JUDGMENT : N.K. Gupta, J. The appellant has preferred the present appeal being aggrieved with the judgment dated 17.1.1997 passed by the Sessions Judge, a Panna, in S.T. No. 108/93 whereby he has been convicted of offence under Sections 306 and 498A of IPC and sentenced to 5 years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 500 and 2 years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 500 respectively, in each default of payment of fine three months' rigorous imprisonment. 2. The facts of the case, in short, are that the deceased Shivkali @ Badi Bahu was married to the appellant Jagpal, resident of village Dagri (Police Station Ajaygarh, Distt. Panna). On 13.10.93 she was found hanging in a room kept for cattle in the house of appellant Jagpal. One Ramavtar lodged a Merg intimation Ex. P/8 at outpost Veera of Police Station Ajaygarh. ASI Ganesh Prasad Thapa (P.W.3) had recorded that intimation and, thereafter, he informed his higher authorities to make various memos relating to dead body. Ultimately the dead body of the deceased was sent for its postmortem to Govt. Hospital, Ajaygarh. Dr. P.C. Shrivastava (P.W.4) along with other doctors performed postmortem on the body of the deceased Shivkali and gave a report Ex. P/11. According to Dr. Shrivastava, the deceased had expired due to asphyxia caused by hanging and she would have died 48-60 hrs. prior to the p.m. examination. Initially Merg intimation Ex. P/15 was registered at police station Ajaygarh then on the basis of the statements given by the parents and relatives of the deceased, a case was registered with FIR Ex. P/16. After due investigation a charge-sheet was filed before JMFC, Ajaygarh, who committed the case to the Court of Session. 3. The appellant abjured his guilt. He took a plea that the deceased was issue less and she was suffering from abdominal pain and there was possibility that she would have committed suicide due to that reason. After the death of the deceased, the appellant and the relatives of the deceased have falsely implicated him and his family members. In defence, Saltali (D.W. 1), Biharilal (D.W. 2) and Bittibai (D.W. 3) were examined. 4. The Sessions Judge, Panna, after considering the evidence adduced by the parties acquitted all other accused persons from all the charges, except the appellant Jagpal and Karidai. In defence, Saltali (D.W. 1), Biharilal (D.W. 2) and Bittibai (D.W. 3) were examined. 4. The Sessions Judge, Panna, after considering the evidence adduced by the parties acquitted all other accused persons from all the charges, except the appellant Jagpal and Karidai. The appellant Jagpal was also acquitted from the charge of offence under Section 304(B) of IPC but he was convicted of offence under Sections 306 and 498-A of IPC and sentenced as mentioned above. 5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length. 6. Dr. P.C. Shrivastava (P.W. 4) has categorically stated that the death of the deceased was caused due to hanging. It was not alleged by Dr. Shrivastava that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature and, therefore, it is also admitted that the death of the deceased Shivkali was suicidal in nature. 7. Since the Trial Court has acquitted the appellant Jagpal from the charge of offence under Section 304B of IPC, there is no need to consider about that offence in absence of any counter appeal filed by the State. It would be apparent that Munnilal (P.W. 5) has stated that marriage of the deceased Shivkali took place with the appellant Jagpal ten years back and, therefore, she died after seven years of her marriage. Hence prima facie no offence under Section 304B of IPC could constitute against the appellant and also no presumption under a Section 113A of Evidence Act is applicable in the present case under these circumstances, it is for the prosecution to prove the overt acts of the appellant that those were within the purview of Sections 107/109 of IPC, otherwise offence under Section 306 of IPC may not constitute. 8. Munnilal (P.W. 5), father of the deceased, Rampal (P.W. 6), brother of the deceased, Manjhal @ Tijiya (P.W. 7), aunt of the deceased, have stated that there was a demand of bicycle from the side of the appellant and he refused to send the deceased Shivkali to her father's house unless that demand would be fulfilled and, therefore, he dealt the deceased with cruelty. Shivnarain (P.W. 11) was examined in support of Munnilal (P.W. 5) but he has turned hostile. He has stated that Munnilal never informed him that the appellant demanded any article or dowry from the deceased Shivkali or that she was being harassed for c that reason. 9. Shivnarain (P.W. 11) was examined in support of Munnilal (P.W. 5) but he has turned hostile. He has stated that Munnilal never informed him that the appellant demanded any article or dowry from the deceased Shivkali or that she was being harassed for c that reason. 