ORDER : 1. This first appeal under Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure has been filed by the appellants/state aggrieved of the judgment and decree dated 20.9.2006 passed by Fourth Additional District Judge, Gwalior in Civil Suit No. 2B of 2006, whereby, the suit filed by the plaintiffs for recovery of Rs. 3,12,681/- along with the interest at the rate of 12% per annum was decreed. 2. Heard I.A. No. 16288 of 2007, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the appellants for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 3. The appeal is drastically barred by 296 days. 4. I have gone through the application for condonation of delay. The facts as disclosed in the application by the appellant are as under:- (1) That the present First appeal is being preferred against the judgment and decree dated 20th September, 2006 passed by the Learned trial court namely Fourth Additional District Judge, Gwalior (MP). (2) That, the certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree dated 20th September, 2006 was applied for on 23.09.2006, which was delivered on 31.10.2006. (3) That, on receipt of the certified copy of the said impugned judgment and decree on 31.10.2006, the concerned Govt. Pleader who was conducting the case in the trial Court, sent his opinion vide his letter dated 30.11.2006 to the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department Division Bhind enclosing therewith the certified copy of the said judgment and decree dated 20.09.2006. (4) On receipt of the said opinion along with the certified copy of the judgment and decree dated 20.09.2006 from the concerned Govt. Pleader, the Executive Engineer, P.W.D. Division Bhind wrote letters to the Sub-Divisional Officer, P.W.D. E & M B Sub-Division Bhind (who was the Officer-in-charge of the case in the Learned trial court) from time to time to make available the requisite records for obtaining the sanction from the Govt. to file appeal before this Hon'ble Court against the said impugned judgment and decree dated 20.09.2006. to file appeal before this Hon'ble Court against the said impugned judgment and decree dated 20.09.2006. Ultimately on receipt of some records from the Officer-in-charge of the case, the Executive Engineer, P.W.D. Division Bhind written letter on 2.3.2007 to the Secretary Government of M.P. Law and Legislative Affairs Department, Bhopal as well as to the Government of M.P. Public Works Department, Bhopal for granting permission to file the appeal against the said impugned judgment and decree and also for appointing him Officer-in-charge of the case for filing the said appeal along with this letter, the certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree as well as the opinion of the Govt. Pleader was also enclosed and sent. (5) Ultimately, the Law Department vide its letter dated 11.07.2007 granted sanction to file appeal before this Hon'ble Court along with application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. This was sent to the Additional Advocate General at Gwalior as well as to the Collector, Bhind. On receipt whereof, the Collector, District Bhind as well as the office of Additional Advocate General at Gwalior wrote letters to the Executive Engineer, P.W.D. Division Bhind (Officer-in-charge of the case) to contact the Additional Advocate General at Gwalior for preparation and filing of the appeal against the said impugned judgment and decree of the Learned trial court. This letter was written by the Collector, Bhind on 24.07.2007. (6) In the meantime, another certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree was applied for, which was delivered on 3.08.2007. (7) On receipt of the said letter from the Collector Bhind as well as from the Additional Advocate General, Gwalior, the Executive Engineer, P.W.D. Division Bhind (Officer-in-charge of the case) and thereafter contacted the office of Addl. Advocate General at Gwalior on 24.9.2007. The Addl. Advocate General at Gwalior thereafter handed over the case to the Government Advocate concerned for preparation and filing of the appeal along with application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. (8) Accordingly the concerned Govt. Advocate to whom the case was handed over for preparation of the appeal as well as application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, got drafted the same on 10.10.2007 and thus the same is being filed today on 11.10.07. The delay thus is based on sufficient cause. It occurred because of following the requisite procedure. Advocate to whom the case was handed over for preparation of the appeal as well as application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, got drafted the same on 10.10.2007 and thus the same is being filed today on 11.10.07. The delay thus is based on sufficient cause. It occurred because of following the requisite procedure. As such the same deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice especially in view of far reaching effect of the case." 5. The manner in which, the appellants have dealt with the matter speaks volume and shows utter negligence on the part of the appellants to consider the issue of condonation. 6. The counsel for the appellants without explaining the delay, has submitted that because of following the requisite procedure, the delay was occurred. He has relied upon the judgments of the apex Court in the case of Hariyana vs. Chandramani and Others, AIR 1996 SC 1623 and Special Tehsildar Land Acquisition Kerala vs. K.V. Ayisumma, AIR 1996 SC 1750 and prayed for condonation of delay. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand has opposed the application by filing reply to the application for condonation of delay saying that in the absence of any reasonable and satisfactory day to day explanation of delay on the part of the appellants, this appeal deserves to be dismissed. They relied upon the judgment of Apex Court in the case of M.K. Prasad vs. P. Arumugam, AIR 2001 SC 2497 where, interpreting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed in para 7 as under : "7. In construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court has to keep in mind that discretion in the section has to be exercised to advance substantial justice. The Court has a discretion to condone or refuse to condone the delay as is evident from the words may be admitted used in the section. While dealing with the scope of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, this Court in Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, AIR 1962 SC 361 held (paras 6 and 7):- "Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides for extension of period of certain cases. While dealing with the scope of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, this Court in Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, AIR 1962 SC 361 held (paras 6 and 7):- "Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides for extension of period of certain cases. It lays down, inter alia, that any appeal may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor when the appellant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. This section raises two questions for consideration. First is, what is sufficient cause; and the second, what is the meaning of the clause within such period? With the first question we are not concerned in the present appeal. It is the second question which has been decided by the Judicial Commissioner against the appellant. He has held that "within such period" in substance means during the period prescribed for making the appeal. In other words, according to him, when an appellant prefers an appeal beyond the period of limitation prescribed he must show that he acted diligently and that there was some reason which prevented him from preferring the appeal during the period of limitation prescribed. If the Judicial Commissioner has held that within such period means the period of the delay between the last days for filing the appeal and the date on which the appeal was actually filed he would undoubtedly have come to the conclusion that the illness of Ramlal on February 16 was a sufficient cause. That clearly appears to be the effect of his judgment. That is why it is unnecessary for us to consider what is a sufficient cause in the present appeal. It has been urged before us by Mr. Andley, for the appellant, that the construction placed by the Judicial Commissioner on the words within such period is erroneous. In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for execusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna vs. Chathappan, (1889) ILR 13 Mad 269. "Section 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words sufficient cause receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant." Further he relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of State of M.P. and Another vs. Abdul Gani, 2014 (3) MPLJ 265 wherein, it has been held that condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. 8. The facts giving rise to the filing of this appeal are that the respondents filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 3,12,681/- along with the interest at the rate of 12% per annum with the averments in the plaint that the plaintiff is running a firm situated in Vineet market Jayendraganj, Lashker, Gwalior for sell of motor parts and supplying the same to the Government departments. 3,12,681/- along with the interest at the rate of 12% per annum with the averments in the plaint that the plaintiff is running a firm situated in Vineet market Jayendraganj, Lashker, Gwalior for sell of motor parts and supplying the same to the Government departments. It was further stated in the plaint that the supply of motor parts were done to the defendants No. 2 and 3 on various dates and in spite of reminder, the aforesaid amount as has been mentioned in para 1 of the appeal memo has not been paid and therefore so many bills are lying pending with the defendants. Since in spite of sending two notices to the defendants, payment was not made, therefore, the suit was filed on the basis of the allegations made above which was opposed by appellants/ defendants by filing the written statement. 9. The learned trial court after considering the pleadings of the parties and the documents brought on record, decreed the suit of the plaintiffs directing the defendants to pay Rs. 3,12,681/- to the plaintiffs with the interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of filing of the suit. 10. Even if this argument is of any value, the factum of keeping the matter pending for 296 days and doing nothing to assail the judgment of the lower court, shows that the appellants are utterly careless in this case and they do not deserve any condonation of delay as pleaded. 11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Chief Post Master General and Others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and Another, AIR 2012 SC 1506 has held that unless reasonable and acceptable explanation of delay and sufficient cause is shown, the application need not be accepted. Relevant para is quoted below: - "(13) In our view, it is the right time to inform all the Government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The Government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government departments. The Government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay." Hence, I find no good reason to condone the delay in this case. 12. Therefore, I.A. No. 16288 of 2007 for condonation of delay is dismissed. Consequently, the first appeal is also dismissed. Appeal dismissed.