Judgment Debangsu Basak, J. The plaintiffs seek compensation for alleged defamatory statement made by the defendant. The plaintiff no. 1 is a manufacturer of couplings. The plaintiff no. 2 is its associate engaged in the business of export of products manufactured by the plaintiff no. 1. The plaintiff no. 2 is a member of the Engineering Export Promotion Council. Det Norske Veritas AS (DNV) is an authorised certified classification agency. DNV has inspected and certified couplings manufactured by the plaintiff no. 1. According to the plaintiffs, they received an information by electronic mail (e-mail) from DNV on July 10, 2008 that the defendant who is a business rival of the plaintiffs, had complained about a coupling of the plaintiff no. 1 by an e-mail dated July 9, 2008 to DNV. DNV had forwarded the e-mail dated July 9, 2008 of the defendant to the plaintiffs on July 10, 2008. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant had used the words “spurious manufacturer” to describe the plaintiffs. Such words in the context of the entire e-mail are defamatory. The plaintiffs having being defamed by such words, they seek damages. The defendant has filed a written statement. The defendant has denied the material allegations made in the plaint. According to the defendant, the plaintiffs on one hand and the parent foreign company of the defendant and the defendant on the other hand, had disputes with regard to a trademark. Such disputes had been settled and a global settlement had been entered into between the parties and filed in a Court at Singapore. Such global settlement has since been acted upon. The plaintiffs do not have right to use the name “Vulkan” or the Codes bearing EZ, EZS and EZR. The defendant having found the plaintiffs to market products subsequent to the global settlement with the Code EZ, which according to the defendant gives an impression that such product has been manufactured by the defendant, it had issued the e-mail dated July 9, 2008 to DNV protesting against the action of DNV in granting a certificate to the plaintiffs for such products. Such e-mail was a confidential communication and in the nature of a complaint made by the defendant to DNV which is an authority. The defendant claims that every statement made in the e-mail dated on July 9, 2008 are true. Such e-mail was a confidential communication and in the nature of a complaint made by the defendant to DNV which is an authority. The defendant claims that every statement made in the e-mail dated on July 9, 2008 are true. The words “spurious manufacturer” have been rightly use to indicate that the plaintiffs have been trying to deceptively suggest that the products of the plaintiffs were those manufactured by the defendant and/or its parent company. Four issues have been settled by the Order dated November 28, 2011 in the suit. Such issues are as follows:- 1. Is the word “Spurious” in relation to plaintiffs’ products defamatory per se? 2. Did the plaintiffs suffer loss and damage of their business and reputation for the alleged defamatory statements made by the defendant? 3. Are the plaintiffs entitled to damages as claimed? 4. What other relief the plaintiffs are entitled? The plaintiffs have adduced only one witness in support of their case. The defendant did not produce any witness. None of the parties at the hearing has addressed the Court issue wise. On behalf of the plaintiff it is contended that, the words “spurious manufacturer” are defamatory on their own as also when read in the context of the e-mail dated July 9, 2008. The words are libellous in the way of the business of the plaintiffs. Since such words are per se libellous the plaintiffs are entitled to general damages. The plaintiffs not having pleaded and proved special damages are not claiming the same. Relying upon 2007 Bus LR page 299 (Jameel (Mohammed) and Anr. v. Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl) and 1894 (1) Queen’s Bench Division page 133 (South Hetton Coal Company, Limited v. North-Eastern News Association, Limited) it is contended that, when a defamation is with regard to the way of a business of a company such company is entitled to general damages. On general damages reliance have been placed on All India Reporter 1970 Bombay page 424 (Rustom K. Karanjia & Anr. v. Krishnaraj M.D. Thackersey & Ors.), All India Reporter 1987 Calcutta page 136 (Pijush Kanti Datta v. Mangilal Gidia), All India Reporter 1936 Bombay page 114 (Union Benefit Guarantee Co. Ltd. v. Thakorlal P. Thakor & Ors.), All India Reporter 1975 Rajasthan page 40 (Bala Ram v. Sukh Sampat Lal & Ors.) and 1982 ILR (Karnataka) page 252 (G. Sreedharamurthy v. The Bellary Municipal Council & Ors.). Ltd. v. Thakorlal P. Thakor & Ors.), All India Reporter 1975 Rajasthan page 40 (Bala Ram v. Sukh Sampat Lal & Ors.) and 1982 ILR (Karnataka) page 252 (G. Sreedharamurthy v. The Bellary Municipal Council & Ors.). Relying on such authorities it is contended that, the Court should grant general damages in favour of the plaintiffs at the rate as deemed appropriate by the Court. On the user of the words “spurious manufacturer” it is submitted that, the word spurious itself is defamatory. If the general dictionary meaning is looked at, such words convey a meaning that the manufacturer is not genuine, false and that such manufacturer is manufacturing a product which is adulterated. These words defame the plaintiffs in the way of their business. On behalf of the defendant it is contended that, the e-mail dated July 9, 2008 should be read as a whole. Reference has been made to the