JUDGMENT : 1. These two petitions are filed by two different Market Committees. In Special Civil Application No.10259 of 2013, to be referred as ‘First Petition’, Agriculture Produce Market Committee, Unjha and its Chairman have challenged the order dated 14.5.2013 passed by respondent No.1- Chief Information Commissioner in Complaint No.646/ 2006-07 filed by respondent No.5 under Section 18 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (‘the Act’). 2. In Special Civil Application No.13987 of 2013, to be referred as ‘Second Petition’ Agriculture Produce Market Committee, Chhota Udepur has challenged the order dated 25.7.2013 passed by respondent No.1 in Complaint No.673/2010-11 filed by respondent No.3 under Section 18 of the Act. 3. In the first petition, by order dated 27.6.2013, notice was issued to the respondents for final disposal of the petition making it returnable on 15.7.2013. In second petition, by order dated 10.1.2014, the Court after recording that the issue involved therein was identical to the issue involved in the first petition, ordered to hear the second petition with the first petition. 4. The common issue raised in both the petitions is as to whether a Market Committee established and constituted under Section 9 read with Section 11 of the Gujarat Agriculture Produce Markets Act, 1963 (‘the Market Act’) falls within the definition of a ‘Public Authority’ under Section 2(h) of the Act. 5. It appears that a group of three petitions, being Special Civil Application No.6419 of 2007 and allied matters, was filed before this Court challenging the decision of the respondent No.2 therein, whereby the Market Committees were ordered to provide informations as sought for by the applicants therein and also challenging the Government Resolution dated 26.4.2006 directing all Market Committees to appoint Information Officer as provided under the Act. This Court while deciding the said group of petitions found from the orders impugned therein that the respondent No.2 therein (respondent No.1 herein) had not dealt with the issue as to whether the Agricultural Produce Market Committee was amenable to the provisions of the Act on the basis of the definition contained in Section 2(h) of the Act, more particularly Clause (d) of Section 2. The Court, therefore, quashed and set aside the orders impugned therein and also the resolution passed by the Government directing the Market Committees to appoint Information Officer and remanded the matter to respondent No.2 to decide as to whether Agriculture Produce Market Committees are covered under the provisions of the Act or not. The Court clarified that the impugned orders were quashed without entering into the merits of the case and it was left to the respondent No.2 to decide the issue on merits. 6. Learned advocates for the petitioners at the outset made grievance that the respondent No.1 has not considered and decided the issue as to whether the Market Committee is covered by definition of a Public Authority under Section 2(h) of the Act as required to be decided. Learned advocates for the parties, on being asked whether they are agreeable if these matters are finally heard on such issue and periphery issues on merits and decided by this common judgment, they state that it is better if such issue is finally concluded in the present matters. 7. It appears that the first petition is amended so as to challenge the jurisdiction of respondent No.1 to issue direction for providing information sought for by respondent No.5 in exercise of the powers under Section 18 of the Act. Merit of such challenge shall be later on gone into, if so required. 8. Learned advocate Mr. B.S. Patel appearing for the petitioners submitted that to be a public authority as defined in Section 2(h) of the Act, an authority, a body or institution of self Government has to meet with the criteria as provided in Section 2(h) of the Act. Mr. Patel submitted that establishment or constitution of the Market Committee is neither by or under the constitution nor by any other law made by the Parliament nor even by any other law made by the State legislature. Mr. Patel submitted that it is not established by notification issued or order made by appropriate Government and since it cannot be said to be a body, owned, controlled or substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by appropriate Government, in no way, it could be said to be a public authority within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Act. Taking the Court to the definition of Market Committee, as provided in Section 2(xiv) of the Market Act, Mr. Taking the Court to the definition of Market Committee, as provided in Section 2(xiv) of the Market Act, Mr. Patel submitted that the Market Committee is established or deemed to be established under the Act and not by law made by the legislature. Mr. Patel submitted that there is difference between the establishment of an authority, body or institution of self Government by law and under the Act. Mr. Patel submitted that the establishment and constitution of the Market Committee is by State appointed authority- the Director under the Act and not by the Act itself. Mr. Patel submitted that the Market Committee is constituted by the elected members with one councilor of the local body to be nominated by the local body and two members to be nominated by the State and therefore, it cannot be said to be a body owned by the State, nor can it be said that it is substantially financed by the State as the Market Committee creates its own market fund to utilize the same for the purposes mentioned in the Act. 8.1. Mr. Patel submitted that amendment in the Market Act for private market shows that functions of the Market Committee are alienable and not sovereign. Mr. Patel submitted that the powers conferred by the Act are the administrative powers of the Market Committee and the provisions of the Market Act regulate the functions of the Market Committee. Mr. Patel submitted that the powers conferred to the Director is not subordinate legislation and the Director is acting just as a statutory authority and therefore, establishment of the Market Committee by the Director cannot be said to be the act of the legislature. 8.2. Mr. Patel has relied upon following decisions:- (1) In the case of Mohammad Hussain Gulam Mohammad and another, Vs. The State of Bombay and another reported in AIR 1962 SC 97 ; (2) In the case of Dr. Indramani Pyarelal Gupta and others Vs. W.R. Natu and others reported in AIR 1963 SC 274 ; (3) In the case of Agricultural Market Committee Vs. Shalimar Chemical Works reported in (1997)5 SCC 516 ; (4) In the case of Thalappalam Ser. Co-op. Bank Ltd. And Others Vs. State of Kerala and Others reported in 2013(3) GLH 591. 9. Learned advocate Mr. Rana appearing for the petitioner of the second petition has adopted the arguments of Mr. Patel. 10. Mr. Shalimar Chemical Works reported in (1997)5 SCC 516 ; (4) In the case of Thalappalam Ser. Co-op. Bank Ltd. And Others Vs. State of Kerala and Others reported in 2013(3) GLH 591. 9. Learned advocate Mr. Rana appearing for the petitioner of the second petition has adopted the arguments of Mr. Patel. 10. Mr. Patel additionally submitted that respondent No.1 has exceeded in his jurisdiction by directing the Market Committee, Unjha to provide information to respondent No.5 while deciding his complaint under Section 18 of the Act. 11. On the other hand, learned senior advocate Mr. Shelat appearing with Mr. Shah for respondent No.1 submitted that the Market Committee is discharging the Government functions to achieve the objects and purposes of the Act. Its establishment and constitution is mandated by the Market Act and unlike the Cooperative Society, its formation is statutorily required and does not depend upon the volition of the association of persons. Mr. Shelat submitted that a market committee under the Market Act is a local authority within the meaning of Section 3(26) of the Bombay General Clauses Act and as a local authority, it is entrusted with the control and management of market funds by the Act. It is thus legal entity which is entitled to impose fees for its revenue to discharge the Governmental functions under the Act. Mr. Shelat submitted that the Market Committee is a self Government as it performs executive, administrative, a quasi-judicial functions under the Act. Mr. Shelat submitted that the Market Committee comes into being by operation of law and not by its registration like Co-operative Society and therefore, it satisfies the definition of ‘Public Authority’ under Section 2(h) of the Act. 11.1. Mr. Shelat submitted that the Director is delegated with the powers to establish the Market Committee under the Act and not under the Rules and such delegation is held valid in a judgment in the case of Jan Mohammad Noor Mohamad Bagban Vs. The State of Gujarat and Another reported in AIR 1966 SC 385 . Mr. Shelat submitted that the Director performs statutory function and not executory function and the constitution of first Market Committee is by the State as statutorily required and therefore, its establishment and constitution is by the law. 11.2. Mr. Shelat has relied upon the following decisions:- (1) In the case of Ochhavlal Jethalal Desai Vs. Mr. Shelat submitted that the Director performs statutory function and not executory function and the constitution of first Market Committee is by the State as statutorily required and therefore, its establishment and constitution is by the law. 11.2. Mr. Shelat has relied upon the following decisions:- (1) In the case of Ochhavlal Jethalal Desai Vs. State of Gujarat reported in 1967 GLR 359 ; (2) In the case of Patel Premji Jiva By LRs. Vs. State of Gujarat reported in (1971) 3 SCC 815 ; (3) Decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court dated 17.8.1977 in the case of Budha Veerinaidu Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr.; (4) In the case of Union of India Vs. R.C. Jain reported in AIR 1981 SC 951 ; (5) In the case of The Agriculture Produce Market Committee, Wardha Vs. Meghraj Pundlikrao Dongre and Ors. Reported in AIR 2011 Bombay 48; 12. Learned advocate Mr. Mayur Rajguru appearing for respondent No.4 in the first matter has adopted the arguments of learned senior advocate Mr. Shelat and further submitted that considering various powers exercised by the State Government, the Market Committee could be said to be controlled by the State and thus falls within the definition of Public Authority. Mr. Rajguru submitted that the respondent No.1 has not exceeded in his jurisdiction while directing the Market Committee to provide information demanded by respondent No.4 and has also committed no error in directing the State Government to frame Rules for the purpose of achieving the object of the Act. Mr. Rajguru submitted that Section 22 of the Act has overriding effect to other provisions, including the Market Act and therefore, the direction issued by respondent No.1 to amend the Rule is justified. Nobody has appeared for private respondent in second petition. 13. Having heard learned advocates for the parties, it appears that for any body, authority or any institution of self Government, to be called ‘Public Authority’ for the purpose of the Act, it has to fall or to be covered within the definition of ‘Public Authority’ under Section 2(h) of the Act. 13. Having heard learned advocates for the parties, it appears that for any body, authority or any institution of self Government, to be called ‘Public Authority’ for the purpose of the Act, it has to fall or to be covered within the definition of ‘Public Authority’ under Section 2(h) of the Act. Definition of Public Authority not only defines to mean a body, an authority or any institution of the self Government established or constituted as provided therein to be a public authority but has exhausted itself by including all those bodies which are owned, controlled and substantially financed by the funds of the Government and also non-Governmental organizations which are substantially financed by the funds of the Government. Therefore, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and Another Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81, Section 2(h) of the Act when exhausts categories mentioned therein, one is required to look at only the definition to find out whether any authority, body or institution of self Government is covered by the definition of Public Authority. 14. Definition of ‘Public Authority’ in Section 2(h) of the Act reads as under:- 2(h) "Public Authority" means any authority or body or institution of self- government established or constituted- (a) by or under the Constitution; (b) by any other law made by Parliament; (c) by any other law made by State Legislature; (d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government, and includes any- (i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed; (ii) non-Government organisation substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government; 15. It is nowhere found from the definition that any body, authority or an institution is to be taken as a public authority under Section 2(h) of the Act simply because it is called or taken to be a self Government or a local authority. Definition of Public Authority clearly stipulates that to be called a Public Authority under Section 2(h) of the Act, any body, authority, or an institution of the self Government has to fall within the categories mentioned therein or to meet with the criteria provided therein. If all institutes of self Government or all local bodies were to be taken as Public Authority within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Act, the legislature would have so provided. If all institutes of self Government or all local bodies were to be taken as Public Authority within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Act, the legislature would have so provided. When the legislature in its wisdom has not so provided and when definition of Public Authority exhausts the categories, an institution of self Government or a local authority cannot be held to be a public authority unless it falls within the definition of public authority. 16. Thus, what is required is to find out whether definition of public authority in Section 2(h) of the Act takes within it a market committee, established and constituted under the Market Act. For such purpose, some relevant provisions of the Market Act need to be referred. 