JUDGMENT K.J. Thaker, J. (Oral) - This petition is of the year 2011 and it was at the stage of notice and has not been admitted, it is being decided finally. 2. On 10.8.2015, this court has passed the following order: “S.O. to 12.8.2015 for dictation of order. As there is gross delay but Mr. Patel learned advocate wants the authority to consider case for premium on which Mr. Raval ld. AGP will take instruction, otherwise, the petition is required to be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches.” 3. Though the roster has been changed, however, this petition is listed today before this Court for dictation of judgment. 4. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs: A) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit and allow this petition: B) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, by quashing and setting aside - [i] the impugned order passed by the Chief Secretary [Appeals], Revenue Department, at Annexure - A to the petition, [ii] the impugned order dated 2.7.2002 passed by the respondent no. 2 - Collector, Junagadh, at Annexure-B to the petition, and [iii] the impugned order dated 10.4.2001 passed by the Deputy Collector, Veraval at Annexure-C to the petition. (C) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, Your Lordships may be pleased- [i] to stay the execution, operation and implementation of - [i] the impugned order passed by the Chief Secretary [Appeals], Revenue Department, at Annexure-A to the petition, [ii] the impugned order dated 2.7.2002 passed by the respondent no. 2 - Collector, Junagadh, at Annexure-B to the petition, and [iii] the impugned order dated 10.4.2001 passed by the Deputy Collector, Veraval, at Annexure-C to the petition. [iv] to direct the respondents, their officers, employees, agents and servants, not to disturb the peaceful and legal possession of the petitioners qua the land in question, namely the land bearing survey no. 432 mouje Una, taluka Una, district Junagadh admeasuring Acre-2 - 28 gunthas. (D) Your Lordship may be pleased to pass such other and further relief in favour of the petitioner, as deemed just and proper, in the facts and circumstances of the case. 5. Heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties and considered the submissions. 6. Mr. 432 mouje Una, taluka Una, district Junagadh admeasuring Acre-2 - 28 gunthas. (D) Your Lordship may be pleased to pass such other and further relief in favour of the petitioner, as deemed just and proper, in the facts and circumstances of the case. 5. Heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties and considered the submissions. 6. Mr. Patel learned advocate appearing for the petitioners submitted that assuming without admitting that the land was of new tenure, a post-facto permission could have been given by the authorities and can be given by the authorities below, because, the land has changed status as the land was first sold in 1981, and then in 1997, and it is not a case where the State Government authorities were not aware about these facts because the revenue entries were made in the revenue record whereby the names of the purchasers have been entered in the revenue record. It is further submitted that the respondent no. 2 while considering the appeal of the petitioners should have considered the relevant and material fact that the period of almost 17 years had passed when the proceedings were initiated for the first time by way of suo motu notice. It is submitted that it is a law well laid down that the suo motu powers are to be exercised within a reasonable time frame and the time frame is stipulated as few months, at the most one year. There is a gross unexplained delay based on which the proceedings have been delayed and solely on this ground of unreasonable delay, the impugned orders deserve to be quashed and set aside. 7. The factual scenario as it emerges from the petition, shows that the main thrust of the petition is the dismissal of petitioners’ claim by order dated 2006 which confirmed the order dated 2.7.2002 and the order dated 10.4.2001. It is an admitted fact that the petition is filed in the year 2011. The petitioner has come to this court after a period of 7 years. 8. It is an admitted fact that the petition is filed in the year 2011. The petitioner has come to this court after a period of 7 years. 8. On merits also, the petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the impugned orders on the ground that the most relevant and material fact is that till date 1.11.1956, there was no such word “new tenure” and when the Barkhalidars have been given the land, as has been shown in the facts of the case, if the area is less than “Poshankshama”, and it is given from the original Barkhali Estate, it is always deemed to have been given on “old tenure”. However, on two counts the petition deserves to be dismissed; (i) that the order does not suffer from any vice which can be considered to be perverse within the meaning of perversity under article 227 of the Constitution, and; (ii) even before the Revisional Authority the petitioner did not remain present and the order dated 2.7.2002 came to be confirmed vide order at Annexure-A. If we consider the order dated 18.4.2006 passed in review application, which is brought in challenge, there is a gross delay of five years. In the case of Brijesh Kumar and Others v. State of Haryana & Ors, reported in (2014)11 SCC 351 , wherein, the Apex Court observed that inordinate delay caused by inaction or negligence lacking bona fides would disentitle claimant from protection under Section 5. Held, delay not condonable. The principle summarised by the Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v. Subhash Sindhi Coop. Housing Society reported in (2013) 5 SCC 427 - Important considerations being :(a) enforcement of established rights and corresponding duties of State (as distinguished from creating or establishing a legal right), (b) facts of each case, (c) public policy, public interest and public good, (d) equitable principles, (e) interest of justice or substantial justice, (f) proper pleading and bona fides of petitions, (g) promptitude in approaching Court, and (h) demand of right authority concerned in words and conduct (sometimes such demand may not be necessary when it is only an empty formality). 