JUDGMENT:- S.P. Garg, J. 1. The appellant – Austice Dilawar @ Eustice Dilawar is aggrieved by a judgment dated 09.09.1999 of learned Addl. Sessions Judge in Sessions Case No. 59/88 arising out of FIR No. 225/84 PS Vasant Vihar by which he was held guilty for committing offence punishable under Section 306 IPC. By an order dated 10.09.1999, he was awarded RI for seven years with fine Rs. 25,000/-. 2. Shorn of details, the prosecution case as reflected in the charge-sheet was that on 11.08.1984 Daily Diary (DD) No. 4A (Ex.PW-15/A) was recorded at 10.35 A.M. at PS Vasant Vihar after getting information from ASI Veer Singh that a lady had set herself on fire in House No.101, village Munirka. The investigation was assigned to ASI Pratap Singh who with Const.Ram Singh went to the spot and came to know that the victim had already been taken to the hospital by her relatives. Deputing Const.Ram Singh to guard the spot, he (ASI Pratap Singh) went to Safdarjang Hospital; sought permission from the doctor to record victim’s statement by an application (Ex.PW-13/B); the victim was declared fit to make statement. Mr.Satish Gathwal, SDM, New Delhi, recorded her statement. ASI Pratap Singh lodged First Information Report after making endorsement (Ex.PW-15/B) over it. At the spot, the crime team and photographers were summoned; scene of incident was photographed. Various articles i.e. plastic can containing kerosene oil (Ex.P1); a matchbox (Ex.P2) and burnt matchstick (Ex.P3); one white broken button (Ex.P6) and burnt clothes (Ex.P4), etc. were seized by a seizure memo (Ex.PW-4/A); Site-plan (Ex.PW-15/D) was prepared. In her statement (Ex.PW-13/A), the victim – Grace implicated the appellant – Austice Dilawar @ Eustice Dilawar (husband), B.N.Dilawar (father-in-law) and F.Dilawar (mother-in-law) for harassing her on account non-fulfilment of demand for money. On 14.08.1984, she succumbed to the extensive burn injuries in the hospital. Post-mortem examination on the body was conducted. During investigation, the accused persons were arrested. Statements of the witnesses conversant with the facts were recorded. Exhibits collected were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory for examination. After completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted against the appellant and his parents in the Court for committing offences under Sections 498A/306/34 IPC; they were duly charged. It is relevant to note that during the pendency of trial, after B.N.Dilawar (appellant’s father)’s death, proceedings against him were dropped as bated. After completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted against the appellant and his parents in the Court for committing offences under Sections 498A/306/34 IPC; they were duly charged. It is relevant to note that during the pendency of trial, after B.N.Dilawar (appellant’s father)’s death, proceedings against him were dropped as bated. To prove its case, the prosecution examined sixteen witnesses in all. In 313 statements, the appellant and his mother F.Dilawar denied their complicity in the crime and pleaded false implication. They examined DW-1 (Rajinder Kumar Srivastava) and DW-2 (B.Dass) in defence. After appreciating the evidence and considering the rival contentions of the parties, the Trial Court, by the impugned judgment, held the appellant guilty for committing offence under Section 306 IPC. It is pertinent to note that co-accused F.Dilwar was acquitted of the charges. State did not challenge her acquittal. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied, the appellant has preferred the appeal. 3. Learned Senior Counsel urged that the Trial Court did not appreciate the evidence in its true and proper perspective and erred in relying upon the testimonies of close relatives of the deceased who were highly interested in the outcome of the case. It overlooked the fact that there existed no relationship of husband and wife between the appellant and the deceased. The victim was already married to Anup Singh Bhanot. The said marriage subsisted till date as she had not taken divorce from her previous husband. The appellant was not responsible for the burn injuries suffered by the victim accidentally in her house as reflected in the MLC (Ex.PW-12/A). The victim herself had informed the examining doctor in the presence of her brother and brother-in-law that she had caught fire accidentally while kerosene filled bottle spilled on her and nothing was revealed by them if she had set herself on fire. Senior Counsel further pointed out that in the MLC, victim’s residence has been shown at 212, Munirka. Subsequently, during investigation, the spot was changed to house No.101, Munirka. The investigating agency did not collect any document to show the victim’s residence at 101, Munirka and also as to who was her landlord. Even in her alleged dying declaration, she did not disclose as to where she used to live along with her husband and child. It is unclear on which floor the said accommodation was and who had brought her downstairs to take to the hospital. Even in her alleged dying declaration, she did not disclose as to where she used to live along with her husband and child. It is unclear on which floor the said accommodation was and who had brought her downstairs to take to the hospital. The site-plan does not reflect the house number. Senior Counsel further urged that presumption under Section 113A Evidence Act has rightly been not drawn by the learned Trial Court for sound reasons as the prosecution was unable to establish if any valid marriage had ever taken place between the two. She had not obtained decree of divorce from a competent Court. None of the family members of the victim attended her alleged second marriage with the appellant. Her status was no better than that of a concubine. Earlier she had eloped with Anup Singh Bhanot to Bombay and had married him. Subsequently, after deserting him, she came to Delhi. Senior Counsel further contended that the victim had sustained 100 % deep burns at house No. 212, village Munirka. Her condition was very critical; pulse rate was not palpable and BP was not recordable. The respiratory rate was 28 per minute. She was not in physical and mental condition to record any statement. She was incapable to make such a long narrative. The prosecution witnesses were unable to explain as to how her thumb impression of right foot was obtained on the alleged declaration (Ex.PW-13/B). It was further pointed out that no kerosene oil was detected on the burnt pieces of clothes (Ex.P2 & P3) in the chemical examination report (Ex.PW-15/F). It was vehemently argued that the prosecution miserably failed to prove ingredients of Section 107 of the Evidence Act. There was no possibility of the appellant to raise dowry demands as he and his parents were well settled in life. The victim had tendered resignation of her own free will without any compulsion. As per post-mortem examination report, no external injuries were found on her body ruling out any beatings to her. The alleged dying declaration was not attested by the examining doctor. There is no contemporaneous certificate of fitness. Timings of SDM’s arrival and duration of his presence in the hospital are suspect. Ex.PW-13/A does not reflect as to when the SDM started recording the dying declaration and when it was concluded. The alleged dying declaration was not attested by the examining doctor. There is no contemporaneous certificate of fitness. Timings of SDM’s arrival and duration of his presence in the hospital are suspect. Ex.PW-13/A does not reflect as to when the SDM started recording the dying declaration and when it was concluded. Som Nath and Lesley who had taken the victim to the hospital were not examined. Relevant questions were not put to the appellant in 313 Cr.P.C. statement and no proper opportunity was afforded to produce defence evidence. PW-2 (Ireen Nath) and PW-11 (Richard R.Lincoln) have made vital improvements in their deposition before the Court. The incidents of harassment or cruelty given by them are of trivial nature and cannot drive the victim to commit suicide. These indicate only wordly altercations between the two. The investigation has inherent defects. Non-production of material witnesses is fatal to the prosecution case. On the same set of evidence, co-accused - F.Dilawar was acquitted. Reliance was placed on GokalChand vs. Parvin Kumari, AIR 1952 SC 231 & ChitrakalaBewa vs. Jambubati Bewa and ors., AIR 1981 NOC 173 (Orissa). 