Order : This Cr.M.P. has been filed for quashing the order dated 21.04.2003 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chas at Bokaro in connection with F.A. Case No.02 of 2003 by which the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance under Rule 55A(1) and 55A(2) of Jharkhand Factories Rules, 1950. 2. It is submitted that the learned Magistrate has not applied judicial mind while taking cognizance because it is apparent that Rule 55A(1) and 55A(2) of Jharkhand Factories Rules, 1950 do not have penal provisions. For the violation of aforesaid rules, the punishment prescribed is under Section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948. Learned C.J.M. has passed the impugned order without application of judicial mind and he did not bother to go through the relevant provisions of law before passing the impugned order. The cognizance cannot be taken in a mechanical way and person against whom summons have been directed to be issued should not be put to rigor of trial in such circumstances. The cognizance taken by learned C.J.M. is bad in law and same is liable to be quashed. 3. The second point which the learned counsel has taken is that the incident took place on 08.01.2003 and it was duly communicated in the prescribed form on 10.01.2003. The Inspector of Factories has filed complaint on 21.04.2003. Section 106 of the Factories Act says that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act unless complaint thereof is made within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence come to the knowledge of an Inspector. The accident which took place on 08.01.2003 was duly informed in prescribed form on 10.01.2003 but the complaint was filed on 21.04.2003, i.e. after lapse of three months and therefore, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate should not have taken cognizance and should have considered the presentation of complaint as time barred. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the State has opposed the prayer. 5. I have gone through the impugned order and documents placed before me. It appears that the complaint has been filed for violation of Rule 55A(1) and 55A(2) of Jharkhand Factories Rules, 1950 which are punishable under Section 92 of Factories Act, 1948. The aforesaid provision of law finds mentioned at the concluding para of the prosecution report. 5. I have gone through the impugned order and documents placed before me. It appears that the complaint has been filed for violation of Rule 55A(1) and 55A(2) of Jharkhand Factories Rules, 1950 which are punishable under Section 92 of Factories Act, 1948. The aforesaid provision of law finds mentioned at the concluding para of the prosecution report. The learned Magistrate has mentioned the rules which have been violated but did not mention the penal provision contained under Section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948. Before adverting final opinion, I would like to mention that impugned order has been passed in a case of Government complaint. ProvisoA to section 200 of Code of Criminal Procedure give relaxation or exemption to public servant acting or purporting act in discharge of his official duty or if court has made the complaint. What I mean to say is that in a Government complaint, if it is presented in writing, examination of complainant on Solemn Affirmation is exempted and the Court can take cognizance. Therefore, the Magistrate is supposed to look into the prosecution report for passing an order under Section 204 Cr.P.C. On the basis of materials placed before the Magistrate, if he finds prima facie material to proceed further, he may pass order under Section 204 Cr.P.C. directing to issue summons to the accused to face trial. Order passed under Section 204 Cr.P.C. simply suggests that the Court has found material to proceed further against the accused. It is not required that the Court should indicate as to what offence by which of the accused has been committed. In the case at hand, the order impugned suggests that the Magistrate has gone through the prosecution report, but the penal provision i.e. Section 92 of the Factories Act has not been indicated. I do not think that due to nonmentioning of penal provision, the order impugned can be considered as bad in law. 6. Learned counsel has further pointed out that the cognizance is bad in law because it was time barred. The occurrence took place on 08.01.2003 and it was communicated in prescribed form on 10.01.2003 and complaint was filed on 21.04.2003 which clearly indicate that the complaint was filed after expiry of three months and therefore, Section 106 of the Factories Act, 1948 creates a bar against taking cognizance after expiry of three months. The occurrence took place on 08.01.2003 and it was communicated in prescribed form on 10.01.2003 and complaint was filed on 21.04.2003 which clearly indicate that the complaint was filed after expiry of three months and therefore, Section 106 of the Factories Act, 1948 creates a bar against taking cognizance after expiry of three months. It reveals from the record available before me that the Inspector of Factories visited the place of occurrence on 25.01.2003 and the complaint was filed on 21.04.2003. So, it can well be said that the complaint was presented within three months from the date on which the Inspector of Factories visited the place of occurrence and initiated enquiry. In this context the judgment reported in (1973) 3 SCC 524 (P.D. Jambekar Vs. State of Gujarat) and 2014 (3) JLJR 563 (SC) (J.J. Irani & Anr. Vs. State of Jharkhand) appears to be relevant. In both these cases their Lordships have held that if the complaint is filed within three months from the date on which the Inspector of Factories visited the place of occurrence and initiated an enquiry, the complaint is not time barred. In both the judgments, the date of information communicated by the employer in prescribed form has not been considered as a date on which Inspector of Factories received knowledge about the incident. In both the cases it was held that if the complaint is filed within three months from the date on which place of occurrence was visited by the Inspector of Factories and enquiry was commenced, should be considered as a date on which the Inspector of Factories received knowledge about the incident and if the complaint is filed within three months from that date, Section 106 Cr.P.C. will not come into play to restrict the cognizance. 7. Considering aforesaid aspects of the matter and also relying upon the judgments referred to above, I do not find any merit in this Cr.M.P. and the same stands dismissed. Adinterim order dated 09.01.2009 by which proceeding in the Court below has been directed to be kept in abeyance, stands vacated. The petitioner is directed to appear before the Court below to face trial and the Court below shall proceed further in accordance with law.