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2015 DIGILAW 794 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. H. R. Tailor

2015-08-13

J.B.PARDIWALA

body2015
JUDGMENT J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner - State of Gujarat, calls in question the legality, validity and propriety of the order dated 27th September, 2004, passed by the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal, Gandhinagar in the appeal No. 152 of 2002. 2. The facts giving rise to this application may be summarised as under:-- "2.1 The respondent herein was working with the office of the Commissioner, Food and Drugs Control, Gandhinagar, as a Refrigeration Mechanic. The respondent was assigned the additional charge of Superintendent, Air Conditioning Plant on 9.9.93. In the course of his employment as the Superintendent of the Air Condition Plant, he is alleged to have been careless in discharge of his duties. A departmental show cause notice was issued, followed by a charge-sheet dated 9.4.1997. He came to be dismissed from service vide order dated 11th March, 2002, passed by the Commissioner, Food and Drugs Control Department. 2.2 Being dissatisfied with the order of dismissal, the respondent challenged the same before the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal at Gandhinagar. The Tribunal allowed the application filed by the respondent herein and quashed and set aside the order of dismissal dated 11.3.2002. The Tribunal directed the State-respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service with full back-wages. 2.3 Being dissatisfied with the impugned order, the State of Gujarat has come up with this application." 3. Ms. Shruti Pathak, the learned AGP appearing for the petitioner submitted that the Tribunal committed a serious error in passing the impugned order. She submitted that the Tribunal ought not to have interfered with the order of dismissal passed by the Commissioner. She submitted that the respondent herein was found to be negligent in discharge of his duties. She submitted that the Tribunal failed to consider the material evidence on record. She submitted that the Air Condition Plant remained in a non-working condition for about six months and the Department had to incur a loss of Rs. 10 lac on account of the negligence on the part of the respondent. She submitted that the petition deserves to be allowed and the order of the Tribunal be quashed. 4. On the other hand this application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. R.C. Kakkad, the learned advocate appearing for the respondent. Mr. 10 lac on account of the negligence on the part of the respondent. She submitted that the petition deserves to be allowed and the order of the Tribunal be quashed. 4. On the other hand this application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. R.C. Kakkad, the learned advocate appearing for the respondent. Mr. Kakkad raised a preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He submitted that the order passed by the Commissioner, Food and Drugs Control Department could be said to have been passed by the State Government itself and when such order is set aside by the Tribunal in appeal, then the State of Gujarat through the Commissioner cannot challenge the same by filing a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. In short, the contention is that when the legislature did not think it proper to provide for an appeal by the Officer whose order has been set aside in appeal and when the rule making authority also did not think it proper to provide for an appeal by an Officer whose order has been set aside by the appellate authority, then in such circumstances, the Commissioner, whose order has been set aside by the Tribunal in appeal, cannot approach this Court. 5. Mr. Kakkad submitted that assuming for the moment that this petition is maintainable at the instance of the State of Gujarat through the Commissioner, Food and Drugs Control Department, no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the Tribunal in passing the impugned order. He submitted that having regard to the limited scope, this Court may not disturb the impugned order in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the Tribunal committed any error in passing the impugned order. 7. Since Mr. Kakkad, the learned advocate appearing for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of this petition, I must look into the same. The preliminary objection is on the basis of the decision of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat and anr. v. A.V. Mankad -SCA No. 5356/01. 7. Since Mr. Kakkad, the learned advocate appearing for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of this petition, I must look into the same. The preliminary objection is on the basis of the decision of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat and anr. v. A.V. Mankad -SCA No. 5356/01. In the said case, the respondent was working as a Junior Clerk in the office of the District Education Office, Bhavnagar. He remained absent from duty due to sickness. The State of Gujarat invoked Rule 33 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules and considered the respondent to have resigned from the services by a deeming fiction. Aggrieved by such order passed by the State Government, the respondent preferred an appeal before the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal. The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal of the respondent. The District Education Officer, aggrieved by the said order passed by the Tribunal, preferred the petition before this Court. In such circumstances, it was contended that the petition was not maintainable at the instance of the District Education Officer for the reason that the District Education Officer cannot challenge an order passed by the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal. 8. Here in the present case, the contention is that the Commissioner could not have challenged the order passed by the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal. This Court relying on one decision rendered by a learned Single Judge in SCA No. 6003/87, took the view that the petition filed by the State of Gujarat through the District Education Officer was not maintainable. 