4. On the other hand, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor urged that no sound reasons exist to disbelieve the dying declaration made by the victim in which she implicated the appellant for subjecting her with cruelty on account of demand of money. She was declared fit to make statement by the concerned doctor and her statement was recorded by a highly responsible officer who had no extraneous consideration to fabricate it. 5. I have considered the submissions of the parties and have gone through the written notes filed on record by the appellant. Admitted position is that the victim was married to Anup Singh Bhanot and a daughter was born to her out of the said wedlock. The victim sustained 100% deep burns on 11.08.1984 and succumbed to the burn injuries on 14.08.1984 in the hospital. (A) Marriage 6. From the very inception, the victim claimed herself to have married the appellant. In her statement (Ex.PW-13/A), recorded soon after the occurrence, she described herself to be the appellant’s wife. She added that her marriage with the appellant took place about 9 – 10 months before the incident after she got divorce from her previous husband. She had a daughter from the previous marriage who used to stay/live with her. In her statement (Ex.PW-13/A), recorded soon after the occurrence, she described herself to be the appellant’s wife. She added that her marriage with the appellant took place about 9 – 10 months before the incident after she got divorce from her previous husband. She had a daughter from the previous marriage who used to stay/live with her. Her mother-in-law and father-in-law lived in Greater Kailash whereas she and her husband stayed at Munirka. In the MLC (Ex.PW-12/A) also, the appellant’s status was recorded as victim’s husband. The appellant denied the victim to be his legally wedded wife, though admitted to have physical relations with her. Learned Senior Counsel described her status as no better than that of a concubine in the absence of a legal and valid marriage. It is true that during investigation, the Investigating Agency did not collect any materials to show if the previous marriage of the victim was dissolved by a decree of divorce granted by a court of competent jurisdiction. It also did not gather any proof of valid marriage between the two. PW-2 (Ireen Nath) and PW-11 (Richard R.Lincoln), deceased’s sister and brother respectively, admittedly did not participate in the solemnization of the second marriage. These deficiencies, however, do not dent the victim’s relationship with the appellant. In fact, validity of marriage was not an issue during investigation. PW-2 (Ireen Nath) categorically deposed that her sister Mrs.Grace had married to Austice Dilawar @ Eustice Dilawar on 25.01.1984 and during her stay in the matrimonial home, she was beaten by him. She further deposed that B.N.Dilawar and F.Dilawar, her in-laws, lived in Greater Kailash. In the lengthy and searching cross-examination, the appellant did not deny her to be his wife putting any such suggestion. PW-2 (Ireen Nath)’s assertion on this aspect remained unchallenged. She was fair enough to admit her non-participation in the said marriage and her ignorance of dissolution of her previous marriage by a court of competent jurisdiction. She, however, revealed that the victim had shown her a document (divorce certificate) brought by her from Bombay. Suggestions put to the witness in the cross-examination need reproduction: Question. I suggest to you that the marriage took place on 25.01.1984 and it was a Tuesday? Answer. It may be so. I am not sure. I do not remember. Question. She, however, revealed that the victim had shown her a document (divorce certificate) brought by her from Bombay. Suggestions put to the witness in the cross-examination need reproduction: Question. I suggest to you that the marriage took place on 25.01.1984 and it was a Tuesday? Answer. It may be so. I am not sure. I do not remember. Question. Is it correct that Austice Dilawar @ Eustice Dilawar used to harass Grace so that she may obtain divorce from him? Answer. Yes, this was my expression. Question. Was it that Austice Dilawar @ Eustice Dilawar was harassing Grace for money? Answer. He wanted to get either or divorce from her.” These suggestions in the cross-examination lend-credence to the prosecution case that the victim and the appellant used to live in the matrimonial home as husband and wife and the marriage was never challenged/disputed by him. Corroborating PW-2’s version, PW-11 (Richard R.Lincoln) also deposed about her sister’s marriage with the appellant on 25.01.1984 in Bapist Church, Idgah. Nothing was suggested to him if they had not performed any marriage. No suggestion was put to him as to in what capacity, the appellant used to reside with the deceased in her house. In fact, there is no denial that the appellant did not live with the victim in the house at Munirka. At the time of occurrence, the victim was having pregnancy of two months duration as noticed in the medical/post-mortem examination report. The appellant did not deny that he was not instrumental for her pregnancy. The appellant did not produce any evidence to prove if during the relevant period he used to live with his parents. Nothing was suggested/explained as to how and under what circumstances, the appellant came into contact with the victim. PW-2 (Ireen Nath) has narrated detailed account as to how even before marriage, the appellant used to meet and stay with her. When her husband got annoyed due to the frequent visits of the appellant and objected to it, the victim started living separate in a nearby house. She further disclosed that even after shifting, she had seen the appellant visiting her in the said accommodation. Apparently, the appellant and the victim lived together in the matrimonial home as husband and wife and victim’s close relatives had accepted the said relationship. 7. She further disclosed that even after shifting, she had seen the appellant visiting her in the said accommodation. Apparently, the appellant and the victim lived together in the matrimonial home as husband and wife and victim’s close relatives had accepted the said relationship. 7. The Trial Court in the impugned judgment came to the conclusion that a valid marriage did not take place due to absence of any formalities/ceremonies and that for that reason, provisions of Section 498A IPC and 113 A Evidence Act were not applicable. I am in disagreement with these findings. Appellate Court has the powers to reappreciate the entire evidence and come to an independent conclusion. Since validity of the marriage was not an issue during investigation or trial, the prosecution was not expected to prove it to the hilt particularly when there was no specific denial to it by the appellant. 