Judgment Arijit Banerjee, J. (1) This application has been taken out by the defendant praying that the leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent be revoked, the plaint filed in the suit be taken off the record and the suit be dismissed. (2) The case pleaded in the plaint is that sometime in January, 2010, the defendant approached the plaintiff at its then registered office at 38, Bentinck Street, 2nd Floor Room No. 7, Calcutta – 1 within the jurisdiction of this court for financial assistance for the purpose of expanding its business. An oral agreement was entered into by and between the parties at the aforesaid address within this court’s jurisdiction for advancing a loan by the plaintiff to the defendant on the terms and conditions mentioned in paragraph 5 of the plaint. The cheques drawn in favour of the defendant by the plaintiff aggregating Rs. 1,58,00,000/- were encashed by the defendant. However, when the plaintiff demanded repayment of the loan, the defendant failed and neglected to do so. In June, 2011 a representative of the defendant went to the plaintiff’s then registered office within this court’s jurisdiction and agreed to repay the sum of Rs. 1,58,00,000/- within 31st July, 2011 and in default to pay interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum. The defendant failed and neglected to repay the loan within 31st July, 2011 or thereafter. The plaintiff through its advocate’s letter dated 28th October, 2011 sent from the advocate’s office at No. 6 Old Post Office St. Calcutta – 1, within this court’s jurisdiction, demanded repayment of the said loan along with interest from the defendant. In spite of demands, the defendant failed, neglected and refused to repay the said loan or any part thereof. Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for the sum of Rs. 1,69,85,000/- and decree for interest pendente lite at the rate of 18 per cent per annum. Part of cause of action pleaded in paragraphs 5, 11 and 14 of the plaint arose within this court’s jurisdiction and those pleaded in paragraph 15 of the plaint arose outside the jurisdiction of this court. Further the defendant is liable to seek its creditor and make payment of the aforesaid amount to the plaintiff with interest at the plaintiff’s registered office which is within the jurisdiction of this court. Further the defendant is liable to seek its creditor and make payment of the aforesaid amount to the plaintiff with interest at the plaintiff’s registered office which is within the jurisdiction of this court. (3) On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, the suit was instituted in this court by the plaintiff on or about 13th February, 2012 after obtaining leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent. (4) The present application was taken out by the defendant on or about 10th April, 2012. (5) The case of the defendant as pleaded in the application and as submitted at the time of hearing is that neither the defendant is carrying on any business in Calcutta nor it had any occasion to negotiate with the plaintiff in Calcutta nor any part of the cause of action of the suit has arisen within the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this court. The defendant does not deny receipt of the sum of Rs. 1,58,00,000/- but states the entire payment was received by it at Udaipur. The said money was earmarked as part consideration for purchase of land at Udaipur and, therefore, the dispute between the parties touches immovable property situated at Udaipur and hence, this court lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. (6) The defendant has further contended that the balance of convenience and inconvenience overwhelmingly lies in favour of taking the plaint off the file since the defendant does not carry on business in Calcutta nor the defendant has entered into any contract with the plaintiff. If the suit is heard and tried before this court, the defendant will have to bring down to Calcutta all the records, books of accounts, and other related documents which are voluminous in nature from Udaipur which would be burdensome and difficult. The witnesses who would be required to depose in the matter are all residents of Udaipur. It would cause undue hardship to the defendant if it has to contest the suit in this court. However, if the suit is heard before any Civil Court at Udaipur, the plaintiff would not face any inconvenience as the plaintiff has an office in Udaipur and also maintains bank account at Udaipur. The plaintiff’s representative Sri Rakesh Bhandari is also a resident of Udaipur. Hence, the plaintiff shall not suffer any hardship if the suit is heard by a Civil Court at Udaipur. The plaintiff’s representative Sri Rakesh Bhandari is also a resident of Udaipur. Hence, the plaintiff shall not suffer any hardship if the suit is heard by a Civil Court at Udaipur. (7) The defendant further urged that it has filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement for sale of land in the Court at Udaipur which has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The issues which arise in the present suit and in the Udaipur suit would be inter-linked and for the sake of convenience as well as to avoid conflict of judicial decisions, the instant suit and the Udaipur suit should be heard together. This court would not have the jurisdiction to try the suit which has been filed in the court at Udaipur since the said suit pertains to land situated at Udaipur. However, the court at Udaipur would have jurisdiction to try the present suit since the defendant resides within the jurisdiction of the court at Udaipur. Hence, both the suits should be tried by the court at Udaipur analogously. (8) In support of its contention