JUDGMENT : Mir Dara Sheko, J. Subject matter of challenge in the instant criminal appeal is a judgment dated 17th December, 2014 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Port Blair in Sessions Case No. 50 of 2011/Sessions Trial No. 14 of 2012 whereby the appellant was convicted under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of Smt. Mary Martha Lakra wife of Shri M. Thangadurai. Prosecution Case In Brief The defacto-complainant Smt. Soombavally is the mother-in-law of the deceased. She was residing at Makerthivally in her own house along with her son Thangadurai, daughter-in-law Mary, and her three grand children. On 17.04.2011 at about 8.00 p.m. the defacto-complainant went to her daughter's house after taking dinner. At the relevant time the deceased daughter-in-law and her three children were at home. The son of the defacto-complainant was working in a private firm and on the day of the incident he was at Mayabunder. At about 10.00 p.m. the defacto-complainant returned to her house. When she reached near the nallah close to her house she heard her grand children weeping. Upon inquiring from the children she came to know from Sandhya (elder grand daughter) that her daughter-in-law had died and the appellant/convict Ganapathy had murdered her. The defacto-complainant rushed inside the house and found the deceased lying dead in her bedroom in a pool of blood. Then the defacto-complainant went to her daughter's house and told her about the incident. On the following day i.e. 18.04.2011 the police went to the place of occurrence and recorded the statement of the defacto complainant which is the fardbayan, on the basis of which FIR was registered on the same day at about 10.30 am. Police received information from an informer that the convict/appellant was seen near Uttara Jetty and subsequently he was arrested on 18.04.2011. The appellant made an extra judicial confession before the police in the presence of witnesses and also furnished information which led to the recovery of the offending weapon i.e. dao and his blood stained wearing apparels from Uttara corner. Charge sheet was submitted against the appellant under section 302 IPC and consequently charge was framed under section 302 IPC on 30.07.2012. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses however no defence witnesses were adduced. Prosecution Witnesses PW-1 Kumari T. Sandhya daughter of the deceased and the sole eye witness. Charge sheet was submitted against the appellant under section 302 IPC and consequently charge was framed under section 302 IPC on 30.07.2012. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses however no defence witnesses were adduced. Prosecution Witnesses PW-1 Kumari T. Sandhya daughter of the deceased and the sole eye witness. PW-2 Smt. Soombavally defacto-complainant and mother-in-law of the deceased PW-3 Manjula daughter of the defacto-complainant PW-4 Mithun Biswas Chance witness PW-5 Sanjay Das Up-pradhan of Uttara Gram Panchayat. Witness of confessional statement by the appellant and subsequent recovery PW-6 Anand Kumar declared hostile PW-7 Nedum Chelican PW-8 M. Thanga Durai Thus hand of the deceased PW-9 Dr. A.K. Das conducted the post mortem examination PW-10 K. Ganesh Member of Gram panchayat Uttara Kadamtala. Witness of confessional statement by the appellant and subsequent recovery PW-11 Anjana Mondal scribe of the FIR PW-12 Inspector Rizwan Hassan first investigating officer Arguments Advanced By The Counsels 3. Mr. Rakesh Kumar, learned advocate for the appellant made the following submissions before us: 1. Test identification parade of the appellant was not conducted. 2. The Trial Court convicted the appellant upon the evidence of a child witness i.e. PW-l while ignoring some major contradictions appearing in the evidence of PW-5 and PW-10. 3. According to the CFSL report human blood was not found on the blood stained wearing apparels of the appellant and the offending weapon i.e. dao which were allegedly recovered on the basis of the confessional statement of the appellant before the police. Thus no reliance can be placed upon these articles recovered consequent to the confessional statement. 4. In the fardbayan it was stated that the victim was killed by the appellant with a 'sharp object', whereas PW-l stated that her mother was assaulted with phookni and the appellant caught hold of her hair and then cut her with the dao. 5. The motive of the crime could not be established by the prosecution and thus the conviction of the appellant should be set aside and he should be set free by giving him benefit of doubt. 