ORDER : Aggrieved by order dated 19.03.2013 in M.J. Case No. 64 of 2011, the present writ petition has been filed. 2. The brief facts of the case are that, the respondent-workman was appointed on 21.12.1982 as E.P.-Fitter with M/s BCCL. A notice dated 15.05.2010 was issued to the respondent-workman indicating 31.10.2010 the date of his superannuation. The workman made representation to the authority however, simultaneously, he moved this Court in W.P.(S) No.4298 of 2010 challenging notice dated 15.05.2010. The writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 23.09.2010 directing the petitioner M/s BCCL to dispose of representation of the workman by a speaking order. Consequent upon direction of this Court, orders dated 26.10.2010 and 11.02.2011 were passed, accepting 02.07.1956 as date of birth of the respondent-workman. Vide office order dated 11.02.2011 the respondent-workman was permitted to join his duty and on the same day he entered into a Settlement under which he agreed not to claim wages for the idle period. 3. Mr. A. K. Mehta, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that whether settlement dated 11.02.2011 was validly entered into between M/s BCCL and the respondent-workman or not, was not an issue before the Labour Court. Exercising jurisdiction under Section 33 C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court cannot adjudicate rights of the parties. Application under Section 33 C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is maintainable only if the right of the workman is flowing from an award or it has been admitted by the Management. Relying on a decision in “State of Uttranchal Vs. Jagpal Singh Tyagi.” (2005) 8 SCC 49 , the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that once the respondent-workman has signed settlement dated 11.02.2011 and he joined his duty, he cannot be permitted to resile from the said settlement. 4. As against the above, Mr. P.K. Mukhopadhyay, the learned counsel for the respondent-Workman submits that admittedly notice dated 15.05.2010 was issued, illegally. The petitioner-BCCL itself admitted the date of birth of the respondent-workman as 02.07.1956. Since, respondent-workman was illegally prevented from discharging his duty, the Labour Court has rightly allowed application under Section 33 C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is further submitted that neither in letter dated 26.10.2010 nor in order dated 11.02.2011, any condition was imposed whereunder, the respondent-workman can be deprived of the wages for the idle period which is only 88 days. 5. It is further submitted that neither in letter dated 26.10.2010 nor in order dated 11.02.2011, any condition was imposed whereunder, the respondent-workman can be deprived of the wages for the idle period which is only 88 days. 5. Before dealing with rival contentions, it would be appropriate to notice jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33 C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In “State Bank of India Vs. Ram Chandra Dubey and Others” reported in (2001) 1 SCC 73 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, the jurisdiction of Labour Court under Section 33C(2) extends to computation of a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a preexisting right. In “U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Birendra Bhandari”, reported in (2006) 10 SCC 211 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated that “the benefit which can be enforced under Section 33C(2) is a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a preexisting right”. 6. The facts in the case are not in dispute. Vide letter dated 11.02.2011, the petitioner-BCCL accepted 02.07.1956 as date of birth of the respondent-workman. The respondent-workman was permitted to join duty on 11.02.2011 however, it is also a matter of record that on the same day, the respondent-workman and the petitioner-M/s BCCL entered into an agreement which contains the following terms: 1. “Sri Ajay Kr. Pandey, P. No.00473132 will be allowed to resume his duty immediately as per accepted D.O.B. by the management in Form 'B' register of initial place of posting i.e. 2.7.56. 2. It is agreed that Sri Pandey will not be paid any back wages for the idle period nor he will raise any dispute for the same. 3. It is agreed that period of idleness shall be treated as diesnon however, the continuity of service will be maintain and for the purpose of gratuity etc. 4. It is agreed that the pension amount due for the idle period shall be deposited by the concerned employee in due course. 5. That this settles the dispute in toto.” 7. It is thus, seen that one of the terms of Settlement dated 11.02.2011 was that the respondent-workman would not be paid back wages for the idle period. Before the Labour Court, an objection was raised on behalf of M/s BCCL that in terms of settlement, the respondent-workman is not entitled for wages for the period between 01.11.2010 to 11.02.2011. It is thus, seen that one of the terms of Settlement dated 11.02.2011 was that the respondent-workman would not be paid back wages for the idle period. Before the Labour Court, an objection was raised on behalf of M/s BCCL that in terms of settlement, the respondent-workman is not entitled for wages for the period between 01.11.2010 to 11.02.2011. The Labour Court however, has recorded a finding that the settlement dated 11.02.2011 was signed by the workman under “duress”. The Labour Court has further held as under : “In para-7 of cross-examination he explained that he had to accept the said settlement under duress because his grand son was suffering from illness, but he could not got to AIIMS for his treatment and was engaged in connection with admission of his son in R.S.M. He admitted that he did not raise dispute against the said settlement. In my view in the aforesaid situation his explanation that he signed the said settlement is against the order of the Hon'ble Court, as well as interest of the petitioner. I am of the view that no one would like to bind himself against his own interest by signing a settlement. Therefore, it can be hardly relied that aforesaid settlement was signed by the applicant with free consent.” 8. Considering the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33 C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, I am of the opinion that it was not open to the Labour Court to adjudicate validity of Settlement dated 11.02.2011. The Labour Court could not have allowed application filed by the respondent-workman and held that the agreement was signed by the respondent-workman under “duress”. Considering the aforesaid fact, I am of the opinion that order dated 19.03.2013 cannot be sustained in law. In the result, impugned order dated 19.03.2013 is set-aside. The writ-petition stands allowed.