JUDGMENT AND ORDER : N. Chaudhury, J. By judgment and decree dated 25.03.2004, the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division.) No. 3, Kamrup at Guwahati dismissed Money Suit No. 274 of 1998 of his Court holding that the defendants, a common carrier is not liable to make payment of any compensation to the plaintiffs against short delivery. This judgment has been brought under challenge in the present appeal by the plaintiffs. 2. National Insurance Company Ltd. and M/S Wine Word, as plaintiff No. 1 and plaintiff No. 2, instituted Money Suit No. 274 of 1998 in the court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 1 at Guwahati for realisation of Rs. 7,29,024/- from the defendants, Arunachal Carrying Corporation. The pleaded story of the plaintiffs is that plaintiff No. 1 is a Public Sector Undertaking engaged in business of insurance including marine policy and plaintiff No. 2 is a firm who purchased a cargo/inland transit policy being No. 200301/4400061/96 by declaration dated 10.02.1996 from the plaintiff No. 1. This policy was purchased in respect of a consignment. The plaintiff No. 2 executed a letter of subrogation to the plaintiff No. 1 for filing suit against defendants, the common carrier having its head office at Guwahati and branch office at Itanagar and at Khonsa in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. The plaintiff No. 2 booked one consignment of 645 cases/packages containing IMMF liquor in bottles covered by invoice No. 328 dated 09.02.1996 at Itanagar for safe carriage to Khonsa under consignment Note No. 101003 dated 10.02.1996 and the same was carried in truck No. AR-01-1175. The defendants failed to deliver the consignment in good condition and most of them were found broken at the time of delivery. The extent of damage caused to the said consignment was assessed by holding survey on 16.02.1996 at the 'accident spot at Gaurisagar'. The defendant No.1 allegedly issued damage/breakage certificate at the destination station. According to the plaintiffs, the damage/loss was caused to the suit consignment in transit due to negligence of the defendants. The plaintiff No. 2 made claim to the defendant No. 2 vide registered letter dated 11.03.1996 which is a notice under Section 10 of the Carriers Act. The defendant No.1 allegedly issued damage/breakage certificate at the destination station. According to the plaintiffs, the damage/loss was caused to the suit consignment in transit due to negligence of the defendants. The plaintiff No. 2 made claim to the defendant No. 2 vide registered letter dated 11.03.1996 which is a notice under Section 10 of the Carriers Act. But even after receipt of the letter, the defendants did not make payment to the plaintiff No. 2 for which plaintiff No. 1 as insurer paid Rs.7,29,024/- to the plaintiff No. 2 and thus, defendants are liable to make payment of the said amount to the plaintiff No. 1. The suit, therefore, was filed praying for realisation of Rs. 7,29,024/- against the defendants jointly and severally and also for interest pendente lite. 3. Upon receipt of the summons, the defendants appeared and submitted a written statement contesting the suit both on the point of maintainability as well as on merit. According to the defendants, the suit of the plaintiffs is barred by limitation, that the suit is devoid of any cause of action, that the suit is bad for non-joinder of driver of the vehicle as well as insurer of truck No. AR-01-1175 etc. In paragraph-6 of the written statement, an objection was also taken on the point that the suit is bad for non-compliance of the provision of the Carriers Act as well as other law of the land. In paragraph-9 of the written statement, the defendants disclosed that the defendants are a proprietorial concern of one Damodar Prasad Agarwala. On merit, the defendants denied correctness as to issuance of damage certificate on 16.02.1996 in respect of subject consignment. The defendants denied that goods were damaged during transit when under custody of defendant No.1 and that the consignment was booked at the risk of the owner. The defendants specifically denied the allegation of negligence on their part and denied to have received notice under Section 10 of the Carriers Act. The defendants denied liability of making any payment to the plaintiffs and prayed for dismissal of the suit with exemplary cost Under Section 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Upon such pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed following eleven issues :- (1) Whether there is any cause of action for the suit? (2) Whether the suit is barred by limitation. 4. Upon such pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed following eleven issues :- (1) Whether there is any cause of action for the suit? (2) Whether the suit is barred by limitation. (3) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. (4) Whether the suit is barred by the doctrine of estoppels, waiver and acquisence. (5) Whether the suit is bad for non compliance of provision of Carriers Act. (6) Whether the goods covered by invoice No. 328 dated 09.02.1996 of Arunachal Beverage Enterprise, Itanagar (A.P.) booked for carriage Ex-Itanagar of Khunsa under consignment Note No.101003 dated 10.02.1996 and carrying in truck No. Ar-01-1175 were damaged during the transit of said goods while any charge and custody of the defendant No. 1 and if so whether such damage/loss was goes due to the negligence of the defendant No. 1. (7) Whether the defendants are liable to compensate