8. In Reema Aggarwal vs. Anupam and ors., AIR 2004 SC 1418 , it was observed and held by Supreme Court: “11. The question as to who would be covered by the expression "husband" for attracting Section 498A does present problems. Etymologically, in terms of the definitions of "husband" and "marriage" as given in the various law lexicons and dictionaries – the existence of a valid marriage may appear to be a sine qua non for applying a penal provision. In Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav a woman claimed maintenance Under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short "Code of Criminal Procedure). This Court applied the provision of the Marriage Act and pointed out that same was a law which held the field after 1955, when it was enacted and Section 5 lays down that for a lawful marriage the necessary condition that neither party should have a spouse living at the time of the marriage is essential and marriage in contravention of this condition therefore is null and void. The concept of marriage to constitute the relationship of "husband" and "wife" may require strict interpretation where claims for civil rights, right to property etc. may follow or flow and a liberal approach and different perception cannot be an anathema when the question of curbing a social evil is concerned. XXX XXX XXX 18. The concept of "dowry" is intermittently linked with a marriage and the provisions of the Dowry Act apply in relation to marriages. may follow or flow and a liberal approach and different perception cannot be an anathema when the question of curbing a social evil is concerned. XXX XXX XXX 18. The concept of "dowry" is intermittently linked with a marriage and the provisions of the Dowry Act apply in relation to marriages. If the legality of the marriage itself is an issue, further legalistic problems do arise. If the validity of the marriage itself is under legal scrutiny, the demand of dowry in respect of an invalid marriage would be legally not recognizable. Even then the purpose for which Sections, 498A and 304B Indian Penal Code and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short "the Evidence Act") were introduced, cannot be lost sight of. Legislation enacted with some policy to curb and alleviate some public evil rampant in society and effectuate a definite public purpose or benefit positively requires to be interpreted with a certain element of realism too and not merely pedantically or hyper-technically. The obvious objective was to prevent harassment to a woman who enters into a marital relationship with a person and later on, becomes a victim of the greed for money. Can a person who enters into a marital arrangement be allowed to take shelter behind a smokescreen to contend that since there was no valid marriage, the question of dowry does not arise? Such legalistic niceties would destroy the purpose of the provisions. Such hairsplitting legalistic approach would encourage harassment to a woman over demand of money. The nomenclature "dowry" does not have any magic charm written over it. It is just a label given to demand of money in relation to marital relationship. The legislative intent is clear from the fact that it is not only the husband but also his relations who are covered by Section 498A. The legislature has taken care of children born from invalid marriages. Section 16 of the Marriage Act deals with legitimacy of children of void and voidable marriages. Can it be said that the legislature which was conscious of the social stigma attached to children of void and voidable marriages closed its eyes to the plight of a woman who unknowingly or unconscious of the legal consequences entered into the marital relationship? If such restricted meaning is given, it would not further the legislative intent. Can it be said that the legislature which was conscious of the social stigma attached to children of void and voidable marriages closed its eyes to the plight of a woman who unknowingly or unconscious of the legal consequences entered into the marital relationship? If such restricted meaning is given, it would not further the legislative intent. On the contrary, it would be against the concern shown by the legislature for avoiding harassment to a woman over demand of money in relation to marriages. The first exception to Section 494 has also some relevance. According to it, the offence of bigamy will not apply to "any person whose marriage with such husband or wife has been declared void by a court of competent jurisdiction". It would be appropriate to construe the expression "husband" to cover a person who enters into marital relationship and under the colour of such proclaimed or feigned status of husband subjects the woman concerned to cruelty or coerces her in any manner or for any of the purposes enumerated in the relevant provisions - Sections 304B/498A, whatever be the legitimacy of the marriage itself for the limited purpose of Sections 498A and 304B Indian Penal Code. Such an interpretation, known and recognized as purposive construction has to come into play in a case of this nature. The absence of a definition of "husband" to specifically include such persons who contract marriages ostensibly and cohabit with such woman, in the purported exercise of their role and status as "husband" is no ground to exclude them from the purview of Section 304B or 498A Indian Penal Code, viewed in the context of the very object and aim of the legislations introducing those provisions.” 9. In Subash Babu vs. State of A.P. and Anr., AIR 2011 SC 3031 , the High Court had quashed the proceedings pending before the learned Magistrate under Section 498A IPC on the spacious ground that the marriage of the appellant with Respondent No.2 was void and as respondent No.2 was not the “wife”, she was not entitled to lodge first information report with the police for commission of offence under Section 498A IPC and on the basis of police report, cognizance of the said offence against the appellant could not have been taken by the learned Magistrate. The Supreme Court held that such reasoning was quite contrary to the law declared in Reema Aggarwal vs. Anupam and ors. (supra). 10. For the first time, in 313 Cr.P.C. statement, the accused denied Grace to be his wife. He, however, did not divulge as to how and in what capacity, he used to stay with her. He took an inconsistent plea that on 11.08.1984, he was invited for lunch on Rakhifestival there. No such suggestion was put to PW-2 (Ireen Nath) or PW-11 (Richard R.Lincoln). The timings of the incident that occurred at about 10.00 or 10.30 A.M. cannot be taken as lunch time. In my considered view, for the purpose of 498A and 306 IPC, the victim is to be taken as the appellant’s wife to attract the presumption under Section 113A of Evidence Act. (B) Place of Incident 11. Learned Senior Counsel would vehemently submit that the prosecution was unable to establish the spot where the incident of burning took place. I find no merit in this submission. PW-15 (ASI Partap Singh) to whom the investigation was assigned specifically deposed that the place of incident was 101, village Munirka situated on the 3rd Floor; it belonged to one Hari Singh. Many articles i.e. plastic can containing kerosene oil (Ex.P1); a matchbox (Ex.P2) and burnt matchstick (Ex.P3); one white broken button (Ex.P6) and burnt clothes (Ex.P4), etc. were seized vide seizure memo (Ex-PW-4/A) which describes the spot as House No.101, Village Munirka, which was photographed; site-plan (Ex.PW-15/D) was prepared. Daily Diary (DD) No.4A (Ex.PW-15/A) in clear words records that a lady had put herself on fire in house No.101, village Munirka. Ex.PW-15/D also reveals the