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2015 DIGILAW 814 (CAL)

Dinesh Mehta v. Shantilal Mehta

2015-09-24

ARIJIT BANERJEE

body2015
JUDGMENT : Arijit Banerjee, J.: 1. This application has been taken out by the defendant praying that the leave granted under Cl. 12 Letters Patent be revoked, the plaint filed in the suit be taken off the record and the suit be dismissed. 2. The case pleaded in the plaint is that the plaintiff is the director of various companies namely Rooprekha Sales Pvt. Ltd, Gunmala Sales Pvt. Ltd., Phalguni Goods Pvt. Ltd. and Fast Flow Dealcon Pvt. Ltd. all having their registered offices at 2, Raja, Woodmunt Street, 3rd Floor, Calcutta-700001. The defendant is the director of four companies namely, Navkar Buildestates Pvt. Ltd., Navkar Buildhome Pvt. Ltd, Navkar Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd and Navkar Promoters Pvt. Ltd. all having their registered offices at 103-104, Shubh Apartment, 99-L, Bhopalpura, Udaipur, Rajasthan. Sometime in May, 2011 the defendant approached the plaintiff at 15 J.L. Nehru Road, 2nd Floor, Shop No. 423, Calcutta-700013, the then registered office of Phalguni Goods Pvt. Ltd for financial assistance. An oral agreement was entered into by and between the parties at the aforesaid address within this Court’s jurisdiction for advancing loan by the plaintiff to the defendant on the terms and conditions mentioned in paragraph 5 of the plaint. On 19th May, 2011 the plaintiff lent and advanced to the defendant a total sum of Rs. 1,35,00,000/- by way of cash. In repayment of the said sum the defendant issued five several cheques all dated 31st May, 2011 in favour of the plaintiff aggregating Rs. 1,35,00,000/-. The said cheques were delivered to the plaintiff’s office at 15, JL Nehru Road, 2nd Floor, Shop No. 423, Calcutta-700013 within this Court’s jurisdiction. Upon being presented for payment at the HDFC Bank, Stephen House Branch, Calcutta-70000, within this Court’s jurisdiction, all the said cheques were dishonoured and returned with the endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. In spite of being informed about dishonour of the said cheques, the defendant failed to issue fresh cheques in lieu thereof. The plaintiff has initiated proceedings against the defendant under the provisions of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 in respect of the dishonoured cheques. The plaintiff, through his Advocate’s letter dated 23rd October, 2011 called upon the defendant to repay the sum of Rs. 1,35,00,000/- together with interest thereon but the defendant failed and neglected to do so. The plaintiff has initiated proceedings against the defendant under the provisions of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 in respect of the dishonoured cheques. The plaintiff, through his Advocate’s letter dated 23rd October, 2011 called upon the defendant to repay the sum of Rs. 1,35,00,000/- together with interest thereon but the defendant failed and neglected to do so. Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for the sum 1,49,17,500/- and decree for interest pendente lite at the rate of 18 per cent per annum. Part of cause of action pleaded in paragraphs 5, 11, 12 and 13 of the plaint arose within this court’s jurisdiction and those pleaded in paragraph 16 of the plaint arose outside the jurisdiction of this court. Further the defendant is liable to seek its creditor and make payment of the aforesaid amount to the plaintiff at its office within this court’s jurisdiction. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, the suit was instituted in this Court by the plaintiff on or about 18th January, 2012 after obtaining leave under Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent. 4. The present application was taken out by the defendant on or about 10th April, 2012. 5. The case of the defendant as pleaded in the application and as submitted at the time of hearing is that the plaintiff had never advanced any loan to the defendant nor was there any agreement to that effect between the parties. The five cheques that were issued in favour of the plaintiff by the defendant were on account of acquiring 13,13,000 shares at the rate of Rs. 15/- per share in D.M. Trading Pvt. Ltd of 5, Old Court House Street, Kolkata-700001. The plaintiff is the major share-holder in the said company and the remaining shares are held by family members of the plaintiff. The said cheques were drawn on the defendant’s banker Rajasthan Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd. at Udaipur. The plaintiff did not transfer the shareholding in the said company in the name of the defendant and his nominees. The plaintiff fraudulently presented the said cheques for encashment. 6. The defendant has further contended that the balance of convenience and inconvenience overwhelmingly lies in favour of taking the plaint off the file since the defendant does not reside or carry on business within this court’s jurisdiction nor any part of cause of action has arisen within this court’s jurisdiction. The plaintiff fraudulently presented the said cheques for encashment. 