the losses sustained by the plaintiff No. 2. (8) Whether the suit is jurisdiction to try this suit? (9) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? (10) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree as prayed for? (11) To what relief/reliefs the parties are entitled to? 5. Subsequently, by order dated 25.10.2004, the issue No.9 was struck out and Issue No. 8 was recast as follows:- "Whether this court has jurisdiction to try this suit?" 6. In course of trial, one Dilip Kumar Chakraborty, Assistant Administrative Officer of the plaintiff No. 1 was examined as PW-1 and he exhibited as many as 19 documents. He was thoroughly cross-examined by the defendants. The defendants, on the other hand, submitted examination-in-chief on behalf of D.P. Agarwala but as he failed to appear for cross-examination, his evidence was expunged by order dated 25.03.2004. Thus, except the evidence adduced by PW-1, there is no other evidence on record of the suit. 7. The learned trial court after hearing the parties and on perusal of the materials available on records passed the impugned judgment and decree on 25.03.2004 deciding issue No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8 in favour of the plaintiffs. But while deciding issue No.6, the learned trial court held that the goods were damaged admittedly due to accident and the same is apparent from the evidence of the plaintiffs. But while deciding issue No.6, the learned trial court held that the goods were damaged admittedly due to accident and the same is apparent from the evidence of the plaintiffs. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that damage or loss caused to the consignment was either due to criminal act or due to negligence of the defendants and so they are not liable for any loss or damage. Consequently, issue Nos. 10 and 11 was also decided against the plaintiffs, holding that they are not entitled to any relief. Accordingly, the suit of the plaintiff has been dismissed in entirety. It is this judgment which has been brought under challenge in the present appeal. 8. I have heard Mr. K.K. Bhatra, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Z Mukit, learned counsel for the respondents. I have perused the lower court records. 9. Mr. K.K. Bhatra, learned counsel for the appellants would argue that under Section 9 of the Carriers Act, burden is on the common carrier to show that it did not commit any negligence or criminal act. A common carrier is liable to compensate the owner for any loss or damage caused to the consignment under Section 8 of the Carriers Act. The plaintiffs having served notice on the common carrier under Section 10 of the Carriers Act and the defendants not having denied the allegations levelled therein, the learned trial court committed error in not decreeing the suit for damage against the defendants. Mr. Bhatra has placed reliance on invoice Exhibit-A dated 9.2.1996 to show that IMMF worth Rs. 7,59,975/- was booked through the defendants for delivery at Khonsa. Drawing attention of the court to Exhibit-11 which is the inspection report of the officer under District Transport office, Sivsagar, Mr. Bhatra argues that the vehicle met with accident at Gaurisagar and as per report of the MVI, name of the driver and his license was not furnished which gives rise to presumption that the vehicle was driven by unlicensed driver and so, carrier must be held liable for negligence. According to him Exhibit-12 is the notice under Section 10 of the Carriers Act. He has also drawn attention of the court to Exhibit-14 issued on 15.02.1996 by the defendants which is the certificate of short delivery. So, the loss and damage of the consignment is proved by preponderance of probability. According to him Exhibit-12 is the notice under Section 10 of the Carriers Act. He has also drawn attention of the court to Exhibit-14 issued on 15.02.1996 by the defendants which is the certificate of short delivery. So, the loss and damage of the consignment is proved by preponderance of probability. Plaintiff No. 1 being insurer has made payment of Rs. 7,29,024/- to the plaintiff No. 2 for which letter of subrogation as well as power of attorney has been executed by plaintiff No. 2 in favour of plaintiff No. 1. This is why the suit has been jointly instituted by plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 for realisation of the aforesaid amount from the common carrier with interest. The impugned judgment and decree has been passed without considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter and hence the same is liable to be set aside and quashed and the suit of the plaintiffs is liable to be decreed in entirety with cost. 10. Per contra, Mr. Z. Mukit learned counsel for the respondents would argue that the letter of subrogation (Exhibit-4) has been issued by attorney of the plaintiff No. 2. He has also executed Exhibit-3 special power of attorney being in favour of the plaintiff No. 1. But this power of attorney is also executed by the same attorney. According to him, neither the subrogation letter nor the special power of attorney is valid, inasmuch as, a delegate of the plaintiff No. 2 has made further delegation by these instruments which are not permissible in law. Besides, by this special power of attorney the plaintiff No. 1 has been merely authorised to institute suit in Court of law against Railway Administration, if necessary for recovery of claim money. Apart from Clause-6 of this special power of attorney, there is no other clause authorising the