17. Market Act is to consolidate and amend the law relating to buying and selling of agricultural produce and establishment of the markets for agricultural produce in the State of Gujarat. Section 2(xiv) defines the Market Committee to mean a market committee established or deemed to be established under the Market Act. Section 4 provides that State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint an officer to be the Director of Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance, Gujarat State to exercise such powers and perform such functions and duties as are conferred or imposed on him by or under the Market Act and shall subject to such general or special orders as the State Government may pass, superintend the administration and carry out the purposes of the Market Act. Subsection (2) of Section 4 also authorizes the State Government to appoint such number of other officers as may be deemed necessary to be Joint Directors or Deputy Directors who are to exercise their powers under the control of the Director and perform functions and duties under the Market Act as the State Government by general or special order directs. Section 5 provides for declaration of intention of regulating purchase and sale of agricultural produce in specified area by Director, by notification in Official Gazette. Section 6 provides for declaration of the market areas by notification in Official Gazette after following the procedure provided therein for the purposes of the Market Act in respect of all or any of the kinds of agricultural produce specified in the notification. Section 6 provides for declaration of the market areas by notification in Official Gazette after following the procedure provided therein for the purposes of the Market Act in respect of all or any of the kinds of agricultural produce specified in the notification. It also provides for excluding any area specified in the notification, under sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Market Act or include any area therein. Section 7 provides for declaration of the market, market yard and market proper for each market area. Section 9 mandates establishment of the Market Committee or committees by the Director for every market area. This provision also enables the Director to establish more than one market committee for the market area. Sub-Section (5) of Section 9 provides that every market committee shall be deemed to be established under Section 9 with effect from the date on which it is duly constituted for the first time under Section 11 of the Act. Section 10 provides for incorporation of market committee to be a body corporate by such name as the Director may specify by notification in the Official Gazette. As per sub-Section (2) thereof, a Market Committee shall be deemed to be a local authority within the meaning of Clause (26) of Section 3 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. Section 11 speaks about the constitution of the Market Committee, as per which every Market Committee shall consist of 14 elected members, one member to be mentioned by local authority within whose jurisdiction the principal market yard is situated from amongst its councilors and two members to be nominated by the State Government. However, it is provided therein that when a Market Committee is constituted for the first time, all members thereof shall be persons nominated by the State Government and shall hold office for a period of two years from the date of their nomination. Section 17 speaks about election of Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Market Committee from elected Members. Section 20 is about preparation of budget estimate. Section 21 is about maintaining of accounts and records of the market, audit of accounts and submission of the annual report to the prescribed authority. Section 22 speaks about appointment of servants of Market Committee and conditions of their service. Section 20 is about preparation of budget estimate. Section 21 is about maintaining of accounts and records of the market, audit of accounts and submission of the annual report to the prescribed authority. Section 22 speaks about appointment of servants of Market Committee and conditions of their service. Section 23 says that a market committee shall exercise the powers and perform the function and duties conferred or imposed on it by the Market Act and the Rules. Section 26 provides for duties of the Market Committee which reads as under:- 26. Duties of market committees.- It shall be the duty of every market committee to maintain and manage the market and standardisation of the Agricultural produce as may be prescribed, to provide such facilities in the market as the Director may from time to time direct and to enforce in the market area the provisions of this Act, the rules, bye-laws and the conditions of licences granted under the Act in connection with the purchase and sale of the agricultural produce with which it is concerned. It shall also be the duty of every market committee to collect and maintain such information relating to market intelligence as may be prescribed and to supply the same to Government whenever so required. Section 27 is for grant, renewal, suspension or cancellation of the licence by Market Committee for the purpose of any specific transaction or transactions to a trader, general commission agent, broker, weighman, surveyor, warehouseman or any person to operate in the market area or part thereof. Section 28 speaks about power to levy fee on the agricultural produce bought or sold in the market area. Chapter IV-A inserted by Gujarat Act 17 of 2007 is for private market, special market, e-market, direct purchase market farmer consumer market and contract farming. This Chapter contains different provisions for establishment of the private market, e-market, etc. for levy of market fees for grant or rejection of suspension or cancellation of the licence etc. Section 31-N of this Chapter is for constitution of market committee for special market or special commodity market. This Chapter contains different provisions for establishment of the private market, e-market, etc. for levy of market fees for grant or rejection of suspension or cancellation of the licence etc. Section 31-N of this Chapter is for constitution of market committee for special market or special commodity market. This Section provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 11(1) of the Act, every Market Committee for special market or special commodity market shall consist of Chairman to be nominated by the State Government, Vice Chancellor to be nominated by the State Government, not more than five traders to be nominated by the State Government, Municipal Commissioner or his nominee, the Collector or his nominee, Chief Town Planner or his nominee, Registrar of Co-operative Societies or his nominee, Director or his nominee to be ex-officio members of the Committee, Executive Member to be appointed by the State Government who shall be the Secretary of the Market Committee and Agricultural Market Advisor to the Government of India as ex-officio member of the Market Committee. Members of such Market Committee other than ex-officio members are to hold the office during the pleasure of the Government. Thus, in the constitution of the Market Committee under this Section for special market or special commodity market, no elected member is included. Chapter V is for market committee fund and State Agricultural Produce Market fund. Section 32 under this Chapter provides that all moneys received by a market committee shall be paid into a fund to be called ‘the Market Committee Fund’ and all expenditure incurred by the market committee shall be defrayed out of the said Fund. Any surplus remaining with the market committee after such expenditure has been met shall be invested in such manner as may be prescribed in this behalf. Section 33 speaks about the purposes for which the fund shall be expended. It includes acquisition of a site or sites for the market, maintenance or improvement of the market, construction and repair of buildings necessary for the purpose of market etc., provision and maintenance of weights and measures and other incidental expenses, including payment of contribution to the State Agricultural Produce Markets Fund. Chapter V-A is for establishment of State Agricultural Market Board and such Board is to carry out the functions as provided in Section 34-J, which reads as under:- 34J. Chapter V-A is for establishment of State Agricultural Market Board and such Board is to carry out the functions as provided in Section 34-J, which reads as under:- 34J. Powers and functions of Board The Board shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, perform the following functions and shall have powers to do such things as may be necessary or expedient for carrying out such functions, namely:- (i) to co-ordinate the working of the market committees and other affairs thereof including programmes undertaken by such market committees for development of principal market yards, sub-market yards and provisions of infrastructural facilities and amenities; (ii) subject to orders or directions, if any, of the State Government in this regard, to undertake the State level planning of the development of agricultural produce markets; (iii) to administer the Development Fund; (iv) with the prior approval of the State Government, to give advice to market committees in general or to any market committee in particular with a view to ensuring efficiency thereof; (v) to approve proposals for selection of any new site by a market committee for establishment of principal market yard or submarket yard: Provided that this clause shall not apply to the selection of any new site by a market committee for establishment of principal market yard or sub-market yard where such new site is to be purchased by the market committee from its own resources; (vi) where a market committee makes a request in that behalf, to supervise and guide the market committee in respect of the construction of infra-structural facilities in, or in hinterland of, a principal market yard or sub-market yard undertaken by the market committee; (vii) where a market committee makes a request in that behalf to supervise and guide the market committee in preparation of plans and estimates of construction programmes undertaken by the market committee; (viii) to execute all works chargeable to the Development Fund; (ix) to maintain accounts in such forms as may be prescribed and get the same audited in such manner as may be laid down in the regulations; (x) to publish annually at the close of the year, progress report, balance-sheet, and statement of assets and liabilities and send copies thereof to each member of the Board, the State Government and the Director of Agricultural Marketing, Gujarat State; (xi) to prepare and adopt budget for the ensuring year; (xii) to make necessary arrangement for education, propaganda and publicity on matters relating to regulated marketing of agricultural produce; (xiii) to assist, undertake and promote market survey and research in the field of agricultural marketing; (xiv) to assist and undertake collection, compilation, dissemination and publication of market intelligence and statistics in respect of agricultural produce; (xv) to promote and undertake grading and standardisation of agricultural produce; (xvi) to provide facilities for training of officers and staff of market committees; (xvii) to arrange and organise seminars, workshops, camps, conferences, exhibitions in the State on agricultural marketing; (xviii) to grant subsidy and loans to market committees for the purpose of this Act on such terms and conditions as the Board may by regulations determine; (xix) where a market committee makes a request in that behalf, to give assistance to the market committee in technical, legal and administrative matters and maintenance of staff for rendering such assistance; (xx) to promote and assist orderly marketing of agricultural produce in areas where there is no regulation of market under this Act; (xxi) to do such other things and perform such other acts as it may think necessary or expedient for the proper conduct of its business and the carrying into effect the purposes of this Act. Section 34-M provides for contribution to be paid to the Board by Market Committee, which may be equal to such percentage of its income as may be prescribed from time to time by the State Government. State Government is also under obligation to make payment to the Board by way of contribution or grants of an amount not less than five percent of the aggregate amount by the Market Committees. Utilization of such fund called as ‘Development Fund’, is provided in Section 34-O, which reads as under:- 34O. Utilisation of Development Fund.- (1) The Development Fund may be utilised by the Board for discharging its functions under this Act. Utilization of such fund called as ‘Development Fund’, is provided in Section 34-O, which reads as under:- 34O. Utilisation of Development Fund.- (1) The Development Fund may be utilised by the Board for discharging its functions under this Act. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, the Board may utilise the Development Fund for all or any of the following purposes, namely:- (a) supervision, regulation and improvement of markets established for the purposes of this Act; (b) giving aid to market committees in the form of loans or grants to enable them to discharge their duties and functions under this Act; (c) payment of salaries, allowances, pensions, gratuities and compassionate grants to the Government servants, if any, serving under the Board: Provided that all expenditure under this clause shall be a first charge on the Development Fund; (d) payment of allowances and fees to the members of the Board; (e) imparting education and giving publicity in the matters connected with the-regulated marketing; (f) meeting legal expenses relating to the functions of the Board; (g) giving technical and administrative assistance to market committees including maintenance of staff for rendering assistance to market committees for the following purposes, namely:- (i) Engineering; (ii) Legal assistance; and (iii) Inspection; (h) imparting training to officers and servants of market committees or organising or arranging camps, workshops, seminars or conferences or exhibitions on development of marketing of agricultural produce; (i) grading and standardisation of agricultural produce; (j) market survey, research, and collection, compilation, dissemination, and publication of market information and statistics; (k) undertaking functions of a market committee in areas where there is no market committee or where a market committee is not viable; (l) construction of principal market yards, and sub-market yards and leasing or transferring them to market committees; (m) establishment and maintenance of office of the Board; (n) expenditure on audit of accounts of the Board; (o) sanctioning of loans and advances to the employees of the Board; (p) with the prior approval of the State Government, any other purposes connecting with the marketing of agricultural produce, in any market area or market declared or deemed to be declared as such under this Act; (q) any of the matters connected with, or incidental to, any of the purpose specified in clauses (a) to (p). Section 36 provides for offences, penalties, investigation and procedure to be followed in respect of contravention of the provisions of the Act. Chapter VIII is for control over the Market Committee for holding inquiry by Director into the affairs of the market committee, for proper performance of duties by Director in default of the Market Committee, for super-session of the market committee and to call for proceedings of market committee by Director as also by the State Government to examine legality or propriety of any decision or order of the Market Committee. Section 49 provides for acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act to be transferred to the market committee on payment by Market Committee of compensation awarded under the Land Acquisition Act. Section 52 provides for denotifying or dividing market area by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette. Effect of de-notification or exclusion of the market area is given in Section 53, as per which the market established in the market area to cease to be market and market committee or market committees established for such market area to stand dissolved and the further consequences to be followed as provided therein. Section 55 provides for vesting of property etc. of dissolved market committee in new market committee constituted. Section 57 provides that Chairman, Vice Chairman, Members, Secretary, Servants of the Market Committee to be a public servants within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 59 provides for making of Rules by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette for any market area or market areas for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act. Section 60 provides for making of bye-laws by Market Committee in respect of the market area and agricultural produce for which it is established, not inconsistent with the Act and the Rules made thereunder for the regulation or business and the conditions of trading in the market area and for any other matters as may be prescribed. Such bye-laws are required to be registered by the Director on being satisfied that bye-law so forwarded to him is not inconsistent with the Act and the Rules. Section 61 gives independent powers to the Director to direct the Market Committee to make bye-laws or to modify or amend the existing bye-law. Such bye-laws are required to be registered by the Director on being satisfied that bye-law so forwarded to him is not inconsistent with the Act and the Rules. Section 61 gives independent powers to the Director to direct the Market Committee to make bye-laws or to modify or amend the existing bye-law. Section 62 gives power to State Government to amend the Schedule so as to add or cancel any of the items of agricultural produce specified therein by notification in the Official Gazette and to lay such notification for a period of 30 days before the State legislature and shall be subject to rescission by legislature or modification by legislature. By Section 64, the Bombay Agricultural Produce markets Act, 1939 and the Saurashtra Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1955 are repealed. 18. The Rules, called as Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1965 are for election of the market committee, election of its Chairman and other office bearers, levy and collection of the market fees and other measures to be taken by Market Committee for the purposes of the Act. 19. What appears from the Scheme of the Market Act is that for the purpose of regulating of buying and selling of the agricultural produce, declaration of an area as market area, a market for such area and establishment of market committee is envisaged by the Act. The question is whether a Market Committee could be said to be established or constituted by law of the State Legislature and/or could it be said to be a body owned, controlled or substantially financed either directly or indirectly by the funds provided by the Government for the purpose of definition of public authority. Though, as per the definition of the Market Committee in Section 2(xiv) of the Market Act, it means a Market Committee established or deemed to be established under the Market Act, however, such could not be the only guiding factor to decide whether a Market Committee is a Public Authority or not under Section 2(h) of the Act as there are other provisions of the Market Act, which are required to be considered before concluding that the Market Committee is or is not a Public Authority under Section 2(h) of the Act. At this stage, reference needs to be made to the State Bank of India Act, 1955 wherein the State Bank is defined to mean the State Bank of India constituted under the Act. However, by Section 3 of the State Bank of India Act, constitution of State Bank is provided for to carry on business of banking and other business under the provisions of that Act. Therefore, if there are other provisions in a particular Statute concerning establishment and constitution of any body, the authority or any institution of the self Government, such provisions are required to be considered to decide whether any body or authority or institution of self Government is established under the Act or by the Act to gather the intention of the legislature. The establishment of the Market Committee is mandated by Section 9 of the Act after declaration of the market area and the market under Sections 6 and 7 of the Market Act by the Director. As per Section 4 of the Market Act, State Government is authorized to appoint an officer to be the Director of the Agricultural Market and Rural Finance and to appoint other required officers by notification in the Official Gazette to exercise such powers and perform such functions and duties as are conferred or imposed by or under the Act. 20. Considering the scheme of the Market Act, it appears that though in Sections 5 and 6 of the Market Act, word ‘MAY’ is used, but for advancement of public good, the Statute imposes a compulsory force upon the Director to implement the intents of the legislature. The Director is under statutory mandate to start functioning for implementing the Act. Use of word ‘MAY’, therefore, confers no discretion to Director as regards implementation of the Act but, he may use his discretion to declare his intention for area to be market area and the agricultural produce to be regulated and finalize the same after following procedure. After declaration is made by the Director for any area to be a market area, established of market committee is compulsory and constitution of the market committee under Section 11 is deemed establishment from the date of its constitution under Section 9 of the Market Act. After declaration is made by the Director for any area to be a market area, established of market committee is compulsory and constitution of the market committee under Section 11 is deemed establishment from the date of its constitution under Section 9 of the Market Act. On such establishment, provisions of the Market Act become operative for the State, the Director and the Market Committee to function as statutorily required to achieve the objects and purposes of the Act. As per the provision of Section 11, first Market committee is to be constituted after the declaration of the market area by the members to be nominated by the State Government who are to hold office for a period of two years from the date of their nomination. Therefore, it could be said that the Market Committee owes its establishment as statutorily required by the Market Act. Unlike a Co-operative Society or a company, which becomes body corporate by name on its registration under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 and the Companies Act, 1956 respectively, incorporation of the Market Committee to be a body corporate by a name is by statutory declaration to be made by the Director by notification in the Official Gazette as per Section 10 of the Market Act. Such Market Committee is deemed to be a local authority within the meaning of Clause (26) of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1904 as provided in sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Market Act. 21. As a local authority, the market committee is in control of its funds and is free to function like self government as statutorily required subject to the control envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Act which includes exercise of the revisional powers by the Director and to examine the proceedings of the market committee by the State Government or the Director as the case may be as to the legality or propriety of any decision of the market committee. By the present Market Act, the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939 and the Saurashtra Agricultural Market Act, 1955 stood repealed. As could be seen from the provisions of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939 (‘old Act’), somewhat similar provisions were there as regards declaration of the market area, declaration of the markets, establishment of the market committee as per section 4, 4A and 5 respectively. As could be seen from the provisions of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939 (‘old Act’), somewhat similar provisions were there as regards declaration of the market area, declaration of the markets, establishment of the market committee as per section 4, 4A and 5 respectively. However, under the old Act, such acts were to be performed by the State Government whereas in the present Market Act, the State Government is authorized to appoint the Director and other officers as stated above to perform the above said statutory functions but the declaration of the market area, declaration of the markets and establishment of the market committee was as required in the old Act and is as required by the present Market Act. 22. The appointment of the Director is the first step towards implementation of the provisions of the Market Act. It appears from the provisions for establishment and constitution of the market committee that since the legislature was mindful of the fact that there would be a need of a body to regulate the sale and purchase of agricultural produce in the area declared as market area by the Director and, therefore, it is made mandatory for the Director to establish the market committee by Section 9 and its constitution is fixed by Section 11 of the Market Act. In order to see that the object and the purposes of the Market Act could be better achieved the agriculturists, from Co-operative societies dispensing agricultural credit, traders holding general licences and representatives of cooperative marketing societies are involved in the constitution of the market committee by elections and while doing so, the legislature has also seen to it that there remains one member in such committee as mentioned by the local authority within whose jurisdiction the principal market yard is situated from amongst its councilors and two members to be nominated by the State Government. Therefore, the establishment of the market committee by provision of section 9 and constitution thereof by provision of Section 11 directly enacted in the Statute of Market Act and not as per the volition of any private persons or the residents of the area. 23. Therefore, the establishment of the market committee by provision of section 9 and constitution thereof by provision of Section 11 directly enacted in the Statute of Market Act and not as per the volition of any private persons or the residents of the area. 23. In the case of Ochhavlal Jethalal Desai (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has held that the functions discharged by the market committee are government functions and the fund at its disposal is local fund within the meaning of definition given in clause (31) of section 3 of the General Clauses Act. 24. In the case of R.C. Jain (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the context of the definition of local authority in section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, has held and observed in para 2 as under: “2. Let us, therefore, concentrate and confine our attention and enquiry to the definition of 'Local Authority' in Section 3 (31) of the General Clauses Act. A proper and careful scrutiny of the language of Section 3(31) suggests that an authority, in order to be a local Authority, must be of like nature and character as a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body of Port Commissioners, possessing, therefore, many, if not all, of the distinctive attributes and characteristics of a Municipal Committee, District Board, or Body of Port Commissioners, but, possessing one essential feature, namely, that it is legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with, the control and management of a municipal or local fund. What then are the distinctive attributes and characteristics, all or many of which a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body of Port Commissioners shares with any other local authority? First, the authorities must have separate legal existence as Corporate bodies. They must not be mere Governmental agencies but must be legally independent entities. Next, they must function in a defined area and must ordinarily, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, be elected by the inhabitants of the area. Next, they must enjoy a certain degree of autonomy, with freedom to decide for themselves questions of policy affecting the area administered by them. The autonomy may not be complete and the degree of the dependence may vary considerably but, an appreciable measure of autonomy there must be. Next. Next, they must enjoy a certain degree of autonomy, with freedom to decide for themselves questions of policy affecting the area administered by them. The autonomy may not be complete and the degree of the dependence may vary considerably but, an appreciable measure of autonomy there must be. Next. they must be entrusted by Statute with such Governmental functions and duties as are usually entrusted to municipal bodies, such as those connected with providing amenities to the inhabitants of the locality, like health and education services, water and sewerage, town planning and development, roads, markets, transportation, social welfare services etc. etc. Broadly we may say that they may be entrusted with the performance of civic duties and functions which would otherwise be Governmental duties and functions. Finally, they must have the power to raise funds for the furtherance of their activities and the fulfilment of their projects by levying taxes, rates, charges, or fees. This may be in addition to moneys provided by Government or obtained by borrowing or otherwise. What is essential is that control or management of the fund must vest in the authority.” 