9. It appears that the view taken by this Court is no longer a good law in view of the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of R.M. Patel v. State of Gujarat and ors. 2015(2) GLR 1242. In that case the contention before the Division Bench was that since the Tribunal is vested with the powers which the Government previously exercised, the Government cannot question any decision of the Tribunal in exercise of such powers. The contention was accordingly negatived by observing in paras 12 to 23 as under:-- "12. The Tribunal is constituted under Section 3 of the Act of 1972. The contention was accordingly negatived by observing in paras 12 to 23 as under:-- "12. The Tribunal is constituted under Section 3 of the Act of 1972. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that for the purpose of securing in a more effective and satisfactory manner the just claims and interests of specified civil servants with respect to certain matters affecting their rights, the State Government shall, by notification, constitute a Tribunal to be called the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal. Section 10 of the Act of 1972 pertains to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and reads as under: "10. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide (a) appeals filed by specified civil servants under section 11; (b) any application filed by the State Government under section 12; (c) appeals and applications transferred to it under section 21." 13. Section 11 of the Act of 1972 pertains to appeal by specified civil servants. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that any specified civil servant aggrieved by an original or appellate order or decision of any officer or authority other than the State Government with respect to any of the matters specified in the Schedule may, within a period of 90 days from the date of such order or decision, appeal to the Tribunal against such order or decision, in a case where an appeal lies under the law to the State Government. Essentially, thus, all appeals of subordinate authorities and officers pertaining to specified officers and the matters specified in the Schedule, which were previously maintainable before the State Government would now be entertained by the Tribunal. 14. Section 12 of the Act of 1972 pertains to power of State Government to apply for modification or annulment of order or decision. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that where it appears to the State Government that any order or decision of any officer or authority in relation to any specified civil servant with respect to any of the matters specified in the Schedule against which an appeal lies to the Tribunal under section 11 requires to be modified, annulled or reversed on the ground of such order being contrary to law or inconsistent with the material on record or for any other sufficient reason, the State Government may, in the interest of justice, apply to the Tribunal within specified time to modify, annul or reverse such an order or decision. 15. 15. Section 21 of the Act of 1972 pertains to bar of jurisdiction of Government and transfer of pending proceedings to Tribunal. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that neither the State Government nor any officer or authority empowered to exercise the powers of the State Government shall, with effect on and from the date on which the Tribunal is constituted under section 3, be competent to entertain or hear appeals or applications against, or to revise, orders or decisions of any officer or authority in relation to specified civil servants with respect to any of the matters specified in the Schedule, in cases where an appeal lies to the Tribunal against such orders or decision under Section11 and all such appeals and such other proceedings pending before the State Government or any officer or authority shall stand transferred to the Tribunal for disposal in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 16. Perusal of the above provisions contained in the Act of 1972, would demonstrate that the Tribunal would exercise appellate or revisional powers, which hitherto were enjoyed by the State Government and exercised either by the State Government or by an officer or authority specified for such purpose. Under Section 11, a specified civil servant with respect to the matters specified in the Schedule, would now appeal to the Tribunal where previously the appeal lied before the Government. Under Section 12, the State Government would apply to the Tribunal for modification, annulment or reversal of an order or decision of an officer or authority in relation to any specified civil servant concerning the matters specified in the Schedule. Section 21 provides that with effect from the constitution of the Tribunal, the State Government or any officer or authority empowered to exercise the power of the State Government, would be incompetent to entertain or hear appeals or applications and to revise the orders or decision of any officer or authority in relation to the specified civil servants with respect to the matters specified in the Schedule. In other words, the Tribunal was give exclusive jurisdiction to decide such matters to the total exclusion of the jurisdiction of the State Government. In other words, the Tribunal was give exclusive jurisdiction to decide such matters to the total exclusion of the jurisdiction of the State Government. This was, clearly, thus, not a case of delegation of powers by the State Government to the Tribunal but it was the case of creation of a statutory Tribunal to exercise powers of appellate and revisional jurisdiction, which the State Government hitherto enjoyed with respect to the specified civil servant concerning the matters specified in the Schedule. In a case of delegation, the delegator always enjoys concurrent jurisdiction and may even withdraw the authority of the delegatee. In the present case, the jurisdiction of the State Government is totally ousted upon creation of the Tribunal under Section 3 of the Act of 1972 and vesting of the powers to the Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act of 1972. Significantly, under