plaintiff No. 1 to institute suit against the defendants. This special power of attorney, therefore, has not conveyed any locus standi on the plaintiff No. 1 to institute the suit on behalf of the plaintiff No. 2. According to him, the Exhibit-10, report by police as well as the report of the MVI make it clear that the driver was not guilty of any foul play and that the accident had taken place due to jam or brake show of the truck which is a mechanical failure. According to him, the Exhibit-10, report by police as well as the report of the MVI make it clear that the driver was not guilty of any foul play and that the accident had taken place due to jam or brake show of the truck which is a mechanical failure. Besides to get claim of compensation against damage of goods under carriage, the plaintiffs are duty bound to prove the real damage. Here in this case, invoice only showed number of cases of wine bottles booked for Arunachal Beverage Enterprise. On the other hand, Exhibit-14 which is the certificate issued against the consignment is not a damage certificate at all. It only indicates the number of bottles delivered by the defendants to the plaintiff No. 2. This document, therefore, cannot show how many bottles were there in the truck and what was the price of the bottles handed over to the plaintiff No. 2. So, neither the suit has been duly instituted nor have the plaintiffs proved the actual damage caused to them. Moreover, damage admittedly having taken place owing to accident of the vehicle which on turn is not due to laches and negligence of the defendants and so, the learned trial court has not committed any error in refusing to decree the suit of the plaintiffs. According to him, there is no merit in the appeal and it is liable to be dismissed in limine. 11. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the points that fall for determination in this appeal are as follows: (i) Whether the suit instituted by the plaintiffs vide Exhibit-3 and Exhibit-4 is maintainable. (ii) Whether defendants are not liable for loss of goods in view of Section 3 of the Carriers Act, 1965. (iii) Whether defendants are liable to make payment of damage and compensation to the plaintiffs under the facts and circumstances of the case. 12. I have perused the pleadings as well as evidence on record and various judgments relied on by both sides in support of their respective claims. 13. Referring to Section 3 of the Carriers Act, 1865 (herein after referred to as 'the Act'), Mr. Mukit argues that in this case Arunachal Beverages Enterprise is the consignor. 12. I have perused the pleadings as well as evidence on record and various judgments relied on by both sides in support of their respective claims. 13. Referring to Section 3 of the Carriers Act, 1865 (herein after referred to as 'the Act'), Mr. Mukit argues that in this case Arunachal Beverages Enterprise is the consignor. Exhibit-6 is the invoice and it shows that Arunachal Beverages Enterprise delivered goods described in the invoice to the carrier for delivery to plaintiff No. 2 at Khonsa. The plaintiffs have exhibited declaration No. 1 dated 10.02.1994 which contains the statements of despatches made under Policy No. 200301/4400061 vide invoice No. 328 dated 09.02.1996. This declaration is Exhibit-1 and invoice No. 328 dated 09.02.1996 mentioned therein is the Exhibit-6 referred to above. Mr. Mukit submits that consignor did not give any declaration under Section 3 of the Act and so, defendants are not liable for loss of goods under the invoice. According to him, the goods in question are covered by Schedule to the Act. He refers to the entry 'glass' in the schedule to the Act and claimed that the wine bottles were made of glass and so, they were covered by the schedule. Section 3 of the Act provides that carriers shall not be liable for loss of certain goods above Rs. 100/- in value and described in schedule to the Act unless the person delivering such property to be carried, or some person duly authorised on that behalf, shall have expressly declared to such carrier or his agent the value and description thereof. Schedule does not contain mention of wine or liquor. Along various other items there is mention of the word 'glass' therein. But defendants have not led any evidence to show that the bottles were of glass. The container of wine may or may not be made of glass and so unless a positive evidence is available in support of the contention that there were glass bottles in this consignment, it cannot be presumed that they were made of glass and so, carrier is not liable in the absence of declaration. The container of wine may or may not be made of glass and so unless a positive evidence is available in support of the contention that there were glass bottles in this consignment, it cannot be presumed that they were made of glass and so, carrier is not liable in the absence of declaration. A carrier being beneficiary of Section 3 of the Act, obviously burden lies on a carrier to plead and to establish that the goods carried are covered by schedule to the Act and that no declaration of value and description as required under Section 3 of the Act has been made. In the case in hand, the defendants did not lead any evidence at all and so, there is nothing on record to come to hold that the consignment contained glass and so, benefit of Section 3 would be available to the defendants. In the absence of such positive evidence, the argument of Mr. Mukit in the light of the Section 3 of the Act cannot be accepted and accordingly, first point for determination goes in favour of the appellants/plaintiffs. 