6. The defendant has further contended that the balance of convenience and inconvenience overwhelmingly lies in favour of taking the plaint off the file since the defendant does not reside or carry on business within this court’s jurisdiction nor any part of cause of action has arisen within this court’s jurisdiction. If the suit is heard by this court, the defendant would be faced with great hardship and difficulty since he will have to come down to Calcutta frequently to contest the suit and will have to bring all records in connection with the proposed acquisition of the shareholdings in the said company. It would also be difficult to produce any oral evidence in Calcutta inasmuch as all the witnesses are residents of Udaipur. 7. In support of his contention that the balance of convenience warrants trial of the instant suit by the court at Udaipur, Ld. Counsel for the defendant has relied on the following decisions:- (i) Muttra Electrical Supply Co. Ltd. vs. Gopal Saran Kulasresthi reported in 59 CWN 419. In this case, a Learned Judge of this court observed that a close scrutiny of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865 reveals that there are certain total and absolute jurisdictions of this court. They are where the whole of the land or immovable property is situated within its jurisdiction when the suit is for such land or immovable property. That is also the case where the whole of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the court in suit is other than a suit for land. Also that is the case where the defendant at the time of institution of the suit dwells or carries on business or personally works for gain within the jurisdiction of the court irrespective of where the cause of action arose. These three are the categories of total and absolute jurisdiction of the court under the grant of the power under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. No question of the litigant having to take the leave of the court arises in these three cases. So long as the litigant satisfies the test laid down in these three cases, his right to institute the suit in this court is absolute and unfettered. No question of the litigant having to take the leave of the court arises in these three cases. So long as the litigant satisfies the test laid down in these three cases, his right to institute the suit in this court is absolute and unfettered. There is another class of jurisdiction which this court can assume under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent where the cause of action is not wholly but only partly arose within its jurisdiction. It is an inchoate jurisdiction which springs into action upon the court granting the leave to institute the suit. It is a nascent jurisdiction which lies dormant in this court and is brought to life by an act of the court in granting leave to institute suit. In performing this act of granting leave, the court performs a judicial function. The court has to exercise its discretion as to whether or not it will grant its fiat or leave to the plaintiff’s choice of this forum although only part of his cause of action has arisen here. The plaintiff ordinarily is dominus litis but where part of his cause of action arises within this court’s jurisdiction, he has no absolute right of the choice of forum because his choice has to be backed up by the sanction and leave of this court. Where cause of action is transitory and amphibious in the sense that parts of the cause of action arise at difference places, the jurisdiction of the courts at any one of such places is essentially tentative. When this court grants leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent to a plaintiff on the basis that a part of his cause of action has arisen within this Court’s jurisdiction, which is almost always done ex parte, it acquires a tentative jurisdiction over the entire cause of action but such tentative jurisdiction is liable to be taken exception to by the defendant on the ground of the balance of convenience or that the choice of this forum has been vexatious, oppressive, malicious or harassing. The subject matter of the suit, parties to the suit, witnesses required for the proof of the respective cases of the parties and expenses of trial are, inter alia, all relevant factors while the court considers the balance of convenience in a particular case. The subject matter of the suit, parties to the suit, witnesses required for the proof of the respective cases of the parties and expenses of trial are, inter alia, all relevant factors while the court considers the balance of convenience in a particular case. In the facts of that case, this court found that the plaintiff itself carried on business at Muttra, the services rendered by the defendant were at Muttra, the main work was at Muttra and