JUDGMENT : In this appeal under Section 82 of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948, appellant has challenged the judgment and order dated 7.7.2006 passed by the ESI Court in ESI Case No. 1 of 2005. By that judgment and order the application filed by the present appellant under Section 75 of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (herein after referred to as ‘Act’) was rejected by the learned trial court holding that the subject garage owned and run by the present appellant was a factory within the meaning of Section-2(12) of the Act. Short facts necessary for adjudication of the appellant are as follows. 2. Mr. George Ashley Devid as plaintiff filed application under Section 75 of the Act before the learned ESI Court at Guwahati stating that he is the Chief Executive of Gargya Motor Pt. Ltd. He opened a small motor garage known as M/S Simcars at G.S. Road and employed as many as four regular employees for repairing works of motor cars. He did not require engagement of bigger work force in view of the volume of the work and could run the garage only for two years till it was closed down in February, 1996. 3. The respondents issued a show cause notice to him on 28.4.2003 vide Cft No.43- 2925 for the purpose of recovery of amount under the Act. Petitioner approached this High Court challenging the notice whereupon he was given liberty to file the application under Section 75 of the Act before the appropriate court. According to the petitioner, his garage was not covered by the provisions of the Act as it was not a factory within the meaning of Section-2 (12) of the Act because he did not engage more than 10 persons for wages on any day of the preceding 12 months of the year of manufacturing process and that the manufacturing process was not done by aid of power. But even thereafter the respondents were pressurerising him for making payment and issued notices on 28.4.2003 and 5.5.2003. Aforesaid application was registered as ESI Case No. 1 of 2005 and notice was issued to the respondents who submitted written statement denying the case of the petitioner. It was contended by the respondents that an Inspector of ESI Corporation inspected the garage on 5.6.1995 and thereupon it was found that as many as fifteen employees were working in the garage. It was contended by the respondents that an Inspector of ESI Corporation inspected the garage on 5.6.1995 and thereupon it was found that as many as fifteen employees were working in the garage. Accordingly, observation slip was handed over to the Manager obtaining his signature in acknowledgment of the receipt. The petitioner was thereafter informed about the implementation of the ESI Act in respect of the garage w.e.f. 1.1.1995 provisionally by letter dated 7.7.1995. The same garage was again inspected by the Inspector on 28.12.1995 and this time, it was found that there were ten or more than 10 employees engaged in the garage. It was also noticed that the garage was run by aid of power and accordingly it was held that the petitioner’s establishment stood covered under the ESI Act, 1948. The copy of inspection report dated 5.6.1995, letter dated 7.7.1995 and inspection report dated 28.12.1995 were annexed and marked as Annexure- A , B and C to the written statement. 4. The respondents also brought to the notice of the court by a letter dated 19.4.1996 written by none other than the petitioner wherein he admitted that he did not have more than 20 employees in the establishment. With these averments, respondents prayed that the application be dismissed. 5. The learned court upon such pleadings of the parties proceeded to decide as to whether the petitioner’s establishment was a factory within the meaning of Section-2(12) of the E.S.I. Act, 1948 and accordingly permitted the parties to lead their respective evidence. 6. Petitioner examined as many as two witnesses whereas respondents examined one witness in support of their contention. Both the parties brought documentary evidence in support of their respective contentions. Upon consideration of the evidence led by the parties, the learned trial court held that in view of letter dated 19.4.1996 as well as oral evidence led by DW-1, it was proved by preponderance of probability that the petitioner’s establishment was run by aid of power and that there were 15 employees as on the date of inspection in the year 1995. However, contention of the petitioner that the garage had been closed down in February, 1996 was accepted by the learned trial court in view of absence of any evidence to the contrary. However, contention of the petitioner that the garage had been closed down in February, 1996 was accepted by the learned trial court in view of absence of any evidence to the contrary. Having arrived at such finding of facts, the application filed by the petitioner was rejected holding that the petitioner’s establishment was run by aid of power and that there were 15 employees engaged on the date of inspection in the year 1995. It is this judgment dated 7.7.2006 which has been brought under challenge in the present appeal. 7. I have heard Mr. J Roy, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. G Sharma, learned counsel for the State of Assam. None appears for the ESI although name of the learned counsel is reflected in the Cause List. 8. While presenting the memorandum of appeal, the appellant suggested two substantial questions of law. One is in regard to consideration of ESI Court and the other is in regard to applicability of the ESI Act, 1948 in respect of the subject garage. 9. Mr. J Roy, learned counsel for the appellant submits that in the cross examination of the sole witness of the respondents, it has come to light that there was discrepancy as to date of inspection and as to date of report. DW-1 specifically admitted that inspection was held in the month of July, 1995 and 30.5.1995. Exhibit-B was the report dated 30.7.1995. Upon such submission of the learned counsel, this court has perused evidence of DW-1 in entirety. In his examination-in-chief, DW-1 claimed that on 30.5.1995 and 5.6.1995, he visited the factory and upon inspection he found 15 numbers of employees working in the factory. He also noticed that the factory was run by electric power and on both the occasions, he furnished observation slip vide Exhibit-B to the Manager/owner of the factory. But in course of cross examination , no question was put to this witness in regard to correctness or truthfulness of his oral evidence that he had found 15 employees on the date of inspection and that the garage was run by aid of power. He was cross examined only in regard to date of Exhibit-B, observation slip. But in course of cross examination , no question was put to this witness in regard to correctness or truthfulness of his oral evidence that he had found 15 employees on the date of inspection and that the garage was run by aid of power. He was cross examined only in regard to date of Exhibit-B, observation slip. This being the position, oral evidence of DW-1 in regard to number of employees on the relevant dates engaged in the garage and the fact in regard to running of the factory by aid of power went unrebutted in evidence. The finding therefore arrived at by the learned trial court in this regard cannot be said to perverse. This being the position, this appeal appears to be concluded by finding of fact and accordingly there is no scope to admit the same as no substantial question of law does arise from the facts and circumstances. Consequently, the appeal fails. It is accordingly dismissed. It is needless to say that the appellant shall be at liberty to explore any other avenue that may be available to him under the law.