25. In the case of Budha Veerinaidu versus State of Andhra Pradesh and another reported in 1983- 143-ITR 1021 AP, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has observed in para 4 to 7 as under: “4. It is true that this decision of the Supreme Court rests on two conclusions. The first conclusion is that by virtue of Section 10(2) of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963, a market committee is a local authority within the meaning of the Bombay. General Clauses Act. But it is also pointed out that if a body is entrusted by the Government with control over management of a local fund, there is no scope for the argument that the market committee established is not a local authority. The test, therefore, which the Supreme Court applied was entrustment of local fund by the Government to a market committee. Though the word " local fund " has not been statutorily defined, it is permissible to us to refer to the Financial Code of the Andhra Pradesh Govt. The test, therefore, which the Supreme Court applied was entrustment of local fund by the Government to a market committee. Though the word " local fund " has not been statutorily defined, it is permissible to us to refer to the Financial Code of the Andhra Pradesh Govt. which is a set of rules issued by the Government for the guidance of the officers, for finding out what the concept of local fund is and it is clear that under the Andhra Pradesh Financial Code the market committee fund constitutes one of the categories of local funds. Apart from this test, when one goes through the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Rules, 1969, framed by the State Govt. under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966, it is clear that ample provision has been made for the budget which has to be sanctioned by the director, for collection of licence fees and regulation of market charges, etc., for law charges and for creation of different posts and appointment to such posts in the market committee. All these matters' are to be strictly supervised by the Government and are to be carried out under the direction and control of the Government and the director of marketing is an officer appointed by the Government. Hence the requirements of the definition in Clause (1) of the "local fund ", namely, control over its budget, creation of particular posts and appointment to such posts are satisfied. All these matters are directly under the control of the State Govt. Hence the moneys received and administered by the market committee, which fulfil these requirements would constitute local fund. Since the market committee has been entrusted by the Government with the control and management of this local fund, it would be a local authority within the meaning of Clause (31) of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.“ 26. The decision in the case of Mohamad Hushen Gulam Mohamad (supra) was not concerning the issue whether the establishment of the market committee was by the Act. The Court has examined the constitutional validity of the provisions of the old Market Act and has observed about the powers of the market committee for levy of the fees etc. The decision in the case of Mohamad Hushen Gulam Mohamad (supra) was not concerning the issue whether the establishment of the market committee was by the Act. The Court has examined the constitutional validity of the provisions of the old Market Act and has observed about the powers of the market committee for levy of the fees etc. However, in the case of Jan Mohammad Noor Mohamad Bagban (supra), while examining the challenge as regards constitutional validity of the present Market Act, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para 9 as under:- 9. Section 5 of the Gujarat Act authorities by Director to declare his intention to regulate purchase and sale of agricultural produce in a specified area after inviting objections or suggestions from the local authorities functioning in the area, and from other persons. By S. 6 the Director after considering the objections and suggestions received within the period specified in the notification is authorised to declare the area or part thereof a market area for the purposes of the Act in respect of all or any of kinds of produce specified in the notification. The object of the Act being to ameliorate the condition of agriculturists and to do away with the middlemen, who, it is a matter of common knowledge, make large and unconscionable profits out of the transactions carried out through them, declaration of intention to regulate trade in agricultural produce in a specified area, after hearing the objections and suggestions of interested parties, cannot be regarded as imposing unreasonable restrictions on the right to carry on trade. 27. In the case of Dr. Indramani Pyarelal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained the meaning of the phrase “by the Act” and “under the Act” in the context of Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 and the bye-laws made thereunder. In para 15, it is held and observed as under: “15. A more serious argument was advanced by learned Counsel based upon the submission that a power conferred by a bye-law framed under S.11 or 12 was not one that was 'conferred "by or under the Act or as may be prescribed". In para 15, it is held and observed as under: “15. A more serious argument was advanced by learned Counsel based upon the submission that a power conferred by a bye-law framed under S.11 or 12 was not one that was 'conferred "by or under the Act or as may be prescribed". Learned Counsel is undoubtedly right in his submission that a power conferred by a law is not one conferred "by the Act", for in the context the expression "conferred by the Act" would mean "conferred expressly or necessary implication by the Act itself." It is also common ground that a bye law framed under Sections (11) or 12 could not fall within the phraseology "as may be prescribed", for the expression "prescribed" has been defined to mean "by rules under the Act", i.e, those framed under S.28 and a bye law is certainly not within that description. The question therefore is whether a power "conferred by a bye-law could be held to be a power conferred under the Act". The meaning of the words ''under the Act" is well known. "By an Act would mean by a provision directly enacted in the statute in question and which is gatherable from its express languages or by necessary implication therefrom. The words "under the Act" would in that context signify what is not directly to be found in the statute itself but is conferred or imposed by virtue of powers enabling this to be done; in other words, bye-laws made by Subordinate law- making authority which is empowered to do so by the parent Act. The distinction is thus between what is directly done by the enactment and what is done indirectly by rule-making authorities which are vested with powers in that behalf by the Act. (vide Hubli Electricity Co. Ltd. v. Province of Bombay, 76 Ind App 57 at p. 66: ( AIR 1949 PC 136 at p. 139) and Narayanaswamy Naidu v. Krishna Murthi ILR (1958) Mad 513 at p. 547: ( AIR 1958 Mad 343 at p. 359)). That in such a sense bye-laws would be subordinate legislation "under the Act" is clear from the terms of Ss. 11 and 12 themselves. Section 11(1) enacts; "11. That in such a sense bye-laws would be subordinate legislation "under the Act" is clear from the terms of Ss. 11 and 12 themselves. Section 11(1) enacts; "11. (1) Any recognised association may subject to the previous approval of the Central Government make, byelaws for the regulation and control of forward contracts", and sub-s. (2) enumerates the matters in respect of which bye-laws might make provision. Sub-s. (3) refers to the bye-laws as those made under this section and the, provisions of sub-s. (4) put this matter beyond doubt by enacting: "11. (4) Any bye-laws made under this section shall be subject to such conditions in regard to previous publication as may be prescribed and when approved by the Central Government, shall be published in the Gazette of India and also in the Official Gazette of the State in which the principal office of the recognised association is situate : ..................." Section 12 under which the impugned bye-law was made states in sub-s. (2) : "12. (2) Where, in pursuance of this section, any byelaws have been made or amended, the bye-laws so made or amended shall be published in the Gazette of India and also in the Official Gazette of the State in which the principal office of the recognised association is situate, and on the publication thereof in the Gazette of India the bye-laws so made or amended. shall have effect as if they had been made or amended by the recognised association." and in sub-s. (4): "12. (4) The making or the amendment or revision of any bye-laws under this section shall in all cases be subject to the condition of previous publication : ..............................." Having regard to these provisions it would not be possible to contend that notwithstanding that the bye-laws are rules made by an Association under S. 11 or compulsory made by the Central Government for the Association as its bye-laws under S. 12, they are not in either case Subordinate legislation under S. 11 or 12 as the case may be, of the Act and they would therefore squarely fall within the words "under the Act" in S. 4(f). Indeed, we did not understand Mr. Pathak to dispute this proposition. 28. Learned Advocate Mr. Indeed, we did not understand Mr. Pathak to dispute this proposition. 28. Learned Advocate Mr. Patel then placed reliance on the decision in the case of Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd. (supra) to point out that the Director exercised delegated powers for establishment of the market committee and, therefore, establishment and constitution of the market committee cannot be said to be by the Act. 29. The decision rendered in the said case is in the context of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Live Stock) Markets Act, 1966. In para 2 of the decision, it is observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Agricultural Market Committee is a statutory body created under the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Live Stock) Markets Act, 1966. While examining the other provisions of the said Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para 20 to 26 as under: “20. The Act was made by the State Legislature while the Rules have been made by the State Government and the Bye-laws have been made by the Committee. Both constitute delegated legislation. 21. Delegated Legislation has been defined by Salmond as "that which proceeds from any authority other than the sovereign power and is therefore dependent for its continued existence and validity on some superior or supreme authority". (See : Salmond, Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., Page 116). 22. Delegated Legislation is not a new phenomenon. Ever since the Statutes came to be made by Parliament, the Delegated Legislation also came to be made by an authority to which the power was delegated by the Parliament. It is no use going back into the pages of history or to look to the Statute of Proclamations 1539, under which Henry VIII was given extensive powers to legislate by proclamations. What is intended to be emphasised is that there has always been, and continues to be, need for delegated legislation. The exigencies of the modern State, especially the social and economic reforms, have given rise to the making of Delegated Legislation on a larger scale (by authorising the Government, almost in every Statute passed by Parliament or the State Legislature to make Rules) so much so that a reasonable fear could have arisen among the people that they were being ruled by the Bureaucracy. 23. 23. The reasons for giving delegated power to the Government to make Rules are many, but the most prominent and dominant reasons are :- (i) The area for which powers are given to make delegated legislation may be technically complex, so much so, that it may not be possible and may even be difficult to set out all the permutations in the Statute. (ii) The Executive may require time to experiment and to find out how the original legislation was operating and thereafter to fill up all other details. (iii) It gives an advantage to the Executive, in the sense that a Government with an onerous legislative time schedule may feel tempted to pass skeleton legislation with the details being provided by the making of Rules and Regulations. 24. The power of delegation is a constituent element of the legislative power as a whole under Article 245 of the Constitution and other relative Articles and when the Legislature enact laws to meet the challenge of the complex socioeconomic problems, they often find it convenient and necessary to delegate subsidiary or ancillary powers to delegates of their choice for carrying out the policy laid down by the Acts as part of the Administrative Law. The Legislature has to lay down the legislative policy and principle to afford guidance for carrying out the said policy before it delegates its subsidiary powers in that behalf (See : Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. State of Bombay, (1961) 1 SCR 341 : ( AIR 1961 SC 4 ). This Court in another case namely, The Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi, AIR 1968 SC 1232 as also in an earlier decision in In Re : The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, The Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947 and The Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, 1951 SCR 747 : ( AIR 1951 SC 332 ), has laid down the principle that the Legislature must retain in its own hands the essential legislative functions and what can be delegated is the task of subordinate legislation necessary for implementing the purposes and objects of the Act concerned. 