Indira Shah, J.:-- This petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is filed against the order dated 9.1.2014 passed by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Yupia in PCA No.08 (YPA)/2010 whereby the charge under sections 13(2), 13(l)(d)(i) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, has been framed against the petitioner. 2. I have heard Mr. P.K. Tiwari, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. L. Tenzin, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Kholi Tado, learned Public Prosecutor, appearing on behalf of the State/opp. party. Both the parties have filed their written arguments in this matter. 3. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the Director of Health Services (DHS), Naharlagun, Arunachal Pradesh, Sri Hage Lodor, lodged a written complaint dated 18.5.2007 at Naharlagun Police Station alleging, inter alia, that the petitioner while functioning as i/c Director of Health Services, Government of Arunachal Pradesh at Naharlagun, had committed gross criminal misconduct by appointing 224 candidates in various posts in Malaria Branch of the Health Department without any existing vacancies and thereby deceived the innocent candidates. On the receipt of the said FIR, Naharlagun Police Station Case No.101/2007 under sections 13(l)(d)(i), (ii) read with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was registered against the petitioner. 4. During the investigation, it was revealed that the petitioner, while serving as Director (i/c) of the Health Services, was to retire on superannuation on 28.2.2006, but his service was extended for another one year with approval of the State Government. During the extended period of his service as i/c Director of Health Services, the petitioner illegally appointed 303 persons to various posts in spite of non-existing vacancies in the Malaria Branch of the Directorate of Health Services without following any process of selection by abusing his official position. 5. Initially the charge sheet under section 13(2) read with section 13(l)(d) (i)(ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was laid against the petitioner. A supplementary charge sheet dated 27.12.2010 was also filed under section 13(2)/13(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act in continuation of the earlier charge sheet. 6. It is submitted by Mr. Tiwari, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner that in the supplementary charge sheet, petitioner has not been made accused and recommendation is given to frame charge against Shri Ngihon Singpho. 6. It is submitted by Mr. Tiwari, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner that in the supplementary charge sheet, petitioner has not been made accused and recommendation is given to frame charge against Shri Ngihon Singpho. The supplementary charge sheet does not in any manner implicate the petitioner and contents material only against Shri Ngihon Singpho. 7. In the first charge sheet, altogether 26 witnesses have been cited as witness. Out of 26 witnesses, 5 are State Government officials belonging to the Directorate of Health Services and the rest are alleged illegal appointees. The co-accused Sri Harish A.R. (DHV) of the Directorate of Health Services was also examined by the Inquiry Officer and his statement was recorded under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The charge sheet refers 14 documents marked as Annexures 1 to 14. 8. It is also submitted by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that in order to sustain the charge against the petitioner under section 13(l)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, it is necessary to have some evidence or material in the charge sheet, even prima facie, to show that the petitioner by way of making illegal appointments obtained from any person in valuable things or pecuniary advantage either for himself or for any other persons. 9. The statement of witnesses available on record demonstrate that there is not an iota of evidence to show even prima facie that the petitioner by way of such illegal appointments obtained for himself any pecuniary advantage or valuable things. None of the documents, marked as Annexures 1 to 14, referred in the charge sheet, contain a shred of evidence on petitioner attempting to obtain any pecuniary advantage or obtaining any valuable things either for himself or for others in lieu of illegal appointments of Groups C and D staff in Malaria Branch of the Health Directorate. 10. Annexures I, IV, VI, IX and XII only indicate that the petitioner amongst others was responsible for illegal appointments of Groups C and D staff in the Malaria Branch of the Directorate of Health Services. The documents marked as Annexures II & III relate to preventive measure for control of Malaria in the State. Documents marked as Annexures VI and VIII contend details of staff appointed for implementing programmes for control of Malaria. The documents marked as Annexures II & III relate to preventive measure for control of Malaria in the State. Documents marked as Annexures VI and VIII contend details of staff appointed for implementing programmes for control of Malaria. Documents marked as Annexures XIII and XIV are related to court cases filed by the petitioner. Annexure V is the petitioner's letter justifying his action. Annexure X relates to correspondence with the Director of Health Services regarding furnishing of information for the purpose of investigation. Annexure XII relates to petitioner's extension of service from 1.3.2006 to 31.3.2007. 