14. Mr. Mukit argues that the plaintiffs have instituted the suit on the basis of Exhibit-3, special power of attorney as well as Exhibit-4, the letter of subrogation. Exhibit-3 is a special power of attorney executed by the plaintiff No. 2 in favour of the plaintiff No. 1, inter alia, to file suit in the Court of law against the Railway Administrations, if necessary, for the recovery of the claim moneys. This power of attorney is executed by one attorney of the plaintiff No., Wine World. Referring to Section 190 of the Contract Act, Mr. Mukit submits that the person who executed Exhibit-3, himself was an attorney and so, he being an agent could not have lawfully employed another to perform acts which he has expressly or impliedly undertaken to perform personally. Plaint does not show as to whether plaintiff No. 2 is a proprietorial firm or a partnership firm. In either case execution of Exhibit-3 by an agent of the plaintiff No. 2 would be incompetent. The maxim "delegatus non protest delegare" mentioned in Paragraph-396 of volume-I, 3rd Edition of Halshbury's Laws of England is conditional. Plaint does not show as to whether plaintiff No. 2 is a proprietorial firm or a partnership firm. In either case execution of Exhibit-3 by an agent of the plaintiff No. 2 would be incompetent. The maxim "delegatus non protest delegare" mentioned in Paragraph-396 of volume-I, 3rd Edition of Halshbury's Laws of England is conditional. It provides that an agent cannot delegate his power or duties to another, in whole or in part, without express authority of the principal or authority derived from the statute. If the authority is given reposing personal confidence on the attorney there cannot be a further delegation. But there are well recongnised exceptions to this maxim, wherein authority is expressly given to someone for performing a job which pre-supposes that the attorney will be bound to engage others for performing the same in entirety. In that event, delegation would not be covered by the maxim. In the case of Sardar Bir Singh v. Noor Ahmed and Others reported in AIR 1972 Gau 122 , question arose as to whether a constituted attorney of plaintiff can execute Vakalatnama for institution of a suit in favour of the principal. This Court after consideration of the maxim referred to above was satisfied that the attorney was engaged to institute suit on behalf of the principal. When the principal engaged him as agent for institution of the suit, he was aware that engagement of a pleader would be necessary for institution of suit and so, this Court held that by constituting an attorney, the principal had given him the authority to engage a counsel. The maxim "delegatus non protest delegare" was not applicable to the case. In the present case, the plaintiffs are silent not only in regard to nature and character of the plaintiff No.2 firm but also have not disclosed as to why was the agent appointed by the plaintiff No. 2 who had executed Exhibit-3 & 4. It was the duty of the plaintiff to furnish materials so as to avoid the rigour of the maxim "delegatus non protest delegare" and the same not having been done, the Court has to apply the maxim and to hold that by Exhibit-3 plaintiff No. 2 has no authority to authorise the plaintiff No. 1 to institute the suit. 15. Exhibit-4 is the letter of subrogation. 15. Exhibit-4 is the letter of subrogation. Subrogations have been classified under three broad categories by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Economic Transport Organisation v. Charan Spinning Mills.(P) Ltd. reported in (2010) 4 SCC 114 as follows: (i) Subrogation by equitable assignment; (ii) Subrogation by contract; and (iii) Subrogation-cum-assignment. In the second category, subrogation is evidenced by an instrument as in the present case. To avoid any dispute about the right to claim reimbursement or to confirm the quantum of reimbursement in pursuance of subrogation and to ensure co-operation by the insured in suing the wrong doer, the insurer obtains a letter of subrogation in writing specifying its right vis-a-vis the assured. By Exhibit-3 plaintiff No. 2 appointed the plaintiff No. 1 to institute the suit and to collect money from the defendants undertaking to make over the money in the first instance to the plaintiff No. 1. This means that if any decree is passed for realisation of money from the carrier and the amount is received by the plaintiffs, the amount paid by the insurer to the insured would be adjusted at the first instance and thereafter, if any balance remains, the plaintiff No. 2 shall be entitled. Thus, in the present case subrogation has been done by executing an instrument, namely, the Exhibit-4. It is now necessary to see as to whether the Exhibit-4 has been duly executed. Like Exhibit-3, this instrument is also executed by attorney of the plaintiff No. 2 and so, the reason for which Exhibit-3 could not confer any authority to the plaintiff No.1 for instituting the suit against the defendants, would also apply in case of Exhibit-4 and so, plaintiff No.1 has not been duly subrogated by the plaintiff No. 2 to institute the present suit against the defendants. Exhibit-4, therefore, is not a valid subrogation. 