that the balance of convenience warrants trial of the instant suit by the court at Udaipur, Ld. Counsel for the defendant has relied on the following decisions:- (i) Muttra Electrical Supply Co. Ltd. vs. Gopal Saran Kulasresthi reported in 59 CWN 419. In this case, a Learned Judge of this court observed that a close scrutiny of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865 reveals that there are certain total and absolute jurisdictions of this court. They are where the whole of the land or immovable property is situated within its jurisdiction when the suit is for such land or immovable property. That is also the case where the whole of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the court in suit is other than a suit for land. Also that is the case where the defendant at the time of institution of the suit dwells or carries on business or personally works for gain within the jurisdiction of the court irrespective of where the cause of action arose. These three are the categories of total and absolute jurisdiction of the court under the grant of the power under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. No question of the litigant having to take the leave of the court arises in these three cases. These three are the categories of total and absolute jurisdiction of the court under the grant of the power under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. No question of the litigant having to take the leave of the court arises in these three cases. So long as the litigant satisfies the test laid down in these three cases, his right to institute the suit in this court is absolute and unfettered. There is another class of jurisdiction which this court can assume under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent where the cause of action is not wholly but only partly arose within its jurisdiction. It is an inchoate jurisdiction which springs into action upon the court granting the leave to institute the suit. It is a nascent jurisdiction which lies dormant in this court and is brought to life by an act of the court in granting leave to institute suit. In performing this act of granting leave, the court performs a judicial function. The court has to exercise its discretion as to whether or not it will grant its fiat or leave to the plaintiff’s choice of this forum although only part of his cause of action has arisen here. The plaintiff ordinarily is dominus litis but where part of his cause of action arises within this court’s jurisdiction, he has no absolute right of the choice of forum because his choice has to be backed up by the sanction and leave of this court. Where cause of action is transitory and amphibious in the sense that parts of the cause of action arise at difference places, the jurisdiction of the courts at any one of such places is essentially tentative. When this court grants leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent to a plaintiff on the basis that a part of his cause of action has arisen within this Court’s jurisdiction, which is almost always done ex parte, it acquires a tentative jurisdiction over the entire cause of action but such tentative jurisdiction is liable to be taken exception to by the defendant on the ground of the balance of convenience or that the choice of this forum has been vexatious, oppressive, malicious or harassing. The subject matter of the suit, parties to the suit, witnesses required for the proof of the respective cases of the parties and expenses of trial are, inter alia, all relevant factors while the court considers the balance of convenience in a particular case. In the facts of that case, this court found that the plaintiff itself carried on business at Muttra, the services rendered by the defendant were at Muttra, the main work was at Muttra and all the alleged acts of insubordination and prejudice to the plaintiff company were at Muttra. Accordingly the court revoked the leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. (ii) Madanlal Jalan vs. Madanlal & Ors. Reported in AIR 1949 Cal 495. Accordingly the court revoked the leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. (ii) Madanlal Jalan vs. Madanlal & Ors. Reported in AIR 1949 Cal 495. The Learned Judge of this court, after considering several judicial decisions, enunciated the following propositions:- “(a) that an application lies for revoking the leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent; (b) that such an application should be made at an early stage of the suit and delay and acquiescence may be a bar to such an application; (c) that if the application depends on difficult questions of law or fact the court should not revoke leave on a summary application but should decide the question at the trial; (d) that if the defendant shows clearly that no part of the cause of action arose within jurisdiction the leave should be revoked as a matter of course; (e) that if only a part of the cause of action arose within jurisdiction, then it is a question of discretion for the court to give or refuse leave or where leave has already been granted to revoke or maintain the leave; (f) that assignment is a very important part of the cause of action in a suit by the assignee; (g) that in giving or refusing leave or maintaining or revoking leave the court will ordinarily take into consideration the balance of convenience and may, if the balance is definitely in favour of the defendant, apply the doctrine of forum convenience; (h) that the court may refuse leave or revoke leave on the ground of balance of convenience although there be no evidence of bad faith or abuse of process on the part of the plaintiff; (i) that if the cause of action is founded on an assignment within jurisdiction