11. Per contra learned P.P. has submitted that on close scrutiny of the statement of witnesses and the documents, it reveals that the petitioner, while functioning as i/c Director of Health Services, illegally appointed 333 candidates and while appointing those candidates, he did not follow any rule and procedure. He appointed those candidates abusing his official position and thereby committed gross misconduct and it can be inferred that those illegal appointments were for his pecuniary gain. The appointments were made without existing vacancies and without adhering to the prescribed norms causing wrongful loss to the State exchequer and wrongful gain to the petitioner and others. 12. It is further submitted by the learned P.P. that during the pendency of investigation, the petitioner filed CRP No.09(AP) of 2007 for quashing of the FIR lodged against him and for stay of the process of further investigation. However, this court dismissed the petition and aggrieved by the said order of this court, the petitioner filed a special leave petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court of India and the Apex Court also dismissed the said special leave petition (SLP) of the petitioner and directed the State Government to continue with the investigation. 13. In the cited case of Satish Mehra v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr., (2012) 13 SCC 614, it has been held in paras 13 and 14, as under : "13. 13. In the cited case of Satish Mehra v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr., (2012) 13 SCC 614, it has been held in paras 13 and 14, as under : "13. Though a criminal complaint lodged before the court under the provisions of Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure or an FIR lodged in the police station under Chapter XII of the Code has to be brought to its logical conclusion in accordance with the procedure prescribed, power has been conferred under section 482 of the Code to interdict such a proceeding in the event the institution/continuance of the criminal proceeding amounts to an abuse of the process of court. An early discussion of the law in this regard can be found in the decision of this court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab wherein the parameters of exercise of the inherent power vested by section 561-A of the repealed Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (corresponding to section 482, Cr.PC, 1973) had been laid down in the following terms (AIR, p. 869, para 6): (i) where institution/continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice; (ii) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding, e.g., want of sanction; (iii) where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; and (iv) where the allegations constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly falls to prove the charge. 14. The power to interdict a proceeding either at the threshold or at an intermediate stage of the trial is inherent in a High Court on the broad principle that in case the allegations made in the FIR or the criminal complaint, as may be, prima facie do not disclose a triable offence, there can be reason as to why the accused should be made to suffer the agony of a legal proceeding that more often than not gets protracted . A prosecution which is bound to become lame or a sham ought to be interdicted in the interest of justice as continuance thereof will amount to an abuse of the process of the law. This is the core basis on which the power to interfere with a pending criminal proceeding has been recognised to be inherent in every High Court. The power, though available, being extraordinary in nature has to be exercised sparingly and only if the attending facts and circumstances satisfy the narrow test indicated above, namely, that even accepting all the allegations levelled by the prosecution, no offence is disclosed. However, if so warranted, such power would be available for exercise not only at the threshold of a criminal proceeding but also at a relatively advanced stage thereof, namely, after framing of the charge against the accused. In fact the power to quash a proceeding after framing of charge would appear to be somewhat wider as, at that stage, the materials revealed by the investigation carried out usually come on record and such materials can be looked into, not for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused but for the purpose of drawing satisfaction that such materials, even if accepted in their entirety, do not, in any manner, disclose the commission of the offence alleged against the accused." 14. In the same judgment, in paras 17 and 21, it has been observed as follows : "17. While dealing with the contours of the inherent power under section 482, Cr.PC to quash a criminal proceeding, another decision of this court in Padal Venkata Rama Reddy v. Kowuri Satyanarayana Reddy to which one of us (P. Sathasivam, J) was a party may be usefully noticed. In the said decision after an exhaustive consideration of the principles governing the exercise of the said power as laid down in several earlier decisions this court held that (SCC, p. 448, para 31): "31.... When exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. When exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. The scope of exercise of power under section 482 and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognisable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in detail in Bhajan Lal. The powers possessed by the High Court under section 482 are very wide and at the same time the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution." 