16. As pointed out above, plaintiff No. 2 is a firm. Under Order 30, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure any two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business in India may sue or be sued in the name of the firm of which they were partners at the time of accruing of the cause of action. Under Order 30, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure any two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business in India may sue or be sued in the name of the firm of which they were partners at the time of accruing of the cause of action. Thus, two or more partners of a partnership alone have been vested with power to sue in the name of the partnership and they can be sued as well. Order 30, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the other hand, provides that any person carrying on business in a name or style other than his own name or HUF carrying on business under any name may be sued in such name or style as if it were a firm name. Thus, it is clear that while partners can both sue and be sued in the name of the partnership firm, a person carrying on business in the name or style other than his own can alone be sued. This means that he cannot sue. This is the difference between Rule 1 and Rule 10 Order 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A Division Bench of this Court had occasion to deal with such exigency in the case of Shankarlal Jhawar v. State of Assam and Others reported in 2010 (4) GLT 378, wherein this Court made a comparative study of Rule 1 and Rule 10 Order 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure and held that a Single person who is the sole proprietor of a firm cannot sue in the name of a firm in which he carries on a business. In case of proprietorial firm even his business is run in the name of a firm, the suit is required to be filed by the proprietor in his own name and cannot sue in the name of the firm. The same view was held by the Bombay High Court in the case of Bhagvan Manaji Marwadi and Others v. Hiraji Premaji Marwadi reported in AIR 1932 Bombay 516. 17. In the case in hand, it is not clear as to whether the plaintiff No. 2 is a partnership firm or a proprietorial firm. The same view was held by the Bombay High Court in the case of Bhagvan Manaji Marwadi and Others v. Hiraji Premaji Marwadi reported in AIR 1932 Bombay 516. 17. In the case in hand, it is not clear as to whether the plaintiff No. 2 is a partnership firm or a proprietorial firm. If it is a proprietorial firm in that event the suit could not have been instituted in the name of the firm as pointed out above and consequently, suit becomes not maintainable. On the other hand, if it is a partnership firm in that event unless the firm is a registered one suit will be barred under Section 69 of the Partnership Act. Moreover, in that event two or more partners ought to have joined to institute the suit in view of the provisions of Order 30, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, either way whether the firm is proprietorial or a partnership one, the suit of the plaintiffs cannot be maintained in its present form. The learned trial court did not consider this aspect of the matter. 18. Mr. K.K. Bhatra, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the issue having been decided in favour of the appellant by the learned trial court and no cross objection having been filed by the respondents, this objection cannot be considered at the appellate stage. I am afraid, in view of amended provision of the Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a respondent cannot be restrained from supporting the decree on additional ground than the one on which the decree has been passed in his favour. Of course, in case the respondents pray for modification of decree on additional point, in that event, filing of cross-appeal or cross objection may be necessary. Here respondents have not prayed for modification of decree. So, failure to file cross-objection cannot be a fatal. Even under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure the appellate Court has power to pass any decree and to make any order which ought to have been passed or made by the learned trial court even if the respondents may not have challenged. So, the point No. 2 needs to be decided against the plaintiffs by reversing the findings of the learned trial court in this regard and it is accordingly decided. 19. So, the point No. 2 needs to be decided against the plaintiffs by reversing the findings of the learned trial court in this regard and it is accordingly decided. 19. While Section 3 of the Act provides as to when a common carrier shall be liable for the loss of or damage to the property delivered to it, Section 8 thereof lays down the provision as to when a common carrier shall be liable for such loss and damage. Section 8 starts with a non-obstante clause providing that every common carrier shall be liable to the owner for loss of or damage to any property delivered to such carrier for being carried when loss or damage occurs to it 'from the criminal act of the carrier or any of his agents or servants'. A carrier shall also be liable to the owner for loss of or damage to such property other than the property to which Section 3 of the Act applies where such loss or damage has arisen from the negligence of the carrier or any of his agents or servants. The section is clear. If loss or damage occurs to the property delivered to the carrier for being carried and such loss or damage is due to criminal act of the carrier, his agent or servant, the carrier shall be liable. The carrier shall also be liable if such loss or damage is caused due to negligence by the carrier, its agent or servant. Section 9 of the Act further provides that in any suit