Section 12 of the Act of 1972, the State Government itself can be a petitioner before the Tribunal. An order or decision of the officer or authority, which was till the constitution of the Tribunal, was appealable or revisable by the State Government would now have to be questioned before the Tribunal by the State Government, if it was of the opinion that such order was contrary to law or inconsistent with the material on record or required modification, annulment or reversal on any other sufficient reasons in the interest of justice. It can easily be conceived that the order that the Tribunal may pass on such a petition of the State Government, in a given case, may even aggrieve the State Government. It would be incorrect, therefore, to suggest that the State Government would be bound by the view of the Tribunal and would be compelled to accept the finality of the view of the Tribunal prohibiting a writ before the High Court at the hands of the State Government. 17. In the case of Roop Chand v. State of Punjab & Anr. reported in AIR 1963 SC 1503 , the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered the question of powers of the State Government to revise an order passed by the officer, who was delegated such powers by the State Government. 17. In the case of Roop Chand v. State of Punjab & Anr. reported in AIR 1963 SC 1503 , the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered the question of powers of the State Government to revise an order passed by the officer, who was delegated such powers by the State Government. In the majority opinion, it was held that where the State Government has delegated its powers to hear appeals to an officer, the order passed by such officer is an order passed by the State Government itself and not an order passed by any officer under the Act. The provision providing for revision contemplated an order passed by an officer in his own right and not as a delegate. It was, therefore, held that the State Government was not entitled to call for and examine the record of the case disposed of by the officer acting as a delegate. In the present case, we are not dealing with the situation where the powers of the State Government has been delegated to the Tribunal but, as noted above, the Tribunal is exercising its independent statutory powers vested under Section 10 of the Act of 1972. In the said decision, in the minority opinion, it was expressed that the appellate powers of the State Government are exercised by the officer to whom such powers are delegated and the officer though exercising such powers possessed by the State Government, is still an officer of the State Government. The power of the State Government for revision is distinct from the power exercised by the delegate. The revisional powers give overall control to the State Government to see that the appellate orders passed by its officers are legal and proper because one illegal or improper order may start a chain of reaction which may disturb the whole scheme of consolidation of land and prevent such scheme from coming into existence. 18. The revisional powers give overall control to the State Government to see that the appellate orders passed by its officers are legal and proper because one illegal or improper order may start a chain of reaction which may disturb the whole scheme of consolidation of land and prevent such scheme from coming into existence. 18. As is well known, Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code pertains to the revision and authorizes the State Government and any revenue authority not inferior in rank to an Assistant or Deputy Collector or Superintendent of Survey, to call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any subordinate revenue officer for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such officer. 19. In the context of the revisional order passed by an officer for and on behalf of the State Government, the question of challenging such an order by the Collector came up before this Court. The learned Single Judge in case of Collector v. Bavabhai Karshanbhai Patel, vide judgment dated 17.10.2002 in Special Civil Application No. 3486 of 2002, held that the Principal Secretary has exercised the powers under section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and thus exercised the powers of the State Government itself. It was, therefore, highly improper on the part of the Collector, Deputy Collector or Mamlatdar to challenge the decision of the Principal Secretary by filing a writ petition. It was observed that it was not open for the subordinate officer to challenge the order of the superior officer by filing the petition to challenge the said decision unless specifically authorized by the State Government in that behalf. 20. Such decision was carried in appeal. The Division Bench, in a judgment dated 16.06.2004 upheld the view of the learned Single Judge and observed that "Thus, in our considered opinion the main writ petition filed by the present Appellant - original petitioners before this Court, itself was not maintainable in their individual capacity." Such decisions were carried in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Division Bench, in a judgment dated 16.06.2004 upheld the view of the learned Single Judge and observed that "Thus, in our considered opinion the main writ petition filed by the present Appellant - original petitioners before this Court, itself was not maintainable in their individual capacity." Such decisions were carried in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal observing as under: "In both the orders the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench were of the view that since the order of the Secretary to the State Government has been challenged by the Collector the writ petition is not maintainable, according to them the Collector is subordinate to the Secretary in the Government and, therefore, he is incompetent to challenge the order passed by the Secretary to the State Government. We have perused ground 'A' taken in this appeal which shows that the appeal was preferred by the Collector of Rajkot on the expressed direction given by the Ministry of Revenue. Apart from that, we are of the view that when an illegality is committed it is open to the Collector to change the same to protect the interest of the State. Therefore, both the learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court were not correct in saying that the Collector cannot change the order passed by the Secretary to the State Government." 