4. Mr. Santosh Kumar Mandal, learned senior counsel appearing for the state made the following submissions before us: 1. PW-l, who was 7 years old at the time of making her deposition was subjected to preliminary examination by the Trial Court and found to be competent to be examined as a witness. 4. Mr. Santosh Kumar Mandal, learned senior counsel appearing for the state made the following submissions before us: 1. PW-l, who was 7 years old at the time of making her deposition was subjected to preliminary examination by the Trial Court and found to be competent to be examined as a witness. The trial judge has clearly recorded his satisfaction in this regard. 2. The testimony of PW-1 who is the sole eye witness could not be shaken during cross-examination. 3. The defacto-complainant PW-2 came to know about the incident from her granddaughter PW-l and after seeing the deceased lying dead on the floor of the bedroom in a pool of blood, she rushed to her daughter PW-3 and told her about the incident. Hence the behaviour of the witnesses was natural and expected. 4. The fardbayan of PW-2 was recorded on the following day after the incident i.e. 18/4/2011 at about 8:10 am and FIR was lodged on the basis of the said fardbayan at about 10.30 am. Hence there was no delay in lodging the FIR. 5. Extrajudicial confession was made by the appellant before the police and in the presence of PW-5 and PW-10 leading to the recovery of the offending weapon and the blood stained wearing apparels of the appellant in presence of the two aforesaid witnesses. 6. The Trial Court has correctly appreciated the evidence and convicted the appellant on the basis of a well reasoned judgment which does not warrant any interference. Critical Analysis of Evidence On Record 5. PW-1 Kumari T. Sandhya aged 7 years at the time of deposition is the sole eye witness in this case. She has stated in her examination-in-chief as follows- "Ganapathy is present in court today, identified the accused Ganapathy on dock. Ganapathy had cut my mother. I saw it. My mother died as Ganapathy had cut my mother. My mother was at the kitchen of our house. I was at the bedroom. Ganapathy had cut my mother with a dao. Ganapathy had also assaulted my mother with a phukni and caught hold of her hair and then cut her with a dao" 6. In her cross examination PW-1 stated that she knew the appellant and she had often seen him at the house of her aunt (father's sister). Ganapathy had cut my mother with a dao. Ganapathy had also assaulted my mother with a phukni and caught hold of her hair and then cut her with a dao" 6. In her cross examination PW-1 stated that she knew the appellant and she had often seen him at the house of her aunt (father's sister). PW- 1 further stated in her cross examination that she was interrogated by the police and she deposed as follows- "Police interrogated me. Police asked me questions on the next day from the date of my mother's death. Police asked me questions first at our house. Then police asked me questions at thana. I stated police exactly how Ganapathy killed my mother. I stated police that Ganapathy assaulted my mother with phukni and then caught hold of her hair and then cut her with a dao. Police asked me questions at morning time at about 8.00am... I saw Ganapathy killing my mother at night. It was about 9.00pm. " 7. PW-2 the mother-in-law has stated in her testimony that on the day of the incident i.e. 17.04.2011 after taking dinner at about 8.00 p.m. she went to her daughter's house by walking and returned at about 10.00 pm. While returning home she saw her grand children sitting besides the nallah close to her house and crying. She inquired from Sandhya (PW-1) as to what had happened. PW-1 told her that there was a quarrel between the appellant and the deceased after which the appellant caught hold of the deceased's hair and assaulted her with a phukni and then cut her with a dao. PW-2 went inside the house and saw the deceased lying dead on the floor. She also noticed that the deceased had sustained injuries on her head, eyes, throat and hands which were bleeding profusely. PW-2 found that there was blood in the kitchen as well as in the bedroom. Thereafter she went to her daughter's house and narrated the incident to her. She has stated in her cross-examination that it takes half an hour to go from her house to her daughter's house by walking. She also identified the appellant in the dock. 8. PW-3 Manjula (daughter of PW-2) stated in her examination-in-chief that on the day of the incident her mother came to her house twice. She had deposed as follows: "The incident took place on 17.04.2011. She also identified the appellant in the dock. 8. PW-3 Manjula (daughter of PW-2) stated in her examination-in-chief that on the day of