all the alleged acts of insubordination and prejudice to the plaintiff company were at Muttra. Accordingly the court revoked the leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. (ii) Madanlal Jalan vs. Madanlal & Ors. Reported in AIR 1949 Cal 495. Accordingly the court revoked the leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. (ii) Madanlal Jalan vs. Madanlal & Ors. Reported in AIR 1949 Cal 495. The Learned Judge of this court, after considering several judicial decisions, enunciated the following propositions:- (b) that such an application should be made at an early stage of the suit and delay and acquiescence may be a bar to such an application; (c) that if the application depends on difficult questions of law or fact the court should not revoke leave on a summary application but should decide the question at the trial; (d) that if the defendant shows clearly that no part of the cause of action arose within jurisdiction the leave should be revoked as a matter of course; (e) that if only a part of the cause of action arose within jurisdiction, then it is a question of discretion for the court to give or refuse leave or where leave has already been granted to revoke or maintain the leave; (f) that assignment is a very important part of the cause of action in a suit by the assignee; (g) that in giving or refusing leave or maintaining or revoking leave the court will ordinarily take into consideration the balance of convenience and may, if the balance is definitely in favour of the defendant, apply the doctrine of forum convenience; (h) that the court may refuse leave or revoke leave on the ground of balance of convenience although there be no evidence of bad faith or abuse of process on the part of the plaintiff; (i) that if the cause of action is founded on an assignment within jurisdiction of a negotiable instrument the court will in recognition of the principle of negotiability insist on a far greater degree of balance of convenience in favour of the defendant and will more readily give or maintain leave than in other cases of assignment; (j) that if the court is satisfied that the suit has been filed mala fide for the purpose of harassing or oppressing the defendant or might result in injustice the court should in all cases readily refuse leave or if leave has already been granted revoke the leave as a matter of course.” “(a) that an application lies for revoking the leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent; (iii) Hansraj Bajaj vs. The Indian Overseas Bank Ltd. reported in AIR 1956 Cal 33 . In this case, a Learned Judge of this court observed that the courts are generally and naturally inclined in favour of executing and discharging the jurisdiction that the law has vested in them. However, there is one exception and that is where in the interest of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of court, it becomes necessary to stay the trial of a suit although this court otherwise has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Primary and ultimate purpose of exercising such discretion is that the conflict between the parties should be resolved according to a fair judicial trial. If, therefore, conditions exist which defeat that primary purpose, the courts have declined to proceed with a suit even where they have jurisdiction to try the suit. The jurisdiction to stay an otherwise competent suit is the inherent jurisdiction which the court exercises under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The courts have evolved certain well defined principles to guide their decision on this point. The first principle is that a mere balance of convenience is not a sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of his right of prosecuting his action in or his right of access to the competent courts of the land. The second principle is that a court stays an action brought within the jurisdiction in respect of a cause of action arising entirely out of the jurisdiction when it is satisfied that the plaintiff will thereby suffer no injustice whereas if the action is continued, the defendant will in defending the action be the victim of such injustice as to amount to vexation and oppression which would not arise for the defendant if the action were brought in another accessible court having jurisdiction in the matter. In the facts of that case the court held that the cause of action had arisen entirely at Penang/Singapore. All the documents, material evidence and witnesses would have to come from abroad. To continue with the suit in this court would cause serious injustice to the defendant. (iv) Rekhab Chand Jain vs. Paras Das Bhartiya reported in AIR 1970 Cal 394 . All the documents, material evidence and witnesses would have to come from abroad. To continue with the suit in this court would cause serious injustice to the defendant. (iv) Rekhab Chand Jain vs. Paras Das Bhartiya reported in AIR 1970 Cal 394 . In that case, a Learned Judge of this