brought against the carrier for loss, damage or non delivery of the goods entrusted for the purpose of carriage, it shall not be necessary for the plaintiffs to prove that such loss, damage or non-delivery was owing to the negligence or the criminal act of the carrier, its servant or agent. The effect of Section 9 of the Act is that burden lies on the carrier to prove that there was neither any criminal act nor was there any negligence on its part. The basic purpose of the Section 9 of the Act is to mandate that after a plaintiff pleads loss or damage of the property under custody of the common carrier, burden comes on the carrier to prove that it is no guilty of criminal act or negligence leading to the loss. The basic purpose of the Section 9 of the Act is to mandate that after a plaintiff pleads loss or damage of the property under custody of the common carrier, burden comes on the carrier to prove that it is no guilty of criminal act or negligence leading to the loss. Section does not say that pleading of loss or damage to property would not be necessary to establish a case under Section 8 of the Act. What is provided in Section 8 of the Act is that a plaintiff does not require to establish that common carrier, including its agent and servant, was guilty of criminal act or negligence. Once it is pleaded that goods delivered to the common carrier for transportation to destination has been lost or damaged or not delivered at destination, the common carrier shall be bound to show that such loss, damage or non-delivery at destination was neither due to criminal act nor for negligence on the part of the carrier, its agent or servant. If a common carrier fails to discharge such burden vested on vested by Section 9 of the Act, in that event the common carrier shall be liable to the owner for such loss or damage or non-delivery either in part or in full as the case may be. So, to assess the liability a plaintiff in such suit shall have to establish fact as to loss, damage or non-delivery either in part or in full. Plaintiff is also to show the value of such property lost, damaged or not delivered and upon establishment of such facts, a court shall be required to pass appropriate decree against the common carrier to make amend for the loss, damage or non-delivery as the case may be. Shifting burden to establish absence of criminal act or negligence by operation of Section 9 of the Act cannot amount to shifting burden to the common carrier to show the real quantum of loss, damage or non-delivery. Ultimately, it is the plaintiff who is to get due compensation against loss, damage or non-delivery and so in absence of a provision of like nature as laid down in Section 9 of the Act, burden of a plaintiff in any other suit for damage and compensation would continue to remain in a suit for compensation under the Carriers Act. 20. 20. Keeping in view the discussions made above, let us examine the case in hand. In Paragraph-4 of the plaint it is pleaded that 645 cases/packages containing IMMF liquor in bottles covered by invoice No. 328 dated 09.02.1996 was booked for safe carriage to Khonsa under consignment note No. 101003 dated 10.02.1996 and same was carried in the truck No. AR-01-1175 but the common carrier failed to deliver the consignment in good condition at the destination. At the time of delivery most of the goods of the consignment were received in broken condition at a destination. It is further pleaded in the same paragraph that extent of such damage was assessed by holding survey on 16.02.1996 at accident spot at Gaurisagar and that defendant No.1 issued damage/breakage certificate to that effect. In Paragraph-5, it was pleaded that such damage or loss was caused due to negligence of the defendants which was brought to the notice of the defendant No. 2 in the notice under Section 10 of the Act under registered cover on 11.03.1996. But the defendants did not make payment of the loss sustained by the plaintiff No. 2 which is quantified at Rs. 7,29,024/- at Paragraph-6 of the plaint. The plaint does not disclose as to whether any amount was paid by the plaintiff No.1/insurer to the plaintiff No. 2 because of the insurance policy. A decree has been prayed for Rs. 7,29,024/- against the defendants jointly and severally in favour of plaintiff No. 1 or plaintiff No. 2 or both along with pendente lite @ 21% per annum till realisation of the decreetal amount. 21. In Paragraphs-4, 5 & 6 of the plaint, there is indication that truck No. AR-01-1175 which was carrying the subject consignment must have met with an accident at Gaurisagar for which some surveyor was required to assess the loss and such assessment was made upon survey conducted at the spot of the accident on 16.02.1996. The defendants by filing written statement denied the case of the plaintiffs in entirety. It denied to have issued any damage or loss certificate and even causing of damage to the property under transit. It was claimed that no notice under Section 10 of the Act was ever received by the defendants. The defendants by filing written statement denied the case of the plaintiffs in entirety. It denied to have issued any damage or loss certificate and even causing of damage to the property under transit. It was claimed that no notice under Section 10 of the Act was ever received by the defendants. It was pleaded that the transportation was done at the risk of the consignor i.e. Arunachal Beverages Enterprise, Itanagar and that damage or loss, if there be any, was due to negligence of the consignor. The