the incident her mother came to her house twice. She had deposed as follows: "The incident took place on 17.04.2011. On that date at about 8.30 pm my mother came to our house. She returned to her home at about 9.30 to 10.00 pm. Then again sometime later my mother came to our house crying. She stated that Sandhya stated her that Ganapathy had cut Mary." 9. PW-3 then accompanied PW-2 to her house and saw that the deceased Mary was lying dead on the floor of the bed room. PW-3 deposed that there was huge amount of blood in the kitchen and the bed room. She also noticed that the victim had sustained injuries on her cheek, hand, eyes, legs and several other parts of her body. 10. PW-8 M. Thangadurai is the husband of the deceased. He has stated in his deposition that he was doing a private job at Mayabunder. On the day of the incident i.e. 17.04.2011 he was at Mayabunder. At about 11.00 p.m. when he was sleeping PW-3 called him over phone and told him that his wife Mary was lying dead in a pool of blood in her bedroom and that the appellant had murdered her. PW-8 knew the appellant and hence identified him in court. PW-8 has deposed that his daughter PW-1 told him that she had seen the appellant assaulting the deceased with a phukni and thereafter with a dao. The wearing apparels of the deceased were seized in the presence of PW-8 and he has clearly identified the same in court. 11. PW-7 Nedum Chelican stated in his deposition that on the day of incident i.e. 17.04.2011 he was at Long Island. At about 11.30 p.m. PW- 3 Manjula the cousin sister of his wife informed him over phone that Mary had been murdered. PW-7 went to the house of the deceased on the following day and saw that the body of the deceased was lying on the floor of the bedroom surrounded by a pool of blood. He has stated in his deposition that PW-1 told him that the appellant had murdered her mother. Police had seized blood stained earth and controlled earth in the presence of PW-7 which was duly identified by him in court. He has stated in his deposition that PW-1 told him that the appellant had murdered her mother. Police had seized blood stained earth and controlled earth in the presence of PW-7 which was duly identified by him in court. 12. PW-5 Sanjay Das was the Up-Pradhan of Uttara Gram Panchayat. In his deposition he stated that he was called to Kadamtala Police Station as the appellant wanted to make a confession. PW-5 further stated that in his presence the appellant confessed that he had murdered the deceased Mary and that he had hidden his blood stained wearing apparels and offending weapon i.e. dao in the jungle near Uttara corner. Thereafter PW-5, PW-10, police personnel and the appellant went to Uttara corner by Police vehicle. The appellant recovered his wearing apparels and the offending weapon from a bush and handed over the same to the police in his presence. The offending weapon dao was shown to him and he identified it in court. He also identified the sized wearing apparels of the appellant. 13. PW-10 Mr. K. Ganesh was a member of the Gram Panchayat Uttara, Kadamtala. He has stated in his deposition that he got a call from Kadamtala Police Station that the appellant wanted to make a confessional statement and so he was called to the Police Station. The appellant confessed to the murder of the deceased in his presence. PW- 10 further deposed that the appellant had said in his confession that he had hidden his blood stained wearing apparels and the offending weapon and that he could recover the same. Thereafter PW-10, PW-5, the appellant and the police personnel went to Uttara corner by police vehicle. PW-10 has further deposed that the appellant led them towards the jungle and took out a blood stained T-shirt, half pant and one dao from a bush and gave it to the police in his presence. PW-10 identified the wearing apparels and the offending weapon in court. 14. PW-6 Anand Kumar is a cultivator by occupation. He has deposed that on 18.04.2011 at about 9.00 a.m. he heard that one lady of his basti namely Mary was killed. He further deposed that the police told him to lift the body of the victim and that he had brought the body to Kadamtala hospital. This witness was declared hostile. PW-6 Anand Kumar is a cultivator by occupation. He has deposed that on 18.04.2011 at about 9.00 a.m. he heard that one lady of his basti namely Mary was killed. He further deposed that the police told him to lift the body of the victim and that he had brought the body to Kadamtala hospital. This witness was declared hostile. PW-6 maintained that nothing was seized in his presence and that he did not witness the inquest held by police over the dead body. However, he identified his signature on the seizure list, inquest report and the supurdignama. He also deposed that after post-mortem examination he along with PW-8 and others brought the dead body of the deceased for cremation. PW-6 also identified the appellant in court as a resident of his basti. 