted that the petitioner is not challenging the competence of respondent No.4 in passing the impugned order, Annexure P-1. He fairly admitted that the as per the Adhiniyam, the respondent No.4 is the competent authority to decide the question of cancellation. However, his main attack is on the decision making process, which resulted in issuance of impugned order. 7. Per contra, Shri Vishal Mishra, learned Deputy Advocate General for the State, submits that the petitioner has statutory alternative remedy. The insertion of section 2(a) and substitution of word "appellate authority" in section 6(3) are procedural in nature. Hence, it must be presumed that the said provisions were there in the statutory book since inception of the Adhiniyam. On the strength of this contention, it is contended that the order/notification dated 30.3.2007 must be treated to be issued under the Adhiniyam. In support of his contention, Shri Mishra relied on AIR 1979 SC 310 (Shambhu Dayal v. State of Uttar Pradesh); (2004)8 SSC 1 (Zile Singh v. State of Haryana and others); AIR 2005 SC 3685 (Government of India and others v. Indian Tobacco Association); and 2013(2) MPLJ 220 (Ramgopal and another v. Haneef Khan and others). He further submits that there is no flaw in decision making process also. Copy of inquiry report was admittedly supplied to the petitioner on 15.4.2015, which is clear from petitioner's representation, Annexures P-12 (p.175) and P-13 (P.179). The impugned order is passed on 25.6.2015. Nothing prevented the petitioner to submit a detailed reply after receiving said report. It is urged that no prejudice is caused to petitioner. 8. Shri Madhukar Rao, learned senior counsel assisted by Shri Jitendra Sharma and Shri Mukesh Sharma, submits that even prior to amendment of 2008 aforesaid, as per section 14(d), the State was competent to prescribe the procedure for preferring appeal. Thus, it cannot be said that the order dated 30.3.2007 appointing the appellate authority is invalid or without authority of law. As per said order, appellate authority very much exists. The petitioner has a statutory, alternative and efficacious remedy. Hence, this petition be not entertained. In addition, it is contended that by way of amendment in 2008, the word "appellate authority" is substituted. As per said order, appellate authority very much exists. The petitioner has a statutory, alternative and efficacious remedy. Hence, this petition be not entertained. In addition, it is contended that by way of amendment in 2008, the word "appellate authority" is substituted. This provision being procedural in nature must be treated to be retrospective. 9. No other point is pressed by learned counsel for the parties. 10. I have heard the parties at length on admission and perused the record. 11. Before dealing with rival contention of parties, I deem it apposite to refer certain provisions of the Adhiniyam. Section 4 deals with application for registration and licence. Section 4(4)(a) reads as under : "Section 4(4) -- The supervising authority may reject an application if he is satisfied -- (a) that the applicant, or any person employed by him at the nursing home or the clinical establishment is not a fit person, whether by reason of age of otherwise, to carry on or to be employed at, the nursing home or the clinical establishment of such a description as the nursing home or clinical establishment named in the application." Section 5 talks about cancellation of registration and licence. It reads as under : Section 5 -- Cancellation of registration and licence. -- If at any time after any person has been registered in respect of any nursing home or clinical establishment and granted a licence therefore, the supervising authority is satisfied -- (i) that the terms of the licence are not being complied with; and (ii) that any of the grounds which would have entitled him to refuse the application for registration or licence, exist; or (iii) that the person registered and licensed, has been convicted of any offence punishable under this Adhiniyam; or (iv) that any other person who has been convicted of an offence under this Adhiniyam is materially interested in the nursing home or the clinical establishment, he may cancel such registration and licence." A plain reading of section 5 shows that if terms of licence are not complied with and there exists any ground, which would have entitled the supervising authority to refuse the application for registration or licence, the licence can be cancelled. 12. The licence was issued in statutory Form 'B'/'BB'. The licence, Anneuxre P-2, shows that it was issued subject to terms and conditions specified in Schedule II of the said Rules. 