9. If the evidence of Munnilal (P.W. 5), Rampal (P.W. 6) and Manjhali @ Tijiya (P.W. 7) is considered then it would be apparent that these three persons have stated in omnibus manner that as and when the deceased came to her father's house she had stated that she was beaten by the appellant in consequence of demand of bicycle. It is also told by these witnesses that when Munnilal went to the house of the appellant to take his daughter then she was not sent by the appellant because his demand was not fulfilled. Again it was stated by these witnesses that the deceased was detained at house of Munnilal and not sent when Sattali @ Bhoora came to take the deceased to the house of the appellant. Thereafter, Munnilal (P.W. 2) came to take the deceased and he took the responsibility that she would be kept comfortably. Then she was sent and within 10-15 days of that visit a news was received by these witnesses that the deceased had expired. Manjhali @ Tijiya, sister of Munnilal (P.W. 5) stated about a new fact in her statement that when the appellant was not sending his wife to the house of her father then she gave a message to her brother Munnilal that if any assurance was given by Munnilal to the appellant to provide a bicycle then fulfil the assurance, otherwise not to provide any bicycle, however the appellant was harassing the deceased for a bicycle. If such a statement as given by Manjhali @ Tijiya is considered then it would be apparent that the deceased did not give a message that a bicycle be provided to the appellant. The message gives two fold results in favour of her father Munnilal that if he assured the appellant to give a bicycle then give it and second fold is that if he did not assure to give a bicycle then not to give. If the deceased was being tortured for demand g of bicycle then certainly she could not inform the second option to her father through her aunt Manjhali @ Tijiya. If the deceased was being tortured for demand g of bicycle then certainly she could not inform the second option to her father through her aunt Manjhali @ Tijiya. The statement of Manjhali @ Tijiya shows that the deceased was not tortured for the demand of bicycle. Also Manjhali @ Tijiya told about this fact for the first time in the Court and her such version was not at all corroborated by either Munnilal (P.W. 5) or Rampal (P.W. 6). Hence in absence of any corroboration, testimony of Manjhali @ Tijiya is not acceptable h that such a message was given by the deceased through her to inform her father. 10. It is alleged by the witnesses that the deceased was not sent to the house of her father in consequence of demand of dowry but according to the witnesses themselves when the deceased went to the house of her husband for the last time she died within 15 days. Such statement indicates that the deceased was sent by the appellant to the house of her father. If the witness Munnilal or Rampal did not fulfil the demand of the appellant then these witnesses did not explain as to why the deceased was sent to the house of her father without fulfilment of the demand. It appears that such allegation is incorrect that the appellant did not send the deceased to her father's house because his demand of bicycle was not fulfilled. Manjhali @ Tijiya has accepted in para 1 of her statement that when the deceased informed about the demand of the appellant then Munnilal retorted that if there is a demand of any cow or goat he could give such an animal to the appellant but he cannot give a bicycle to the appellant. It would be apparent that the cost of cow is always more than the cost of bicycle and if Munnilal, father of the deceased, was ready to give a cow to the appellant then certainly he could sell the cow and purchase a bicycle to provide it to the appellant. In the statement of Manjhali) Tijiya the name of the vehicle is clearly mentioned as cycle and, therefore, there is no confusion that there is an allegation of demand of motorcycle. It is simply a demand of bicycle according to Munnilal and Rampal. In the statement of Manjhali) Tijiya the name of the vehicle is clearly mentioned as cycle and, therefore, there is no confusion that there is an allegation of demand of motorcycle. It is simply a demand of bicycle according to Munnilal and Rampal. If there was a demand of bicycle only and Munnilal was capable to give a cow or a goat then certainly such a demand would have been fulfilled. Hence looking to the statement of Manjhali) Tijiya it appears that there was no demand from the side of the appellant and, therefore, it was not required for Munnilal to fulfil any demand. 