of a negotiable instrument the court will in recognition of the principle of negotiability insist on a far greater degree of balance of convenience in favour of the defendant and will more readily give or maintain leave than in other cases of assignment; (j) that if the court is satisfied that the suit has been filed mala fide for the purpose of harassing or oppressing the defendant or might result in injustice the court should in all cases readily refuse leave or if leave has already been granted revoke the leave as a matter of course.” (iii) Hansraj Bajaj vs. The Indian Overseas Bank Ltd. reported in AIR 1956 Cal 33 . In this case, a Learned Judge of this court observed that the courts are generally and naturally inclined in favour of executing and discharging the jurisdiction that the law has vested in them. However, there is one exception and that is where in the interest of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of court, it becomes necessary to stay the trial of a suit although this court otherwise has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Primary and ultimate purpose of exercising such discretion is that the conflict between the parties should be resolved according to a fair judicial trial. If, therefore, conditions exist which defeat that primary purpose, the courts have declined to proceed with a suit even where they have jurisdiction to try the suit. The jurisdiction to stay an otherwise competent suit is the inherent jurisdiction which the court exercises under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The courts have evolved certain well defined principles to guide their decision on this point. The first principle is that a mere balance of convenience is not a sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of his right of prosecuting his action in or his right of access to the competent courts of the land. The second principle is that a court stays an action brought within the jurisdiction in respect of a cause of action arising entirely out of the jurisdiction when it is satisfied that the plaintiff will thereby suffer no injustice whereas if the action is continued, the defendant will in defending the action be the victim of such injustice as to amount to vexation and oppression which would not arise for the defendant if the action were brought in another accessible court having jurisdiction in the matter. In the facts of that case the court held that the cause of action had arisen entirely at Penang/Singapore. All the documents, material evidence and witnesses would have to come from abroad. To continue with the suit in this court would cause serious injustice to the defendant. (iv) Rekhab Chand Jain vs. Paras Das Bhartiya reported in AIR 1970 Cal 394 . All the documents, material evidence and witnesses would have to come from abroad. To continue with the suit in this court would cause serious injustice to the defendant. (iv) Rekhab Chand Jain vs. Paras Das Bhartiya reported in AIR 1970 Cal 394 . In that case, a Learned Judge of this court on the facts of the case held that the defendant had made out a case whereby the court could come to a conclusion that the balance of convenience was overwhelmingly in favour of the defendant in having the suit heard in the appropriate court at Uttar Pradesh and if the suit was allowed to be proceeded with in this court, the prejudice that the defendant would suffer would amount to injustice. (v) Karam Chand Thapar vs. Inder Mohan Kapoor reported in AIR 1972 Cal 82 . In that case, a Learned Judge of this court observed that to succeed in an application for revocation of leave on the ground of balance of convenience, a strong case has to be made out. A mere balance of convenience would not be enough but it must be such that it would be overwhelmingly in favour of the suit being heard by a court other than the court which had granted the leave. The paramount consideration for the court in such a case would be to consider whether in acquiring jurisdiction it would cause serious prejudice resulting in injustice to the defendant if the suit would be permitted to be proceeded with in the court where it has been instituted with such leave. In the facts of that case the court held that the defendant would be put to great hardship and inconvenience if the suit is allowed to continue in this court. On the contrary, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff would not in any way be prejudiced if the suit was proceeded with at Madras where the plaintiff carried on business through its branch office and could well have all the evidences available there. (vi) Jokai (Assam) Tea Co. Ltd. vs. Bhawani Shankar Bagaria reported in AIR 1976 Cal 18 . In that case, a suit was instituted in this court to recover moneys advanced under contracts for supply of food-grains and coins and currency notes of required denominations. (vi) Jokai (Assam) Tea Co. Ltd. vs. Bhawani Shankar Bagaria reported in AIR 1976 Cal 18 . In that case, a suit was instituted in this court to recover moneys advanced under contracts for supply of food-grains and coins and currency notes of required denominations. The suit was instituted after obtaining leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent on the ground that letters terminating the contracts were sent from Calcutta. The defendant applied for revocation of leave under Clause 12. The court found that the defendant who was located at Dibrugarh in Assam would suffer grave prejudice if the suit was continued in this court as the entire evidence and all the witnesses were in Dibrugarh. The court also took note of the jurisdiction clause in the contracts whereby the parties agreed that the contracts would be subject to Dibrugarh jurisdiction. Accordingly, the leave under Clause 12 was revoked. (vii) Ultra Engineering Industries P. Ltd. vs. Spintex Industries Pvt. Ltd. reported in 1980 Cal 159. In that case, the plaintiff had filed the suit in this court with leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The defendant applied for revocation of the leave. This court found that the plaintiff’s registered office was at Delhi. Both the plaintiff and the defendant had their places of business at Delhi and Faridabad. All transactions between the parties had taken place at Delhi/Faridabad excepting that a sum of Rs. 1.25 lakhs had been paid by the defendant to the plaintiff at the plaintiff’s office at Calcutta within this court’s jurisdiction. The entire evidence was available at Delhi/Faridabad. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case the court held that it would cause not only inconvenience but also hardship to ask the defendant to come and defend the suit herein at Calcutta when admittedly the defendant had no office at Calcutta. Accordingly this court revoked the leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. (viii) Unreported judgment of a Ld. Single Judge of this court delivered in GA No. 247 of 2008, GA No. 248 of 2008 and GA No. 249 of 2008 (M/s. Karma Lakeland Pvt. Ltd. vs. Ravi Goel). In that case, the plaintiff instituted a suit for defamation in this court after obtaining leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Each of the three defendants applied for revocation of such leave. In that case, the plaintiff instituted a suit for defamation in this court after obtaining leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Each of the three defendants applied for revocation of such leave. After considering the facts of the case, the Learned Judge held that this court had very little nexus with the plaintiff’s cause of action in the suit. Territorial jurisdiction can easily be invoked in a defamation action merely by alleging publication or circulation of the defamatory matter within jurisdiction. Plaintiff had its principal place of business in Delhi and the notices were published in Delhi papers. Hence it would either need the acquiescence of the defendants for the action to be continued in this unnatural forum or a special case being made out by the plaintiff upon the jurisdiction of this court being challenged on the ground of balance of convenience. The Learned Judge further observed that a plaintiff has a right to choose his forum. Equally, the chosen forum has to assess whether its jurisdiction had been invoked to harass or inconvenience the defendant. Ordinarily, such a charge of mala fides is assessed at the trial. But when the defendants have made out grounds and the plaintiff has ignored them as irrelevant without denying them the court may draw an adverse inference on the pleadings. The Learned Judge revoked the leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent on the ground of balance of convenience and the serious embarrassment and hardship that the defendants were likely to face if the action was allowed to continue in this court. (9) Ld. Counsel for the defendant relied on five decisions on the point of conflict of judicial decisions. These are as follows:- (i) Soroj Bashini Debi vs. Girija Proshad Bhattacharjee reported in AIR 1926 Cal 326. In that case, A had filed a suit against B on a hand note. B filed a suit against A in another court for accounts. Both the suits dealt with a common issue as to whether the hand note was genuine. In that view of the matter for the sake of convenience and also to avoid conflict of judicial decisions, this court directed the suit instituted at the Kalna Court be transferred to the Burdwan Court for the two suits to be heard analogously. (ii) G.M. Rajulu vs. M. Govindan Nair reported in AIR 1938 Madras 745. In that view of the matter for the sake of convenience and also to avoid conflict of judicial decisions, this court directed the suit instituted at the Kalna Court be transferred to the Burdwan Court for the two suits to be heard analogously. (ii) G.M. Rajulu vs. M. Govindan Nair reported in AIR 1938 Madras 745. In that case an application was made before the High Court under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code to transfer a suit from the Presidency Small Cause Court to the Madras City Civil Court. The two suits related to the same matter and arose out of the same contract between the parties. The City Civil Court suit was filed by the contractor alleging breach of contract by the person who entrusted the work to him. The suit in the Small Cause Court was filed by the person who had entrusted the work, alleging breach of contract on the part of the contractor. Both the plaintiffs in their respective suits claimed damages. The Madras High Court held that it was in the best interest of the parties to have those two cases tried together as it would cause very great inconvenience if the two courts were to give different findings on the same question. Accordingly the application for transfer was allowed. (iii) Vaman Vasudeo Chitaley vs. Zaghunath Ganesh Thakar reported in AIR 1949 (36) Bombay 263. In that case the Bombay High Court was dealing with an application under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code. The petitioner in the application had filed a suit before the court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) Puna. The defendant in that suit had filed a suit against the petitioner in the Bombay High Court. By filing the Section 24 application the petitioner sought transfer of the Bombay suit to the Puna Court for the two suits being heard together. The High Court observed that both the suits involved consideration of the same