various paragraphs of the plaint and it has been contended that, the plaint does not disclose a cause of action. According to the defendant DNV is a necessary party. The defendant also claims that the e-mail dated July 9, 2008 and the words therein when read as a whole are justified. Reliance in this regard has been placed on 1995 Volume 2 All England Law Reports page 313 (Charleston & Anr. v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. & Anr.). On the issue that justification is a complete defence reference has been placed on Carter-Ruck on Libel and Slander 3rd Edition Chapter 10. On the meaning of the word “spurious” reliance has been placed on 1976 Volume 3 Supreme Court Cases page 97 (Chaitanya Kumar Adatiya v. Smt. Sushila Dixit & Ors.). On the point that the entire document has to be read as a whole to find out whether the same is defamatory or not reliance has been placed on 2002 Volume 4 All England Law Reports page 497 (McManus & Ors. v. Beckham). It is submitted on behalf of the defendant that, the plaintiffs are loss making companies and that has been admitted in cross-examination by the witness of the plaintiffs in the answers given to question Nos. 251 to 254. Reference has also been made to the answers given to question Nos. 189 to 190 and 201 to 207 of the plaintiffs’ witness. 251 to 254. Reference has also been made to the answers given to question Nos. 189 to 190 and 201 to 207 of the plaintiffs’ witness. It is submitted that, the plaintiffs not having proved the basis for the claim of quantum on account of general damages, the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief. The result of the second, third and fourth issues would depend upon the answer to the first issue. The first issue is taken up for consideration. The word “spurious” has received the consideration of the Supreme Court in Chaitanya Kumar Adatiya (supra). Such consideration has been made in the context of a challenge to an election under the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951. The word “spurious” is used in Rule 56(2)(a) of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961. Such rules require a Returning Officer to reject a ballot paper if it is a spurious ballot paper. The meaning of the word “spurious” in Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary as not genuine, not proceeding from true source, not legitimate has been noted. It goes on to say that “not proceeding from true source” means that the thing is not what it pretends to be, which only means that it is not genuine or legitimate. In the present case the plaintiffs have been called spurious manufacturers of identified products by the e-mail dated July 9, 2008 of the defendant. Charleston & Anr. (supra) is of the view that, whether an article is defamatory or not has to be considered as a whole since an isolated passage may be defamatory but its effect can be negated if the article is read as a whole. The single natural and ordinary meaning of the words of the alleged defamatory publication has to be understood in the context of the whole article and the meaning which such words taken as a whole convey to the mind of an ordinary, reasonably fair minded reader. The offending e-mail dated July 9, 2008 is Exhibit “D2”. It refers to a certificate issued by DNV, Calcutta in respect of a product manufactured by the plaintiff no. 1. The defendant takes strong objection to DNV certifying such product of the plaintiff no. 1 to be equivalent to a product manufactured by the foreign associate of the defendant. The offending e-mail dated July 9, 2008 is Exhibit “D2”. It refers to a certificate issued by DNV, Calcutta in respect of a product manufactured by the plaintiff no. 1. The defendant takes strong objection to DNV certifying such product of the plaintiff no. 1 to be equivalent to a product manufactured by the foreign associate of the defendant. It goes on to say that, the defendant has no objection for the manufacture of the rubber element by the plaintiff no. 1 if it uses its model number and that the plaintiffs should not use the model number of the foreign associate of the defendant. The defendant therefore requests DNV to withdraw the certificate. The defendant also refers to the proceedings before the Singapore Court. In Exhibit “D2” the plaintiff no. 1 has been called a “spurious manufacturer”. The ordinary meaning of the word “spurious” as noted by the Supreme Court in Chaitanya Kumar Adatiya (supra) is that the plaintiff no. 1 is not a genuine or a legitimate manufacturer. These words have been used to describe the plaintiff no. 1 and its product to the certifying agency. DNV is acknowledged to be the certifying agency by both the parties to the suit. The user of the words “spurious manufacturer” to describe the plaintiffs and its products before the certifying agency conveys something more than a complaint of infringement of trademark, patent, copyright or the like. In my view, these words are defamatory in the context made. The defamation gets accentuated when read in the context of the hostilities between the parties. The e-mail refers to a proceedings before the Singapore Court. The parties have a history of hostilities as would appear from the pleadings of the plaint and the written statement. Although justification is a defence in an action for defamation, in the facts of this case the defendant has not substantiated such defence by any evidence. The defendant has not led any evidence. The evidence on record does not support such a defence of the defendant. The absence of DNV has neither hindered nor