defendants also disputed the quantum of damage. So, to prove its case as to damage to the booked consignment, plaintiffs examined one witness, namely, Dilip Chakraborty who is a Principal Officer of the plaintiff No. 1 and allegedly constituted attorney of the plaintiff No. 2. In Paragraph-5 of his examination-in-chief he stated that 645 cases/packages containing IMMF liquor in bottles covered by invoice No. 328 dated 09.02.1996 belonging to Arunachal Beverages Enterprise was booked for safe carriage to Khonsa from Itanagar in Truck No.AR-01-1175 and the defendants failed to deliver the consignment in good condition. According to him, most of the goods of the consignment were received in broken condition at the destination. According to him extent of damage was assessed by holding surveyor on 16.02.1996 at the accident spot at Gaurisagar and that defendant No. 1 issued damage/breakage certificate. He has proved Exhibit-5 consignment note and Exhibit-6 invoice of Arunachal Beverages Enterprise to show that the consignment was of the value of Rs. 7,51,975/- for 645 cases of IMMF liquor. He has proved Exhibit-10 certificate dated 19.02.1996 issued by officer in charge of Gaurisagar police station in regard to accident of the vehicle in question. Exhibit-11 is the Xerox copy of the Inspection report dated 12.02.1996 in regard to vehicle AR-01-1175 by the MVI. Exhibit-12 is the office copy of the notice dated 11.03.1996 and Exhibit-13 is the postal registration receipt. Exhibit-14 has been proved as damage certificate dated 15.02.1996 issued by the defendant No. 2. Exhibit 16 is the claim form dated 19.02.1996 submitted by the plaintiff No. 2 to the plaintiff No.1, whereas the Exhibit-15 is the claimed bill for Rs. 7,27,643.47 submitted by the plaintiff No. 2 to the plaintiff No.1. Exhibit-17 is the marine survey reported dated 11.03.1996 submitted by one Bhupen Borah, the surveyor, in which Exhibit-17(1) is the signature of said Bhupen Borah. 7,27,643.47 submitted by the plaintiff No. 2 to the plaintiff No.1. Exhibit-17 is the marine survey reported dated 11.03.1996 submitted by one Bhupen Borah, the surveyor, in which Exhibit-17(1) is the signature of said Bhupen Borah. Of course, Bhupen Borah has not been examined either to prove his signature or contents of the Exhibit-17. By Ehibit-18, P.W.1 proved payment of money of Rs. 7,29,024/- by plaintiff No. 1 to plaintiff No. 2. Exhibit-19 is the pleaders notice to the learned counsel of the defendants under Section 66 of the Evidence Act. 22. In whole of his examination-in-chief, apart from exhibiting and marking copy of the survey report allegedly given by one Bhupen Borah, the sole witness of the plaintiff has not said a word more about the quantum of loss or damage sustained by the plaintiff No. 2. The sole P.W. being an officer of the plaintiff No. 1 did not have any personal knowledge about the loss or damage caused to the property of the plaintiff No. 2 and so, being a constituted attorney, even if, the special power of attorney is accepted for the time being, his statement would not have more value than that of a hearsay evidence. Moreover, mere marking a document as exhibit cannot amount to proof of its contents. A content of a document has to be proved in accordance with law. In the case of Sait Tarajee Khimchand and Others v. Yelamarti Satyam @ Satteyya and Others reported in (1972) 4 SCC 562 it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that any statement has to be proved as a fact. Documents do not prove facts. The contents of the document have to be proved. 23. Exhibit-17 is the report submitted by one Bhupen Borah, the surveyor and loss assessor of Dibrugarh. Exhibit-17 was submitted on 11.03.1996 on the basis of inspection held by him on 16.02.1996 at Gaurisagar. This is available at Clause-(xxii) of Paragraph-A of the report. In Paragraph-C of this report, the surveyor states that he visited the accident spot and Gaurisagar police station on 16.02.1996 where he was presented with the damage consignment that contained wine and beer in bottles/cartoons. According to the surveyor, he came to know that the concerned vehicle fell on the ground with its left portion on metal surface and most of the bottles were broken at the accident spot. According to the surveyor, he came to know that the concerned vehicle fell on the ground with its left portion on metal surface and most of the bottles were broken at the accident spot. According to him, huge quantity of different quality of wine bottles/beer bottles were found broken and lying at the accident spot. He found the accident affected vehicle in Gaurisagar Police Station and took its photograph. In Paragraph-E of the report it is claimed that 1595 bottles were found recovered by police personnel at the accident site. He collected the information’s from the police station and thereafter, proceeded to assess the value. In the column titled assessment, he claims to have carefully and closely inspected the damage/broken consignment at the accident spot and the recovered bottles by the police authority at the Gaurisagar police station. He examined witnesses and also took into consideration the discussions he had with the police personnel and accordingly, he made the assessment. What is apparent from above is that he visited the spot on 16.02.1996 whereas accident had taken place on 11.02.1996 at about 10 P.M. on NH-37 near Gaurisagar. Before he had visited the spot on 16.02.1996, personnel of Gaurisagar police station had recovered 1595 bottles of wine/beer