agreement. They also involved the true construction of that agreement and hence it was desirable that the question was decided by one court instead of two courts. If the two suits involving the construction of the same agreement were allowed to go on in two different courts, it was likely that the two courts may come to different conclusions on the construction of the same agreement. It was most desirable to avoid that result. If the two suits involving the construction of the same agreement were allowed to go on in two different courts, it was likely that the two courts may come to different conclusions on the construction of the same agreement. It was most desirable to avoid that result. On the basis of the said consideration the High Court allowed the application for transfer of the Bombay suit to the Puna court. (iv) Purna Chandra Mahanty vs. Samanta Radhaprasana Das reported in AIR 1953 Orissa 46. In that case the Orissa High Court was dealing with an application for transfer of a suit instituted in the Balasore Court to the Court at Cuttack. A suit had been instituted by Samanta Radhaprasana Das in the Cuttack court against his wife Smt. Snehalata Dei, his daughter and some other persons. The wife of the plaintiff in the Cuttack suit filed a suit against him in the Balasore court, inter alia, for maintenance. The application for transfer of the suit was based on the ground of balance of convenience and for the purpose of joint trial of the two suits as they involved almost identical questions of fact. In that background the court observed that it is no doubt a well-established principle that the plaintiff has a choice of his forum so long as the suit is not subject to the defect of want of local jurisdiction and a suit is not to be transferred from court where plaintiff chooses to institute it, merely to serve the convenience of the defendants. However, there could also be no doubt that where there are two suits which raise certain common questions of fact and law having a substantial bearing on the decision of each of the cases, it is desirable that they should be tried at the same place and by the same judge. This course is necessary in order to avoid multiplicity in the trial of the same issues and conflict of decisions. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court allowed the application for transfer. (v) M/s. Engineering Investments P. Ltd. vs. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. reported in AIR 1983 Madras 1. In that case, the Madras High Court observed that under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court even on its own, can transfer the proceedings to avoid conflict of decisions. (v) M/s. Engineering Investments P. Ltd. vs. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. reported in AIR 1983 Madras 1. In that case, the Madras High Court observed that under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court even on its own, can transfer the proceedings to avoid conflict of decisions. The Madras High Court referred and relied on, inter alia, the decision of the Orissa High Court in the case of Purna Chandra (Supra). (10) Relying on the aforesaid submission Ld. Counsel for the defendant prayed for revocation of leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent and alternatively for taking the plaint off the file and dismissing the suit. The plaintiff’s contention: (11) In a demurer application the allegations made in the plaint are to be taken as true and correct and the application must be decided on the basis of the allegations made in the plaint. In the plaint it has been clearly pleaded that the defendant came down to Calcutta in January, 2010 and entered into an agreement for an accommodation loan and the said loan was advanced at Calcutta. Subsequently, negotiations also took place between the parties at Calcutta. Hence, clearly a part of the plaintiff’s cause of action has arisen within this court’s jurisdiction and there is no reason while leave under Clause 12 should be revoked or the suit should be dismissed. (12) It is immaterial as to whether or not the defendant has any place of business at Calcutta. When the defendant chose to come down to Calcutta for negotiating for the accommodation loan and obtain the loan, it does not lie in the mouth of the defendant to say that the suit is harassing and the convenient forum is the court at Udaipur. (13) The plaintiff has its registered office in Calcutta. All dealings took place at Calcutta. The material witness of the plaintiff is also at Calcutta. It would be highly inconvenient for the plaintiff to conduct the suit in the court at Udaipur. (14) In a monetary transaction of this nature, voluminous documents need not be brought from Rajasthan to Calcutta. Further, in the 21st century distance cannot be a ground for dismissal of the suit when so many convenient modes of transportation and communication are available. (14) In a monetary transaction of this nature, voluminous documents need not be brought from Rajasthan to Calcutta. Further, in the 21st century distance cannot be a ground for dismissal of the suit when so many convenient modes of transportation and communication are available. (15) The suit which has been filed by the defendant in the court at Udaipur claiming specific performance of an alleged agreement to purchase land at Rajasthan is a counter-blast to the instant suit and is later in point of time. The intention of the defendant is clear. It is its intention to confuse the issues unnecessarily. (16) The purported suit filed by the defendant for specific performance of the alleged agreement for sale/purchase of land at Rajasthan is a subsequent suit, the fate whereof depends on the fate of the instant suit. If the