embarrassed the trial. The defendant has not applied for adding DNV as a party to the suit. The defendant has not substantiated that DNV is a necessary and a proper party to this suit. The first issue is therefore answered in the affirmative and in favour of the plaintiffs. The absence of DNV has neither hindered nor embarrassed the trial. The defendant has not applied for adding DNV as a party to the suit. The defendant has not substantiated that DNV is a necessary and a proper party to this suit. The first issue is therefore answered in the affirmative and in favour of the plaintiffs. The words “spurious” is per se defamatory in the facts of the case. The plaint as it stands does disclose a cause of action, more so in view of the finding returned on the first issue. The second and the third issues being interconnected are taken up together for consideration. In Dr. Vijay Pahwa (supra) this Court has held as follows:- “19. It is now settled law that in the following cases slander is actionable per se without proof of special damages:- a) An imputation that the plaintiff has committed a criminal offence; b) An imputation that the plaintiff suffers from an existing contagious or infectious disease; c) An imputation of unchastity against a woman; d) An imputation against the plaintiff in the way of his business or office. (See Salmond and Heuston on the law of torts’ 12th edition by R.F.V. Heuston and R.A. Buckley, page 192)” In Pijush Kanti Datta (supra) it has been held that the task of the Court is to award fair and reasonable compensation. McManus & Ors. (supra) is of the view that, a defendant is liable if the defendant is actually aware that what the defendant says or does is likely to be reported, and that, if the defendant slanders someone, that slander is likely to be repeated in whole or in part. In the present case the defendant has issued the e-mail to the certifying agency DNV. While issuing such e-mail as a reasonable person the defendant is in a position to understand that such complaint would be referred to the plaintiffs at the very last. In fact, DNV has referred the e-mail dated July 9, 2008 to the plaintiffs by the e-mail dated July 10, 2008 being Exhibit “D1”. The defamatory words therefore have been repeated. It has been made to a third party. The defendant is therefore liable. In Union Benefit Guarantee Co. Ltd. (supra) it has been held that, the fact that the defendant has apologized the plaintiffs is no defence. The defamatory words therefore have been repeated. It has been made to a third party. The defendant is therefore liable. In Union Benefit Guarantee Co. Ltd. (supra) it has been held that, the fact that the defendant has apologized the plaintiffs is no defence. It goes on to find that the defendants did not have any grudge against the plaintiff. The Court however has granted compensation on a fair and reasonable assessment. In Bala Ram (supra) after reading the authorities a fair and reasonable compensation has been awarded. In G. Sreedharamurthy (supra) it has been held that where there is injury to reputation of a person, substantial damages ought to be granted as general damages by Courts. The authorities cited are of the view that, damages are presumed in cases involving injury to reputation. In such cases the Courts are entitled to award substantial damages although proof of damage is not produced. What would constitute proper damages is always a matter of impression. The quantum of damages requires consideration. In answer to questions 251 to 254 the witness of the plaintiffs has stated that the plaintiffs are loss making companies. The plaintiffs have not led any evidence as to the quantum of damages suffered. The plaintiffs contend they are not claiming special damages and that once defamation is established they are entitled to general damages. The plaintiffs contend that, the quantum of general damages need not be established. The plaintiffs have been defamed as to their way of business. They are, therefore, entitled to general damages. The hostilities between plaintiffs and the defendant have a history. The quantum of damages has to be considered in the context of the history of hostilities between the parties. A foreign associate of the defendant is involved in the hostilities. Considering the hostilities between the parties and that such foreign associate of the defendant being of Germany a compensation of 50,000 Euros should be adequate, fair and reasonable in the facts of this case. The plaintiffs will therefore be entitled to a decree for the Rupee equivalent to 50,000 Euros at the exchange rate prevailing as on the date of the judgment from the defendant. The defendant will pay the same within four weeks from the date of the judgment. In view of the discussions the second and the third issues are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the plaintiffs. The defendant will pay the same within four weeks from the date of the judgment. In view of the discussions the second and the third issues are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the plaintiffs. On the fourth issue the plaintiffs have expended costs in conducting the present litigation. In such circumstances, the plaintiffs are entitled to costs reasonably assessed at Rs.1,00,000/-. There will therefore be a decree for costs of Rs.1,00,000/- against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiffs. The fourth issue is answered accordingly. C.S. No. 179 of 2008 is decreed accordingly. The department is directed to draw up and complete the decree as expeditiously as possible.