name of the landlord i.e. Hari Singh. PW-2 (Ireen Nath) and PW-11 (Richard R.Lincoln) have given the place of incident as house No.101. In her dying declaration (Ex.PW-13/A), her residential address has been mentioned as 101, village Munirka. The rukka (Ex.PW-15/B) specifically mentions the place of incident as house No.101, village Munirka. Simply because of appearance of victim’s residence at 212, Munirka, in the MLC (Ex.PW-12/A), it cannot be presumed that occurrence had taken place there. In fact, the said house was in the occupation of PW-2 (Ireen Nath) who lived with her husband Som Nath whose name also finds mention in the MLC. Simply because of appearance of victim’s residence at 212, Munirka, in the MLC (Ex.PW-12/A), it cannot be presumed that occurrence had taken place there. In fact, the said house was in the occupation of PW-2 (Ireen Nath) who lived with her husband Som Nath whose name also finds mention in the MLC. In 313 statement, the appellant did not specifically deny that Mrs.Grace had not burnt herself while living at 101, village Munirka. He gave an evasive reply that the deceased did not sustain burn injuries in his house on 11.08.1984. It was not appellant’s claim that the occurrence took place at 212, Munirka. There was no valid reasons forcing the investigating agency to change the place of occurrence as soon after the incident, the victim was taken in a PCR to Safdarjung Hospital. The appellant in 313 Cr.P.C. statement though admitted his visit to deceased’s house in Munirka village on 11.08.1984 but conspicuously avoided to divulge whether it was 212, Munirka or 101, Munirka. The prosecution was able to establish that the place of incident was 101, village Munirka. (C) Testimony of PW-2 12. Mrs. Ireen Nath, deceased’s sister is the most crucial witness as she lived in the vicinity and was aware about the relations between the appellant and the victim. She had intervened on numerous occasions to make the appellant mend his ways. She, on oath, deposed that after two months of the marriage, the appellant would often ask her (the victim) to quit her job with Siddharth Continental Hotel and he would try to get her a job in Hotel Taj Palace where he was working. The deceased complained to her that the appellant often quarrelled with her during her job at Siddharth Continental Hotel. She elaborated that both the victim and her husband often visited her residence at Munirka and she (PW-2) used to advise them not to quarrel and to live peacefully with affection. Following Court question was put to her during her examination: Question. Did they ever quarrel in your presence? Answer. Yes. Twice or thrice they quarrelled in my presence also. The accused Eustice tried to throw her over the balcony of my flat which was on the first floor of the flat. I advised the accused Austice not to conduct himself in that fashion and that it was improper to fight and quarrel. 13. Answer. Yes. Twice or thrice they quarrelled in my presence also. The accused Eustice tried to throw her over the balcony of my flat which was on the first floor of the flat. I advised the accused Austice not to conduct himself in that fashion and that it was improper to fight and quarrel. 13. She further revealed that after two to four weeks of her leaving the job with Siddharth Continental Hotel, the victim visited her at about 09.30 P.M. with blue injury marks on her various body-parts. She apprised her that she was beaten by her husband with sticks and requested her to persuade her husband to advise him (her husband). She thereon accompanied her at night to her house to make the appellant understand. The reason to pick-up quarrel was her inability to meet demand of Rs. 600 per month being out of job. The appellant was, however, adamant to arrange money for him in any manner whatsoever and he was not concerned whether she was in job or not. She further deposed that on 11.08.1984, the day of incident, the victim came to her house early in the morning at around 05.00 A.M. and told her that on the previous night, her husband had beaten her and was quarrelling with her since then. The victim wanted her to accompany to the house to tell her husband that he should not behave in that fashion or he should live separate from her. Since she was unable to accompany the victim due to urgency to attend her duty at 07.00 A.M., she promised to visit her after duty hours. However, at about 12.00 (noon), her brother Lesley intimated her on duty about victim’s admission in Safdarjang Hospital, and asked her to reach soon. She went to the hospital. To the following specific Court question, she answered : Question. Did you go the hospital and had a talk with your sister? Answer. Yes. I reached the hospital that day. I found my sister in burnt condition on a bed in the hospital. Initially, I did not go to her considering her serious condition but then I went to her after my husband and some others had come. I talked to her as to why she has done this (Tumne aisa kyu kiya). Yes. I reached the hospital that day. I found my sister in burnt condition on a bed in the hospital. Initially, I did not go to her considering her serious condition but then I went to her after my husband and some others had come. I talked to her as to why she has done this (Tumne aisa kyu kiya). Her reply was that “In logo sas, sasur wa husband se thak chuki thi is liye tang aakar kiya”. There was no other talk at that time. 14. PW-2 (Ireen Nath) was subjected to unending lengthy cross-examination on various dates and all sorts of questions covering various facets of victim’s life were put apparently to project her a lady of low moral values. She, however, withstood the searching cross-examination and answered all the queries put to her elaborately. She revealed various incidents of harassment and cruelties meted out to the victim on specific questions put to her. Responding to the questions/suggestions that after the marriage, both the appellant and the victim had started living together peacefully, she answered that though they lived together but were not happy. When asked to explain it, she disclosed that they used to quarrel on trivial issues. The victim was beaten many a times. The appellant gave her beatings even on the pretext that his clothes were not washed better than hers. She further deposed that all this had occurred in her presence when they came quarrelling to her and continued to do so. Refuting the suggestion that no quarrel had ever taken place between the two, she replied that there used to be quarrels and if she disclosed as to on what issues, these took place, the examining counsel would also be ashamed. When asked to give specific instances on which the quarrels took place, she revealed that the appellant had picked up a quarrel on one occasion and beat the victim when her younger sister Honey had worn her suit in February, 1984. When prompted to give more instances, she told that on another occasion, he had picked up quarrel over rajmah which the victim wanted to give her (PW-2); she was given beatings that day also. Again, when the deceased declined to give money for scooter, he picked up a quarrel with her. 15. When prompted to give more instances, she told that on another occasion, he had picked up quarrel over rajmah which the victim wanted to give her (PW-2); she was given beatings that day also. Again, when the deceased declined to give money for scooter, he picked up a quarrel with her. 15. Attempt was made to show that the victim was schizophrenic and the appellant had taken her to AIIMS for medical treatment. It was emphatically denied by her. Sinister attempt was made to associate the victim with various individuals i.e. A.K. Sarkar, Irfan and Samual Peter Singh without any foundation to tarnish her character. 