plaintiff in the instant suit succeeds in proving the inter-corporate loan then the Rajasthan suit of the defendant would fail automatically. (17) The defendant has business interest in Calcutta in two companies by the name of Gemini Barter Pvt. Ltd. and Rasika Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd which have their registered offices in Calcutta. The defendant is in control and management of the said companies and or hold controlling and substantial interest therein. The defendant has filed two petitions under Section 397 and 398 of the Companies Act before the Calcutta Bench of the Company Law Board in respect of alleged mismanagement and oppression of the affairs of the said two companies. The defendant is conducting the said company proceedings in Calcutta and, hence, it cannot suffer any inconvenience if it has to defend the instant suit in Calcutta. (18) The defendant is also defending proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act instituted by the plaintiff before the Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. (19) In support of its submissions, the plaintiff has relied on the following decisions:- (i) Kanthal India Ltd. vs. Anant Prasad Bhatia reported in AIR 1987 Cal 24 . In that case, a Learned Judge of this court held that where leave has been granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, an application by the defendant for revocation of such leave may raise questions far too difficult to determine upon affidavit evidence and in such case the question should not be decided on affidavit evidence. In that case, a Learned Judge of this court held that where leave has been granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, an application by the defendant for revocation of such leave may raise questions far too difficult to determine upon affidavit evidence and in such case the question should not be decided on affidavit evidence. In a proper case an application to revoke leave granted under clause 12 may be entertained by the court, but a question of difficulty and importance should not be dealt with by an application to revoke leave under Clause 12 and to take the plaint off the file. The proper course is to dismiss such an application and to direct that the case should proceed on all points in the usual way. No detailed investigation into questions of facts and law can be gone into in a demurer application for revocation of leave. (ii) Ritu Sachdev vs. Anita Jindal reported in AIR 1982 Cal 333 . In that case, a Division Bench of this court held that on a demurer application for revocation of leave under Cl. 12, the issue of jurisdiction must be decided on the basis of the pleadings in the plaint and not otherwise. (iii) Indian Mineral and Chemicals Co. vs. Deutsche Bank reported in AIR 2004 SC 3615 . In that case the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the observations made in a plaint must be assumed to be true for the purpose of determining whether leave under Cl. 12 is liable to be revoked on a point of demurer. The trial court had rejected the defendant’s application for revocation of leave under Cl. 12. The Division Bench had allowed the appeal preferred by the defendant. The plaintiff’s appeal against the Division Bench order was allowed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court which also approved the trial court’s finding that it would be highly inconvenient for the plaintiff to conduct the suit in Germany and compared to such inconvenience the defendant bank could easily defend the suit through its branch office in Calcutta. (iv) Ratan Kr. Bhar Pilania vs. Luxmi Devi Bhar Pilania reported in 1985 (1) CHN 21 . In that case, a Learned Single Judge of this court held that the plaintiff has a right to choose his forum. In that case, the plaintiff had chosen Calcutta. (iv) Ratan Kr. Bhar Pilania vs. Luxmi Devi Bhar Pilania reported in 1985 (1) CHN 21 . In that case, a Learned Single Judge of this court held that the plaintiff has a right to choose his forum. In that case, the plaintiff had chosen Calcutta. The hardship that the defendants would suffer in defending the suit at Calcutta would be matched by the difficulty that the plaintiff would have to face if the suit was to be tried at Ahmedabad. The balance of convenience was not in favour of the trial of the suit at Ahmedabad. The mere balance of convenience is not a decisive factor. The defendant must establish that the balance of convenience is overwhelmingly in favour of the suit being tried elsewhere than the court where it has been instituted. Leave granted under Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent is revoked only in cases where it is found that it would not be inconvenient for the plaintiff to prosecute the suit at the place where the defendant resides. (v) Unreported judgment dated 5th September, 2011 delivered in GA No. 1403 of 2011, CS 135 of 2010 (Siddhi Vinayak Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Mahesh Goyal). In that case also a Learned Single Judge of this court after discussing several precedents came to the conclusion that mere balance of convenience is not really a decisive factor. To succeed in an application for revocation of leave under Cl. 12, the defendant must establish that the balance of convenience is overwhelmingly in favour of the suit being tried in some other court. (20) On the basis of the aforesaid submission, Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff prayed for dismissal of the instant application. Defendant’s case in reply: (21) In reply the defendant/petitioner has contended that the submission of the plaintiff that the petitioner is in control of two companies having registered offices in Calcutta is baseless and incorrect. In