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2015 DIGILAW 80 (CHH)

Ramesh Pahuja v. State of M. P.

2015-03-05

MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA

body2015
JUDGMENT : Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, J. 1. This appeal is directed against impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 11/10/96 passed by the 5th Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge (CBI), Jabalpur in Special Case No. 48/96 whereby and whereunder the appellant has been held guilty of commission of offence as described below:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 13(1)(d) / 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 R.I. for two years and fine of Rs. 6,000/-. In default R.I. for one year. Under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 R.I. for one year and fine of Rs. 4,000/-. In default, R.I. for one year. Prosecution story, as unfolded from the records of the case is that one Vijay Shankar Awasthi, father of the complainant - Deepak Awasthi (PW4) suffered heart attack on 29/06/95 and was admitted in the hospital at Bhilai. Rs. 1,500/- vide receipt (Ex. P/9) was immediately deposited by the complainant towards treatment on 261/06/95. It is said, complainant -Deepak Awasthi (PW4) was called by the appellant and instructed that he should deposit a further amount of Rs. 1,900/- towards medical expenses and should pay separately Rs. 500/- for treatment. The appellant expressed inability to pay additional amount of Rs. 500/-, he being a poor person and already huge expenses having been incurred, but the appellant insisted on giving Rs. 500/- and the complainant was asked to bring the said amount on 29/09/95 in the morning at 10 AM. As the complainant did not want to give bribe, he complained the matter to the Vigilance Officer in the hospital, upon which, the vigilance officer informed him that CBI officers are staying in the retiring room of the railway station and he may contact them. Thereafter, the complainant met the Sub-Divisional Officer (Police) CBI-Shri N.K. Dubey and submitted written complaint (Ex. P/1). This complaint was handed over to Inspector Vinay Kumar (PW8). The complainant was then asked to come in the vigilance office and a report in Ex. P/22 was recorded. Two independent witnesses for the purposes of verifying complaint and laying trap were arranged by extending request to the Bank of India branch, Bhilai and National Insurance Company branch, Bhilai. On 29/06/95, the complaint and the two panch witnesses - Vinod Mehta (P.W. 1) and A.K. Dutta (PW2) presented him in the vigilance office. The complaint (Ex. P/22 was recorded. Two independent witnesses for the purposes of verifying complaint and laying trap were arranged by extending request to the Bank of India branch, Bhilai and National Insurance Company branch, Bhilai. On 29/06/95, the complaint and the two panch witnesses - Vinod Mehta (P.W. 1) and A.K. Dutta (PW2) presented him in the vigilance office. The complaint (Ex. P/1) was given to the panch witnesses to verify. Thereafter, they read over the complaint from the complainant. The complainant was asked to produce five currency notes, each of Rs. 100/-. Demonstration of reaction of Phenolphthalein with Sodium Carbonate solution was given to the prosecution witnesses and the complaint by Inspector-Vinay Kumar (PW8). The currency notes were smeared with phenolphthalein powder and kept in the pocket of the complainant with instruction not to touch it till demanded by the appellant and then give a signal. A.K. Dutta (PW2), panch witness was also instructed to over hear conversation and watch transaction. The hands of the members of the trap team were washed and they were also searched. A pre-trap panchanama of the aforesaid proceedings was prepared in Ex. P/2. Further case of the prosecution is that thereafter, the trap team along with complainant, went to the hospital where members of the trap team arranged to stand near and around the place of sitting of the appellant. When the appellant came out of the emergency room and asked the complainant whether he brought money and upon getting response and money being taken out by the complainant, he accepted, counted and kept in the pocket. At that stage, the members of the trap team led by Inspector Vinay Kumar arrived at the spot, caught him red handed, he was taken to the emergency room where sodium carbonate solution was prepared and hands of the appellant were washed, upon which the solution turned pink. The hand wash was kept and sealed in a bottle. The tainted currency notes were taken out from the pocket of his apron and numbers were tallied with the numbers written in pre-trap panchanama (Ex. P/2). The pocket of the apron was also washed in the sodium carbonate solution and its wash kept and sealed in bottle. The records relating to admission and treatment of the patient were seized. The tainted currency notes were taken out from the pocket of his apron and numbers were tallied with the numbers written in pre-trap panchanama (Ex. P/2). The