JUDGMENT : C.L. Soni, J. 1. By the present petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:- 11(a) To quash and set aside the impugned order dated 24-7-2012 passed by the respondent No. 1 in Revision Application No. MVV/BKP/BHAVAN/1/2012 at Annexure-C. (b) To quash and set aside the order dated 21-2-2012 passed by the Deputy Collector, Sihor at Annexure-B by holding the same to be illegal, without authority and without jurisdiction. (c) Pending the hearing and final disposal of this petition, be pleased to stay the impugned orders at Annexure-C and B respectively and direction be given to restore the order at Annexure-B granting stay in favour of the petitioners and in the meanwhile direct the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 from undertany further developmental activities on the land in question. (d) To grant any other appropriate and just reliefs. By order dated 21-2-2012 Deputy Collector has granted permission under Section 65 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code (for short the Code) to respondent Nos. 3 and 4 to use the land bearing Survey No. 1138 admeasuring 25495.00 sq. mtrs. situated in Vallabhipur, District - Bhavnagar (the land in question) for Non-Agricultural purpose. Such order is challenged by the petitioner by Revision Application No. 1 of 2012 before respondent No. 1 wherein interim relief is refused by rejecting the application vide order dated 24-7-2012. 2. The main thrust of grievance voiced in the petition is that Deputy Collector had earlier rejected the application of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 for Non-Agricultural Permission. However, subsequently, Deputy Collector reviewed his decision, which is not permissible in the eye of law. 3. It is also averred in the petition that there are civil suits filed by the petitioner in connection with land in question, and therefore, the order made by the Deputy Collector needs to be interfered with by revisional authority and since the order of the Deputy Collector is without jurisdiction, the revisional authority committed serious error in refusing to grant interim relief. 4. The petition is opposed by respondent Nos. 3 and 4 by filing affidavit-in-reply wherein it is pointed out that the petitioner has not only no right to challenge the impugned orders but has abused process of law by taking out different proceedings. Respondent No. 2 has also filed affidavit-in-reply opposing the petition. 5. Mr. 4. The petition is opposed by respondent Nos. 3 and 4 by filing affidavit-in-reply wherein it is pointed out that the petitioner has not only no right to challenge the impugned orders but has abused process of law by taking out different proceedings. Respondent No. 2 has also filed affidavit-in-reply opposing the petition. 5. Mr. Upadhyaya, learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that there is no power with the Deputy Collector to review his earlier order dated 24-1-2012 whereby the application of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 seeking Non-Agricultural Permission was rejected. Mr. Upadhyaya submitted that revisional authority has failed to consider the issue about competency of Deputy Collector in making the impugned order and just cursorily rejected the application for interim relief prayed for in the revision application without good reasons. Mr. Upadhyaya has relied on decision in the case of Patel Narshi Thakershi vs. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, 1971 (3) SCC 844 , Kalabharati Advertising vs. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, 2010 (9) SCC 437, Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. vs. Mawasi, 2012 (7) SCC 200 as well as R.R. Verma vs. Union of India, 1980 (3) SCC 402 so as to point that law is well settled that administrative authority has got no power to review its own decision unless there is specific provision in the Statute under which such authority exercises its administrative powers. 6. As against above arguments, Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Advocate appearing for respondent Nos. 3 and 4 submitted that present proceeding before this Court and the proceedings before the revisional authority and the Court are nothing but abuse of process of law as the petitioner with oblique motive is pursuing such remedies before different forums. Mr. Joshi submitted that the petitioner with other co-owners has signed sale-deed in respect of land in question and out of eight co-owners only the petitioner is pursuing such remedies with a view to see that respondent Nos. 3 and 4 may not be in a position to develop the land in question. Mr. Joshi submitted that in the notice as regards non-payment of cheque amount which was part of sale consideration issued to the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 by the petitioner, it is clearly stated that land was sold to respondent Nos. 3 and 4 by registered sale-deed. Mr. Mr. Joshi submitted that in the notice as regards non-payment of cheque amount which was part of sale consideration issued to the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 by the petitioner, it is clearly stated that land was sold to respondent Nos. 3 and 4 by registered sale-deed. Mr. Joshi submitted that for recovery of cheque amount the petitioner had initiated proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and the petitioner since paid the cheque amount, the complaint is quashed by this Court. Mr. Joshi has taken the Court through the averments made in Para F (Page No. 9) of the petition so as to point out that under the guise of challenging the order of N.A. permission, the petitioner intends to recover more amount from respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and for such purpose, the petitioner is trying to misuse process of law not only by filing proceedings before this Court but also filing civil suit before Civil Court. Mr. Joshi submitted that the petitioner has filed two different civil suits in respect of land in question for declaration and for permanent injunction seeking to restrain respondent Nos. 3 and 4 for development of land in question. He further pointed out that Civil Court has rejected interim injunction application by well reasoned order, and therefore, there is no good reason for the petitioner to pursue the revenue remedy before the Secretary as also before this Court. Mr. Joshi has relied on decision of this Court in the case of Nirajanbhai Bhagwanbhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat, 2004 (3) GLH 671 : 2005 (2) GLR 1493 . 