so far as filing of the company proceedings before the Company Law Board, Calcutta Bench, is concerned, it is not the petitioner but its Directors who have filed such proceedings and that they had no option but to choose that forum since the registered offices of the said two companies are in Calcutta. In so far as filing of the company proceedings before the Company Law Board, Calcutta Bench, is concerned, it is not the petitioner but its Directors who have filed such proceedings and that they had no option but to choose that forum since the registered offices of the said two companies are in Calcutta. The petitioner referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the court having jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is the court within the jurisdiction of which the cheque was dishonoured. Relying on the aforesaid decision, the petitioner/defendant submitted that all proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant and pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta shall have to be transferred to the court in Udaipur. The defendant reiterated that it would suffer undue hardship if it has to defend the instant suit in Calcutta. Court’s View:- (22) From the pleadings filed by the parties in connection with the present application including annexures thereto, the following undisputed facts emerged:- (a) The plaintiff, though has its registered office in Calcutta, also has an office in Udaipur, and also maintains a bank account at Udaipur. This, I say on the basis that in paragraph 14 of the petition the defendant alleges that if the suit is heard before any Civil Court at Udaipur the plaintiff would not be faced with inconvenience inasmuch as the plaintiff has an office at Udaipur and also maintains bank account at Udaipur. In paragraph 13 of the affidavit-in-opposition, there is no specific denial of the assertion that the plaintiff has an office at Udaipur or maintains a bank account at Udaipur. In paragraph 13 of the affidavit-in-opposition, there is no specific denial of the assertion that the plaintiff has an office at Udaipur or maintains a bank account at Udaipur. What the plaintiff has stated in response to such assertion is as follows:- “It has further denied that if the suit is heard or tried before this Hon’ble Court the petitioner will have to bring down to Calcutta the records of books of accounts or other related documents which are voluminous in nature or that the same would be burdensome or difficult or that the oral evidence that would be required to be given in the matter are all residing at Udaipur or it could be hardship for the petitioner to contest the suit in the Hon’ble Court or that the plaintiff will not face inconvenience since the plaintiff has an office at Udaipur or maintaining bank account at Udaipur as alleged.” This is elusive traversal of an allegation and to my mind, the same does not amount to a denial of the plaintiff having an office in Udaipur and also maintaining a bank account in Udaipur. (b) The defendant does not carry on any business in Calcutta. This I say on the basis that an assertion to that effect has been made by the defendant in paragraph 10 of its petition which has not been denied by the plaintiff in paragraph 7 of the affidavit-in-opposition. Further, nowhere has the plaintiff made any positive assertion that the defendant has any office or carries on business in Calcutta. (c) The plaint has been verified by one Dr. Rakesh Bhandari. The affidavit-in-opposition on behalf of the plaintiff has been affirmed by the same person. Dr. Bhandari admittedly resides at Udaipur. He is the person controlling the affairs of the plaintiff company. I say that Dr. Bhandari is in full control of the plaintiff company, on the basis that in an application made by the said Dr. Bhandari and another before the Company Law Board, Calcutta Bench being Company Application No. 449 of 2012 connected with Company Petition No. 106 (CAL) of 2012, Dr. Bhandari himself states that he is the majority shareholder of Rooprekha Sales Pvt. Ltd. He further states that ‘………………. The applicant no. 1 ………………. through one of his companies namely Rooprekha Sales Pvt. Ltd lent and advanced ……………….’. Thus, Dr. Bhandari himself states that he is the majority shareholder of Rooprekha Sales Pvt. Ltd. He further states that ‘………………. The applicant no. 1 ………………. through one of his companies namely Rooprekha Sales Pvt. Ltd lent and advanced ……………….’. Thus, Dr. Bhandari himself claims that the plaintiff herein is ‘one of his companies’. There is no doubt that the plaintiff in a suit is the dominus litis. If he has a choice of fora for ventilating his grievance against the defendant, he is generally at liberty to choose one of the fora and bring his action in that forum provided that such forum otherwise has jurisdiction to entertain the action. Such choice of the plaintiff is not lightly interfered with by the Court. (23) However, if it appears to the Court in which the plaintiff has brought an action that that court is not a natural forum for adjudicating the action and that the plaintiff has chosen that court with an oblique motive, the court would refuse to proceed with the action and would relegate the plaintiff to a more convenient or natural forum. Thus, if a court is of the opinion that the plaintiff has invoked the jurisdiction of that court to put the defendant in difficulty in contesting the proceeding and that there is another court which may try the action without causing any undue hardship, to either of the parties, then the court which the plaintiff has approached shall stay its hands and relegate the plaintiff to that other court. This is what is generally referred to as the principle of balance of