Judgment : 1. Petitioner has assailed preliminary notification issued by the respondents under Section 17 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976, (BDA Act, 1976) dated 12.1.1978 and the declaration and final notification dated 28.12.1982, which was gazetted on 6.1.1983 in so far as it pertains to land bearing survey No.1, measuring 10 guntas at Boopasandra Village, Bangalore North Taluk. 2. It is the case of the petitioner that his father was the original owner of the aforesaid land which was granted to him under the provisions of the Mysore (Religious and Charitable) Inam Abolition Act, 1955, vide order dated 14.7.1962 by the then Special Deputy Commissioner of Inam Abolition. Petitioner's father was in possession and enjoyment of the land in question till his demise and thereafter the name of his mother entered in the revenue records. The aforesaid land was sought to be acquired for formation of new extension of R.M.V. IT Stage (Gokul II Stage) by issuance of the preliminary notification dated 19.1.1978 and thereafter a declaration was made under Section 19 of the aforesaid Act on 28.12.1982 which was published in Karnataka Gazette on 6.1.1983. Those notifications are assailed in this writ petition. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Additional Government Advocate for respondent no.1. 4. On a query raised by the Court with regard to inordinate delay in filing the writ petition, learned counsel for petitioner stated that petitioner's mother was illiterate and on the demise of her husband she was not able to approach the court and that petitioner has now tiled writ petition assailing the acquisition notifications. It was contended that on account of illiteracy, poverty and ignorance, the petitioner did not approach this court at an earlier point of time. It is also stated that petitioner was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the land in question, but recently there has been threat to their possession and therefore has been constrained to file the writ petition in the year 2014. 5. I have considered the aforesaid submissions in light of the material on record. I find that the cause of action for the petitioner as well as his mother to assail the acquisition notifications arose in the year 1982. 5. I have considered the aforesaid submissions in light of the material on record. I find that the cause of action for the petitioner as well as his mother to assail the acquisition notifications arose in the year 1982. Except stating that petitioner's mother was suffering from financial deprivation and illiteracy, no other valid reason has been assigned to condone the delay of 31 years in filing the writ petition. In fact illiteracy and financial deprivation are not sufficient grounds to condone the exorbitant delay. It is also well known that ignorance of law is no excuse, Ignorantia juris non- excusat. In that: view of the matter, writ petition has to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches by placing reliance on the decisions Hon'ble Supreme Court. 6. In this context, a plethora of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the issue regarding delay and as to how a Court of equity exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot extend its hands to such persons who approach the Court after several years can be relied upon. In fact, the Apex Court has held in several decisions that stale claims ought not to be entertained by High Courts exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The recent decisions in that regard are as follows:- a) In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1332 (STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. Vs. MAMATA MOHANTY) the consideration of an application where delay and laches could be attributed against a person who approaches in a writ petition is discussed by stating that though the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to writ jurisdiction, however, the Doctrine of Limitation being based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ petitions could be dismissed at the initial stage on the ground of delay and laches. b) In the case of SHANKAR CO-OP HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. Vs. M.PRABHAKAR & ORS (2011 AIR SCW 3033), the Apex Court at para 53 has given the relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches in approaching the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The same reads as follows; "53. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. The same reads as follows; "53. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are: (1) there is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its owns facts. (2) The principle on which the court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners. (3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay." c) Similarly, the Apex Court in the case of SAW ARAN LATH A AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS ( 2010(4) SCC 532 ) has held that when the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in the year 2001 and the award was passed in the year 2004, writ petitions filed for quashing of the notification in the year 2009 have to be dismissed on the ground of delay as the litigants who dare to abuse the process of the Court in disregard of the law of limitation, delay arid laches should not be encouraged. d) In TAMIL NADU HOUSING BOARD, CHENNAI Vs. d) In TAMIL NADU HOUSING BOARD, CHENNAI Vs. M.MEIYAPPAN & OTHERS (2010 AIR SCW 7130), when the acquisition proceedings were challenged 10 years after notifications were issued, the Apex Court held that the High Courts should not have entertained the writ petition particularly after passing of the award and that the High Court should have dismissed the writ petition at the threshold on the ground of delay and laches. e) In SWAIKA PROPERTIES (P) LIMITED AND ANOTHER Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & OTHERS ( 2008 (4) SCC 695 ), the Apex Court has followed its earlier decisions in the case of MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY Vs. THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT CO. PVT. LTD. & OTHERS ( (1996) 11 SCC 501 ) by observing as follows: "After the award under Section 11 of the Act was made by the Collector he is empowered under Section 16 to take possession of the land, if the possession was not already taken, exercising power under Section 17(4). Thereupon, the land shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. It is well settled law that taking possession of the land is by means of a memorandum (Panchnama) prepared by the Land Acquisition Officer and signed by Panch witnesses called for the purpose. Subsequently, the collector hands over the same to the beneficiary by means of another memorandum or panchnama, as the case may be. But in this case Section 91 of the BMC Act statutorily comes into play which would indicate that the Land Acquisition Officer white making award should intimate to the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of the amount of compensation determined and all other expenses. The Corporation shall pay over the same to the Land Acquisition Officer." It was held that the writ petition had been filed after possession was taken over and the award had become final and therefore, the writ petition had to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. f) The order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition was confirmed by the Apex Court in BANDA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, BANDA Vs. f) The order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition was confirmed by the Apex Court in BANDA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, BANDA Vs. MOTILAL AGARWAL AND OTHERS ( (2011) 5 SCC 394 ) as the filing of the writ petition was 9 years after the declaration was issued under Section 6(1) of the Act and the delay of 6 years after passing of the award and the delayed filing of the writ petition was a reason for refusing to entertain the prayer made in the writ petition. It was held that in a challenge made to the acquisition of land for the purpose of public purpose Courts have consistently held that the delay in filing the writ petition should be viewed seriously, if the petitioner fails to offer plausible explanation for the delay. g) Reference can also be made to another decision of the Apex Court reported in (1996) 6 SCC 445 in the case of STATE OF RAJASTHAN & OTHERS Vs. D.R.LAKSHMI & OTHERS, wherein it has cautioned the High Court not to entertain the writ petitions where there is inordinate delay while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. h) Similarly, in the case of THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, AHMEDNAGAR & ANR. Vs. SHAH HYDER BEIG & ORS. [( 2002) 2 SCC 48], it has been opined thus:- "The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time such but the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner so as to infer that he has given up his claim or where the petitioner has moved the Writ Court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to disturb unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay." i) In fact in S.S.BALU AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA [ (2009) 2 SCC 479 ], it has been held that delay defeats equity and that relief can be denied on the ground of delay alone even though relief is granted to other similarly situated persons who approach the courts in time. j) To a similar effect is the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ANDHRA PRADESH INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE CORPORATION LTD. V. CHINTHAMANENI NARASIMHA RAO & OTHERS [ (2012) 12 SCC 797 ]. 6. j) To a similar effect is the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ANDHRA PRADESH INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE CORPORATION LTD. V. CHINTHAMANENI NARASIMHA RAO & OTHERS [ (2012) 12 SCC 797 ]. 6. The aforesaid judgments are squarely applicable to the present case. 7. The writ petition is hence rejected on the ground of delay and laches.