pocket of the apron was also washed in the sodium carbonate solution and its wash kept and sealed in bottle. The records relating to admission and treatment of the patient were seized. Hand wash kept in the bottle along with currency notes were sent for chemical examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory from where, report in Ex. P/21 was received, which confirmed the presence of phenolphthalein in the hand wash and apron wash. Sanction for prosecution was sought by the investigating agency and sanction vide Ex. P/12 and Ex. P/20 was granted. Thereafter, charge sheet was filed in the Special Court for commission of offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and under Section 13 (1) (d)/13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short "the Act of 1988") alleging that the appellant demanded and accepted bribe for treatment as illegal gratification. The appellant having abjured guilt, he was put to trial. 2. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined in all, eight witnesses. The appellant was also examined in respect of incriminating evidence and circumstances appearing against him in the evidence led by the prosecution. The appellant's defence was that no bribe was demanded by him and he has been falsely implicated because he had scolded and slapped the complainant-Deepak Awasthi for not following doctor's advice. Tainted currency notes were thrust into his pocket from behind. When he turned back, it was the complainant standing who shook hands and then the CBI officials caught hold of his hands. In support of his defence, the appellant examined two defence witnesses namely Dr. Indrajeet Kalia (DW1) and M.K. Bhatia (DW2). 3. Learned Special Court, relying upon the evidence of the complainant and holding that the story of demand and acceptance was corroborated from the testimony of independent panch witnesses as also members of the trap team and that the appellant had demanded and accepted Rs. 500/- which was recovered from him and the defence was not found reliable but afterthought, held him guilty of commission of offence and sentenced as described above. 4. 500/- which was recovered from him and the defence was not found reliable but afterthought, held him guilty of commission of offence and sentenced as described above. 4. Assailing correctness and validity of impugned judgment of conviction and sentence, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. He contended that the appellant had scolded and slapped the complainant - Deepak Awasthi, who was getting his father moved around contrary to the doctor's advice as he was a heart patient and suffered heart attack. Due to this insult and slap, the complainant got enraged and adopting a revengeful attitude, got the appellant falsely implicated. The next contention is that the time, place and manner of demand as stated in the complaint - Ex. P/1 and in the Court statement are contradictory and render the story of demand, highly doubtful. He emphasized on the circumstance that according to hospital records, complainant's father was first checked up by the appellant only on 27/06/95 and having found that for further investigation, eco-cardiography would be necessary, complainant was asked to deposit a further amount of Rs. 1900/-. On 26/06/95, when he had not examined complainant's father, there was no occasion for him to raise any demand. According to the complainant, the demand of bribe of Rs. 500/- was made simultaneously along with instruction to deposit Rs. 1900/- on 26/06/95. Therefore, the story of demand is concocted. Further submission is that the defence of the appellant is more probable and plausible than the story of the prosecution, in view of reliable testimony of two defence witnesses who have clearly stated that there was a quarrel in which the appellant had slapped the complainant and tainted currency notes were thrust into the pocket of the apron from behind and shook hands with the appellant. Therefore, the possibility of appellant being falsely implicated cannot be ruled out and the appellant is entitled to be acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgments in Panalal Damodar Rathi v. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 4 SSC 526 : AIR 1979 SC 1191 and Meera Upadhyay v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, 2013 (1) CGLJ 22 . 5. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgments in Panalal Damodar Rathi v. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 4 SSC 526 : AIR 1979 SC 1191 and Meera Upadhyay v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, 2013 (1) CGLJ 22 . 