15. PW-9 Dr. A.K. Das conducted the post mortem examination upon the victim. He has stated in his deposition that the death of the deceased was caused due to severe haemorrhage and shock after sustaining sharp cut injury on the left side of her neck, which was fatal in nature and that the death was homicidal. He also deposed that a moderately heavy sharp weapon was used to inflict the wounds. He also examined the appellant twice i.e. on 18.04.2011 and on 19.04.2011 and found no external injury on his person. In his cross-examination PW-9 deposed that the Investigation Officer did not produce the offending weapon before him. 16. PW-12 Inspector Rizwan Hassan is the first Investigating Officer in this case. He was posted at PS Kadamtala as the SHO and he received information regarding the incident on 18.04.2011 at about 5.30 am. He recorded statement of PW-2 which is the fardbayan on the basis of which the FIR was lodged on 18.04.2011. He apprehended the appellant from Uttara Jetty passenger hall and brought him to PS Kadamtala. PW-12 has stated in his deposition that the appellant wanted to make a confession and that his statement was recorded in presence of two witnesses. He further deposed that the appellant in his statement confessed that he had indeed killed the deceased Mary and hidden his blood stained wearing apparels and dao in a bush near Uttara corner and that he could recover the same. He further deposed that the appellant in his statement confessed that he had indeed killed the deceased Mary and hidden his blood stained wearing apparels and dao in a bush near Uttara corner and that he could recover the same. Thereafter PW-12 along with police personnel, witnesses and the appellant went to Uttara corner where the appellant lead them to the place where he had concealed those articles. The appellant recovered the blood stained wearing apparels and the offending weapon which were duly seized under proper seizure list. PW- 12 identified the wearing apparels as well as offending weapon in court. 17. PW-11 Anjana Mondal is the lady head constable of Andaman and Nicobar police and was posted at PS Kadamtala at the relevant time. She has deposed that at about 10.30 am she received the fardbayan of PW-2 for lodging FIR. Thereafter as per directions of PW-12 she chalked out the FIR dated 18.04.2011 under section 302 IPC. 18. The Post Mortem Examination was conducted on 18.04.2011 at 1.45 p.m. The following findings were recorded in the post-mortem report (exhibit 10):- 1. According to the post-mortem report the stomach of the victim was found to be partially filled with food and the urinary bladder was also found to be partially filled with urine. These finding corroborate the statement of PW-2 (mother-in-law) that on the day of the incident i.e. 17.04.2011 at about 8.00 pm after dinner she went to her daughter Manjula's house, naturally the deceased and the three grand children had also taken food at the same time. 2. Injury was found to be caused by a moderately heavy sharp weapon. All cut injuries were ante-mortem in nature. The offending weapon i.e. dao which was recovered clearly fits the description of a moderately heavy sharp weapon. 3. Death of the victim was due to severe haemorrhage and shock after the deep sharp cut injury on the left side of her neck which was fatal. 4. Nature of death was homicidal. 19. According to injury report (exhibit 11) dated 18.04.2011 there were eight injuries on the body of the deceased of which three injuries were sustained on her limbs. This shows that the victim offered a stiff resistance. Further the testimony of PW-2 and PW-3 clearly reveals that the deceased had sustained several injuries on her person. 20. Although the offending weapon was not shown to PW-9 Dr. This shows that the victim offered a stiff resistance. Further the testimony of PW-2 and PW-3 clearly reveals that the deceased had sustained several injuries on her person. 20. Although the offending weapon was not shown to PW-9 Dr. A.K. Das who conducted the post-mortem, nonetheless it is amply clear that the description given by him of a moderately heavy sharp weapon clearly fits the description of a dao. 21. According to the CFSL report (Exhibit 18) dated 29.09.2011 following findings were made:- 1. Blood was detected on the wearing apparels of the deceased, wearing apparels of the appellant and the offending weapon. 