court on the facts of the case held that the defendant had made out a case whereby the court could come to a conclusion that the balance of convenience was overwhelmingly in favour of the defendant in having the suit heard in the appropriate court at Uttar Pradesh and if the suit was allowed to be proceeded with in this court, the prejudice that the defendant would suffer would amount to injustice. (v) Karam Chand Thapar vs. Inder Mohan Kapoor reported in AIR 1972 Cal 82 . In that case, a Learned Judge of this court observed that to succeed in an application for revocation of leave on the ground of balance of convenience, a strong case has to be made out. A mere balance of convenience would not be enough but it must be such that it would be overwhelmingly in favour of the suit being heard by a court other than the court which had granted the leave. The paramount consideration for the court in such a case would be to consider whether in acquiring jurisdiction it would cause serious prejudice resulting in injustice to the defendant if the suit would be permitted to be proceeded with in the court where it has been instituted with such leave. In the facts of that case the court held that the defendant would be put to great hardship and inconvenience if the suit is allowed to continue in this court. On the contrary, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff would not in any way be prejudiced if the suit was proceeded with at Madras where the plaintiff carried on business through its branch office and could well have all the evidences available there. (vi) Jokai (Assam) Tea Co. Ltd. vs. Bhawani Shankar Bagaria reported in AIR 1976 Cal 18 . In that case, a suit was instituted in this court to recover moneys advanced under contracts for supply of food-grains and coins and currency notes of required denominations. (vi) Jokai (Assam) Tea Co. Ltd. vs. Bhawani Shankar Bagaria reported in AIR 1976 Cal 18 . In that case, a suit was instituted in this court to recover moneys advanced under contracts for supply of food-grains and coins and currency notes of required denominations. The suit was instituted after obtaining leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent on the ground that letters terminating the contracts were sent from Calcutta. The defendant applied for revocation of leave under Clause 12. The court found that the defendant who was located at Dibrugarh in Assam would suffer grave prejudice if the suit was continued in this court as the entire evidence and all the witnesses were in Dibrugarh. The court also took note of the jurisdiction clause in the contracts whereby the parties agreed that the contracts would be subject to Dibrugarh jurisdiction. Accordingly, the leave under Clause 12 was revoked. (vii) Ultra Engineering Industries P. Ltd. vs. Spintex Industries Pvt. Ltd. reported in 1980 Cal 159. In that case, the plaintiff had filed the suit in this court with leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The defendant applied for revocation of the leave. This court found that the plaintiff’s registered office was at Delhi. Both the plaintiff and the defendant had their places of business at Delhi and Faridabad. All transactions between the parties had taken place at Delhi/Faridabad excepting that a sum of Rs. 1.25 lakhs had been paid by the defendant to the plaintiff at the plaintiff’s office at Calcutta within this court’s jurisdiction. The entire evidence was available at Delhi/Faridabad. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case the court held that it would cause not only inconvenience but also hardship to ask the defendant to come and defend the suit herein at Calcutta when admittedly the defendant had no office at Calcutta. Accordingly this court revoked the leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. (viii) Unreported judgment of a Ld. Single Judge of this court delivered in GA No. 247 of 2008, GA No. 248 of 2008 and GA No. 249 of 2008 (M/s. Karma Lakeland Pvt. Ltd. vs. Ravi Goel). In that case, the plaintiff instituted a suit for defamation in this court after obtaining leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Each of the three defendants applied for revocation of such leave. In that case, the plaintiff instituted a suit for defamation in this court after obtaining leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Each of the three defendants applied for revocation of such leave. After considering the facts of the case, the Learned Judge held that this court had very little nexus with the plaintiff’s cause of action in the suit. Territorial jurisdiction can easily be invoked in a defamation action merely by alleging publication or circulation of the defamatory matter within jurisdiction. Plaintiff had its principal place of business in Delhi and the notices were published in Delhi papers. Hence it would either need the acquiescence of the defendants for the action to be continued in this unnatural forum or a