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the State supports the judgment of conviction and sentence by submitting that the complainant had no reason to falsely implicate a doctor who was treating his ailing father. The story of complainant being slapped is an afterthought and cooked-up defence. The appellant was a senior doctor in the treating team of the ward, as stated by Dr. Samar K. Ghosh (PW5). Therefore, the patient was under treatment of the appellant also. The story of demand as stated by the complainant in his complaint and Court evidence inspires confidence and it does not suffer from any material contradictions and discrepancies, if any, are very trivial and do (sic)render the entire evidence liable to be disbelieved. The story of demand has been corroborated in material aspects from the testimony of Vinay Kumar (PW8), Inspector of the trap team and also from cogent evidence of two independent panch witnesses - Vinod Mehta (P.W. 1) and A.K. Dutta (PW2). These panch witnesses were officers of Bank and Insurance company, who had accompanied the trap team to overhear the conversation and watch transaction. The witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution by corroborating the story of demand and have also corroborated acceptance of bribe money by the appellant. It is next submitted that the appellant has not disputed recovery of tainted currency notes from his pocket but has sought to wriggle out by offering an afterthought explanation that someone from behind thrust money in his pocket without his knowledge and when he turned around, complainant was standing who quickly shook hands with him. The independent panch witnesses had no reason to falsely implicate the appellant and their version clearly corroborates the story of demand, acceptance and recovery. The hand wash of the appellant and pocket of his apron was found containing traces of phenolphthalein in the chemical analysis report (Ex. P/21). Therefore, conviction of the appellant does not warrant any interference. 6. In the case of Panalal Damodar Rathi v. State of Maharashtra, (1979)4 SSC 526 : AIR 1979 SC 1191 , the Supreme Court observed as under:- "8. P/21). Therefore, conviction of the appellant does not warrant any interference. 6. In the case of Panalal Damodar Rathi v. State of Maharashtra, (1979)4 SSC 526 : AIR 1979 SC 1191 , the Supreme Court observed as under:- "8. There could be no doubt that the evidence of the complainant should be corroborated in material particulars. After introduction of Section 165-A of the Indian Penal Code making the person who offers bribe guilty of abetment of bribery, the complainant cannot be placed on any better footing than that of an accomplice and corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the crime has to be insisted upon." 7. The status of person offering bribe and the caution required while assessing his evidence implicating a Govt. servant was examined by the Supreme Court in its subsequent decision in the case of M.O. Shamsudhin v. State of Kerala, (1995) 3 SCC 351 , wherein, it was held as under:- "12. Now confining ourselves to the case of bribery it is generally accepted that the person offering a bribe to a public officer is in the nature of an accomplice in the offence of accepting illegal gratification but the nature of corroboration required in such a case should not be subjected to the same rigorous tests which are generally applied to a case of an approver. Though bribe-givers are generally treated to be in the nature of accomplices but among them there are various types and gradations. In cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act the complainant is the person who gives the bribe in a technical and legal sense because in every trap case wherever the complaint is filed there must be a person who has to give money to the accused which in fact is the bribe money which is demanded and without such a giving the trap cannot succeed. When there is such a demand by the public servant from a person who is unwilling, and if to do public good approaches the authorities and lodges a complaint, then in order that the trap succeeds he has to give the money. There could be another type of bribe-giver who is always willing to give money in order to get his work done and having got the work done he may send a complaint. Here he is a particeps criminis in respect of the crime committed and thus is an accomplice. There could be another type of bribe-giver who is always willing to give money in order to get his work done and having got the work done he may send a complaint. Here he is a particeps criminis in respect of the crime committed and thus is an accomplice. Thus there are grades and grades of accomplices and therefore a distinction could as well be drawn between cases where a person offers a bribe to achieve his own purpose and where one is forced to offer bribe under a threat of loss or harm that is to say under coercion. A person who falls in this category and who becomes a party for laying a trap stands on a different footing because he is only a victim of threat or coercion to which he was subjected to. Where such witnesses fall under the category of 'accomplices' by reason of their being bribe-givers, in the first instance, the court has to consider the degree of complicity and then look for corroboration if necessary as a rule of prudence. The extent and nature of corroboration that may be needed in a case may vary having regard to the facts and circumstances." 