12. The licence was issued in statutory Form 'B'/'BB'. The licence, Anneuxre P-2, shows that it was issued subject to terms and conditions specified in Schedule II of the said Rules. Schedule II provides various conditions. Once of such condition is as under : "(k) Services of one Medical Practitioner on duty shall be available at all time for attending to emergency call of the indoor patients." (Emphasis supplied) 13. The allegation against the petitioner is that on 25.1.2013, Manoj Upadhyay took his daughter Ku. Gargi to the petitioner hospital. Considering her critical condition, she was admitted in PICU. It is alleged tht in PICU, no MBBS duty doctor was available. PICU was manned on the said date by Shri Shailendra Sahu and Shri Awadhesh Diwakar. They treated the said patient on the said date. It is further alleged that Shailendra Sahu was a student of BHMS in Vasundhara Raje Homoeopathic Medical College, Gwalior, whereas Awadhesh Diwakar was final year student of BHMS of Sofia Homoeopathic Medical College. Thus, said two students were entrusted with the expertised, delicate, sensitive and emergent work of PICU. The said persons on 26.1.2013 closed ventilator and exygen support system, which was given to Ku. Gargi. In the result, she died at 3:35 a.m. The said persons treated Ku. Gargi as dead and even issued death certificate. Therefore, it is alleged that the petitioner has violated the terms of licence. 14. A conjoint reading of sections 4 and 5 of the Adhiniyam shows that if the terms of licence are not complied with, section 5 can be invoked. As noticed above, Shri R.N. Singh, learned senior counsel fairly admitted that respondent No.4 is competent authority under the Adhiniyam. In view of this stand oupled with the factual backdrop of matter and combined reading of sections 4 and 5 of the Adhiniyam, it is clear that it cannot be said that action of respondent No.4 is without authority of law or jurisdiction. 15. Before dealing with the aspect of decision making process, I deem it proper to first deal with the question of maintainability of writ petition because of availability of alternative remedy. 16. 15. Before dealing with the aspect of decision making process, I deem it proper to first deal with the question of maintainability of writ petition because of availability of alternative remedy. 16. Section 6(3) of the Adhiniyam reads as under : "Section 6(3) -- Any person aggrieved by an order refusing an application for registration and licence, or cancelling any registration and licence may, within a period of a calendar month after the date on which the copy of the order was received by him, appeal to the appellate authority against such order." Section 6(6) provides the power of the appellate authority to pass interim orders. It reads as under : "(6) The appellate authority may, for sufficient cause order the stay of the order appealed against until further orders or until the disposal of the appeal whichever is earlier." 17. The State Government has passed following notification/order : "Bhopal, the 30th March No.F.13-3-2005-XVII-Med.2 -- In exercise of the powers conferred by the clause (3) of section 6 of Madhya Pradesh Upcharyagriha Tatha Rujopchar Sambandhi Sthapanaye (Registrikaran Tatha Anugyapan) Adhiniyam, 1973 (No.47 of 1973), the State Government hereby appoints the Secretary, dEpartment hereby appoints the Secretary, Department of Health and Family Welfare as "appellate authority" for the purpose of the said Adhiniyam. By order and in the name of Governor of Madhya Pradesh M.M. Upadhyaya, Principal Secretary." 18. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner contended that although remedy of appeal is provided to him, there exists no competent appellate authority. Since sections 2(a) and 6(3) were amended in 2008, the order of 2007 aforesaid cannot be treated to be a valid competent order providing a competent appellate authority. On the first blush, the argument appears to be attractive. However, on a deeper scrutiny, I find that there is no force in such submission. This is trite that right of preferring appeal is a substantive right whereas right relating to forum is procedural in nature. The substantive right of preferring appeal exists since the inception of the Adhiniyam. By way of amendment, appellate authority is substituted, which at best is a substitution of forum. This substitution is a procedural change which will be presumed to be retrospective. This is settled in law that in contrast to statutes dealing with the substantive rights, statutes dealing with merely matters of procedure are presumed to be retrospective unless such a construction is textually inadmissible. This substitution is a procedural change which will be presumed to be retrospective. This is settled in law that in contrast to statutes dealing with the substantive rights, statutes dealing with merely matters of procedure are presumed to be retrospective unless such a construction is textually inadmissible. See, Gardner v. Lucas [(1878)3 AC 582]; Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co.Ltd. v. CIT, Delhi [ AIR 1927 PC 242 ]; Jose De Costa v. Bascora Sadashiva Sinai Narcornim [ AIR 1975 SC 1843 ]; Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh [ AIR 1990 SC 209 ]; Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra [ AIR 1994 SC 2623 ]; Lord Denning in Blyth v. Blyth [(1966)1 All ER 524], opined that the rule that an Act of Parliament is not to be given retrospective effect applies only to statutes which affect vested rights. It does not apply to statutes which only alter the form of procedure or the admissibility of evidence, or the effect which the Courts give to evidence. 