7. Having heard learned Advocates for the parties, it appears that in connection with the land in question, the petitioner has filed two different civil suits one being Special Civil Suit No. 154 of 2011 seeking declaration that registered sale-deed dated 22-3-2011 in favour of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 is not binding to him and for permanent injunction restraining respondent Nos. 3 and 4 from transferring the land in question; and second being Regular Civil Suit No. 458 of 2011 to declare that respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and other State authorities have no right or title to convert land in question for Non-Agricultural purpose and also for permanent injunction restraining State authorities from taking any action for the purpose of converting the land in question for Non-Agricultural purpose. 8. 3 and 4 and other State authorities have no right or title to convert land in question for Non-Agricultural purpose and also for permanent injunction restraining State authorities from taking any action for the purpose of converting the land in question for Non-Agricultural purpose. 8. As could be seen from copy of registered sale-deed at Page No. 58, the petitioner appears to have signed with other co-owners and except the petitioner no other co-owner has filed any litigation questioning the right and title of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in the land in question. Such execution of sale-deed by all the co-owners appears to have been confirmed by the petitioner himself through his legal notice dated 20-1-2011 at Annexure R-2 addressed to respondent Nos. 3 and 4 by clearly stating therein that the petitioner and other co-owners of the land in question have executed registered sale-deed in favour of respondent Nos. 3 and 4. Such notice was issued to demand cheque amount of Rs. 76,250/- stated to be part of sale consideration, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. As pointed out by Mr. Joshi, which is not disputed by Mr. Upadhyaya that such amount of cheque has been paid during the proceedings of complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, based on which the complaint has come to be quashed. Thus, by the sale-deed as it stands today, respondent Nos. 3 and 4 have become owners of land in question and so long as the sale transaction in favour of the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 is not held to be invalid, they remain entitle to develop the land in question. 9. It is no ground to say that since suits are filed by the petitioner, the petitioner has continued to be co-owner of the land in question. The Court finds that by virtue of sale-deed the petitioner has ceased to be owner of the land, and therefore, the petitioner has no locus to make any grievance as regards order made by the Deputy Collector granting N.A. permission to respondent Nos. 3 and 4. 10. It is required to note that the petitioner though has filed Revision Application before the Secretary, Revenue Department challenging the order made by the Deputy Collector dated 21-2-2012 granting N.A. permission to respondent Nos. 3 and 4. 10. It is required to note that the petitioner though has filed Revision Application before the Secretary, Revenue Department challenging the order made by the Deputy Collector dated 21-2-2012 granting N.A. permission to respondent Nos. 3 and 4 for land in question, still made substantive challenge to the order of Deputy Collector in the present petition. When put to Mr. Upadhyaya, he chose to continue with such challenge. 11. As regards the contention about authority of the Deputy Collector to review his earlier order dated 24-1-2012, it is required to note that by earlier order dated 24-1-2012 the application of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 was not accepted and rejected just on the ground that hearing on the question of interim relief was going on in the proceedings of suit filed by the petitioner and that Deputy Collector was also joined as party therein. From the contents of the order dated 24-1-2012, it clearly appears that the application of the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 for N.A. permission was, in fact, not decided on merits. The application was though stated to be rejected, however, it can be said that the application was not entertained on the ground that hearing of interim injunction application before the Civil Court was going on. It was thereafter, when the interim application was rejected by the Court, the Deputy Collector considered the application on merits and passed impugned order. It is therefore, not an order of review. Even if such impugned order is seen to be order of review, the Court finds that the Deputy Collector while exercising powers under Section 65 of the Code since exercising administrative and executive powers, he has power to review his own decision. There is a difference between an administrative authority exercising administrative powers and adjudicatory powers. The Deputy Collector while exercising the powers under Section 65 of the Code is not adjudicating upon the right of the parties. As held in the case of M/s. Yashkamal Builders, Baroda vs. State of Gujarat, 1989 (1) GLH 177 : 1989 (1) GLR 382 and in the case of Hirabhai Bhagwanbhai vs. State of Gujarat, 2001 (3) GCD 1862 , the power conferred under Section 65 of the Code are executive and administrative in character. 