8. It is not in dispute that the father of the complainant (PW4) had suffered heart attack and was admitted in the hospital where the appellant was posted and working as Senior Consultant, Medicine. The evidence of complainant (PW4) in this regard has remained uncontroverted that on 24/06/95, his father had suffered heart attack, a local doctor was called up and he was advised that it being a serious case, immediately he should immediately take the patient to Sector 9 hospital, Bhilai and then he got his father admitted in Jawaharlal Nehru Hospital and Research Centre, Bhilai on 24/06/95 and his father was admitted in the ICU. Fee of Rs. 1,500/- was immediately deposited in the casualty ward, proved by receipt (Ex. P/9). The bed head tickets (Ex. P/5) also prove admission of Vijayshankar Awasthi in the hospital on 24/06/95 and thereafter his continuous treatment. The case sheets, attendance register (Ex. P/6-A) Central Admission Register (P/7-A), receipts Ex. P/8-A to P/10, all prove that the father of the complainant was admitted in the hospital on the stated day and remained there for treatment till his discharge. 9. Complaint (Ex. The case sheets, attendance register (Ex. P/6-A) Central Admission Register (P/7-A), receipts Ex. P/8-A to P/10, all prove that the father of the complainant was admitted in the hospital on the stated day and remained there for treatment till his discharge. 9. Complaint (Ex. P/1), has been proved by the complainant (PW4) as also by Vinay Kumar (PW8) Inspector, CBI and two panch witnesses, Vinod Mehta (P.W. 1) and A.K. Dutta (PW2). The complainant has stated that the complaint was submitted by him and has proved his signature. The signature of the then DSP, CBI, N.K. Dubey have been proved by Inspector Vinay Kumar (PW8), his associate. Similarly, the two panch witnesses also admitted their signature on the complaint stating that the complaint was given to them and they had seen the complaint and also made their own enquiry. In the complaint, complainant (PW4) stated that he got his father admitted in the hospital on 24/06/95 and 26/06/95. He was called by Dr. Pahuja (the appellant) in his room asking him to deposit Rs. 1900/-, in addition to Rs. 1500/- already deposited and also to pay Rs. 500/- to him in addition to fee. The complainant then requested the doctor that he would deposit Rs. 1900/- on 27/06/95 but, he expressed his inability to give further amount of Rs. 500/- as he is a poor man and is already facing financial crisis, having incurred money on treatment of his father. At this stage, Dr. Pahuja/the appellant stated that if he wants his father to be treated, he will have to pay Rs. 500/- to him, which will be in addition to the hospital fee and that the appellant should give it to him on 29/06/95 at 10 in the morning. 10. In his testimony, the complainant - Deepak Awasthi (PW4) has clearly stated regarding story of demand, substantially in the same manner, as stated by him in the complaint. He has deposed that on 26/06/95, when he was sitting outside the intensive care unit ward, a call was given by the appellant in the morning that the complainant should meet him for further enquiry regarding treatment. When this information was given to him, he immediately went to the chamber of the appellant, where the appellant stated that Rs. 500/- has to be deposited in the casualty ward in addition to Rs. 1900/-. He then also said that Rs. When this information was given to him, he immediately went to the chamber of the appellant, where the appellant stated that Rs. 500/- has to be deposited in the casualty ward in addition to Rs. 1900/-. He then also said that Rs. 500/- is his own fee which the complainant should deposit by evening. When the complainant stated that he having already deposited the fee of the hospital why further amount is being demanded, the appellant said that it is his own fees and his father would be properly treated only when this amount is given to him. Then, the complainant stated that he is a poor man and is unable to pay this amount. He has further stated that when he verified whether Rs. 500/- is to be deposited in the casualty ward, the appellant insisted him to give this money to him. The receipt of deposit of Rs. 1,500/- and Rs. 400/- has been exhibited as Ex. P/9 and Ex. P/8 respectively. Deposit of Rs. 1,500/- on 27/06/95 is proved from its receipt (Ex. P/10). These receipts are signed and certified as photo copy of the original records by Sohanlal (PW6) and its veracity has not been disputed. These deposits, as stated by the complainant lend credence to the evidence of the complainant. The witness further states that he requested for 2 - 4 days' time to arrange and pay Rs. 500/- and the appellant had asked him to give bribe in two days. When he came out of the room, he came across the notice that any complaint can be made to Shri M.C. Jain, Vigilance Officer and his number was also given. Then he met Shri M.C. Jain on 28/06/95 and complained regarding bribe. The CBI officials were contacted by Shri Jain and the complainant was told that CBI officials are staying in the retiring room of the railway station, Durg where he met them and then he met the Dy. S.P., Shri N.K. Dubey and submitted his complaint (Ex. P/1) written in his own handwriting and signed by him. In his cross examination, this witness has been given suggestion that no demand was made which has been denied and has reiterated that he met the appellant not in the casualty ward but in his room where demand of Rs. 500/- was made. P/1) written in his own handwriting and signed by him. In his cross examination, this witness has been given suggestion that no demand was made which has been denied and has reiterated that he met the appellant not in the casualty ward but in his room where demand of Rs. 500/- was made. He has also stated that on the same day, he met the appellant in the evening also. At this juncture, it would be apposite to test the veracity of evidence of demand in the light of the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the time of demand, as stated in the complaint - Ex. P/1 and the Court statement, are different. According to the complainant, the demand was made by the appellant at about 5 in the evening in his room on 26/06/95 whereas in the Court evidence, it has been stated that the demand was made at about 9:30 in the morning when he was informed in the ward to meet the appellant in his chamber. Complainant's father was critically ill and admitted in the Intensive Care Unit of the hospital. The complainant was in continuous attendance and he has stated in his Court evidence that he met the appellant in the morning as well as in the evening. The place where he met the appellant and the amount which has been demanded by the appellant as also the contents of the transaction, as stated in the complaint, are substantially the same, as stated in the Court evidence. Therefore, only on the ground that the hours of the day when demand was made, there is discrepancy, the evidence of the complainant cannot altogether be rejected but may only require a cautious approach seeking independent corroboration of the story of demand from the established circumstances of the case and evidence of other witnesses, particularly the panch witnesses. In so far as circumstances of the case are concerned, as has been discussed above, complainant was present in the hospital as he was in attendance of his critically ill father, admitted in the ICU and was the only person dealing with the hospital staff and the doctors treating his father. The prosecution has examined two panch witnesses who were called by the Vigilance Inspector right from the stage of examination of the complainant till the completion of trap proceedings. The prosecution has examined two panch witnesses who were called by the Vigilance Inspector right from the stage of examination of the complainant till the completion of trap proceedings. These two witnesses are responsible officers, one being the officer of Bank of India and the other being an officer of the National Insurance Company and both posted in their respective branches at Bhilai. They are neither partisan nor interested nor accomplice. Vinod Mehta (P.W. 1) has deposed in para 4 of his evidence that when he along with trap team had gathered in the hospital to oversee the transaction and also hear conversation, while he was standing about 5-10 feet away from the appellant, he heard complainant telling the appellant that he has deposited fees of the hospital and has brought Rs. 500/- as told to him. Thereafter, the appellant accepted the money, counted and kept in the pocket of his apron. This witness, in his cross examination, has remained firm on his statement and the fact that he heard conversation has been reiterated that the appellant had accepted the money, counted and kept in the pocket. The suggestion that the tainted currency notes were thrust into pocket of the apron, without the knowledge of the appellant, has been specifically denied. He has also denied that there was no conversation between the appellant and the complainant. This witness is an independent witness and there is no reason why his version should be disbelieved. 11. Similarly, the other panch witness A.K. Dutta (PW2) has also stated in para 5 of his evidence, substantially the same version, as stated by Vinod Mehta (P.W. 1). He deposed that he heard complainant telling the appellant that as demanded, he has brought Rs. 500/- and he also requested the appellant to properly treat his father as he has deposited fees. Then the appellant said that he will properly treat his father and demanded money. Thereafter, the complainant took out Rs. 500/- from his pocket and handed over to the appellant, which was accepted, counted and kept in the pocket of the apron. This witness has been subjected to detailed cross examination but nothing could be elicited to impeach the credibility of his evidence, firstly with regard to he being an independent person and outsider and secondly with regard to he having heard conversation of demand and then acceptance of bribe money by the appellant. 