2. Human blood was detected only on the wearing apparels of the victim, but human blood could not be detected on the wearing apparels of the appellant and the offending weapon i.e. dao. 3. Blood group 'O' was detected on the wearing apparels of the deceased. 22. According to the CFSL report blood was found on the wearing apparels of the appellant and the offending weapon but the same was not or could not be identified as human blood. In the circumstances we cannot rule out the possibility that the appellant may have tried to remove the blood stains from the aforesaid articles before concealing them in the jungle near Uttara corner. We must bear in mind that the offending weapon and the wearing apparels were recovered based on the confession made by appellant himself before witnesses. At this juncture we must refer to the testimony of PW-4 Mithun Biswas a resident of Uttara, Kadamtala, he has stated in his testimony that on 17.04.2011 at about 12 midnight he was returning home after visiting Baba Mela. On his way he met the appellant at Uttara. PW-4 asked the appellant where he was going and the appellant told him that he was going to Kadamtala. PW-4 thereafter asked him as to why he was going to Kadamtala at such late night. To this the appellant replied that "he will understand that next morning." The following day PW-4 came to know that a woman was murdered. Hence after the incident the appellant was seen by PW-4. The evidence of this witness corroborates the confessional statement made by the appellant before the police and other witnesses to that extent. Furthermore in the presence of direct evidence by an eye witness such discrepancies can be safely ignored. 23. Hence after the incident the appellant was seen by PW-4. The evidence of this witness corroborates the confessional statement made by the appellant before the police and other witnesses to that extent. Furthermore in the presence of direct evidence by an eye witness such discrepancies can be safely ignored. 23. The fact that the offending weapon and the wearing apparel of the accused were recovered from Uttara corner and the fact that the accused was also arrested from near Uttara corner is not a mere co-incidence. The appellant knew where he had hidden the aforesaid articles. His guilty knowledge took him or forced him to guard the place. This fact provides further assurance to the Court as regards his guilt. 24. The testimony of PW-1 T. Sandhya daughter of the deceased who is the sole eye witness in this case has remained unshaken. She has clearly testified that she saw the appellant attacking her mother with a phukni and a dao thereby causing her death. PW-1 has also reported the same thing to all witnesses. All witnesses have reproduced the version of the PW-1 as regards assault by the appellant. The appellant is known to PW-1. She has stated in her deposition that she had seen the appellant at the house of her aunt (father's sister). PW-1 was aged seven years at the time of making her deposition. Conviction can be based on the testimony of a child witness if her statement is found to be cogent and reliable. The need for corroboration is not a requirement under the law, but rather a rule of practical wisdom. It is the quality of the evidence that matters and not quantity thereof. This principle has been codified under section 134 of the Evidence Act. The following authorities clearly go to show that conviction can be based on the testimony of a child witness and the precautions which the court must bear in mind. 25. In Mohamed Sugal Esa Mamasan Rer Alalh v. The King reported in AIR 1946 PC 3 their lordships relied on the testimony of a child witness and upheld the conviction and sentence of death. Lord Goddard held as follows:- "It was also submitted on behalf of the appellant that assuming the unsworn evidence was admissible the Court could not act upon it unless it was corroborated. Lord Goddard held as follows:- "It was also submitted on behalf of the appellant that assuming the unsworn evidence was admissible the Court could not act upon it unless it was corroborated. In England where provision has been made for the reception of unsworn evidence from a child it has always been provided that the evidence must be corroborated in some material particular implicating the appellant. But in the Indian Act there is no such provision and the evidence is made admissible whether corroborated or not. Once there is admissible evidence a court can act upon it; corroboration, unless required by statute, goes only to the weight and value of the evidence. It is a sound rule in practise not to act on the uncorroborated evidence of a child, whether sworn or unsworn, but this is a rule of prudence and not of law." 26. In Dattu Ramarao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1997) 5 SCC 341 it was held as follows:- "A child witness if found competent to depose to the facts and reliable one such evidence could be the basis of conviction. In other words even in the absence of oath the evidence of a child witness can be considered under Section 118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to understand the answers thereof. The evidence of a child witness and credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The only precaution which the Court should bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one and his/her demeanour must be like any other competent witness and there is no likelihood of being tutored." 27. In Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka reported in (2001) 9 SCC 129 conviction under section 302 was upheld by Supreme Court on the basis of the testimony of a six year old girl who was the sole eye witnesses. The Supreme Court in this case observed as follows:- "Admittedly, Bhavya (PW 2), who at the time of occurrence was about four years of age, is the only solitary eyewitness who was rightly not given the oath. The time and place of the occurrence and the attending circumstances of the case suggest no possibility of there being any other person as an eye-witness. The time and place of the occurrence and the attending circumstances of the case suggest no possibility of there being any other person as an eye-witness. The evidence of the child witness cannot be rejected per se, but the court, as a rule of prudence, is required to consider such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality of the statements and its reliability, base conviction by accepting the statement of the child witness. The evidence of PW 2 cannot be discarded only on the ground of her being of Teen age. The fact of PW 2 a child witness would require the court to scrutinise her evidence with care and caution. If she is shown to have stood the test of cross-examination and there is no infirmity in her evidence, the prosecution can rightly claim a conviction based upon her testimony alone. Corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence. Some discrepancies in the statement of a child witness cannot be made the basis for discarding the testimony. Discrepancies in the deposition, if not in material particulars, would lend credence to the testimony of a child witness who, under the normal circumstances, would like to mix up what the witness saw with what he or she is likely to imagine to have seen. While appreciating the evidence of the child witness, the courts are required to rule out the possibility of the child being tutored. In the absence of any allegation regarding tutoring or using the child witness for ulterior purposes of the prosecution, the courts have no option but to rely upon the confidence inspiring testimony of such witness for the purposes of holding the appellant guilty or not. This Court in Panchhi & Ors v. State of U.P. [ 1998 (7) SCC 177 ] held that the evidence of the child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him and thus an easy prey to tutoring. This Court in Panchhi & Ors v. State of U.P. [ 1998 (7) SCC 177 ] held that the evidence of the child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him and thus an easy prey to tutoring. The evidence of the child witness must find adequate corroboration before it is relied upon, as the rule of corroboration is of practical wisdom than of law (vide Prakash v. State of M.P. 1992 (4) SCC 225 ; Baby Kandayanathil v. State of Kerala 1993 Supp (3) SCC 667; Raja Ram Yadav v. State of Bihar, 1996 (9) SCC 287 ; Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra 1997 (5) SCC 341 ). To the same effect is the judgment in State of U.P. v. Ashok Dixi & Anr. [ 2000 (3) SCC 70 ]. In this case Bhavya (PW 2) when appeared before the trial court was of 6 years of age. After questioning the witness, the Sessions Judge found, "though the girl is 6 years old she is active and she understands everything". 28. The learned Trial Judge conducted the preliminary examination upon PW-1 and found that she was competent to be examined as a witness. The conduct of PW-1 was natural and she reported the incident immediately to her grandmother (PW-2). Hence there could be no possibility of tutoring. 29. According to the testimony of PW-1 she was in the bed room and her mother was in the kitchen and she saw the appellant cut her mother with a dao. According to the site plan (exhibit 16) prepared by the IO the bedroom and the kitchen are adjacent so PW-1 could have easily seen what was happening in the kitchen. Furthermore both PW-2 and PW-3 have deposed that immediately after the incident they saw that blood was lying in the kitchen and the bedroom. Hence these facts corroborate the testimony of PW-1. 