12. Though, Mr. As held in the case of M/s. Yashkamal Builders, Baroda vs. State of Gujarat, 1989 (1) GLH 177 : 1989 (1) GLR 382 and in the case of Hirabhai Bhagwanbhai vs. State of Gujarat, 2001 (3) GCD 1862 , the power conferred under Section 65 of the Code are executive and administrative in character. 12. Though, Mr. Upadhyaya has relied on some decisions to press for his point that the authority once passes order for rejection of the application, it has no power to review unless there is specific provision in the Statute, the Court finds that in none of the decisions relied on by Mr. Upadhyaya has laid down that the authority exercising administrative power has no authority to review its decision. In fact it is otherwise. In the case of R.R. Verma, 1980 (3) SCC 402 , relied on by Mr. Upadhyaya the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in Paragraph No. 5 as under: "5. The last point raised by Shri Garg was that the Central Government had no power to review its earlier orders as the rules do not vest the Government with any such power. Shri Garg relied on certain decisions of this Court in support of his submission : Patel Narshi Thakershi vs. Pradyamunsinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 , D.N. Roy vs. State of Bihar, 1971 (2) SCR 522 : AIR 1971 SC 1045 and State of Assam vs. J.N. Roy Biswas, 1976 (2) SCR 128 : AIR 1975 SC 2277 . All the cases cited by Shri Garg are cases where the Government was exercising quasi-judicial powers vested in them by statute. We do not think that the principle that the power to review must be conferred by Statute either specifically or by necessary implication is applicable to decisions purely of an administrative nature. To extend the principle to pure administrative decisions would indeed lead to untoward and startling results. Surely, any Government must be free to alter its policy or its decision in administrative matters. If they are to carry on their daily administration they cannot be hidebound by the rules and restrictions of judicial procedure though of course they are bound to obey all statutory requirements and also observe the principles of natural justice where rights of parties may be affected. If they are to carry on their daily administration they cannot be hidebound by the rules and restrictions of judicial procedure though of course they are bound to obey all statutory requirements and also observe the principles of natural justice where rights of parties may be affected. Here again, we emphasise that if administrative decisions are reviewed, the decisions taken after review are subject to judicial review on all grounds on which an administrative decision may be questioned in a Court. We see no force in this submission of the learned Counsel. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed." 13. In the case of Mawasi, 2012 (7) SCC 200 , relied on by Mr. Upadhyaya, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in Paragraph Nos. 24 to 29 and 36 as under:- "24. We shall first consider whether the petitioner's prayer for review should be entertained by ignoring the dismissal of similar petitions by this Court vide order dated 13-1-2011. A careful reading of that order shows that in Review Petition Nos. 2107-2108 of 2010, the petitioner had sought reconsideration of judgment dated 17-8-2010 on the premise that the vendor and the vendee had common management and that the price mentioned in the sale-deed had been manipulated with an oblique motive. The Court declined to entertain this plea by observing that the petitioner had not produced any material to substantiate its assertion. 25. Along with the present batch of review petitions, the petitioner has placed on record the search reports prepared by M/s. A.K.G. Company, Certificate of Incorporation, Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association of M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. mutations showing the purchase of land by M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. vide sale-deeds dated 16-8-1993 and 18-8-1993, annual return of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. showing Shri Saroj Kumar Poddar, Shri Gurbunder Singh Gill and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar as the Directors and the statement of Albel Singh, but these documents neither singularly nor collectively support the petitioner's plea that management of the two companies, i.e., the vendor and the vendee, was under the control of the same set of persons or that the vendee had paid unusually high price with some oblique motive. As a matter of fact, Shri Saroj Kumar Poddar and Ms. As a matter of fact, Shri Saroj Kumar Poddar and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar were appointed as Directors of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. on 9-6-1994 and Shri Gurbunder Singh Gill was so appointed on 9-2-1997 whereas the agreement for sale was executed on 31-5-1994. The petitioner has not controverted the averments contained in Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the reply-affidavit filed in Review Petition No. 239 of 2011, perusal of which makes it clear that in 1993 similar parcels of land had been sold at the rate of Rs. 15,73,289/- and Rs. 13,74,345/- per acre. Therefore, it cannot be said that M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd., had paid exorbitantly high price to M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. for extraneous reasons and we do not find any valid ground for indirect review of order dated 13-1-2011. 