21. It can thus be seen that even in a case where the powers were exercised by the Principal Secretary under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, which were vested with the Government, the Supreme Court held that such a decision could be challenged by the State Government or even by a lower authority under the instructions of the State Government. In case of decision dated 05.12.1987 in Special Civil Application No. 6003 of 1987, the learned Single Judge primarily proceeded on the basis that the Act of 1972 did not think it proper to provide for an appeal by the officer whose order was set aside by the appellate authority. It was, therefore, observed that it is doubtful whether the officer whose order has been set aside by the appellate authority can approach this Court by filing a writ petition under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution. 22. It was, therefore, observed that it is doubtful whether the officer whose order has been set aside by the appellate authority can approach this Court by filing a writ petition under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution. 22. Relying on this decision, the learned Single Judge in case of A.V. Mankad (Supra) held that the writ petition filed through the District Education Officer to challenge the judgment of the Tribunal was not maintainable. 23. We have already held that a writ petition at the hands of the State Government, if it is otherwise aggrieved, calling in question the decision of the Tribunal, would be maintainable. Our view is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Roop Chand (Supra). Besides, the present is not a case where the writ petition was filed by an officer subordinate in rank than the officer whose order was challenged. It was a case where the Government itself approached the High Court by filing writ petition. For all these reasons, the challenge to the maintainability of the State Government's writ petitions must fail." 10. My attention was also drawn to an order passed by the Supreme Court dated 16th October, 2006 in the case of Collector, Rajkot v. Bhavabhai - Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 3449/06. I may quote the order as under:-- "The challenge in this appeal is to the order dated 17.10.2002 in Special Civil Application No. 3486 of 2002 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the petition as not maintainable and the order dated 16.6.2004 passed by the division Bench in LPA No. 850 of 2003 affirming the order passed by the learned Single Judge. We have heard the parties. In both the orders the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench were of the view that since the order of the secretary to the State Government has been challenged by the Collector the writ petition is not maintainable, according to them the Collector is subordinate to the Secretary in the Government and, therefore, he is incompetent to challenge the order passed by the Secretary to the State Government. We have perused ground 'A' taken in this appeal which shows that the appeal was preferred by the Collector of Rajkot on the expressed direction given by the Ministry of Revenue. We have perused ground 'A' taken in this appeal which shows that the appeal was preferred by the Collector of Rajkot on the expressed direction given by the Ministry of Revenue. Apart from that, we are of the view that when an illegality is committed it is open to the Collector to challenge the same to protect the interest of the State. Therefore, both the learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court were not correct in saying that the Collector cannot challenge the order passed by the Secretary to the State Government. Since, the controversy has not been settled on merits, we set aside the orders of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court and the matter is remitted back to the learned Single Judge by restoring Special Civil Application No. 3486 of 2002 before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge shall after hearing the parties consider the respective merits and pass an appropriate order in accordance with law. We make it clear that the parties are at liberty to raise all rights and contentions before the learned Single Judge. The High Court is requested to dispose of the matter within six months. The appeal is disposed of accordingly." 11. In view of the above, the preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is overruled. 12. So far as the legality and validity of the impugned order is concerned, I am of the view that no error, not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal, while allowing the appeal of the respondent herein observed as under. The free English translation of the same is as under:-- "9. Heard the arguments advanced by the rival parties and also minutely perused the papers on record of the case. The Appellant has argued that, he being a Scheduled Caste employee, intentionally such a harsh order is passed against him. 10. In the present case, a Departmental Inquiry was conducted and the same was completed as per the Rules by following and observing all the relevant provisions. There is no dispute with regard to the entire facts of the Appeal. The Appellant has argued that, he being a Scheduled Caste employee, intentionally such a harsh order is passed against him. 10. In the present case, a Departmental Inquiry was conducted and the same was completed as per the Rules by following and observing all the relevant provisions. There is no dispute with regard to the entire facts of the Appeal. Looking to the papers of the Inquiry proceedings it becomes clearly evident that the accusation alleged against the Appellant does not get proved absolutely. First of all, the documentary evidences asked for by him were not supplied. The said fact is admitted in the written arguments also. It was informed vide a letter dated 8/9/97 to collect the copies, meaning thereby that the copies were not supplied by the Department. The requisition was made by the Appellant to make use of branded Oil or say that he insisted not to use loose oil. Under such circumstances his doubt should have been made clear that the oil which is given is appropriately branded and should be shown to him to his satisfaction. If the driver refuses to drive the Bus without brake or to make representation in this regard, action cannot be taken against such driver. It is argued by the representative of the respondent side that the Appellant was making wrong representations and false complaints. This argument substantiates the fact that the Appellant insisted upon to make use of oil of the good company, and considering this fact, his representation to make use of oil of the good Company cannot termed to be the false representation. 