special case being made out by the plaintiff upon the jurisdiction of this court being challenged on the ground of balance of convenience. The Learned Judge further observed that a plaintiff has a right to choose his forum. Equally, the chosen forum has to assess whether its jurisdiction had been invoked to harass or inconvenience the defendant. Ordinarily, such a charge of mala fides is assessed at the trial. But when the defendants have made out grounds and the plaintiff has ignored them as irrelevant without denying them the court may draw an adverse inference on the pleadings. The Learned Judge revoked the leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent on the ground of balance of convenience and the serious embarrassment and hardship that the defendants were likely to face if the action was allowed to continue in this court. The plaintiff’s contention:- 8. In a demurer application the allegations made in the plaint are to be taken as true and correct and the application must be decided on the basis of the allegations made in the plaint. In the plaint it has been clearly pleaded that the defendant approached the plaintiff at the then registered office of Phalguni Goods Pvt. Ltd. within this court’s jurisdiction for availing financial assistance and the agreement for advancing of loan by the plaintiff to the defendant was entered into at the same office within this court’s jurisdiction. It has been further pleaded that the said loan was to be repaid by the defendant to the plaintiff at the said registered office of Phalguni Goods Pvt. Ltd., within this court’s jurisdiction. It has been further pleaded that the said loan was to be repaid by the defendant to the plaintiff at the said registered office of Phalguni Goods Pvt. Ltd., within this court’s jurisdiction. The said cheques were received by the plaintiff at the said registered office of Phalguni Goods Pvt. Ltd. within this court’s jurisdiction. The cheques were dishonoured at the HDFC Bank, Stephen House Branch, Calcutta – 700001 within the jurisdiction of this court. Demand for repayment of the loan was made by the plaintiff through its Advocate’s letter which was sent to the defendant from Premises No. 6, Old Post Office Street, Calcutta700001, within the jurisdiction of this court. Hence, clearly a substantial part of the plaintiff’s cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this court and there is no reason while leave under Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent should be revoked or the suit should be dismissed. 9. It is immaterial as to whether or not the defendant has any place of business or resides at Calcutta. When the defendant chose to come down to Calcutta for negotiating for the accommodation loan and obtain the loan, it does not lie in the mouth of the defendant so say that the suit is harassing or that this court is not the convenient forum. 10. The plaintiff resides and carries on business in Calcutta. All dealings took place at Calcutta. The material witness of the plaintiff is also at Calcutta. It would be highly inconvenient for the plaintiff to conduct the suit in the court at Udaipur. 11. In a monetary transaction of the nature as pleaded in the plaint, voluminous documents need not be brought from Rajasthan to Calcutta. Further, in the 21st Century distance cannot be a ground for dismissal of the suit when so many convenient modes of transportation of communication are available. 12. The defendant has business interest in Calcutta in two companies by the names of Gemini Barter Pvt. Ltd. and Rasika Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. which have their registered offices in Calcutta. The defendant is in control and management of the said two companies and/or holds controlling and substantial interest therein. The defendant has filed two petitions under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act before the Calcutta Bench of the Company Law Board in respect of alleged mismanagement and oppression of the affairs of the said two companies. The defendant is in control and management of the said two companies and/or holds controlling and substantial interest therein. The defendant has filed two petitions under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act before the Calcutta Bench of the Company Law Board in respect of alleged mismanagement and oppression of the affairs of the said two companies. The defendant is conducting the said company proceedings in Calcutta and, hence, he cannot suffer any inconvenience if he has to defend the instant suit in Calcutta. 13. The defendant is also defending proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant before the Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. 