16. Elaborating further she disclosed that after getting information about the incident in between 11.00 a.m. to 12.00 (noon) from her brother, she went to the hospital without delay and saw her husband and Lesley there. She met the victim at around 04.00 p.m. When confronted with some portion of her examination-in-chief, she admitted that those facts were not told by her to the police as they did not ask the details. She admitted that no complaint was lodged with the police for the beatings given to the victim during her lifetime. She was however categorical that the appellant used to harass her. Initially her harassment was comparatively less but, it increased after she left the job. She denied that the victim had caught fire from the stove accidentally while cooking something on the stove. She revealed that there was no stove in the house at that time. (D) Testimony of PW-11 (Richard R.Lincoln) 17. Another material witness is PW-11 (Richard R.Lincoln) Deceased’s elder brother. He deposed that the victim had complained to him about the ill-treatment of the appellant and her parents during her visits to him on few occasions. Elaborating further, he revealed that at the time of her visit to her in-laws? house on one occasion, she was insulted by the appellant’s father and he did not permit her to enter the house. When the victim informed him about the beatings by the accused, he visited him at his house and told him that if he had any financial problem, he should not worry, it being a temporary phase and the victim would get job soon. On Raksha Bandhan i.e. 11.08.1984, he learnt that the victim had burnt herself and was admitted in the hospital. On Raksha Bandhan i.e. 11.08.1984, he learnt that the victim had burnt herself and was admitted in the hospital. When he met her, she was in pain and entrusted him the responsibility to bring up her child. He further stated that the victim died due to the constant ill-treatment and cruelty by the accused and his family members. In the cross-examination, he admitted that the victim was married earlier to Mr. Anup Singh Bhanot and had a daughter. He fairly admitted that his deposition was on the basis of the information given by her deceased sister. He admitted that no report/complaint was lodged with the police during her lifetime against the appellant. (E) Analysis/discussion 18. I have carefully analysed the testimonies of PW-2 and PW- 11. It stands established that the victim was earlier married to Mr. Anoop Bhanot and had a daughter out of the said wedlock. However, due to strained relations, the said relationship came to an end. It is unclear if there was divorce granted by a competent court of law. The fact remains that the appellant and the victim had started living together apparently in a live-in relationship before performing marriage on 25.01.1984 at house No.101, village Munirka and continued to stay there till the incident. Indisputably, the victim was earlier employed in Hotel Siddharth Continental and submitted her resignation in April, 1983. On the day of incident, she was jobless. 19. Both PWs 2 and 11 have consistently spoken as to how after marriage, the victim was subjected to constant physical and mental cruelties by the appellant on trivial issues in his home. He used to beat her frequently on petty excuses. Despite repeated interventions by PW-2; her husband and also by PW-11 to advise the appellant to behave properly, there was no change in his attitude and conduct. The deceased was in helpless condition and found no other way to come out of it. When a young girl finds herself in a helpless situation, and decides to end her life, in the absence of any other circumstances, it is natural to infer that she was unhappy in her home. In “Karan Singh & anr. vs. State of Haryana,” 2014 Crl.L.J.2708 SC, the appellant therein was acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 304B IPC as the harassment did not relate to dowry demands. However, he was convicted under Section 306 of the IPC. In “Karan Singh & anr. vs. State of Haryana,” 2014 Crl.L.J.2708 SC, the appellant therein was acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 304B IPC as the harassment did not relate to dowry demands. However, he was convicted under Section 306 of the IPC. It was observed that an offence of abetment of suicide punishable under Section 306 IPC is much broader in scope than an offence punishable under Section 304 B of the IPC. The Supreme Court observed: “....From the facts of the case it is quite clear to us that although there may be no evidence of Manju having been compelled by Karan Singh and Mukhtiari to consume poison, they had created a situation over a sufficiently long period of time whereby she was left with no option but to take her life. It is quite unlikely that a young lady, particularly one having a year old child, would take her life unless she had some mental health issues (which is not the case) or was compelled by circumstances to do so....” 20. PWs 2 and 11 had no ulterior motive to make false statement against the appellant. Their cross-examination did not bring out any legal or substantial infirmity which could render their version unreliable. 21. The appellant has put up divergent and contradictory defence. Denying any relation/connection with the victim, he went to the extent of describing her a complete stranger to him. In the cross-examination, however, various questions were put to the witnesses which prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant and the victim lived together in H.N.101 village Munirka. The appellant had accompanied the victim to Dehradun on 27.04.1984 at the time of her father’s death. He claimed to have paid the full fare of the hired taxi. He admitted that in June 1984, he had gone to Kashmir with the victim and had stayed in a hut booked by her mother for three or four days. Suggestion was put to PW-2 that on one occasion after the victim had become unconscious due to fall, he had taken her to AIIMS and got her treated there for schizophrenia. It was also suggested that on 11.08.1984, he had gone to see the victim in the hospital but was not allowed to meet her. Suggestion was put to PW-2 that on one occasion after the victim had become unconscious due to fall, he had taken her to AIIMS and got her treated there for schizophrenia. It was also suggested that on 11.08.1984, he had gone to see the victim in the hospital but was not allowed to meet her. In 313 Cr.P.C. statement, he admitted his visit to the deceased’s house on 11.08.1984 in Munirka village, though he reasoned that it was on the invitation of her brother Richard R.Lincoln with whom he was friendly while working at Hotel Taj Palace, for lunch on Rakhi festival. When he entered the house, he saw Smt. Grace on fire and attempted to put off fire along with her brother. No such suggestion was put to PW-11 (Richard R.Lincoln) in the cross-examination if he had invited him for lunch that day. Since PW-11 did not live with the victim at H.No.101, village Munirka, the appellant had no occasion to visit the deceased’s house even for lunch on his (PW-11) invitation. False defence seems to have been raised. (F) Victim’s Dying Declaration 22. Most relevant piece of evidence relied upon by the prosecution is the dying declaration of the deceased (Ex.PW-13/A) recorded by PW-13 (Sh.Satish Gathwal) which provides a cogent and possible explanation of the occurrence of the events. After the victim sustained burn injuries, she was immediately taken to Safdarjung Hospital. MLC (Ex.PW-12/A) records the