11. In his evidence the Witness Shri Joshi does not say anything with regard to negligence of the applicant. What is wrong if it is enquired by the appellant as to from which barrel the oil is taken? The indiscipline is considered merely on the basis of the fact that whether the statement of defense is submitted within time or not? None of the witnesses say that the damage was caused because of the reason that the A.C. remained off. Deposition of Shri Tomas is also important. Moreover the work of the Appellant was admirable, and out of his own understanding and cleverness he avoided damage to the machine. There is no evidence of repairing and it is also not mentioned in the proposed Charge of the delinquent. Deposition of Shri Tomas is also important. Moreover the work of the Appellant was admirable, and out of his own understanding and cleverness he avoided damage to the machine. There is no evidence of repairing and it is also not mentioned in the proposed Charge of the delinquent. Further, during the tenure of services of the Appellant, service contract was not required to be given to any one as he himself was doing the repairing work, whereas now the contract is required to be given. 12. Further, in the said order the clarification given by the Appellant is not analyzed, and reasons are also not given for not taking into consideration his detailed explanation. 13. In the present case there does not appear to be any lack of trustworthiness. The appellant had joined the services from dated 4/2/95 and had rendered 15 years of service. His explanation dated 6/1/2001 has not been examined reasonably. The order of clearing efficiency bar is passed in the year 1995 whereas the Higher Scale was granted in the 1994. We agree with the argument advanced by the representative of the Branch that, it is not the case that due to these facts Departmental Inquiry cannot be contemplated, but there has to be relevant and solid evidence. 14. There does not appear to be any evidence regarding indiscipline whatsoever committed by the delinquent employee. Actually, in the present case the Statement of Defense submitted by the Appellant is not examined in any way, which creates considerable doubt against the Department. There is no mention in the order of the respondent with regard to the argument made by the Appellant that a good quality lubricant should be used, and the total disregard to such an important issue creates doubt regarding proceedings of the Departmental Inquiry. In the present proceedings it clearly becomes evident that the Defendant herein is having prejudice against the Appellant, and it appears to us that the order passed against the Appellant is bias. 15. The fact that the Appellant suddenly becoming un-useful should be consistent with the principle of WENDSBURY. The penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority in proportion to the incident occurred cannot be said to be reasonable by any means. 15. The fact that the Appellant suddenly becoming un-useful should be consistent with the principle of WENDSBURY. The penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority in proportion to the incident occurred cannot be said to be reasonable by any means. The Honourable High Court by rendering many Judgments has established the principle regarding considering the question of wages of intervening period of dismissal, at the time of reinstatement of the employee. Where from one of the principle is such that, if the order of dismissal is totally perverse, the employee after reinstatement should get complete salary for the intervening period. In the present case also the order dismissing the Appellant clearly appears to be totally perverse and prejudiced and without application of mind, therefore, the Authorized Officer shall pass the order reinstating the Appellant in service and should pay the complete salary of the intervening period of dismissal to the Appellant, than only the justice will be considered to have been dispensed. Thus the following order is passed." 13. Having regard to the limited scope of interference in these type of matters, this petition should fail and is accordingly rejected. 14. The next question that crops up is what should be the consequential order. It appears that at the time when this petition was admitted on 11.2.2005, the ad-interim relief in terms of para 6(B) was granted. The impugned order passed by the Tribunal directing reinstatement of the respondent in service with full back-wages was ordered to be stayed and it has remained stayed till this date. It also appears that during the pendency of this petition, the respondent retired from service. Therefore, there is no question of now reinstating the respondent in service. The only question will be about the benefits. The petitioner was dismissed from service way back in the year 2004. Almost 11 years have passed since the time the petitioner was dismissed from the service. During the pendency of this writ-application, he also attained superannuation. Once the order of dismissal from service is held to be illegal and invalid, and the petitioner being in the public employment, the necessary declaration must follow that he continued to be in service uninterruptedly till he attained superannuation. When removal from service is held to be illegal and invalid, the next question is whether: the victim of such action is entitled