11. Munnilal has cited a witness Shivnarain (P.W. 11) to show that when he went to take the deceased from village Parseni then he called Shivnarain who also visited there to take his sister but ultimately Munnilal was returned back without taking his daughter to his house. Shivnarain who turned partly hostile did not say that the witness Munnilal told him about the reason as to why his daughter was not being sent by the appellant. If the statement of Munnilal and Rampal are considered then it would be apparent that Tulaiya, father of the appellant got the property of village Parseni and he was residing at Parseni whereas the appellant was looking after the property of his grand-mother at village Dhagri and he was residing along with his wife at village Dhagri. If Munnilal went to the house of Tulaiya at village Parseni then he would have come back without his daughter as his daughter was residing at village Dhagri in the house of the grand-mother of the appellant. Hence Munnilal could not prove that the deceased was not being sent with him in consequence of the dowry demand. 12. Rampal has stated that he went to take his sister from village Dhagri 7 years prior to her death, whereas according to the witness Shivnarain marriage of Shivkali took place 10 years prior to her death and Gauna took place 4 years prior to the evidence given by Shivnarain. Munnilal (P.W. 2) has categorically stated in para 10 of his statement that the Gauna of the deceased Shivkali took place two years prior to her death. Dr. P.C. Shrivastava, in the postmortem report Ex. Munnilal (P.W. 2) has categorically stated in para 10 of his statement that the Gauna of the deceased Shivkali took place two years prior to her death. Dr. P.C. Shrivastava, in the postmortem report Ex. P/11, has found the age of the deceased Shivkali to be 17 years at the time of the incident and if her marriage took place 7 years prior to her death then at the time of her marriage, she was only 10 years old. Hence the evidence of Munnilal (P.W. 2) appears to be acceptable that the Gauna of Shivkali took place when she was 15 years old. When Gauna of Shivkali took place two years prior to her death then it was not possible for Rampal to take a his sister from village Dhagri 10-12 years back. 13. If the deceased was not sent by the appellant for demand of bicycle then no explanation has been given by this witness that thereafter why the deceased Shivkali was sent to the house of her father by the appellant without getting the bicycle. Under these circumstances, the story that the deceased was not sent to her father's house in consequence of demand of dowry or that she was dealt with cruelty in consequence of that demand appears to be not acceptable. The second part of allegation that Munnilal (P.W. 5) kept his daughter in his house because she was dealt with cruelty by the appellant is concerned if there was a demand of bicycle then it is not stated by the witness Munnilal and Ram prasad that whether any conversation took place between Munnilal and either the appellant or his father Tulaiya. According to these witnesses one Sattali came to take the deceased and he was returned because he was not read to give any guarantee that the deceased would be kept with comfort. Thereafter, Munnilal (P.W. 2) came to take the deceased and again assurance was demanded from him. When he assured, thereafter the deceased was sent. Munnilal (P.W. 5) and Rampal (P.W. 6) did not inform about the relation of Munnilal (P.W. 2) with the appellant. Whether Munnialal (P.W. 2) d was competent to give such an assurance and why such an assurance was acceptable to Munnilal (P.W. 5). Munnilal (P.W. 2) has stated that Sattali came back with the news that Shivkali was not present in the house of her father. Whether Munnialal (P.W. 2) d was competent to give such an assurance and why such an assurance was acceptable to Munnilal (P.W. 5). Munnilal (P.W. 2) has stated that Sattali came back with the news that Shivkali was not present in the house of her father. She went to village Tilgaon where her maternal uncle was residing and therefore Sattali could not bring Shivkali. He has further stated that when he went to take Shivkali, Munnilal (P.W. 5) sent his daughter without any delay. He did not e confirm whether he gave any assurance to Munnilal or Rampal. He did not state that any assurance was demanded by Munnilal or Rampal. 