12. This witness has been subjected to detailed cross examination but nothing could be elicited to impeach the credibility of his evidence, firstly with regard to he being an independent person and outsider and secondly with regard to he having heard conversation of demand and then acceptance of bribe money by the appellant. 12. The version of demand has also been substantially corroborated from the evidence of Vinay Kumar (PW8), CBI Inspector. He has also stated in para 3 of his evidence that the appellant and the complainant came out in the corridor and at the time, A.K. Dutta was there, the doctor was wearing a gown and though he could not hear the conversation, he witnessed the complainant taking out money from the pocket and handing it over to the appellant, who accepted, counted and kept the money in the pocket. On this aspect, the evidence of this witness has remained unimpeached. 13. Thus, the story of demand, as stated in the complaint (Ex. P/1) and evidence of complainant (PW4) is fully corroborated on material aspects by not only the CBI officer (PW8) who led the trap team but also the two independent panch witnesses Vinod Mehta (P.W. 1) and A.K. Dutta (PW2). The prosecution story of demand is sought to be impeached on the ground of improbabilities that as the appellant had not examined the father of the complainant before 27/06/95, there was no occasion for him to demand bribe, because by that time, he had neither seen the patient not met with the complainant. To substantiate this submission, learned counsel for the appellant drew attention of this Court to the relevant hospital records relating to treatment in Ex. P/5 which records a note that the father of the complainant was seen by the appellant on 27/06/95 and not before that. This submission, though seems to be attractive at the first instance, upon close scrutiny, liable to be rejected. At the first place, to say that a doctor would never raise any demand until he has first examined the patient, is not acceptable. Undoubtedly, the appellant was senior consultant in the hospital and the fact that he was in the team of doctors and In-charge of the ward where the father of complainant was admitted, has been proved by Dr. Samar K. Ghosh (PW5), who was Additional Director of the hospital. Undoubtedly, the appellant was senior consultant in the hospital and the fact that he was in the team of doctors and In-charge of the ward where the father of complainant was admitted, has been proved by Dr. Samar K. Ghosh (PW5), who was Additional Director of the hospital. He has stated that in the admission register (Ex. P/6), the name of the appellant is recorded at serial No. 3 and according to this register, the appellant was on duty in the hospital from 24/06/95 to 29/06/95. He has further stated that the patient was admitted in his unit and the appellant/Dr. Pahuja was junior to him but senior to all other doctors in the unit. Therefore, the patient was under the treatment of the appellant. He has further stated that as 25/06/95 was Sunday, on which day, he does not go to the hospital but the other doctors of his unit attend duty and on that day, round in the ward is taken by the appellant and junior doctor Padgania and they inform him regarding the situation in the ward and if need arises, he also attends duty in the hospital. This clearly proves that from the day, the patient was admitted in the hospital, he was under supervision and treatment by the appellant as the appellant was the next senior most consulting doctor of his team where the patient was admitted. Therefore, merely because in the records, there is entry regarding appellant having checked up the patient on 27/06/95, it cannot be said that the story of demand made a day before check up is improbable. On the contrary, it lends support to the story of the prosecution because having come to know about the patient, the appellant might have well insisted on first getting assurance of bribe and then only proceeding to check up the patient. There is nothing unusual in first demanding bribe and then checking the patient as an expert. 14. In order to convince this Court that the appellant has been falsely implicated, in an act of revenge, learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the testimony of Dr. Indrajeet Kalia (DW1) that on 28/06/95, in the evening, the appellant was badly scolding a person standing with an elderly patient and the appellant also slapped that person. 