25. In Avinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1979) 1 SCC 137 : ( AIR 1979 SC 321 ), Krishna Iyer, J. laid down the following tests for valid delegation of legislative power. 25. In Avinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1979) 1 SCC 137 : ( AIR 1979 SC 321 ), Krishna Iyer, J. laid down the following tests for valid delegation of legislative power. These are : "(1) the legislature cannot efface itself; (2) it cannot delegate the plenary or the essential legislative function; (3) even if there be delegation, Parliamentary control over delegated legislation should be a living continuity as a constitutional necessity." It was further observed as under : "While what constitutes an essential feature cannot be delineated in detail it certainly cannot include a change of policy. The legislature is the master of legislative policy and if the delegate is free to switch policy it may be usurpation of legislative power itself." 26. The principle which, therefore, emerges out is that the essential legislative function consists of the determination of the legislative policy and the Legislature cannot abdicate essential legislative function in favour of another. Power to make subsidiary legislation may be entrusted by the Legislature to another body of its choice but the Legislature should, before delegating, enunciate either expressly or by implication, the policy and the principles for the guidance of the delegates. These principles also apply to Taxing Statutes. The effect of these principles is that the delegate which has been authorised to make subsidiary Rules and Regulations has to work within the scope of its authority and cannot widen or constrict the scope of the Act or the policy laid down thereunder. It cannot, in the garb of making Rules, legislate on the field covered by the Act and has to restrict itself to the mode of implementation of the policy and purpose of the Act.” 30. There is a distinction between exercise of the powers under delegated legislation and exercise of powers emanated directly from the enactment. Establishment and constitution of the Market Committee, as statutorily required by the Market Act, is not in exercise of the powers conferred under delegated legislation because it is not that in the Market Act, there is no direct provision found for establishment and constitution of the Market Committee and for such purpose, legislature has delegated its power to the Government to make rules for such purpose and in exercise of powers under such Rules, Market Committee is established. When there are provisions directly enacted in the Statute of the Market Act for establishment and constitution of the Market Committee and when the statutory authority is to act in temperament with such provision, it could be said that establishment and constitution of the Market Committee is by law of legislature and such establishment and constitution of the Market Committee could not be said to be in exercise of delegated powers. 31. On the law for regulating of buying and purchase of agricultural produce and establishment of the markets, the legislature has legislated on every aspects like providing declaration of the area as a market area, markets for such areas, establishment and constitution of Market Committees, its statutory powers and duties, powers and duties of other statutory authorities and provided to the statutory authorities the manner and method of carrying out its legislation into effect and also the determination of the area to which such legislation would extend. Therefore, establishment of the Market Committee could be said to be by conditional legislation whereby the Market Committee is established and constituted to function for the area declared as market area by the Director. The Director is not exercising powers under delegated legislation. Distinction between the delegated legislation and the conditional legislation is explained by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hamdard Dawakhana and Another Vs. The Union of India reported in AIR 1960 SC 554 in para 29, as under: “29. The third point raised by Mr. Munshi was that the words or any other disease or condition which may be specified in the rules made under, this Act in cl. (d) of S. 3 of the Act are delegated legislation and do not lay down any certain criteria or proper standards, and surrender unguided and uncanalised power to the executive to add to diseases in the schedule. The learned Solicitor-General in reply supported the schedule as a case of conditional legislation and not the exercise of delegated legislative power and he further contended that even if it was held to be the latter it was within the limits recognised by judicial decisions. The distinction between conditional legislation and delegated legislation is this that in the former the delegate's power is that of determining when a legislative declared rule of conduct shall become effective; Hampton and Co. The distinction between conditional legislation and delegated legislation is this that in the former the delegate's power is that of determining when a legislative declared rule of conduct shall become effective; Hampton and Co. v. United States, (1927) 276 US 394, and the latter involves delegation of rule making power which constitutionally may be exercised by the administrative agent. This means that the legislature having laid down the broad principles of its policy in the legislation can then leaves the details to be supplied by the administrative authority. In other words by delegated legislation the delegate completes the legislation by supplying details within the limits prescribed by the statute and in the case of conditional legislation the power of legislation is exercised by the legislature conditionally leaving to the discretion of an external authority the time and manner of carrying its legislation into effect as also the determination of the area to which it is to extend; The Queen v. Burah, (1878) 3 AC 889 : Charles Russell v. The Queen, (1882) 7 AC 829 at p. 835; Emperor v. Benoarilal Sarma, 72 Ind App 57 : ( AIR 1945 PC 48 ); Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1957) SCR 605 : ( (S) AIR 1957 SC 510 ). Thus when the delegate is given the power of making rules and regulations in order to fill in the details to carry out and subserve the purposes of the legislation the manner in which the requirements of the statute are to be met and the rights therein created to be enjoyed it is an exercise of delegated legislation. But when the legislation is complete in itself and the legislature has itself made the law and the only function left to the delegate is to apply the law to an area or to determine the time and manner of carrying it into effect, it is conditional legislation. But when the legislation is complete in itself and the legislature has itself made the law and the only function left to the delegate is to apply the law to an area or to determine the time and manner of carrying it into effect, it is conditional legislation. To put it in the language of another American case : "To assert that a law is less than a law because it is made to depend upon a future event or act is to rob the legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or the things future and impossible to fully know." The proper distinction there pointed out was this : "The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate to power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to make its own action depend. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law making power, and, must therefore be subject of enquiry and determination outside the hall of legislature." (In Locke's Appeal 72 Pa. 491; Field and Co. v. Clark, (1892) 143 US 649). But the discretion should not be so wide that it is impossible to discern its limits. There must instead be definite boundaries within which the powers of the administrative authority are exercisable. Delegation should not be so indefinite as to amount to an abdication of the legislative function. Schwartz - American Administrative Law, page 21. Such distinction is further explained by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decision in the case of State of T.N. Represented by Secretary, Housing Deptt., Madras Vs. K. Sabanayagam and Another reported in (1998)1 SCC 318 in para 14 as under:- “14. This takes us to the last contention canvassed on behalf of the appellants. It is true that Section 36 of the Act is held by a Constitution Bench of this Court to be a piece of conditional legislation. In the case of Jalan Trading Co. K. Sabanayagam and Another reported in (1998)1 SCC 318 in para 14 as under:- “14. This takes us to the last contention canvassed on behalf of the appellants. It is true that Section 36 of the Act is held by a Constitution Bench of this Court to be a piece of conditional legislation. In the case of Jalan Trading Co. (P) Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha, the majority of the Constitution Bench speaking through J. C. Shah, J. while interpreting Section 36 of the Act has made the following pertinent observations: "By Section 36 the appropriate Government is invested with power to exempt an establishment or a class of establishments from the operation of the Act, provided the Government is of the opinion that having regard to the financial position and other relevant circumstances of the establishment. It would not be in the public interest to apply all or any of the provisions of the Act. Condition for exercise of that power is that the Government holds the opinion that it is not in the public interest to apply all or any of the provisions of the Act to an establishment or class of establishments, and that opinion is founded on a consideration of the financial position and other relevant circumstances. Parliament has clearly laid down principles and has given adequate guidance to the appropriate Government in implementing the provisions of S. 36. The power so conferred does not amount to delegation of legislative authority. Section 36 amounts to conditional legislation, and is not void. Whether in a given case, power has been properly exercised by the appropriate Government would have to be considered when that occasion arises." The said observations have been made for repelling the challenge to the vires of Section 36 of the Act on the ground that it amounted to excessive delegation of legislative power or was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The question with which we are concerned in the present proceedings was not on the anvil of scrutiny before the Constitution Bench of this Court in that case, namely, whether before exercising powers under Section 36 as a delegate of conditional legislative function the appropriate Government was estopped from considering the rival version or rebuttal evidence that may be offered by the employees whose employer seeks exemption from the Act under Section 36 thereof. The distinction between delegated legislation and conditional legislation is a clear and well-settled one. In this connection we may usefully refer to a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf), v. Union of India, Kapur, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench has made the following pertinent observations at page 695-96 of the Report : ".... The distinction between conditional legislation and delegated legislation is this that in the former the delegate's power is that of determining when a legislative declared rule of conduct shall become effective : Hampton and Co. v. U.S., (1927) 276 US 394, and the latter involves delegation of rule-making power which constitutionally may be exercised by the administrative agent. This means that the legislature having laid down the broad principles of its policy in the legislation can then leave the details to be supplied by the administrative authority. In other words by delegated legislation the delegate completes the legislation by supplying details within the limits prescribed by the statute and in the case of conditional legislation the power of legislation is exercised by the legislature conditionally, leaving to the discretion of an external authority the time and manner of carrying its legislation into effect as also the determination of the area to which it is to extend; (The R. v. Burah; Russell v. R., AC at p.835 King Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma, Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan). Thus when the delegate is given the power of making rules and regulations in order to fill in the details to carry out and subserve the purposes of the legislation the manner in which the requirements of the statute are to be met and the rights therein created to be enjoyed it is an exercise of delegated legislation. But when the legislation is complete in itself and the legislature has itself made the law and the only function left to the delegate is to apply the law to an area or to determine the time and manner of carrying it into effect, it is conditional legislation." It is thus obvious that in the case of conditional legislation, the legislation is complete in itself but its operation is made to depend on fulfilment of certain conditions and what is delegated to an outside authority, is the power to determine according to its own judgment whether or not those conditions are fulfilled. In case of delegated legislation proper, some portion of the legislative power of the Legislature is delegated to the outside authority in that, the Legislature, though competent to perform both the essential and ancillary legislative functions, performs only the former and parts with the latter, i.e., the ancillary function of laying down details in favour of another for executing the policy of the statute enacted. The distinction between the two exists in this that whereas conditional legislation contains no element of delegation of legislative power and is, therefore, not open to attack on the ground of excessive delegation, delegated legislation does confer some legislative power on some outside authority and is therefore open to attack on the ground of excessive delegation.In this connection we may also refer to a decision of this Court rendered in the case of Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, wherein it is laid down that when an appropriate Legislature enacts a law and authorises an outside authority to bring it into force in such area or at such time as it may decide, that is conditional and not delegated legislation. 