from the accident site and he inspected them at the police station only. He visited the accident spot and claimed to have seen damaged bottles there. He appears to have recorded statement of witnesses and then prepared his report. This report is nothing but his statement based on inspection and examination of witness. Report is the outcome of what he had allegedly seen at the place of occurrence. The relevant fact emanating from Exhibit-18, therefore, was a matter seen by him and so, such relevant fact could only be proved once he comes to the witness box and claims to have so seen. This is because, under Section 60 of the Evidence Act a fact which can be seen can only be proved by someone who deposes to have seen such fact to occur. Exhibit-18 report, therefore, cannot prove the fact as to damage caused to the consignment due to accident unless the author of the report is examined. Besides, Exhibit-14 certificate relied on by the plaintiff also does not appear to be a damage/breakage certificate at all. Exhibit-18 report, therefore, cannot prove the fact as to damage caused to the consignment due to accident unless the author of the report is examined. Besides, Exhibit-14 certificate relied on by the plaintiff also does not appear to be a damage/breakage certificate at all. This certificate was issued by the defendant No.2 to the plaintiff No.2 declaring that most of the goods of the consignment were damaged due to truck accident near Gaurisagar on 11.02.1996 at 10 P.M. There was also theft of the articles at the accident spot and rest of the goods were delivered to the consignee as in good condition. This certification does not show the value of the goods returned to the consignee and value of goods damaged or lost. It does not show as to how many cases/packages of the consignment have been returned to the consignee. On the other hand, the surveyor also stopped after reporting that most of the goods were damaged. He did not specifically quantify the damage caused and from perusal of the consignment note, the invoice and Exhibit-14 it is not possible to find as to goods of what value had really been damaged or stolen. That being the position, it is not possible to assess the damage caused to the consignment which is necessary for imposing liability on the common carrier. In fine, plaintiff has failed to establish the extent of damage by leading appropriate evidence. The third point for determination, therefore, has to be decided against the plaintiff/appellant and in favour of the defendants/respondents. 24. It has been held that the suit is neither maintainable in present form for the defects discussed above nor have the plaintiffs established the extent of damage caused to the plaintiff No. 2. The learned trial court has held that damage, if there be any, was caused due to accident which is apparent from the recital of the plaint itself. Since, the defendants were not responsible for the accident, the learned trial court held that no damage or compensation was liable to be paid by the defendants. Paragraph-4 of the plaint contains information as to occurrence of accident leading to damage of the consignment. Although, there is a general allegation at Paragraph-5 of the plaint that the damage or loss was caused due to negligence of the defendants and the consignor, but the consignor has not been made a party. Paragraph-4 of the plaint contains information as to occurrence of accident leading to damage of the consignment. Although, there is a general allegation at Paragraph-5 of the plaint that the damage or loss was caused due to negligence of the defendants and the consignor, but the consignor has not been made a party. There is no allegation that the accident had taken place due to negligent act of the defendants, their agents or servants and so, in the absence of an allegation to that extent there was no occasion on the part of the defendants to lead evidence in this regard. Of course, in this case, the defendants had not led any evidence at all. But plaintiffs having proved Exhibit-10 (police report) and Exhibit-11 (MVI Report) the fact as to occurrence of the accident and absence of 'foul play' on the part of the driver stood ruled out. Police report Exhibit-10 shows that accident had taken place due to sudden jamming of the rear right wheel of the truck and the enquiry did not reveal any 'foul play' on the part of the driver. Plaintiffs themselves have disclosed these facts in their own evidence and so, there is no scope to hold that findings of the learned trial court on this count are erroneous or baseless. In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Mehta Transport Company reported in AIR 2002 Raj 157 , it is held that when damage to goods takes place due to accident for bursting of the tyre of the vehicle, it is not a negligent act of the driver and it cannot be said that the carrier did not take proper care in maintaining the vehicle. The claim for loss on account of damage was found to be not maintainable by the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court in that case. In the case in hand, as per the evidence of the plaintiffs accident had taken place due to sudden jamming of the right rear wheel of the truck, wherein there was no foul play on the part of the driver. The common carrier, therefore, cannot be held liable under Section 8 of the Act for damage caused due to such accident. The learned trial court has not committed any error in passing the judgment. Accordingly, appeal stands dismissed. 25. No order as to costs.