21. A criminal trial cannot be allowed to assume the character of a fishing and roving enquiry. It would not be permissible in law to permit a prosecution to linger, limp and continue on the basis of a mere hope and expectation that in the trial some material may be found to implicate the accused. Such a course of action is not contemplated in the system of criminal jurisprudence that has been evolved by the courts over the years. A criminal trial, on the contrary, is contemplated only on definite allegations, prima facie, establishing the commission of an offence by the accused which fact has to be proved by leading unimpeachable and acceptable evidence in the course of the trial against the accused. We are, therefore, of the view that the criminal proceeding in the present form and on the allegations levelled is clearly not maintainable against either of the appellant-accused G.K. Bhat and R.K. Arora." 15. Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 provides punishment of offence of criminal misconduct, which reads as under : "(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine." 16. Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 provides punishment of offence of criminal misconduct, which reads as under : "(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine." 16. In the case of A. Subair v. State of Kerala, (2009) 6 SCC 587 , the Apex Court has laid down the following essential ingredients in respect of section 13(1)(d)(1) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 : (i) the accused should have been a public servant; (ii) that he should have used corrupt and other means or otherwise abused his position as such public servant; (iii) that he should have obtained or attempted to obtain a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for himself or for any other person. 17. In the cited case of C.K. Damodaran Nair v. Government of India, (1997) 9 SCC 477 , it was held that the primary requisite of an offence under section 13(l)(d) of the Act is proof of a demand or request of a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage from the public servant and obtaining or attempt to obtain or accept such valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. 18. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner by referring the cited cases of Subash Parbat Sonvane v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 5 SCC 86 ; M.W. Mohiuddin v. State of Maharashtra, (1995) 3 SCC 567 and K.R. Purushothaman v. State of Kerala, (2005) 12 SCC 631, has submitted that in absence of proof of demand or request from the public servant for a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage and obtaining or attempt to obtain the same, the offence under section 13(1)(d) cannot be made out and mere acceptance of money without there being any other evidence would not be sufficient for convicting the accused under section 13(1)(d)(i) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 19. The Witness, Techi Kena, was examined during the investigation. He stated that he personally approached Dr. P.P. Chaliha (petitioner herein), the then Director of Health Services and managed the appointments of six candidates, although, most of the appointments were made by Dr. P.P. Chaliha on the recommendations of the MLA and Ministers in various posts of Malaria branch of the Directorate of Health Services. He stated that he personally approached Dr. P.P. Chaliha (petitioner herein), the then Director of Health Services and managed the appointments of six candidates, although, most of the appointments were made by Dr. P.P. Chaliha on the recommendations of the MLA and Ministers in various posts of Malaria branch of the Directorate of Health Services. The petitioner was to retire from active service on 28.2.2006 but his service was extended for another period till 31.3.2007 and he might have succumbed to the request of MLA and Ministers in order to get the benefit of his extension of service for another one year. 20. The documents referred and the statement of witnesses prima facie show that the petitioner appointed as many as 333 candidates by misusing his official position without following any rule or procedure and without any existing vacancies. 21. A fact can be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. The illegal appointments made by the petitioner may lead to circumstantial evidence of a demand of a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage from the public servant and obtaining or attempt to obtain valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. The petitioner by helping the MLA and Ministers and by appointing the candidates without following norms, rule and procedure, might have obtained gain for extension of his service or other advantage. Therefore, while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the court should not embark upon an inquiry whether the evidence is reliable or whether the accusation would be sustained. Prima facie it appears that the accused petitioner should face the trial for the charges framed against him. 22. In the result, in the light of the aforesaid discussions, this criminal petition is dismissed and disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. ----------