30. In cross-examination, as mentioned earlier, PW-1 answered, "I stated police exactly how Ganapathy killed my mother. Furthermore both PW-2 and PW-3 have deposed that immediately after the incident they saw that blood was lying in the kitchen and the bedroom. Hence these facts corroborate the testimony of PW-1. 30. In cross-examination, as mentioned earlier, PW-1 answered, "I stated police exactly how Ganapathy killed my mother. I stated police that Ganapathy assaulted my mother with phukni and then caught hold of her hair and then cut her with a dao." This part of statement made by PW-1 was confronted to her by the appellant, might be with a view to confront to the Investigating Officer to obtain either contradiction or omission, if any to obtain any intended benefit within section 162(1) proviso or sub section (2) explanation of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But the I.O. PW-12 was not confronted with reference to the statements of PW-1 recorded by him under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As a result, the direct and natural evidence of PW-1 as comes out against the appellant as the murderer of her mother does not suffer from contradiction on material point. 31. Motive behind the crime remains in the mind of perpetrator of the crime, which in evidence sometimes comes out sometimes not. In the case on hand, the appellant being known man to the family of the deceased, entered into the house taking advantage of absence of her husband and mother-in-law and must have demanded sexual favour, and being refused the assault took place. Only inference behind the murderous assault upon the lady, who initially tried to give strong resistance at the cost of blows on her limbs, can be disclosure of the attempted misdeed of the appellant, had the lady been left alive. 32. Furthermore, the appellant was known to PW-1 and hence the fact that test identification parade was not conducted would not prejudice the appellant. Therefore the testimony given by PW-1 has been corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses and the recovery of the offending weapon at the instance of the appellant. 33. PW-2 and PW-3 have testified that they tried to contact Kadamtala police station immediately after the incident on 17.04.2011 but the line was out of order so they contacted Long Island police station. 33. PW-2 and PW-3 have testified that they tried to contact Kadamtala police station immediately after the incident on 17.04.2011 but the line was out of order so they contacted Long Island police station. The following day the police came and recorded the fardbayan of PW-2 and consequently the FIR was lodged on the basis of the said fardbayan at about 10.30 am. Hence there was no inordinate delay in lodging the FIR. 34. There are some contradictions in the statements of PW-5 and PW-10 which are as follows:- 1. PW-5 has stated in his cross-examination that when he received telephone call from police to come to PS Kadamtala he was in his shop in the bazar and one panchayat member K. Ganesh (PW-10) was also with him. He further stated that he reached the Police Station along with PW-10 by motorcycle. However, PW-10 in his examination-in-chief stated that he was at the panchayat office along with PW-5 and that time he got the call to come to PS Kadamtala. 2. Furthermore, PW-5 stated in his cross-examination that upon reaching Uttara corner by police vehicle they entered 500 meters into the jungle on foot and that the wearing apparels were hidden on a tree and the offending weapon was hidden underground. However, PW-10 has stated in his deposition that the distance between the place where the police vehicle stopped and the place where the seized articles were recovered is 10 to 15 meters only. He further deposed that the appellant took out the blood stained wearing apparels and dao from a bush. 35. The incident took place on 17.04.2011. PW-5 deposed in court on 10.12.2013 and PW-10 on 12.11.2014. Therefore, the apparent contradiction can be attributed to lapse of memory as almost 2-3 years had passed since the incident occurred. Furthermore the simple villagers cannot be expected to depose accurately about such minute details. 36. Furthermore, such minor contradictions cannot upset the prosecution case which has been established beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of reliable and cogent evidence. As a result the conviction is upheld and the appeal is dismissed. Girish Chandra Gupta, J. - I agree.