14. In support of his submissions, the plaintiff has relied on the following decisions:- (i) Kanthal India ltd. vs. Anant Prasad Bhatia reported in AIR 1987 Cal 24 . In that case, a Learned Judge of this court held that where leave has been granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, an application by the defendant for revocation of such leave may raise questions far too difficult to determine upon affidavit evidence and in such case the question should not be decided on affidavit evidence. In a proper case an application to revoke leave granted under clause 12 may be entertained by the court, but a question of difficulty and importance should not be dealt with by an application to revoke leave under Clause 12 and to take the plaint off the file. The proper course is to dismiss such an application and to direct that the case should proceed on all points in the usual way. No detailed investigation into questions of facts and law can be gone into in a demurer application for revocation of leave. (ii) Ritu Sachdev vs. Anita Jindal reported in AIR 1982 Cal 333 . In that case, a Division Bench of this court held that on a demurer application for revocation of leave under Cl. 12, the issue of jurisdiction must be decided on the basis of the pleadings in the plaint and not otherwise. (iii) Indian Mineral and Chemicals Co vs. Deutsche Bank reported in AIR 2004 SC 3615 . In that case the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the observations made in a plaint must be assumed to be true for the purpose of determining whether leave under Cl. (iii) Indian Mineral and Chemicals Co vs. Deutsche Bank reported in AIR 2004 SC 3615 . In that case the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the observations made in a plaint must be assumed to be true for the purpose of determining whether leave under Cl. 12 is liable to be revoked on a point of demurer. The trial court had rejected the defendant’s application for revocation of leave under Cl. 12. The Division Bench had allowed the appeal preferred by the defendant. The plaintiff’s appeal against the Division Bench order was allowed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court which also approved the trial court’s finding that it would be highly inconvenient for the plaintiff to conduct the suit in Germany and compared to such inconvenience the defendant bank could easily defend the suit through its branch office in Calcutta. (iv) Ratan Kr. Bhar Pilania vs. Luxmi Devi Bhar Pilania reported in 1985 (1) CHN 21 . In that case, a Learned Single Judge of this court held that the plaintiff has a right to choose his forum. In that case, the plaintiff had chosen Calcutta. The hardship that the defendants would suffer in defending the suit at Calcutta would be matched by the difficulty that the plaintiff would have to face if the suit was to be tried at Ahmedabad. The balance of convenience was not in favour of the trial of the suit at Ahmedabad. The mere balance of convenience is not a decisive factor. The defendant must establish that the balance of convenience is overwhelmingly in favour of the suit being tried elsewhere than the court where it has been instituted. Leave granted under Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent is revoked only in cases where it is found that it would not be inconvenient for the plaintiff to prosecute the suit at the place where the defendant resides. (v) Unreported judgment dated 5th September, 2011 delivered in GA No. 1403 of 2011, CS 135 of 2010 (Siddhi Vinayak Industries Pvt. Ltd.-vs.-Mahesh Goyal). In that case also a Learned Single Judge of this court after discussing several precedents came to the conclusion that mere balance of convenience is not really a decisive factor. To succeed in an application for revocation of leave under Cl. 12, the defendant must establish that the balance of convenience is overwhelmingly in favour of the suit being tried in some other court. 15. To succeed in an application for revocation of leave under Cl. 12, the defendant must establish that the balance of convenience is overwhelmingly in favour of the suit being tried in some other court. 15. On the basis of the aforesaid submission Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff prayed for dismissal of the instant application. Court’s View:- 16. From the pleadings filed by the parties in connection with the present application it is clear that the plaintiff resides and carries on business in Calcutta. It is also clear that the defendant does not reside in Calcutta. There is no doubt that ordinarily the plaintiff in a suit is the dominus litis. If he has a choice of for a for ventilating his grievance against the defendant, he is generally at liberty to choose one of the for a and bring his action in that forum provided that such forum otherwise has jurisdiction to entertain the action. Such choice of the plaintiff is not lightly interfered with by the Court. 17. However, if it appears to the Court in which the plaintiff has brought an action that such court is not a natural forum for adjudicating the action and that the plaintiff has chosen that court with an oblique motive, the court would refuse to proceed with the action and would relegate the plaintiff to a more convenient or natural forum. Thus, if a court is of the opinion that the plaintiff has invoked the jurisdiction of that court to put the defendant in difficulty in contesting the proceeding and that there is another court which may try the action without causing any undue hardship to either of the parties, then the court which the plaintiff has approached shall stay its hands and relegate the plaintiff to that other court. This is what is generally referred to as the principle of balance of convenience or forum conveniens. The rationale underlying the principle is that if continuance of a proceeding in a court causes undue hardship and logistic problems to the defendant in contesting the action and if there is any other court which has jurisdiction to entertain and try the action where the defendant will not face such problems and nor will it be inconvenient for the plaintiff to conduct his case, then the court in seisin of the action should relegate the parties to that other court. The convenience of both the plaintiff and the defendant are to be considered. However, a mere balance of convenience is not enough to deprive a plaintiff of his choice of forum. The balance of convenience must be overwhelmingly in favour of discontinuance of the action in the court in which it has been instituted. 18. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the present case carefully and keeping in mind the principles of law discussed above, I am of the view that the balance of convenience does not warrant return of the plaint of the suit to be tried elsewhere. It is not only the convenience and inconvenience of the defendant that has to be considered, the plaintiff’s convenience and inconvenience is equally relevant. While deciding this application I will have to proceed on the basis that the averments made in the plaint are true and correct. If I do so, I clearly find that a substantial part of the plaintiff’s alleged cause of action has arisen within this court’s jurisdiction. Hence, this court has granted leave to the plaintiff to institute the suit in this court. Since I cannot go into the veracity or otherwise of the averments made in the plaint at this stage, the question of revoking the leave under Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent does not arise in the facts and circumstances of the case. 19. Coming to the question of forum conveniens, the defendant has not even contended that the plaintiff resides or carries on business in Udaipur. The defendant has not shown that the plaintiff has any establishment in Udaipur. Although from the pleadings in connected suits I have found that some of the companies of which the plaintiff is a director have offices in Udaipur, the same, in my opinion, cannot be a ground for relegating the plaintiff to a court in Udaipur. The plaintiff has filed the instant suit in his individual capacity and not as a director of any company. Further, today he may be a director of a company which has an establishment in Udaipur but tomorrow his connection with the company may be severed. 20. Further, admittedly the defendant is conducting the proceedings before the Calcutta Bench of the Company Law Board. The defendant is also defending a criminal action under the Negotiable Instrument Act before the Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. 20. Further, admittedly the defendant is conducting the proceedings before the Calcutta Bench of the Company Law Board. The defendant is also defending a criminal action under the Negotiable Instrument Act before the Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. Hence, in any event, the defendant has to be in regular touch with Calcutta. 21. In my view, the plaintiff’s choice of forum can only be interfered with if the court comes to a finding that the forum is not a natural or convenient forum. In the facts of the case I cannot hold that this court is an unnatural form for the instant suit. I also cannot say that the court at Udaipur would be a more convenient or proper forum since in my opinion the plaintiff will face difficulty and hardship in conducting the suit at Udaipur. The plaintiff’s right to choose a forum can only be interfered with if one can point out another forum where the plaintiff can conduct the proceeding with equal ease and efficiency. In my opinion, it cannot be said that the court at Udaipur is a more convenient forum than this court for adjudication of the instant suit. 22. For the reasons aforestated it cannot be said that the balance of convenience is overwhelmingly in favour of the instant suit being tried by the appropriate civil court in Udaipur. Accordingly, this application fails. However, the issue as to revocation of leave under Cl. 12 shall stand to trial. There will be no order as to costs. 23. GA No. 1055 of 2012 is accordingly disposed of. 24. Urgent certified Photostat copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.