convenience or forum conveniens. The rationale underlying the principle is that if continuance of a proceeding in a court causes undue hardship and logistic problems to the defendant in contesting the action and if there is any other court which has jurisdiction to entertain and try the action where the defendant will not face such problems and nor will it be inconvenient for the plaintiff to conduct his case, then the court in seisin of the action should relegate the parties to that other court. The convenience of both the plaintiff and the defendant are to be considered. However, a mere balance of convenience is not enough to deprive a plaintiff of his choice of forum. The convenience of both the plaintiff and the defendant are to be considered. However, a mere balance of convenience is not enough to deprive a plaintiff of his choice of forum. The balance of convenience must be overwhelmingly in favour of discontinuance of the action in the court in which it has been instituted. (24) Having considered the facts and circumstances of the present case carefully and keeping in mind the principles of law discussed above, I am in no doubt that the present suit is one which should be tried by the court in Udaipur. As noted above, the registered office of the defendant is in Udaipur, hence, the seat of the defendant is in Udaipur. The defendant has no office in Calcutta. The plaintiff has an office in Udaipur. Dr. Rakesh Bhandari has verified the plaint and has also affirmed the affidavit-in-opposition filed in response to the instant petition. He is a resident of Udaipur. Having verified the plaint, one can safely assume that he will be the prime witness of the plaintiff. Further, in the application for addition of party filed before the Company Law Board as indicated above, Dr. Bhandari has referred to the plaintiff as ‘one of my companies’. He has verified the statements in the plaint regarding the loan transaction between the parties as true to his knowledge. The suit as framed would not, in my opinion, require any voluminous evidence to be adduced, whether documentary or oral. (25) The facts that the directors of the defendant have filed company proceedings before the Company Law Board Calcutta Bench, is not so relevant, in my view. Indeed the two companies in respect of affairs of which the company proceedings have been initiated have their registered offices in Calcutta and the Calcutta Bench of the Company Law Board is the only forum before which such company proceedings can be carried on. In any event, the defendant is not a party to such company proceedings. The criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act stand transferred to the court in Udaipur by reason of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra (supra). In any event, the defendant is not a party to such company proceedings. The criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act stand transferred to the court in Udaipur by reason of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra (supra). I also cannot lose sight of the fact that the defendant has instituted a suit against the plaintiff in the court at Udaipur for specific performance of the alleged agreement for sale of land situated in Udaipur by the defendant to the plaintiff. Whether such suit is meritorious or is frivolous is to be adjudicated and the land being situated in Udaipur, the court at Udaipur would be the natural forum for trying the said suit. In that view of the matter also it is desirable that the present suit is tried and determined by the Court at Udaipur so that the two suits can be heard analogously which would also avoid the possibility of conflict of judicial decisions. (26) In short, in my opinion, if the instant suit is allowed to continue in this court, the defendant will be seriously inconvenienced and handicapped in contesting the suit. The fact that the plaintiff has its registered office in Calcutta, is rather an insignificant factor. In my view, this court is not the natural forum or convenient forum for trial of the instant suit. (27) On the contrary, the court at Udaipur would be the natural and convenient form for trying the instant suit and the plaintiff, for the reasons stated above, shall also not face any undue hardship in proceeding with the suit before the court at Udaipur. Thus, the defendant will be relieved of any hardship without causing any corresponding disadvantage or hardship to the plaintiff if the instant suit is tried by the Court at Udaipur. (28) For the reasons aforesaid, in my view, the balance of convenience is overwhelmingly in favour of the instant suit being tried by the appropriate Civil Court in Udaipur. If the suit continues in this court the defendant is likely to be subjected to serious embarrassment, hardship and prejudice. (29) Accordingly, I revoke the leave granted under Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent and direct that the plaint be taken off the file. If the suit continues in this court the defendant is likely to be subjected to serious embarrassment, hardship and prejudice. (29) Accordingly, I revoke the leave granted under Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent and direct that the plaint be taken off the file. The plaintiff would be at liberty to file the suit in the appropriate Civil Court at Udaipur or any other more appropriate and convenient forum. The plaintiff may obtain return of the plaint upon leaving a Photostat copy thereof, duly certified by its advocate on record, to be kept in the records of this court. (30) GA No. 1032 of 2012 is accordingly allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. (31) Urgent certified Photostat copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.