19. This aspect was dealt with by apex Court in (1994)4 SCC 602 (Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others etc. v. State of Maharashtra and others). Relevant para reads as under : "26. xxx xxx xxx (i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended meaning and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits. (ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedure in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature. (iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in procedural law." (Emphasis supplied) 20. In view of aforesaid analysis, in my view, section 2(a) and amendment in section 6(3) must be treated as procedural and are, therefore, retrospective in nature. Thus, the notification/order dated 30.3.2007 must be presumed to be issued under the enabling provision. Thus, I am unable to hold that no appellate authority exists for the present petitioner to prefer the appeal. It is noteworthy that the petitioner has not challenged the validity of notification/order dated 30.3.2007. Thus, the notification/order dated 30.3.2007 must be presumed to be issued under the enabling provision. Thus, I am unable to hold that no appellate authority exists for the present petitioner to prefer the appeal. It is noteworthy that the petitioner has not challenged the validity of notification/order dated 30.3.2007. So far rule 20 of the Rules is concerned wherein State Government is still shown to be appellate authority, suffice it so say that rules are always made in aid to the main Adhiniyam. Rule cannot supplant the main provision of the Adhiniyam. In view of finding that amendment in section 2(a) and 6(3) is retrospective in nature, the appellate authority as per order dated 30.3.2007 must be held to be competent and in consonance with the Adhiniyam. Even if rule 20 has not undergone corresponding change (in the name of appellatle authority), this cannot override or prevail over the provisions of the Adhiniyam. Thus, the contention of the petitioner that no appellate authority exists is hereby rejected. 21. Now, the question is, whether the petitioner should be relegated to avail the remedy of appeal. Reliance is placed on the judgment of apex Court in Harbanslal Sahnia (supra). No doubt that in three contingencies, viz., (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders of proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged; despite availability of alternative remedy, writ petition can be entertained. However, this is settled in law that rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction because of availability of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulstion. The competence of respondent No.4 is not in question. The subject-matter of show cause and final order also shows that it was within the competence of respondent No.4 to deal and decide the question of cancellation of licence. After considering the judgment of Harbanslal Sahnia (supra), the apex Court in (2010)14 SCC 553 (Union of India and others v. Mangal Textile Mills India Private Limited and others), opined that restrictions regarding entertaining writ petition under Article 226 despite availability of alternative remedy are self imposed. If an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In (2005)8 SCC 264 (U.P. State Spg. If an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In (2005)8 SCC 264 (U.P. State Spg. Cio.Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey), the apex Court opined that if the competence of authority is not in question, the petitioner should be relegated to avail the alternative remedy, more so when such relegation does not cause any palpable injustice to the petitioner. The apex Court opined as under : "Where under a statute there is an allegation of infringement of fundamental rights of when on the undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they donot possess can be the grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions unless it is shown the there is something more in a case, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer, something which would show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the statute." (Emphasis added) 22. In the present case, sections 6(3) and (4) of the Adhiniyam prescribe a remedy of appeal. It also empowers the appellate authority to pass necessary interim orders. Thus, petitioner has at alternative, statutory and efficacious remedy. Hence, in my view, the petitioner must be relegated to avail the said remedy. So far other contention regarding flaw in decision making process is concerned, it may be raised before the said appellate authority, which may deal with it in accordance with law. 23. Resultantly, this petition is not entertained. Liberty is reserved to the petitioner to prefer appeal. The time consumed before this Court shall not be counted for the purpose of counting limitation by the appellate authority. It is made clear that this Court has not given any opinion on the merits of the case. 24. Subject to a aforesaid observations, petition is dismissed. No costs. .........