32. Learned advocate Mr. Patel, however submitted that since constitution of the Market Committee is by majority of elected members, it cannot be said that it is either established or constituted by the Act. Such argument cannot be accepted as in the case of the Village Panchayat, Taluka Panchayat and District Panchayat, though their establishments are directly by the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993, their constitution is by elected members. Section 3 of the Panchayat Act provides for establishment of Village Panchayat for each village, Taluka Panchayat for each Taluka and District Panchayat for each District and they stand incorporated as a body corporate by name as per Section 5 of the Act. The only difference found between establishment of the Market Committee and establishment of the Panchayats is that establishment and incorporation of the Panchayats for village, taluka and district respectively is made directly by the Panchayat Act whereas the establishment of the Market Committee and its incorporation is mandated by the Market Act through the Director. Like Market Act, there are provisions for exclusion or inclusion of the area from the Village Panchayat, super-session of the Panchayat etc. Like Market Act, there are provisions for exclusion or inclusion of the area from the Village Panchayat, super-session of the Panchayat etc. and various provisions for functioning of the Panchayat as also for exercise of the control by the higher authorities and by the Government over the Panchayats. Therefore, constitution of the Market Committee by elected members is no ground to say that its establishment and constitution is not by the Act. 33. In the case of Thalappalam Ser. Co-op. Bank Ltd. (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court while examining whether a Co-operative Society could be said to be a public authority within the definition of public authority under Section 2(h) of the Act, has held and observed in para 13,15 and 17 as under:- “13. We may first examine, whether the Co-operative Societies, with which we are concerned, will fall within the expression “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and, hence subject to all constitutional limitations as enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. This Court in U.P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Limited v. Chandra Bhan Dubey and others (1999) 1 SCC 741 , while dealing with the question of the maintainability of the writ petition against the U.P. State Cooperative Development Bank Limited held the same as an instrumentality of the State and an authority mentioned in Article 12 of the Constitution. On facts, the Court noticed that the control of the State Government on the Bank is all pervasive and that the affairs of the Bank are controlled by the State Government though it is functioning as a co-operative society, it is an extended arm of the State and thus an instrumentality of the State or authority as mentioned under Article 12 of the Constitution. In All India Sainik Schools employees’ Association v. Defence Minister-cum- Chairman Board of Governors, Sainik Schools Society, New Delhi and others (1989) Supplement 1 SCC 205, this Court held that the Sainik School society is “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution after having found that the entire funding is by the State Government and by the Central Government and the overall control vests in the governmental authority and the main object of the society is to run schools and prepare students for the purpose feeding the National Defence Academy. 15. 15. We can, therefore, draw a clear distinction between a body which is created by a Statute and a body which, after having come into existence, is governed in accordance with the provisions of a Statute. Societies, with which we are concerned, fall under the later category that is governed by the Societies Act and are not statutory bodies, but only body corporate within the meaning of Section 9 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act having perpetual succession and common seal and hence have the power to hold property, enter into contract, institute and defend suites and other legal proceedings and to do all things necessary for the purpose, for which it was constituted. Section 27 of the Societies Act categorically states that the final authority of a society vests in the general body of its members and every society is managed by the managing committee constituted in terms of the bye-laws as provided under Section 28 of the Societies Act. Final authority so far as such types of Societies are concerned, as Statute says, is the general body and not the Registrar of Cooperative Societies or State Government. 17. Societies are, of course, subject to the control of the statutory authorities like Registrar, Joint Registrar, the Government, etc. but cannot be said that the State exercises any direct or indirect control over the affairs of the society which is deep and all pervasive. Supervisory or general regulation under the statute over the co-operative societies, which are body corporate does not render activities of the body so regulated as subject to such control of the State so as to bring it within the meaning of the “State” or instrumentality of the State. Above principle has been approved by this Court in S.S. Rana v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies and another (2006) 11 SCC 634 . In that case this Court was dealing with the maintainability of the writ petition against the Kangra Central Co- operative Society Bank Limited, a society registered under the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1968. After examining various provisions of the H.P. Co-operative Societies Act this Court held as follows: “9. It is not in dispute that the Society has not been constituted under an Act. Its functions like any other cooperative society are mainly regulated in terms of the provisions of the Act, except as provided in the bye-laws of the Society. After examining various provisions of the H.P. Co-operative Societies Act this Court held as follows: “9. It is not in dispute that the Society has not been constituted under an Act. Its functions like any other cooperative society are mainly regulated in terms of the provisions of the Act, except as provided in the bye-laws of the Society. The State has no say in the functions of the Society. Membership, acquisition of shares and all other matters are governed by the bye-laws framed under the Act. The terms and conditions of an officer of the cooperative society, indisputably, are governed by the Rules. Rule 56, to which reference has been made by Mr Vijay Kumar, does not contain any provision in terms whereof any legal right as such is conferred upon an officer of the Society. 10. It has not been shown before us that the State exercises any direct or indirect control over the affairs of the Society for deep and pervasive control. The State furthermore is not the majority shareholder. The State has the power only to nominate one Director. It cannot, thus, be said that the State exercises any functional control over the affairs of the Society in the sense that the majority Directors are nominated by the State. For arriving at the conclusion that the State has a deep and pervasive control over the Society, several other relevant questions are required to be considered, namely, (1) How was the Society created? (2) Whether it enjoys any monopoly character? (3) Do the functions of the Society partake to statutory functions or public functions? and (4) Can it be characterised as public authority? 11. Respondent 2, the Society does not answer any of the aforementioned tests. In the case of a non-statutory society, the control thereover would mean that the same satisfies the tests laid down by this Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi. [See Zoroastrian Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Distt. Registrar, Coop. Societies (Urban)] 12. It is well settled that general regulations under an Act, like the Companies Act or the Cooperative Societies Act, would not render the activities of a company or a society as subject to control of the State. [See Zoroastrian Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Distt. Registrar, Coop. Societies (Urban)] 12. It is well settled that general regulations under an Act, like the Companies Act or the Cooperative Societies Act, would not render the activities of a company or a society as subject to control of the State. Such control in terms of the provisions of the Act are meant to ensure proper functioning of the society and the State or statutory authorities would have nothing to do with its day-to-day functions.” Whether such Co-operative Society could be said to be a body owned or controlled by the Government, Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held and observed in para 30 to 36 as under:- 30. The expression ‘Appropriate Government’ has also been defined under Section 2(a) of the RTI Act, which reads as follows : “2(a). “appropriate Government” means in relation to a public authority which is established, constituted, owned, controlled or substantially financed by funds provided directly or indirectly” (i) by the Central Government or the Union territory administration, the Central Government; (ii) by the State Government, the State Government.” 31. The RTI Act, therefore, deals with bodies which are owned, controlled or substantially financed, directly or indirectly, by funds provided by the appropriate government and also non-government organizations substantially financed, directly or indirectly, by funds provided by the appropriate government, in the event of which they may fall within the definition of Section 2(h)(d)(i) or (ii) respectively. As already pointed out, a body, institution or an organization, which is neither a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution or instrumentalities, may still answer the definition of public authority under Section 2(h)d (i) or (ii). (a) Body owned by the appropriate government – A body owned by the appropriate government clearly falls under Section 2(h)(d)(i) of the Act. A body owned, means to have a good legal title to it having the ultimate control over the affairs of that body, ownership takes in its fold control, finance etc. Further discussion of this concept is unnecessary because, admittedly, the societies in question are not owned by the appropriate government. (b) Body Controlled by the Appropriate Government A body which is controlled by the appropriate government can fall under the definition of public authority under Section 2h(d)(i). Further discussion of this concept is unnecessary because, admittedly, the societies in question are not owned by the appropriate government. (b) Body Controlled by the Appropriate Government A body which is controlled by the appropriate government can fall under the definition of public authority under Section 2h(d)(i). Let us examine the meaning of the expression “controlled” in the context of RTI Act and not in the context of the expression “controlled” judicially interpreted while examining the scope of the expression “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution or in the context of maintainability of a writ against a body or authority under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The word “control” or “controlled” has not been defined in the RTI Act, and hence, we have to understand the scope of the expression ‘controlled’ in the context of the words which exist prior and subsequent i.e. “body owned” and “substantially financed” respectively. The meaning of the word “control” has come up for consideration in several cases before this Court in different contexts. In State of West Bengal and another v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, AIR 1966 SC 447 while interpreting the scope of Article 235 of the Constitution of India, which confers control by the High Court over District Courts, this Court held that the word “control” includes the power to take disciplinary action and all other incidental or consequential steps to effectuate this end and made the following observations : “The word ‘control’, as we have seen, was used for the first time in the Constitution and it is accompanied by the word ‘vest’ which is a strong word. It shows that the High Court is made the sole custodian of the control over the judiciary. Control, therefore, is not merely the power to arrange the day to day working of the court but contemplates disciplinary jurisdiction over the presiding Judge.... In our judgment, the control which is vested in the High Court is a complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment (including dismissal and removal) and posting and promotion of District Judges. Within the exercise of the control vested in the High Court, the High Court can hold enquiries, impose punishments other than dismissal or removal, ..” 32. Within the exercise of the control vested in the High Court, the High Court can hold enquiries, impose punishments other than dismissal or removal, ..” 32. The above position has been reiterated by this Court in Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and others v. L.V.A. Dixitulu and others (1979) 2 SCC 34 . In Corporation of the City of Nagpur Civil Lines, Nagpur and another v. Ramchandra and others (1981) 2 SCC 714 , while interpreting the provisions of Section 59(3) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948, this Court held as follows : “4. It is thus now settled by this Court that the term “control” is of a very wide connotation and amplitude and includes a large variety of powers which are incidental or consequential to achieve the powers- vested in the authority concerned…….” 