9. Thus, the conduct of the petitioners goes to show that this court cannot interfere with the concurrent finding of facts which are neither perverse nor are bad in eye of law. 9. Thus, the conduct of the petitioners goes to show that this court cannot interfere with the concurrent finding of facts which are neither perverse nor are bad in eye of law. There is one more factor which will preclude this Court from exercising the extra-ordinary jurisdiction that is the delay as there is gross delay, and therefore, only on this ground, the petition requires to be dismissed. I am supported in my view by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of M/s. D.S.R. Steel (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., reported in AIR 2012 SC 1602 , which will permit this Court to dismiss the petition both on the ground of delay as well as merits. I am also supported in my view by the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Amalendu Kumar Bera and Ors. v. State of West Bengal, reported in (2013)4 SCC 52 , and in the case of Basavraj and anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013)14 SCC 81 . In the case of Basavraj and anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (supra), the Apex Court has held that the discretion to condone delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case- “Sufficient case” cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party - Even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute-Courts have no choice but to give effect to the same-Result flowing from statutory provision is never an evil. Courts do not have power to extend period of limitation based on equitable ground. If courts start substituting period of limitation then it would amount to legislation, which is impermissible. The fact of delay being condoned and the fact that these days there is a tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner will also have to be looked into. However, it has to be within legal parameters. It is submitted by Mr. patel learned advocate for the petitioner that this Court in such matters have held that the delay of even 17 years can be condoned. However, it has to be within legal parameters. It is submitted by Mr. patel learned advocate for the petitioner that this Court in such matters have held that the delay of even 17 years can be condoned. However, going through the facts, this Court even on merits and on delay encapsulated with each other feels that would not permit this Court to enlarge the scope of writ jurisdiction. Can it be said that the learned advocate has been able to show that the delay is properly explained. Can it be presumed that the petitioners were unaware about the order passed in the year 2006. As mentioned herein above, the delay in pursuing before the authorities concerned is also not properly explained. The fact that there were breach of conditions and the property being sold as without previous permission, it cannot be said that the orders are bad which under Article 227 of the Constitution requires to be exercised. The nature, scope and object of applicability of supervisory jurisdiction has been time and again discussed by this High Court as well as the Apex Court. The Apex Court in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander, reported in AIR 2003 SC 3044 , has summed up the legal position thus: (i) the jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature; (ii) the supervisory jurisdiction is wide and can be used to meet the ends of justice, also to interfere even with interlocutory order; (iii) the power must be exercised sparingly, only to move subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority to see that they obey the law. The power is not available to be exercised to correct mere errors (whether on the facts or laws) and also cannot be exercised “as the cloak of an appeal in disguise.” 10. The supervisory jurisdiction may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed jurisdiction which it does not have; (ii) has failed to exercise jurisdiction which it has and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. 11. Thus, I do not think that the order of the authorities below is such which would permit this Court to exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution. 11. Thus, I do not think that the order of the authorities below is such which would permit this Court to exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution. It is however, well settled that one of the considerations which the High Court will keep in view is whether the party seeking the assistance of the court was or was not reasonably diligent in pursuing the remedy. If he is guilty of undue delay or laches in approaching the court, his petition may be dismissed only on that ground without entering into merits of the cause. If party acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay. There is no justification in condoning delay by imposing conditions. Each application for condonation of delay to be decided within the framework laid down by Supreme Court. If courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause was made out by imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter disregard to legislature. 12. In that view of the matter, this petition being devoid of merits, is dismissed. Petition dismissed.