26. At this stage, it will be apposite to observe that the power of review is a creature of the Statute and no Court or quasi-judicial body or administrative authority can review its judgment or order or decision unless it is legally empowered to do so. Article 137empowers this Court to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Rules framed by this Court under that Article lay down that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which reads as under: "Order 47, Rule 1: 1. Application for review of judgment:- (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved:- (a) By a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred. (b) By a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed. Application for review of judgment:- (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved:- (a) By a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred. (b) By a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed. (c) By a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case of which he applies for the review. Explanation - The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment." 27. The aforesaid provisions have been interpreted in several cases. We shall notice some of them. In S. Nagaraj vs. State of Karnataka, 1993 Supp. (4) SCC 595, this Court referred to the judgments in Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury vs. Sukhraj Rai, AIR 1941 FC 1 and Rajunder Narain Rae vs. Bijai Govind Singh, 1836 (1) Moo PC 117 and observed: "Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or reconsideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law, the Courts and even the Statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law, the Courts and even the Statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest Court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the Courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury vs. Sukhraj Rai, AIR 1941 FC 1, the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest Court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae vs. Bijai Govind Singh, 1836 (1) Moo PC 117 that an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered: "Nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, by errors have been introduced, these Courts possess, by common law, the same power which the Courts of record and Statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in. The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have however gone a step further and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies." Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under: "It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a Court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard." Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution-makers who had the practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power, Order XL had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression, for any other sufficient reason in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order XL, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of Court. The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice." 28. In Moron Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 , the three-Judges Bench referred to the provisions of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure, which was similar to Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C. and observed: "It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47, Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47, Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely, (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and (iii) for any other sufficient reason. It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words "any other sufficient reason" must mean "a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule." See Chnajju Ram vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 (D). This conclusion was reiterated by the Judicial Committee in Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi vs. Parath Nath, AIR 1934 PC 213 (E) and was adopted by on Federal Court in Hari Shankar Pal vs. Anath Nath Miner, AIR 1949 FC 106 at pp. 110, 111 (F). Learned Counsel appearing in support of this appeal recognises the aforesaid limitations and submits that his case comes within the ground of "mistake or error apparent on the face of the record" or some ground analogous thereto." 29. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1964 (5) SCR 174 : AIR 1964 SC 1372 , another three-Judges Bench reiterated that the power of review is not analogous to the appellate power and observed (Para 11): "A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. We do not consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any great detail, but it would suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions, entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out." 30 to 35…………… 36. In the light of the propositions laid down in the aforementioned judgments, we shall now examine whether the petitioner has succeeded in making out a case for exercise of power by this Court under Article 137 of the Constitution read with Order 47, Rule 1C.P.C. This consideration needs to be prefaced with an observation that the petitioner has not offered any explanation as to why it did not lead any evidence before the Reference Court to show that sale-deed Exh. P1 was not a bona fide transaction and the vendee had paid unusually high price for extraneous reasons. The parties had produced several sale-deeds, majority of which revealed that the price of similar parcels of land varied from Rs. 6 to 7 lakhs per acre. A reading of the sale-deeds would have prompted any person of ordinary prudence to make an enquiry as to why M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. (vendee) had paid more man Rs. 2,42,00,000/- for 12 acres land, which have been purchased by the vendor only a year back at an average price of Rs. 6 lakhs per acre. However, the fact of the matter is that neither the Advocate for the petitioner nor its officers/officials, who were dealing with the cases made any attempt to lead such evidence. This may be because they were aware of the fact that at least in two other cases such parcels of land had been sold in 1993 for more than Rs. 13 lakhs and Rs. 15 lakhs per acre and in 1996, a sale-deed was executed in respect of the land of village Naharpur Kasan at the rate of Rs. 25 lakhs per acre. This omission coupled with the fact that the petitioner's assertion about commonality of the management of two companies is ex-facie incorrect leads to an irresistible inference that judgment dated 17-8-2010 does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record warranting its review. Surely, in guise of seeking review, the petitioner cannot ask for de novo hearing of the appeals." 