33. The word “control” is also sometimes used synonyms with superintendence, management or authority to direct, restrict or regulate by a superior authority in exercise of its supervisory power. This Court in The Shamrao Vithal Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Kasargode Pandhuranga Mallya (1972) 4 SCC 600 , held that the word “control” does not comprehend within itself the adjudication of a claim made by a co-operative society against its members. The meaning of the word “control” has also been considered by this Court in State of Mysore v. Allum Karibasappa & Ors. (1974) 2 SCC 498 , while interpreting Section 54 of the Mysore Cooperative Societies Act, 1959 and Court held that the word “control” suggests check, restraint or influence and intended to regulate and hold in check and restraint from action. The expression “control” again came up for consideration before this Court in Madan Mohan Choudhary v. State of Bihar & Ors. (1999) 3 SCC 396 , in the context of Article 235 of the Constitution and the Court held that the expression “control” includes disciplinary control, transfer, promotion, confirmation, including transfer of a District Judge or recall of a District Judge posted on ex-cadre post or on deputation or on administrative post etc. so also premature and compulsory retirement. (1999) 3 SCC 396 , in the context of Article 235 of the Constitution and the Court held that the expression “control” includes disciplinary control, transfer, promotion, confirmation, including transfer of a District Judge or recall of a District Judge posted on ex-cadre post or on deputation or on administrative post etc. so also premature and compulsory retirement. Reference may also be made to few other judgments of this Court reported in Gauhati High Court and another v. Kuladhar Phukan and another (2002) 4 SCC 524 , State of Haryana v. Inder Prakash Anand HCS and others (1976) 2 SCC 977 , High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chand Paliwal and Another (1998) 3 SCC 72 , Kanhaiya Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi and others (1985) 4 SCC 628 , TMA Pai Foundation and others v. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481 , Ram Singh and others v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and others (2004) 1 SCC 126 , etc. 34. We are of the opinion that when we test the meaning of expression “controlled” which figures in between the words “body owned” and “substantially financed”, the control by the appropriate government must be a control of a substantial nature. The mere ‘supervision’ or ‘regulation’ as such by a statute or otherwise of a body would not make that body a “public authority” within the meaning of Section 2(h)(d)(i) of the RTI Act. In other words just like a body owned or body substantially financed by the appropriate government, the control of the body by the appropriate government would also be substantial and not merely supervisory or regulatory. Powers exercised by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies and others under the Cooperative Societies Act are only regulatory or supervisory in nature, which will not amount to dominating or interfering with the management or affairs of the society so as to be controlled. Management and control are statutorily conferred on the Management Committee or the Board of Directors of the Society by the respective Cooperative Societies Act and not on the authorities under the Co-operative Societies Act. 35. Management and control are statutorily conferred on the Management Committee or the Board of Directors of the Society by the respective Cooperative Societies Act and not on the authorities under the Co-operative Societies Act. 35. We are, therefore, of the view that the word “controlled” used in Section 2(h)(d)(i) of the Act has to be understood in the context in which it has been used vis-a-vis a body owned or substantially financed by the appropriate government, that is the control of the body is of such a degree which amounts to substantial control over the management and affairs of the body. SUBSTANTIALLY FINANCED : 36. The words “substantially financed” have been used in Sections 2(h)(d)(i) & (ii), while defining the expression public authority as well as in Section 2(a) of the Act, while defining the expression “appropriate Government”. A body can be substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government. The expression “substantially financed”, as such, has not been defined under the Act. “Substantial” means “in a substantial manner so as to be substantial”. In Palser v. Grimling (1948) 1 All ER 1, 11 (HL), while interpreting the provisions of Section 10(1) of the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act, 1923, the House of Lords held that “substantial” is not the same as “not unsubstantial” i.e. just enough to avoid the deminimis principle. The word “substantial” literally means solid, massive etc. Legislature has used the expression “substantially financed” in Sections 2(h)(d)(i) and (ii) indicating that the degree of financing must be actual, existing, positive and real to a substantial extent, not moderate, ordinary, tolerable etc. In the above-referred decision, Hon’ble Supreme Court, has drawn a clear distinction between a body, which is created by the Statute and a body which after having come into existence is governed in accordance with the provisions of the Statute. Such distinction is there between a Market Committee and a Co-operative Society. 34. Thus, from the entire scheme of the Act, it clearly appears that establishment and constitution of the Market Committee is by the law of Market Act enacted by the legislature. It is thus a public authority as defined under Section 2(h) of the Act. Such distinction is there between a Market Committee and a Co-operative Society. 34. Thus, from the entire scheme of the Act, it clearly appears that establishment and constitution of the Market Committee is by the law of Market Act enacted by the legislature. It is thus a public authority as defined under Section 2(h) of the Act. Having thus come to such conclusion, the Court is not required to examine whether such Market Committee could be said to be owned, controlled or substantially financed by the funds of the Government so as to be covered by Section 2(h) of the Act. However, even on such aspect, considering the provisions of the Market Act, it clearly appears that it is neither owned by the Government nor could it be said that it is controlled by the State Government or substantially financed by the Government. Chapter of Control in the Market Act is to ensure that the Market Committee functions in accordance with the provisions of the Act and to achieve the object and purpose of the Act. Thus, regulatory measures are provided to ensure that Market Committee conducts its affairs as required by the Market Act. The Market Committee has to generate its fund, called as ‘Market Fund’ by levying and collection of market fees and like the State Government, Market Committee is under statutory obligation to provide proportionate funds, as required by the provisions of the Act, to the statutory Board constituted for good object relating to up-liftment of the farmers and for achieving the object and purpose as regards regulating of buying and selling of the agricultural produce. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Market Committee is either controlled by the State Government or in any way, could be said to be substantially financed by the State Government. 35. At this stage, a reference is required to be made to the decision of the Bombay High Court, relied on by learned senior advocate Mr. Shelat, in the case of Meghraj Pundlikrao Dongre (supra). In the said case, similar issue as to whether Market Committee constituted under the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act could be said to be a public authority under Section 2(h) of the Act is decided. Bombay High Court in the said decision has held and observed in para 11 to 14 as under:- 11. In the said case, similar issue as to whether Market Committee constituted under the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act could be said to be a public authority under Section 2(h) of the Act is decided. Bombay High Court in the said decision has held and observed in para 11 to 14 as under:- 11. Perusal of the above provisions shows that, in the Chapter of Constitution of Market Committees, Section 11 of the APMC Act provides for establishment of Market Committees. Section 12(2) provides that such Market Committee shall for all purposes be deemed to be a local Authority. Needless to say that the local Authority is an institution of self-Government. Section 13 opens with the words "constitution of Market Committees". Sub-section (2) of Section 13 clearly provides for constitution of a Market committee for the first time either u/S. 1, 1(A) or 1 (B) and it is significant to note that when such Market Committee is constituted for the first time, it is the State Government which nominates the entire Market Committee and its Office bearers as per the said sub-section (2). It is, thus clear that the APMC Act itself constitutes or brings into existence the Market Committees by operation of the above said provisions of the Act and to reiterate the same, it is not by registration with any Authority appointed by the Government as is found in the case of the Cooperative Societies. Thus, the Market committee is brought into existence not by virtue of an act of any person to register a Market Committee like a Society and then bring it into existence, but a Market Committee comes into existence by virtue of operation of the provisions of the APMC Act, which is the law made by State Legislature. Not only that, Section 12(2) clearly provides that every Market Committee shall for all purposes be deemed to be a local Authority. Not only that, Section 12(2) clearly provides that every Market Committee shall for all purposes be deemed to be a local Authority. Looked in this background, we quote the definition of "public authority", as given in Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, which reads thus : 2(h) : "public authority" means any authority or body or institution of self-government established or constituted - (a) by or under the Constitution; (b) by any other law made by Parliament; (c) by any other law made by State Legislature; (d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government, and includes any - (i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed; (ii) non-Government organization substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government; 12. Perusal of the above definition clearly shows that the APMC is an institution of self-government; that too, established and constituted by a law made by the State Legislature. Section 12(2) of the APMC Act opens with a non-obstante clause and states that every Market Committee for all purposes, be deemed to be a local authority. At this juncture, we have noticed the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of APMC, Narela v. CIT and another, (2008) 305 ITR 1 : (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 566), in which it is held that explanation to Section 10(20) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 as amended by the Finance Act, 2002 does not cover APMC and hence, is not entitled to exemption. We thus find that there is clear distinguishing feature in not treating APMC as a 'local authority' under Income Tax Act. But, by virtue of Section 12(2) of the APMC Act, the Agricultural Produce Market Committee will fall within the meaning of 'local authority' and consequently, under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, 2005.Insofar as the decision of the State Information Commissioner, Amravati Bench, Amravati is concerned, we find that the said Commissioner clearly erred in treating a Market Committee under APMC Act and Co-operative Society under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 as one and the same thing. The Learned Commissioner also erred in holding that the Khamgaon APMC is a Society and following the decision of the single Judge of this Court delivered in Writ Petition No.5666 of 2007(reported in AIR 2009 Bom 75 : 2009 (2) AIR Bom R 592) (cited supra) in respect of Co-operative Society, he wrongly held that the RTI Act will not apply to Khamgaon APMC. The decision recorded by the said Commissioner is thus illegal. 13. We find that the judgment in the case of Dr. Punjabrao Deshmukh Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd. (cited supra) dated 13-1-2009 was in relation to a Co-operative Society/Bank and therefore, it cannot be made applicable to a case relating to the Market Committee under the APMC Act. 14. We, thus, hold that the appellant/Market Committee is established and constituted as an institution of self-government and is a local Authority and by law made by the State Legislature. Consequently, the provisions of the RTI Act do apply to the appellant/APMC. Before parting with the judgment, looking to the increase in number of scams in the Co-operative Credit Societies, Urban and Other Co-operative banks due to frauds played by the persons within the Society or the bank causing severe losses to the poor depositors and since the money of the depositors is involved in such Societies/banks, it would be far better to cover all the Co-operative Credit Societies/banks etc. under the RTI Act. We recommend accordingly to the Central Government. In the result, we find no merit in the present appeal. Hence, the L.P.A. is dismissed. 