14. In order to convince this Court that the appellant has been falsely implicated, in an act of revenge, learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the testimony of Dr. Indrajeet Kalia (DW1) that on 28/06/95, in the evening, the appellant was badly scolding a person standing with an elderly patient and the appellant also slapped that person. He heard the appellant telling that person that even though he had strictly stated not to take out the patient from the bed, why the patient was taken out. Referring to the suggestion given to the complainant (PW4) in his cross examination that as he was slapped by the appellant, in order to take revenge, the complainant falsely implicated the appellant, it is argued that it is a case of false implication. This defence appears to be an afterthought. The witness is a colleague of the appellant working in the same hospital. To say that a person would falsely implicate in a bribe case, the doctor who was treating the patient because he slapped the care taker of the patient for acting against advice, appears to be highly improbable. This particular witness was not part of the team of treating doctors of that unit as reflected from the attendance register (Ex. P/6). None of the doctors or nursing staff of the unit, has been examined by the appellant. Therefore, this defence does not appear to be plausible and probable. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant, in order to impeach credibility of prosecution case, has advanced defence that infact, the bribe money was thrust into the pocket of the appellant from behind, without his notice and knowledge and when he turned behind, the complainant was standing and he immediately shook hands. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that this constitutes sufficient explanation as to how the currency notes were found in the pocket of the appellant and also presence of phenolphthalein in the hand wash of the appellant. This defence does not appear to be plausible and probable for more than one reason. Firstly, attempting to thrust money in the pocket of the appellant would have invited sharp reaction by the appellant, he being the doctor in the hospital. Second part of this defence renders the story more improbable because it is advanced that when the appellant turned back, he found the complainant (PW4) standing behind him and he immediately shook hands. Firstly, attempting to thrust money in the pocket of the appellant would have invited sharp reaction by the appellant, he being the doctor in the hospital. Second part of this defence renders the story more improbable because it is advanced that when the appellant turned back, he found the complainant (PW4) standing behind him and he immediately shook hands. When an attempt has been made to thrust something in the pocket, no person would allow his hands to be shaked rather than natural conduct would be to sharply react against such action. 16. M.K. Bhatia (DW2), who claims to have well known the appellant as appellant being the treating doctor, states that the appellant was taken into casualty ward and he does not know what happened. In his cross examination, he says that he did not make any attempt to find out what happened because he was in hurry. This makes the conduct of this witness highly doubtful and this witness appears to be a concocted witness. As against this, the complainant (PW4), two independent panch witnesses Vinod Mehta (P.W. 1) and A.K. Dutta (PW2) and CBI Inspector - Vinod Kumar (PW8), all have stated that when the complainant informed the appellant that he has brought bribe money as demanded, the appellant accepted, counted and then kept in his pocket. Against such cogent evidence corroborating acceptance of bribe money, the defence story as stated by M.K. Bhatia (DW2) appears to be not only improbable but also an afterthought. At this juncture, it would be apposite to deal with the legal position with regard to sanctity of the evidence of panch witnesses as also witness of raiding police officials in bribery cases. In the case of Maha Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1976 SC 449 , Supreme Court laid down principles with regard to the evidentiary value of independent trap witnesses as below - "33. This also leads to the question whether all witnesses, who are called upon to assist detection of a bribery case by laying a trap, should be considered unreliable as accomplices or at any rate partisan witnesses. There is no rule of law that even if a witness is otherwise reliable and independent, his association in a pre-arranged raid about which he had become acquainted, makes him an accomplice or a partisan witness. There is no rule of law that even if a witness is otherwise reliable and independent, his association in a pre-arranged raid about which he had become acquainted, makes him an accomplice or a partisan witness. In absence of anything to warrant a contrary conclusion because it is based on the testimony of such a witness. 