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2015 DIGILAW 820 (MAD)

M. Rengasamy v. Superintending Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board

2015-02-10

V.M.VELUMANI

body2015
Judgment :- 1. This Writ Petition has been filed by the petitioner to quash the impugned order of the respondent in Ka.No.014487/352/Ni.Pi.3/00.1/Co.0 - Tho/2009, dated 03.08.2009 and direct the respondent to give employment to him. 2. The petitioner sought for absorption permanently in the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. According to the petitioner, he was working as casual Labour in the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board from the year 1995. He applied for permanency in the Board and gave a representation to the respondent to absorb him permanently in the Electricity Board. The respondent did not pass any order on the same. Therefore, the petitioner filed W.P.(MD)No.5074 of 2009 before this Court. This Court, by an order dated 22.06.2009, directed the respondent to consider the representation of the petitioner in accordance with law within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of the order. The petitioner has again given a representation, dated 17.07.2009 [wrongly stated as 07.07.2009] on 03.08.2009 to the respondent. But the respondent, by an order, dated 03.08.2009, rejected the request of the petitioner for permanent absorption. 3. The request of the petitioner was rejected on the ground that the petitioner should have worked continuously for a period of five years prior to 2009 and receive the ex-gratia payment from the Electricity Board. According to the petitioner, he was working continuously for five years without any break and the allegation made by the respondent contrary to the same, is factually incorrect. Therefore, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition for the relief stated supra. 4. The respondent filed counter affidavit denying the various averments made by the petitioner. It is stated that as per settlement, dated 10.08.2007, the persons, who are all received ex-gratia payment from the Electricity Board for certain years were identified by the constituted committee and absorbed as temporary casual labour/Mazdoor Grade-II (Trainee)/Helper as the case may be. Further, the persons, who are continuously working for 480 days in 24 calendar months, are eligible for their permanency as per the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981. The petitioner ought to have approached the appellate authority, i.e., Labour Court or the Inspector of Labour, challenging the impugned order dated 03.08.2009, in view of the factual issue as to his continuous employment is involved and prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. The petitioner ought to have approached the appellate authority, i.e., Labour Court or the Inspector of Labour, challenging the impugned order dated 03.08.2009, in view of the factual issue as to his continuous employment is involved and prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner and respondent reiterated the averments made in the affidavit and counter affidavit. 6. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties. 7. The issue involved in this matter was considered by this Court in a number of judgments. This Court has directed conferring permanency to the workers, who had worked for 480 days in 24 calendar months, based on the order of the concerned jurisdictional Inspector of Labour. In the present case, the respondent has disputed the averment of the petitioner that he worked continuously as causal labour and he is entitled to permanency in service, only if he proves that he had worked for 480 days in 24 calendar months. 8. It is well settled that the disputed question of fact cannot gone into by this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Useful reference can be had from the following decisions. (i) In (1976) 1 SCC 292 (Arya Vyasa Sabha and Ors. v. The Commissioner of Hindu Charitable and Religious Institutions & Endowments, Hyderabad and Ors.) the view taken by the High Court that disputed questions of fact are to be left open to be decided before the Civil Court was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. (ii) In the decision reported in (2003) 4 SCC 317 (Rourkela Shramik Sangh v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Anr.), it is held that the disputed questions of fact could not be entertained in the writ proceedings. In paragraph 19, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "19. The question as to whether the workmen concerned had been continuously working for a period of ten years so as to enable them to derive benefit of the judgment of this Court in R.K. Panda case (1994) 5 SCC 304 was essentially a question of fact...." [emphasis supplied] In paragraph 22, the Hon'ble Supreme Court further held as follows: "22. ...a disputed question of fact normally would not be entertained in a writ proceeding. ...a disputed question of fact normally would not be entertained in a writ proceeding. This aspect of the matter has also been considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. National Union Waterfront Workers (2001) 7 SCC 1 ...." [emphasis supplied] (iii) In (2006) 9 SCC 256 (Himmat Singh v. State of Haryana and Ors.), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the statement of the appellant or the 5th respondent was correct or not, could not ordinarily be tested in writ proceedings and it is well known that in writ petition ordinarily such a disputed question of fact could not be entertained. (iv) In yet another decision reported in (2007) 7 MLJ 687 (Food Corporation of India v. Harmesh Chand), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "Since the facts were seriously disputed by the appellant and no factual finding could be recorded without consideration of evidence adduced by the parties, it was not an appropriate case in which the High Court ought to have exercised its writ jurisdiction. The parties could have approached a civil court of competent jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter." [emphasis supplied] 9. In the light of the above discussion and decisions, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, dismissed. No costs. It is open to the petitioner to approach the concerned jurisdictional Inspector of Labour and establish his case that he has worked for 480 days in 24 calendar months.