36. The Court finds from the impugned orders that the respondent No.1 has considered the provisions of the Market Act and committed no error in coming to the conclusion that the Market Committee is Public Authority within the definition under Section 2(h) of the Act. This Court also having come to conclusion that the Market Committee established and constituted as per the provisions of the Market Act is a public authority under Section 2(h) of the Act, further question in the first petition as to whether respondent No.1 Commissioner while deciding the complaint under Section 18 of the Act could have directed the Market Committee to provide information to the complainant- respondent No.5 needs to be answered. Sections 18 and 19 of the Act read as under:- “18. Sections 18 and 19 of the Act read as under:- “18. Powers and functions of Information Commissions (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, it shall be the duty of the Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be, to receive and inquire into a complaint from any person,- (a) who has been unable to submit a request to a Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, either by reasons that no such officer has been appointed under this Act, or because the Central assistant Public Information Officer or State assistant Public Information Officer, as the case may be, has refused to accept his or her application for information or appeal under this Act for forwarding the same to the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer or senior officer specified in sub-section (1) of section 19 or the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be; (b) who has been refused access to any information requested under this Act; (c) who has not been given a response to a request for information or access to information within the time limit specified under this Act; (d) who has been required to pay an amount of fee which he or she considers unreasonable; (e) who believes that he or she has been given incomplete, misleading or false information under this Act; and (f) in respect of any other matter relating to requesting or obtaining access to records under this Act. (2) Where the Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be, is satisfied that there are Reasonable grounds to inquire into the matter, it may initiate an inquiry in respect thereof. (2) Where the Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be, is satisfied that there are Reasonable grounds to inquire into the matter, it may initiate an inquiry in respect thereof. (3) The Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be, shall, while inquiring into any matter under this section, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect of the following matters, namely:- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons and compel them to give oral or written evidence on oath and to produce the documents or things; (b) requiring the discovery and inspection of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavit; (d) requisitioning any public record or copies thereof from any court or office; (e) issuing summons for examination of witnesses or documents; and (f) any other matter which may be prescribed. (4) Notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other Act of Parliament or State Legislature, as the case may be, the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, may, during the inquiry of any complaint under this Act, examine any record to which this Act applies which is under the control of the public authority, and no such record may be withheld from it on any grounds. 19. Appeal: (1) Any person who, does not receive a decision within the time specified in sub-section (1) or clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 7, or is aggrieved by a decision of the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, may within thirty days from the expiry of such period or from the receipt of such a decision prefer an appeal to such officer who is senior in rank to the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer as the case may be, in each public authority: Provided that such officer may admit the appeal after the expiry of the period of thirty days if he or she is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. (2) Where an appeal is preferred against an order made by a Central Public Information Officer or a State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, under section 11 to disclose third party information, the appeal by the concerned third party shall be made within thirty days from the date of the order. (3) A second appeal against the decision under sub-section (1) shall lie within ninety days from the date on which the decision should have been made or was actually received, with the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission: Provided that the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, may admit the appeal after the expiry of the period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. (4) If the decision of the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, against which an appeal is preferred relates to information of a third party, the Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be, shall give a Reasonable opportunity of being heard to that third party. (5) In any appeal proceedings, the onus to prove that a denial of a request was justified shall be on the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, who denied the request. (6) An appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be disposed of within thirty days of the receipt of the appeal or within such extended period not exceeding a total of forty-five days from the date of filing thereof, as the case may be, for reasons to be recorded in writing. (7) The decision of the Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be, shall be binding. (7) The decision of the Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be, shall be binding. (8) In its decision, the Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be, has the power to- (a) require the public authority to take any such steps as may be necessary to secure compliance with the provisions of this Act, including- (i) by providing access to information, if so requested, in a particular form; (ii) by appointing a Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be; (iii) by publishing certain information or categories of information; (iv) by making necessary changes to its practices in relation to the maintenance, management and destruction of records; (v) by enhancing the provision of training on the right to information for its officials; (vi) by providing it with an annual report in compliance with clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 4; (b) require the public authority to compensate the complainant for any loss or other detriment suffered; (c) impose any of the penalties provided under this Act; (d) reject the application. (9) The Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be, shall give notice of its decision, including any right of appeal, to the complainant and the public authority. (10) The Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed. 37. In the context of Sections 18 and 19 of the Act, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chief Information Commissioner & Another Vs. State of Manipur and Another reported in AIR 2012 SC 864 , has held and observed in para 30 to 37 as under:- “30. It has been contended before us by the respondent that under Section 18 of the Act the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission has no power to provide access to the information which has been requested for by any person but which has been denied to him. The only order which can be passed by the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, under Section 18 is an order of penalty provided under Section 20. However, before such order is passed the Commissioner must be satisfied that the conduct of the Information Officer was not bona fide. The only order which can be passed by the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, under Section 18 is an order of penalty provided under Section 20. However, before such order is passed the Commissioner must be satisfied that the conduct of the Information Officer was not bona fide. 31. We uphold the said contention and do not find any error in the impugned judgment of the High court whereby it has been held that the Commissioner while entertaining a complaint under Section 18 of the said Act has no jurisdiction to pass an order providing for access to the information. 32. In the facts of the case, the appellant after having applied for information under Section 6 and then not having received any reply thereto, it must be deemed that he has been refused the information. The said situation is covered by Section 7 of the Act. The remedy for such a person who has been refused the information is provided under Section 19 of the Act. A reading of Section 19(1) of the Act makes it clear. Section 19(1) of the Act is set out below:- "19. Appeal.- (1) Any person who, does not receive a decision within the time specified in sub-section (1) or clause (a) of subsection (3) of section 7, or is aggrieved by a decision of the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, may within thirty days from the expiry of such period or from the receipt of such a decision prefer an appeal to such officer who is senior in rank to the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer as the case may be, in each public authority: Provided that such officer may admit the appeal after the expiry of the period of thirty days if he or she is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time." 33. A second appeal is also provided under sub-section (3) of Section 19. A second appeal is also provided under sub-section (3) of Section 19. Section 19(3) is also set out below:- "(3) A second appeal against the decision under sub-section (1) shall lie within ninety days from the date on which the decision should have been made or was actually received, with the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission: Provided that the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, may admit the appeal after the expiry of the period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time." 34. Section 19(4) deals with procedure relating to information of a third party. Sections 19(5) and 19(6) are procedural in nature. Under Section 19(8) the power of the Information Commission has been specifically mentioned. Those powers are as follows:- "19(8). In its decision, the Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be, has the power to,- (a) require the public authority to take any such steps as may be necessary to secure compliance with the provisions of this Act, including- (i) by providing access to information, if so requested, in a particular form; (ii) by appointing a Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be; (iii) by publishing certain information or categories of information; (iv) by making necessary changes to its practices in relation to the maintenance, management and destruction of records; (v) by enhancing the provision of training on the right to information for its officials; (vi) by providing it with an annual report in compliance with clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 4; (b) require the public authority to compensate the complainant for any loss or other detriment suffered; (c) impose any of the penalties provided under this Act; (d) reject the application." 35. The procedure for hearing the appeals have been framed in exercise of power under clauses (e) and (f) of sub-section (2) of Section 27 of the Act. They are called the Central Information Commission (Appeal Procedure) Rules, 2005. The procedure of deciding the appeals is laid down in Rule 5 of the said Rules. Therefore, the procedure contemplated under Section 18 and Section 19 of the said Act is substantially different. They are called the Central Information Commission (Appeal Procedure) Rules, 2005. The procedure of deciding the appeals is laid down in Rule 5 of the said Rules. Therefore, the procedure contemplated under Section 18 and Section 19 of the said Act is substantially different. The nature of the power under Section 18 is supervisory in character whereas the procedure under Section 19 is an appellate procedure and a person who is aggrieved by refusal in receiving the information which he has sought for can only seek redress in the manner provided in the statute, namely, by following the procedure under Section 19. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that Section 7 read with Section 19 provides a complete statutory mechanism to a person who is aggrieved by refusal to receive information. Such person has to get the information by following the aforesaid statutory provisions. The contention of the appellant that information can be accessed through Section 18 is contrary to the express provision of Section 19 of the Act. It is well known when a procedure is laid down statutorily and there is no challenge to the said statutory procedure the Court should not, in the name of interpretation, lay down a procedure which is contrary to the express statutory provision. It is a time honoured principle as early as from the decision in Taylor v. Taylor [(1876) 1 Ch D 426] that where statute provides for something to be done in a particular manner it can be done in that manner alone and all other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden. This principle has been followed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad v. Emperor [ AIR 1936 PC 253 (1)] and also by this Court in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan - [ AIR 1961 SC 1527 , (para 9)] and also in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh, reported in AIR 1964 SC 358 (para 8). 36. This Court accepts the argument of the appellant that any other construction would render the provision of Section 19(8) of the Act totally redundant. It is one of the well known canons of interpretation that no statute should be interpreted in such a manner as to render a part of it redundant or surplusage. 37. 36. This Court accepts the argument of the appellant that any other construction would render the provision of Section 19(8) of the Act totally redundant. It is one of the well known canons of interpretation that no statute should be interpreted in such a manner as to render a part of it redundant or surplusage. 37. We are of the view that Sections 18 and 19 of the Act serve two different purposes and lay down two different procedures and they provide two different remedies. One cannot be a substitute for the other. 38. In above view of the matter, even while holding that Market Committee is a public authority under Section 2(h) of the Act, the impugned order in the first petition insofar as respondent No.1 has given direction to the Market Committee to provide information to the complainant- respondent No.5 is required to be interfered with and is quashed and set aside, leaving it open to respondent No.5 to find his remedy to seek information under the Act before appropriate forum by appropriate proceedings. 39. For the reasons stated above, the first petition, being Special Civil Application No.10259 of 2013, is partly allowed. The impugned order to the extent the respondent No.1 has given direction to the Market Committee to provide information to respondent No.5 shall stand quashed and set aside. Rest of the order is not disturbed. 40. Second petition, being Special Civil Application No.13987 of 2013, is dismissed. Notice discharged.