34. We are also not get prepared to dub every witness of a raiding party to be an accomplice person even as an interested witness in total absence of material justifying such, an inference. While PW4 will be highly partisan witness in this case in his own interest to oblige the police nothing was shown against PW3, PW7 the Inspector, cannot be considered as an absolutely partisan witness because he is a Police Officer who took immediate action on the complaint. Nothing unusual is suggested against him. We have not hesitation in accepting the testimony of PW3 and PW7 on their own. They do corroborate the complainant." Even in respect of police officer involved in trap proceedings, their evidence could be relied upon as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Hazari Lal v. The State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1980 SC 873 , wherein it was held - "That the fact that he is the very Police Officer who laid the trap should be sufficient focus to insist up on corroboration. We do wish to say that there is no rule of prudence which has crystallized into a rule of law, nor indeed any rule of prudence which require that the evidence of such officers should be treated on the same footing as evidence on accomplice and there should be insistence on corroboration. In the facts and circumstances of a particular case a Court may be disclined to act upon the evidence of such an officer without corroboration but equality in the facts and circumstances, of another case, the Court may unhesitatingly accept the evidence of such an Officer. It is such matters there can be no hard and fast rule, not there by any precedential guidance." In the case of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 753 , it was held - "Overmuch importance cannot be given to minor discrepancies. Discrepancies which do not go to the root of the matter and shake the basic version of the witnesses, therefore, cannot be annexed with undue importance. Discrepancies which do not go to the root of the matter and shake the basic version of the witnesses, therefore, cannot be annexed with undue importance. More so when all important "probabilities factor" echoes in favour of the version narrated by the witnesses." 17. Judgments in the case of Panalal Damodar Rathi, (1979) 4 SSC 526 : AIR 1979 SC 1191 (Supra) and Meera Upadhyay, 2013 (1) CGLJ 22 (Supra) do not come to the aid of the appellant in the facts and circumstances of the present case. One of the important principles laid down in the aforesaid two decisions is that complainant's evidence has to be scrutinized carefully and the Court has to consider the decree of complicity and then look for corroboration, if necessary, as a rule of prudence. The extent and nature of corroboration that may be needed in a case, may vary, having regard to the facts and circumstances. In the present case, even if the circumstances of the case and false implication story is kept in mind, the requirement of law that in such cases, complainant's evidence of demand should be corroborated from other dependable evidence and circumstance, on facts of the present case, fulfilled in view of ample corroboration of prosecution story of demand, acceptance and recovery by evidence of independent panch witnesses Vinod Mehta (P.W. 1) and A.K. Dutta (PW2). Once the defence story of tainted currency notes thrust into the pocket and followed by hand shake with the complainant is not found plausible and probable, presumption under Section262 of the Act of 1988 has to be drawn as a consequence of recovery of bribe money from the pocket of the appellant. There is, however, one aspect of the matter which needs consideration. Learned Trial Court has awarded sentence of one year for commission of offence under Section 7 of the Act of 1988 and two years for commission of offence under Section 13 (1) (d)/13 (2) of the Act of 1988 and a total period of conviction of three years has been awarded. Learned Trial Court has awarded sentence of one year for commission of offence under Section 7 of the Act of 1988 and two years for commission of offence under Section 13 (1) (d)/13 (2) of the Act of 1988 and a total period of conviction of three years has been awarded. Learned counsel for the appellant, as his last submission, argued that looking to the entire circumstances of the case and considering that present is a case of the year 1995 i.e. almost 20 years old, the appellant, all these years has faced agony of pendency of criminal case and that now, he is 73 years of age, the sentence part may be reduced to the period already undergone by the appellant and the fine amount may be increased. The aforesaid mitigating circumstance which are staring at this stage, cannot be ignored. However, Section 7 of the Act of 1988, at the relevant time, provided punishment of not less than six months and Section 13 (2) of the Act of 1988 also provided for minimum sentence of one year. Therefore, taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, while this Court is not inclined to interfere with the order of conviction, in the interest of justice, appellant's conviction under Section 7 of the Act of 1988 is reduced to six months and that under Section 13 (2) of the Act of 1988 is reduced to one year, The fine amount in each case is increased to Rs. 10,000/-. Sentence, in default of payment of fine, shall remain the same as awarded by the trial Court. The appeal is, to that extent, partly allowed. Both the sentences are directed to run concurrently. As the appellant is on bail, the bail bonds are cancelled and the appellant be taken into custody to serve out remaining part of sentence as awarded by this order.