14. If there was some trouble to the deceased Shivkali and if she was kept at the house of her father under protest then certainly a Panchayat of the community would have been called and appellant arid his father would have been called for conversation and redressal of the problem but Munnilal and Rampal did not state that such Panchayat was called or the appellant or his father was called at village Deewankhora. After considering the evidence given by Munnilal and Rampal, it appears that Shivkali was never detained at the house of her father under protest. It would be clear from the evidence of various witnesses that Puniabai, grand-mother of the appellant died after leaving a huge property at village Dhagri and, therefore, the appellant was not required to harass his wife for the demand of a bicycle. The witness Munnilal and Rampal were suggested that the deceased was not blessed with a child and she was suffering from abdominal pain continuously, however, they refused to accept the suggestion. In criminal cases it is not necessary for the husband to prove the cause so that his wife would have committed suicide. It is for the accused simply to rebut the evidence given by the parents, etc. that he did not h dealt his wife with cruelty and he had not demanded any bicycle. 15. On the basis of the aforesaid discussion it would be apparent that Munnilal (P.W. 5) and his son Rampal (P.W.6) could not prove that there was a demand of bicycle from the side of the appellant. When there was no demand then there was no possibility to torture the deceased by the appellant. 15. On the basis of the aforesaid discussion it would be apparent that Munnilal (P.W. 5) and his son Rampal (P.W.6) could not prove that there was a demand of bicycle from the side of the appellant. When there was no demand then there was no possibility to torture the deceased by the appellant. The Trial Court acquitted the appellant from the charge of Section 304B of I.P.C., hence a no demand of bicycle could be proved by the prosecution. There is no allegation of Munnilal and Rampal about any torture done towards the deceased by the appellant for any other reason. Learned Counsel for the appellant has placed his reliance upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in Sunil Bajaj v. State of M.P., AIR 2001 SC 3020 , in which it is held that by only vague and inconsistent statements of interested witnesses being parents and brother of the deceased and in absence of any evidence given by any relative or neighbour of parties about cruelty to the deceased by accused in relation to the demand of dowry then such evidence cannot be accepted. In the light of the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Sunil Bajaj (supra), evidence given by Munnilal (P.W. 5)/ Rampal (P.W. 6) and Manjhali @ Tijiya bear no confidence. The prosecution has failed to prove any overt act of the appellant which may fall within the purview of Sections 107/109 of the I.P.C. and, therefore, the appellant cannot be convicted of offence under Section 306 of I.P.C. The Trial Court has committed an error in convicting the appellant for that offence. When it is not proved beyond doubt that the deceased was dealt with cruelty for dowry demand or that there was a demand of bicycle then the possibility cannot be ruled out that after the death of the deceased a false allegation was made against the appellant by the parents and brother of the deceased about the demand of bicycle and harassment done by the appellant towards his wife. As discussed above the appellant was owner of a huge property and, therefore, he did not require any bicycle. If he had to demand from the father of the appellant then he would have demanded a tractor to plough his landed property received from his grand-mother. As discussed above the appellant was owner of a huge property and, therefore, he did not require any bicycle. If he had to demand from the father of the appellant then he would have demanded a tractor to plough his landed property received from his grand-mother. Also when Munnilal was capable to give a cow or goat to the appellant then on demand of e bicycle, he would have given it to the appellant. Hence the parents and brother of the deceased imagined that the deceased was dealt with cruelty by the appellant. Their evidence was not confirmed by various persons who were examined by the prosecution as resident of village Dhagri. Under these circumstances, the appellant cannot be convicted even of offence under Section 498A of I.P.C. On the basis of the aforesaid discussion the appeal filed by the f appellant appears to be acceptable and, therefore, it is hereby accepted. The conviction as well as the sentence imposed upon the appellant for offence under Sections 306 and 498A of I.P.C. are hereby set aside. He is acquitted from all the charges appended against him. He would be entitled to get back the fine amount if he has deposited the same before the Trial Court. 16. The appellant is on bail. His presence is no more required before this Court hence it is directed that his bail bonds shall stand discharged. 17. Copy of the judgment be sent to the Court below along with it's record for information.