to the back-wages. When removal from service is held to be illegal and invalid, the next question is whether: the victim of such action is entitled to the back-wages. Ordinarily, it is well settled that if termination of service is held to be bad, no other punishment in the guise of denial of the back-wages can be imposed and therefore, it must, as a necessary corollary follow that he will be entitled to all the back-wages on the footing that he has continued to be in service uninterruptedly. It was sought to be argued that past 11 years the petitioner would surely have not remained unemployed and might have taken up some alternative appointment. If the petitioner had procured an alternative employment, he would not be entitled to the wages and salary from the respondent. But it is equally true that an employee depending on the salary for his survival when he is exposed to the vagaries of the Court litigation cannot hold on to a slender distant hope of judicial process coming to his rescue and not try to survive by accepting an alternative employment, a hope which may turn out to be a mirage. Therefore, even if I believe that the petitioner had taken up an alternative employment, he was perfectly justified in procuring the same in order to keep his body and soul together as also to bear the expenses of litigation to vindicate his honour, integrity and character. I may quote a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah, reported in (2007) 7 SCC 689 . The observations made by the Supreme Court in paras 33 and 34 are as under:-- "33. The matter can be looked at from another angle also. It is true that while granting a relief in favour of a party, the Court must consider the relevant provisions of law and issue appropriate directions keeping in view such provisions. There may, however, be cases where on the facts and in the circumstances, the Court may issue necessary directions in the larger interest of justice keeping in view the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Take a case, where ex facie injustice has been meted out to an employee. In spite of the fact that he is entitled to certain benefits, they had not been given to him. Take a case, where ex facie injustice has been meted out to an employee. In spite of the fact that he is entitled to certain benefits, they had not been given to him. His representations have been illegally and unjustifiably turned down. He finally approaches a Court of Law. The Court is convinced that gross injustice has been done to him and he was wrongfully, unfairly and with oblique motive deprived of those benefits. The Court, in the circumstances, directs the Authority to extend all benefits which he would have obtained had he not been illegally deprived of them. Is it open to the Authorities in such case to urge that as he has not worked (but held to be illegally deprived), he would not be granted the benefits? Upholding of such plea would amount to allowing a party to take undue advantage of his own wrong. It would perpetrate injustice rather than doing justice to the person wronged. 34. We are conscious and mindful that even in absence of statutory provision, normal rule is 'no work no pay'. In appropriate cases, however, a Court of Law may, nay must, take into account all the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The Court, in a given case, may hold that the person was willing to work but was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do so. The Court may in the circumstances, direct the Authority to grant him all benefits considering 'as if he had worked'. It, therefore, cannot be contended as an absolute proposition of law that no direction of payment of consequential benefits can be granted by a Court of Law and if such directions are issued by a Court, the Authority can ignore them even if they had been finally confirmed by the Apex Court of the country (as has been done in the present case). The bald contention of the appellant-Board, therefore, has no substance and must be rejected." At the same time, it is also true that in a plethora of judgments of the Supreme Court, a view has been taken that if the dismissal or removal is held to be illegal or void, there cannot be any automatic reinstatement with back-wages, but a lumpsum amount of compensation can be awarded. In the present case, one of the mitigating factors not to award the back-wages and lean to consider awarding lumpsum compensation is that the petitioner has superannuated. In a very recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Tapash Kumar Paul v. BSNL and anr. reported in (2014) 4 S.C.R 875, the Supreme Court has observed as under:-- "It is no doubt true that a Court may pass an order substituting an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds viz. (I) where the industry is closed; (ii) where the employee has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period of service is left to his credit; (iii) where the workman has been rendered incapacitated to discharge the duties and cannot be reinstated and/or (iv) when he has lost confidence of the Management to discharge duties. What is sought to be emphasised is that there may be appropriate case on facts which may justify substituting the order of reinstatement by award of compensation, but that has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the order of reinstatement should be allowed to be substituted by award of compensation." Even if the petitioner was left with few years of service, and even while affirming the order of the Tribunal so far as the legality and validity of the order of dismissal is concerned, I could have substituted the order of reinstatement with awarding lumpsum amount towards compensation. However, in the present case, there is no question of reinstatement because the petitioner has already superannuated. In such circumstances, while affirming the order of the Tribunal, I substitute the relief granted by the Tribunal by directing the respondents to pay a sum of Rs. 4 lac by way of lumpsum compensation. It is made clear that the petitioner shall not be entitled to any other consequential benefits flowing from the Rules. The petition is partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.