14. In the above decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained the extent of availability of review power in the context of Court or adjudicatory authority exercising review powers. 15. In the case of Kalabharathi Advertising, 2010 (9) SCC 437, relied on by Mr. Upadhyay, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in held in Paragraph No. 12 as under: "12. In the above decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained the extent of availability of review power in the context of Court or adjudicatory authority exercising review powers. 15. In the case of Kalabharathi Advertising, 2010 (9) SCC 437, relied on by Mr. Upadhyay, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in held in Paragraph No. 12 as under: "12. It is settled legal proposition that unless the Statute/rules so permit, the review application is not maintainable in case of judicial/quasi-judicial orders. In absence of any provision in the Act granting an express power of review, it is manifest that a review could not be made and the order in review; if passed is ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction, (vide : Patel Chunibhai Dajibna vs. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar, AIR 1965 SC 1457 and Harbhajan Singh vs. Karam Singh, AIR 1966 SC 641 )." 16. Thus, what is laid down is that in absence of any specific provision for review in particular statute, quasi-judicial authority or an adjudicatory authority may not be empowered to review its decision. However as held by this Court in the case of Nirajanbhai Bhagwanbhai Patel, 2004 (3) GLH 671 : 2005 (2) GLR 1493 , the authority exercising power under Section 65 of the Code is empowered to review its own decision. Paragraph No. 5 and 6 of the said judgment are reproduced herein below: "5. Therefore, it has been expressly held that the exercise of power under Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code is an executive and administrative power, and therefore, when the character of exercise of power is administrative in nature, the view taken by the State Government cannot be maintained in the eye of law that there is no power of review. The surprising aspect is that in spite of me binding decision in the case of Yashkamal Builders, Baroda, 1989 (1) GLH 177 : 1989 (1) GLR 382 , was brought to the notice of the State Government, the same is neither properly understood, nor the decision of this Court is followed by the State Government while exercising the power as quasi-judicial authority. It is needless to state that the view expressed by the High Court in exercise of its constitutional powers are binding to all quasi-judicial authority of the State including the State Government while exercising the power under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code was exercising power as quasi-judicial authority, and therefore, the aforesaid decision was binding to State Government as revisional authority. 6. The perusal of the order passed by the State Government in revisional jurisdiction shows that the State Government did not consider the distinction between the exercise of power as having character of administrative in nature and the exercise of power as quasi-judicial authority. Once, the character of power under Section65 is held as that of administrative in nature, the principles that there should be express provision in Statute for exercise of power of review which are applicable to exercise of the powers which are having character of quasi-judicial in nature would not have any applicability. The finding of the State Government shows that the review in question is not procedural but substantive. In my view, the State Government had ex-facie committed error in applying the principles for exercise of power of review of a quasi-judicial authority in a matter where the decision is taken by the District Panchayat under Section 65 of the Code having character of administrative in nature in view of the aforesaid decision of this Court in case of Yashkamal Builders, 1989 (1) GLH 177 : 1989 (1) GLR 382 . Therefore, there is apparent error committed by the State Government in holding that there was lack of power of review on the part of the District Panchayat in considering the matter for grant of permission under Section 65 of the Code." 17. In light of above, the Court finds that there is no substance in the challenge made against the order of the Deputy Collector. The Revisional Authority has also not committed any error in rejecting the application for interim relief preferred by the petitioner in his revision application. It cannot be ignored that no interim relief in the suits filed by the petitioner is granted by the competent Civil Court against the development of the land by respondent Nos. 3 and 4. The Revisional Authority has also not committed any error in rejecting the application for interim relief preferred by the petitioner in his revision application. It cannot be ignored that no interim relief in the suits filed by the petitioner is granted by the competent Civil Court against the development of the land by respondent Nos. 3 and 4. In such view of the matter, the petitioner cannot be permitted to make any grievance as regards exercise of the powers by the Deputy Collector under Section 65 of the Code. The Court finds no substance in the petition. Hence, the petition is rejected. Notice discharged. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated.