JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. State has appealed against the judgment dated 3.5.2010 of the learned Special Judge, Chamba Division, Chamba, Himachal Pradesh, passed in Sessions Trial No. 36 of 2009, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh v. Diwan Chand, challenging the acquittal of respondent Diwna Chand (hereinafter referred to as the accused), who stands charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. It is the case of prosecution that on 22.8.2009, police party, headed by HC Kartar Singh (PW-10), was on patrol duty at a place known as Koti. At about 6.30 p.m., accused, who saw the police party, tried to flee, but on suspicion was apprehended. In the presence of independent witnesses Manoj Kumar (PW- 2) and Rakesh Kumar (not examined), accused was apprised of his statutory right. After obtaining his consent, police party searched him and recovered the contraband substance, which on weighment was found to be 4 kgs. Recovered contraband substance was wrapped in a parcel (Ex.P-1) and sealed with five seals of seal impression 'K'. Ruka (Ex.PW-10/A) was prepared and sent through Constable Mohammed Aslam (PW-5), on the basis of which FIR No.187, dated 12.8.2009 (Ex.PW-8/A), under Section 20 of the Act, was registered at Police Station, Sadar (Chamba), by ASI Ranjit Singh (PW-8). Accused was arrested; contraband substance was seized and investigation completed on the spot. Contraband substance was resealed by Ranjit Singh (PW-8) with three seals of impression 'M'. Whereafter, it was entrusted to HC Pawan Kumar (PW-7), who, after making entries on the Malkhana register (Ex.PW-7/A), kept it in safe custody. Subsequently, the contraband substance was sent for chemical analysis through Constable Rakesh Kumar (PW-11), vide Road Certificate (Ex.PW-7/B). Report of the Chemical Examiner (Ex.PX) was obtained and taken on record. With the completion of investigation, which, prima facie, revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. With the completion of investigation, which, prima facie, revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to establish its case, prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses and statement of the accused, under the provisions of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was also recorded, in which he pleaded innocence and false implication. No evidence in defence was led. 5. Based on the testimonies of witnesses and the material on record, trial Court acquitted the accused of the charged offence. Hence, the present appeal by the State. 6. We have heard Mr. Ashok Chaudhary, learned Additional Advocate General, on behalf of the State as also Mr. N.K. Thakur, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Surender Kumar, Advocate, on behalf of the accused. We have also minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. Having done so, we are of the considered view that no case for interference is made out at all. We find that the judgment rendered by the trial Court is based on complete, correct and proper appreciation of evidence (documentary and ocular) so placed on record. There is neither any illegality/infirmity nor any perversity with the same, resulting into miscarriage of justice. 7. It is a settled principle of law that acquittal leads to presumption of innocence in favour of an accused. To dislodge the same, onus heavily lies upon the prosecution. Having considered the material on record, we are of the considered view that prosecution has failed to establish essential ingredients so required to constitute the charged offence. 8. In Prandas v. The State, AIR 1954 SC 36 , Constitution Bench of the apex Court, has held as under: "(6) It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot support the view which has been expressed in several cases that the High Court has no power under Section 417, Criminal P.c., to reverse a judgment of acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the subordinate Court has in some way or other misdirected itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice. In our opinion, the true position in regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code in an appeal from an order of acquittal has been stated in - 'Sheo Swarup v. Emperor', AIR 1934 PC 227 (2) at pp.229, 230 (A), in these words: "Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice." 9. We find that version of the police officials, present on the spot, i.e. HC Kartar Singh (PW-10), ASI Ranjit Singh (PW-8), Constable Mohammed Aslam (PW-5) and HC Surinder Kumar (PW-1), is contradicted by independent witness Manoj Kumar (PW-2). Careful perusal of the testimony of the aforesaid police officials reveals that police party had laid a Naka at Koti. The accused, who was carrying a bag, was spotted by the police party. He tried to run away, but on suspicion, was apprehended. In the presence of independent witnesses Manoj Kumar and Rakesh Kumar, accused was informed of his statutory rights. However, he consented to be searched by the police party present on the spot, vide Memo (Ex.PW-1/A). The accused, who was carrying a bag, was spotted by the police party. He tried to run away, but on suspicion, was apprehended. In the presence of independent witnesses Manoj Kumar and Rakesh Kumar, accused was informed of his statutory rights. However, he consented to be searched by the police party present on the spot, vide Memo (Ex.PW-1/A). Though nothing was recovered from the body of the accused, but however, contraband substance was recovered from the bag so carried by the accused, which was weighed, sealed and taken into possession vide Memo (Ex.PW- 1/C). On the basis of ruka (Ex.PW-10/A), FIR (Ex. PW- 8/A) was registered. After the file was brought to the spot, remaining proceedings were completed on the spot. Accused was also arrested vide Memo (Ex.PW- 1/D). 10. We find that another independent witness Rakesh Kumar has not been examined in Court, for the reason that he was allegedly won over. 11. In Gurmej Singh and others v. State of Punjab, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 75, the apex Court held that dropping a witness on the specious plea that he was won over without laying the foundation therefor is generally to be frowned upon. But each case has to be considered on its separate facts. 12. In State of Rajasthan v. Om Parkash, (2002) 5 SCC 745 , the Apex Court held as under:- "14. In State of H.P. v. Gian Chand, 2000 (1) SCC 71 Justice Lahoti speaking for the Bench observed that the Court has first to assess the trustworthy intention of the evidence adduced and available on record. If the court finds the evidence adduced worthy of being relied on then the testimony has to be accepted and acted on though there may be other witnesses available who could have been examined but were not examined." 13. Be that as it may, what we find from the unrebutted testimony of Manoj Kumar (PW-2) is that the police had already recovered the contraband substance and then brought the accused and the contraband substance to the shop of this witness only for the purpose of weighing the same. Now, this witness has not been cross-examined by the Public Prosecutor. Hence, through the testimony of this witness, undoubtedly and undisputedly, two versions with regard to the carrying out of search and seizure operations have emerged on record, rendering the prosecution case to be extremely doubtful, if not false. Now, this witness has not been cross-examined by the Public Prosecutor. Hence, through the testimony of this witness, undoubtedly and undisputedly, two versions with regard to the carrying out of search and seizure operations have emerged on record, rendering the prosecution case to be extremely doubtful, if not false. 14. It is well established principle of law that (i) the appellate Court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be more probable; (ii) while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court must consider entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether views of the trial court are perverse or otherwise unsustainable; (iii) the appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, trial Court failed to take into consideration any admissible fact; and (iv) the trial Court failed to take into consideration any admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration evidence brought on record contrary to law. (See: Balak Ram & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 SC 2165 ; Allarakha K Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 3 SCC 57 ; Raghunath v. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 398 ; State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh & Ors., (2007) 13 SCC 102 ; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 2066 ; Sambhaji Hindurao Deshmukh & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 186 ; Arulvelu & Anr. v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 ; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98 ; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 445 . 15. In Sheo Swaroop and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 186 ; Arulvelu & Anr. v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 ; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98 ; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 445 . 15. In Sheo Swaroop and Ors. v. King Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227 , the Privy Council held that: "......the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses........." 16. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , the apex Court observed as under: "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 17. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne @ Baijnath & Ors., (2009) 4 SCC 271 , the apex Court gave illustrations of certain circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court, which principle, in our considered view, would squarely apply to the judgment under review by us. The circumstances include; (i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) Apex Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; and (vi) the apex Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal. The apex Court further held that "Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference with the decision of the trial court in a routine manner, where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for such interference." (Emphasis supplied) 18. Hence, it cannot be said that prosecution has been able to prove its case, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence so as to prove that the accused was found in exclusive and conscious possession of the contraband substance. 19. The accused has had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohammed Ankoos and others v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad (2010) 1 SCC 94 , it cannot be said that the Court below has not correctly appreciated the evidence on record or that acquittal of the accused has resulted into travesty of justice. No ground for interference is called for. The present appeal is dismissed. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are discharged. Appeal stands disposed of, so also pending applications, if any.