arrival time of the patient at 11.30 A.M. PW-15 (ASI Pratap Singh) on receipt of DD No.4A (Ex.PW-15/A) arrived there at 11.50 A.M. SDM was brought to the hospital by the SHO. PW-13 (Sh.Satish Gathwal) on the verbal request of the Investigation Officer recorded victim’s statement (Ex.PW-13/A) in the hospital in his own handwriting bearing his signatures at point “A”. He obtained victim’s thumb impression of right foot at point “B” as her hands were completely burnt. PW-13 (Sh.Satish Gathwal) before recording her statement, had satisfied himself that she was making the statement voluntarily. Whatsoever dictated by the victim, was recorded by him without any addition or subtraction. Endorsement (Ex.PW-13/C) at the end of the statement was made in this regard. In the cross-examination, he elaborated that ASI Pratap Singh had personally requested him to record the victim’s statement. He fairly admitted that he did not meet any doctor including Mr.Tiwari, Incharge Burns Ward, before recording her statement. Endorsement (Ex.PW-13/C) at the end of the statement was made in this regard. In the cross-examination, he elaborated that ASI Pratap Singh had personally requested him to record the victim’s statement. He fairly admitted that he did not meet any doctor including Mr.Tiwari, Incharge Burns Ward, before recording her statement. He denied the suggestion that he did not visit the hospital to record victim’s statement. PW-13 (Satish Gathwal), SDM, New Delhi, a responsible officer had no ulterior motive to fabricate a false statement on the asking of the Investigating Officer. PW-15 (ASI Pratap Singh) and PW-2 have corroborated his version in this regard. 23. Before arrival of PW-13 (Satish Gathwal) in the hospital, ASI Pratap Singh had obtained permission of the doctor concerned to record her statement by moving an application (Ex.PW-13/B). At around 12.00 P.M. endorsement in the encircled portion mark “A to A” on Ex.PW-13/B was made by Dr.V.K.Tiwari and he noted that the patient was conscious, coherent and was not under sedation; she was fit to give her statement. In his appearance as PW-12, at first time, Dr.V.K.Tiwari deposed that the patient was in critical stage when medically examined on arrival; she was conscious and coherent. When he (Dr.V.K.Tiwari) was again summoned as Court witness (CW-2), he proved the endorsement at “A to A” on Ex.PW-13/B. Dr.V.K.Tiwari, also a responsible officer had no axe to grind to falsely implicate the accused /appellant with whom he was not acquainted with before the incident to bring a false document into existence. Apparently, the victim was in a fit state of mind to make the declaration. She had expired after three days of the incident and during that period, she remained conscious and used to have conversation with her family members including PW-2. The appellant himself has relied on the MLC (Ex.PW-12/A) to stress that the victim herself had given the alleged history recorded in the MLC to the doctor. In “Munawar and ors. vs. State of UP and ors.”, 2010 (5) SCC 411, the Supreme Court held that a dying declaration can be relying upon if the deceased remained alive for a long period of time after the incident and died after recording of the dying declaration. That may be evidence to show that his condition was not overtly critical or precarious when the dying declaration was recorded. That may be evidence to show that his condition was not overtly critical or precarious when the dying declaration was recorded. Besides this, PW-13 (Satish Gathwal), SDM had satisfied himself that the victim was making the statement voluntarily. In “Shudhakar vs. State of M.P.”, AIR 2012 SC 3265 , Supreme Court observed that : Normally, the Court places reliance on the medical evidence for reaching the conclusion whether the person making a dying declaration was in a fit state of mind but where the person recording the statement states that the deceased was in a fit and a conscious state, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. What is essential is that the person recording the dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. A certificate by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and, therefore, the voluntary and truthful nature of the statement can be established otherwise. In “Sher Singh and ors. vs. State of Punjab”, 2008 (4) SCC 265 , The Supreme Court held that absence of doctor’s certification is not fatal if the person recording the dying declaration is satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and the requirement of doctor’s certificate is essentially a rule of caution. In the instant case all the relevant prosecution witnesses have deposed that the victim was conscious, oriented and was fit to make statement. Since the dying declaration was recorded by an independent responsible officer, there were no chances of it being the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The dying declaration (Ex.PW-13/A) was recorded without any inordinate delay at 12.15 (noon) within one hour of her admission in the hospital. Nothing was suggested in cross-examination, if any family member of the victim had tutored her the statement. 24. In her dying declaration, the victim implicated her husband – the appellant for inflicting physical and mental torture. She reasoned that after loss of her job a month before at Siddharth Continental Hotel as Telephone Operator, her husband used to beat and force her to bring cash. 24. In her dying declaration, the victim implicated her husband – the appellant for inflicting physical and mental torture. She reasoned that after loss of her job a month before at Siddharth Continental Hotel as Telephone Operator, her husband used to beat and force her to bring cash. She also disclosed that her father-in-law and mother-in-law on phone also used to ask her to bring money; they used to provoke the appellant to beat her. She further informed that due to beatings on the morning of the occurrence by her husband, she had put kerosene oil and set herself on fire. Her husband did not intervene to save her despite his presence and left the spot. She again affirmed that she committed suicide as she was fed up with the cruelty of her husband, mother-in-law and father-in-law adding that she did not want to live. The dying declaration speaks volume as to how and under what circumstances the victim was forced to commit suicide. PW-2 (Ireen Nath) has testified about the continuous ill-treatment to the victim since the beginning of her marriage. The appellant had created a situation over a sufficiently long period of time whereby the victim was left with no option but to take her life. It is relevant to note that in the post-mortem examination report, the victim had symptoms of pregnancy of two months duration. She had a girl aged about three years. It is quite unlikely that a young pregnant lady particularly having three year girl child would take the extreme step to leave her in lurch and dependent upon others. She could not bear it any further and therefore decided to take her life. The victim had, many a times complained to her close relations including PW- 2 (Ireen Nath), her sister and PW-11 about tormented attitude of the appellant and despite persuasion by them on numerous times, there was no change in his attitude/conduct/behaviour and he continued to harass her physically and mentally on trivial issues. Ultimately, the deceased being unable to bear any more torture committed suicide as setting herself on fire. 25. Ultimately, the deceased being unable to bear any more torture committed suicide as setting herself on fire. 25. The law on relevance/probative value of dying declaration is that if the Court is satisfied that it is true and reliable; has been recorded by a person at a time when the deceased was fit physically and mentally to make the declaration and it has not been made under any tutoring/duress/prompting; it can be the sole basis for recording conviction. In such an eventuality, no corroboration is required. In the instant case, it is beyond doubt that the dying declaration made by the victim is voluntarily, reliable and was made in a fit mental condition. 26. Learned Senior Counsel laid emphasis on the alleged history recorded in MLC (Ex.PW-12/A) where the patient herself had informed of sustaining burn injuries while kerosene oil filled bottle accidentally spilled over her and her clothes caught fire. It is urged that it was an accidental fire for which the appellant cannot be held responsible. It is urged that this information given by the victim herself to the doctor amounts to a dying declaration and being first in point of time merits acceptance as it is the true version. 27. It is true that MLC (Ex.PW-12/A) records the alleged history given by the patient herself about sustaining burn injuries accidentally. It is unclear as to how and under what circumstances, this information was given to the doctor. It appears that at that point of time, the victim did not want to implicate the appellant perhaps for the welfare of her child. In his 313 Cr.P.C. statement, the appellant pleaded that at the time of his visit to the house of victim’s brother on 11.08.1984, he saw Smt.Grace (the victim) on fire and tried to put it off along with her brother. It was not his case in 313 Cr.P.C. statement that she caught fire accidently. No suggestion was put to PW-12 (Dr.V.K.Tiwari) if the injuries suffered by the victim were possible due to accidental fire. Nothing was suggested to PW-13 (Satish Gathwal) as to why the victim deviated from her alleged earlier dying declaration recorded in the MLC (Ex.PW-12/A). 28. It was not his case in 313 Cr.P.C. statement that she caught fire accidently. No suggestion was put to PW-12 (Dr.V.K.Tiwari) if the injuries suffered by the victim were possible due to accidental fire. Nothing was suggested to PW-13 (Satish Gathwal) as to why the victim deviated from her alleged earlier dying declaration recorded in the MLC (Ex.PW-12/A). 28. In cases involving multiple dying declaration, the settled position is that each dying declaration has to be considered independently on its own merit so as to appreciate its evidentiary value and one cannot be rejected because of the contents of the other. In cases, where there is more than one dying declaration, it is the duty of the Court to consider each one of them in its correct perspective and satisfy itself which one of them reflects the true state of affairs. In cases of inconsistencies between two or more dying declarations made by the deceased, the Court has to examine the nature of inconsistencies namely, whether they are material or not and in such a situation, the Court has to examine them in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances. In Pradeep Kumar vs. State of Haryana, 2014 Crl.L.J. 3806 SC, the victim had given inconsistent statements in her dying declaration which was recorded in two parts. In the first part, the victim disclosed that when the pump of stove was pressed to air and match stick was burnt, the stove at once got burst and the terrycot suit worn by her caught fire. In the second part of the declaration, the victim disclosed that first part of the declaration was tutored by her husband. In the second part of declaration, she inculpated her husband and attributed specific role in putting her on fire. Despite inconsistency between the two versions in the same dying declaration before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, her version in the second part was believed and treated as dying declaration. 29. In the instant case, taking into consideration the attendant circumstances and the deposition of various witnesses, it can safely be held that the first dying declaration about accidental fire as recorded in the MLC (Ex.PW-12/A) cannot be relied upon and it pales into insignificance in the presence of more probable and natural declaration immediately recorded by a responsible/competent Magistrate which stands on a much higher footing. The victim who was at the verge of death had no ill motive to tell falsehood in her declaration before the SDM. Ill-treatment of the deceased was clearly established and completely proved on the basis of the evidence of other witnesses i.e. PW-2 & PW-11. In Ravindra Timbak Patil vs. State of Maharashtra, 2014 Crl.L.J. 2664 SC, relying upon the dying declaration, the Supreme Court observed: “....In the wake of dying declaration recorded primarily after the incident and the witnesses who had arrived at the scene of occurrence corroborating the prosecution case, we see no further need to probe the evidence merely to accept the defence case that the reason for the death of Shobha was due to her mental illness ignoring the version given out in the dying declaration when the deceased was conscious and in a fit state of mind to get her statement recorded which finally became a dying declaration after her death. The prosecution case being fully supported by the dying declaration which do not suffer from any blemish or infirmity supported by medical evidence and evidence of other witnesses corroborating the prosecution case, we do not consider that it is not a fit case for interference. Above all, the deceased having died within seven years of her marriage, there is a clear presumption that the charge against the appellant under Section 306 IPC stands fully established apart from the fact that the prosecution is supported even by the dying declaration of the deceased recorded before the executive Magistrate. It is thus not a case where further scrutiny of the evidence led by the prosecution is required merely to uphold the findings recorded by the trial court and the High Court.” (G) Appellant’s Post-Event Conduct 30. The appellant’s conduct in the whole episode is highly unnatural and unresonable. Despite overwhelming evidence on record, he denied to have any connection whatsoever with the victim. Despite his presence at the spot, when the victim burnt herself, he did not intervene to rescue her; did not rush to put off the fire; and, did not take her to the hospital for medical treatment. In 313 statement, he alleged that when he intervened to rescue the victim, he sustained 15% burn injuries on his body. Despite his presence at the spot, when the victim burnt herself, he did not intervene to rescue her; did not rush to put off the fire; and, did not take her to the hospital for medical treatment. In 313 statement, he alleged that when he intervened to rescue the victim, he sustained 15% burn injuries on his body. Appellant’s father in 313 Cr.P.C. statement informed that on that day i.e. 11.08.1984, at about 9:30 a.m., the appellant had left the home to attend lunch at the residence of his friend. When he returned, he disclosed to have suffered 15% burns on his body rescuing his friend’s sister who caught fire in a domestic incident. The appellant in 313 statement did not plead specific time of return to his house after sustaining 15% burns on the body. No evidence was produced in defence to prove any such single burn injury. PW-2 was categorical to deny burn injuries sustained by the appellant. No plausible reason was offered by the accused as to why he did not take the victim to the hospital. He even did not bother to intimate her close relations. It indicates the guilty state of mind of the appellant. MLC (Ex.PW12/A) records the presence of only Somath and Leslee, the individuals who admitted the victim in the hospital with 100% deep burns. Appellant’s absolute denial to accept the victim his wife even after living as husband and wife for sufficient duration reflects his abnormal conduct and behaviour towards the victim. It appears that after the victim’s resignation from job, the appellant started quarrelling with her on petty excuses and wanted to get rid of her. 31. The victim remained admitted in hospital for three days before she succumbed to the burn injuries suffered by her on 14.08.1984. At no stage during admission in the hospital, the appellant considered it fit to visit her or to contribute the expenses for her medical treatment. So much so, he did not participate in her funeral. Mr.Bhanot had rather visited her in the hospital and even had attended her funeral. Nothing is on record to show if at any time the appellant bothered to take care of the child left behind by the victim. Attempt was made to project her as a girl of low virtue; her name was associated with many individuals without any foundation. Mr.Bhanot had rather visited her in the hospital and even had attended her funeral. Nothing is on record to show if at any time the appellant bothered to take care of the child left behind by the victim. Attempt was made to project her as a girl of low virtue; her name was associated with many individuals without any foundation. The appellant had the audacity to contend that her status was no more than that of a concubine. (H) Defenceput up by the appellant 32. No plausible explanation has been offered by the appellant to the incriminating evidence proved against him. He sheltered himself under the usual plea of false implication. The victim and her sister PW-2 (Ireen Nath) had no strong motive to falsely implicate him in the incident. For the first time, in 313 statement, the appellant alleged that when Mrs. Ratna Hiter (Assistant Nursing Superintendent, AIIMS)’s offer to marry her daughter to him was declined by his parents, she and victim’s brother got annoyed and falsely implicated him. The defence deserves outright rejection as nothing has surfaced if Mrs. Ratna Hiter had any grown up daughter or any such offer was made to marry her to the appellant. It is not revealed as to when the said offer was made. Nothing has emerged if there was any meeting between the two any time. No such suggestion was put to PW-2 (Ireen Nath) and PW-11 (Richard R.Lincoln) in their cross-examination. The appellant did not examine Mrs.Ratna Hiter in his defence to confront her. Moreover for that trivial issue, the victim is not expected to set herself on fire. It is the appellant’s defence that the victim caught fire accidentally. 33. The appellant did not produce on record any cogent document to show that during the relevant period, he used to live with his parents at Greater Kailash. 34. No other worthwhile defence has emerged to exonerate the appellant. The appellant did not offer any reason as to what prompted the victim to resign suddenly from her job. PW-2 (Ireen Nath) specifically disclosed that the victim was made to resign on the assurance that a better job would be made available by the appellant at Hotel Taj Palace which did not take place. (I) Miscellaneous 35. The appellant did not offer any reason as to what prompted the victim to resign suddenly from her job. PW-2 (Ireen Nath) specifically disclosed that the victim was made to resign on the assurance that a better job would be made available by the appellant at Hotel Taj Palace which did not take place. (I) Miscellaneous 35. Regarding next limb of argument about non-examination of Som Nath and Lesley, it is true that they were not examined despite their presence in the hospital as reflected in the MLC (Ex.PW-12/A). They were cited as witnesses. Perusal of the record reveals that on various occasions, process was issued to secure her brother-Lesley’s presence, but he could not be traced. No adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution for his non-examination. PW-Som Nath was not a witness to the incident. PW-2, his wife, appeared in the witness box. So, his non-examination is not fatal to the prosecution case. 36. Minor inconsistencies, deficiencies, omissions and improvements on trivial matters highlighted by the appellant’s counsel are insignificant as they do not affect the core of the prosecution case and discredit the cogent and unimpeachable evidence of PW-2 and PW-11 coupled with dying declaration. 37. Acquittal of co-accused F.Dilawar, on the same set of evidence, has no impact. It is always open to a Court to differentiate the accused who had been acquitted from those who were convicted. Acquittal of some of the accused does not necessarily result in acquittal of the rest. If after sieving untruth and unacceptable portion of the evidence, residue is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused, there is no legal bar in convicting a person on the evidence which has been primarily disbelieved vis-a-vis others. In the instant case, there was no direct evidence against co-accused F.Dilawar for harassment to the victim on account of dowry demands. She did not live with the appellant and PW-2 and PW-11 had never met her. Even the appellant was acquitted of the charge under Section 498A IPC, in similar circumstances. (J) Conclusion 38. Various circumstances discussed above prove beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was driven to the act of suicide because of the cruelty both physical and mental, inflicted on her by the appellant continuously, incessantly and over a period of time and there was direct nexus between the acts of the accused that pushed her to suicide. (J) Conclusion 38. Various circumstances discussed above prove beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was driven to the act of suicide because of the cruelty both physical and mental, inflicted on her by the appellant continuously, incessantly and over a period of time and there was direct nexus between the acts of the accused that pushed her to suicide. The impugned judgment based upon fair appraisal of evidence warrants no intervention. Resultantly, findings on conviction under Section 306 IPC are affirmed. 39. Prayer in the alternative is to take lenient view and to modify the sentence order. The occurrence took place on 11.08.1984. The trial resulted in conviction under Section 306 IPC on 09.09.1999. The appellant has suffered the ordeal of trial/appeal for about thirty years. Nominal roll dated 23.05.2011 reveals that he remained in custody for about eleven months and six days besides remission for three months and fifteen days. He was not involved in any other criminal case and is not a previous convict. Sentence Order records that he is an engineer by profession. He has lost his father during trial. Considering these mitigating circumstances, substantive sentence awarded to him for RI for seven years is reduced to RI for three years. Other terms and conditions of the sentence order are left undisturbed. He shall, however, pay a sum of Rs. 2 lacs to victim’s daughter left behind her to nominally compensate her and the amount shall be deposited within two weeks in the Trial Court. It shall be released to her after due notice. 40. The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms. The appellant shall surrender before the Trial Court on 27th March, 2015 to serve out the remaining period of substantive sentence awarded to him. 41. Trial Court record be sent back forthwith with the copy of the judgment. A copy of the judgment be sent to the Superintendent Jail for information.