JUDGMENT Hon’ble Manoj Kumar Gupta, J.—Heard counsel for the petitioner and Smt. Poonam Mishra, holding brief of Sri K.C. Mishra on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 3. She also represents respondent Nos. 4 and 5. 2. The petitioner was a constable in Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). He was arrested in Criminal Case No. 97 of 1988 and was therefore placed under suspension with effect from 20 June 1988. Later on, he was enlarged on bail. However, the suspension was not revoked. It seems that the petitioner proceeded on leave from 14 May 1990 to 12 June 1990, with due permission of the respondents. 3. The case of the petitioner is that thereafter he applied for extension of leave, but which was not granted and he was treated to be unauthorisedly absent from duty since 13 June 1990. Subsequently, the respondents initiated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner for having overstayed the leave from 13 June 1990 to 12 July 1990 i.e. for 30 days without prior permission of the competent authority. The aforesaid proceedings were concluded ex parte, as the petitioner failed to appear before the enquiry officer, followed by an order dated 5 June 1992 passed by the Additional D.I.G., P, G.C., C.R.P.F. Rampur, whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service with effect from 13 June 1990. It has come on record that later on, the order was modified and the termination was made applicable from the date of the order of dismissal i.e. 5 June 1992. 4. Aggrieved by the order dismissing the petitioner from service, the petitioner instituted Original Suit No. 138 of 1993, in which the relief claimed was for declaration of the order dated 5 June 1992 dismissing him from service as null and void. In the said suit, on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, issue No. 2 was framed regarding the validity of the order dismissing the petitioner from service. It is to the following effect : Þ2- D;k oknh dk lsok eqfDr dk vkns'k fof/kd gSAÞ 5. In the said suit, on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, issue No. 2 was framed regarding the validity of the order dismissing the petitioner from service. It is to the following effect : Þ2- D;k oknh dk lsok eqfDr dk vkns'k fof/kd gSAÞ 5. The Union of India and the appointing authority of the petitioner, who were defendants in the suit, led evidence in support of the written statement filed by them and after considering the evidence, the trial Court apart from declaring the order dismissing the petitioner from service as null and void for breach of principles of natural justice also went into the merit of the said order. The trial Court held that the petitioner had duly intimated the authorities for extension of leave by means of an application dated 12 June 1990 wherein, request was made to extend the leave until 12 July 1990. A specific finding has been recorded that the said application was duly received by the defendants and in such circumstances, the charge against the petitioner that he overstayed the leave without due intimation to the authorities was found incorrect. A specific finding has been recorded that the said application was duly received by the defendants and in such circumstances, the charge against the petitioner that he overstayed the leave without due intimation to the authorities was found incorrect. For convenience of reference, the relevant finding in this regard is reproduced below : Þ———————————vkxs foHkkxh; tkap esa eq[; vkjksi oknh ij ;g Fkk fd og fn0 13-6-1990 ls 13-7-1990 rd fcuk fdlh iwokZuqefr ds vuqifLFkr jgkA bl fy;s og nqZO;gkj dk vijk/kh gS vkSj bl vk/kkj ij mldh lsok lekIr dj nh x;hA ;g foHkkxh; tkap bl vk/kkj ij Hkh voS/k gS D;ksafd oknh tSlk fd mlus vius okni= esa dgk gS fd og fn014-5-1990 ls 12-6-1990 rd vius vkijkfèkd okn esa iSjoh gsrq NqV~Vh ij QStkckn x;k Fkk tks fd izfroknh }kjk mls nh x;h FkhA bl eè; mldk vkijkf/kd okn r; ugha gks ik;k bl fy;s og fn0 12-6-1990 dks eq[;ky; mifLFkr ugha gks ldkA ysfdu mlus bl NqV~Vh dks c<+kus gsrq ,d izkFkZuk i= vius fo}ku vfèkoDrk }kjk fn0 12-6-1990 dks gh vfr0 iqfyl egkfujh{kd dks Hkst fn;k ftldh Nk;kizfr i=koyh ij ekStwn gS tks fd oknh ds 'kiFk i= dk ,usDpj&6 gS A bl i= esa oknh us ;g dgk gS fd mldh NqV~Vh fn0 13-6-1990ls vkxs 12-7-1990 rd c<+k nh tk;sA ;g i= izfroknh dks izkIr gks x;k D;ksafd izfroknh us vius tokcnkos esa ;g dgha ugha dgk fd oknh dh fn0 12-6-1990 dh NqV~Vh c<+kus dk dksbZ izkFkZuk i= ugha izkIr gqvkA bl vk'k; dk dksbZ dFku izfroknh us vius izfrokn i= esa ugha dgk gS vkSj u gh dksbZ izfroknh dh vksj ls ekSf[kd lk{; is'k dh x;h gS tcfd oknh }kjk bl ckr dks vius okn i= eas o vius c;ku tks fd mlus U;k;ky; esa crkSj ih-MCyw&1 fn;k gS esa Hkh dgh gSA lkekU;r;k dksbZ Hkh i= tks Mkd esa Mky fn;k tkrk gS tc rd ,d ekg esa ykSVdj u vk;s Hkkjrh; lk{; vf/kfu;e ds vuqlkj ;g ekuk tkrk gS fd og i= ml O;fDr dks izkIr gks x;k gksxk vr% ;g ekuus ds fy;s i;kZZIr vk/kkj gS fd oknh us tks i= fn0 12-6-1990 vkxs NqV~Vh c<+kus ds fy;s izfroknh dks Hkstk] og izfroknh dks izkIRk gks x;k ysfdu izfroknh us tkucw> dj oknh dks jkeiqj vuqifLFkr fn[kkdj mlds f[kykQ foHkkxh; tkap ,di{kh; :i ls iw.kZ djds lsok lekfIr dk vkns'k ikfjr dj fn;kA vr% blls ;g fu"d"kZ fudyrk gS fd oknh us fn0 12-6-1990 ls vkxs 12-7-1990 rd NqV~Vh c<+kus dk tks izkFkZuk i= fn;k] og izfroknh dks fey x;k vkSj izfroknh dh vuqifLFkfr fn0 13-6-1990 ls 12-7-1990 rd eq[;ky; ls ugh ekuhs tk;sxhA vr% bl vkèkkj ij Hkh fookfnr lsok eqfDr dk vkns'k voSèkkfud gSAß 6. The trial Court vide judgment dated 30 May 1996 decreed the suit and declared the order dated 5 June 1992 dismissing the petitioner from service as null and void. Aggrieved by the said order, the Union of India and the other defendants filed Civil Appeal No. 13 of 1998, which was allowed on the ground that the suit is bad for want of notice under Section 80 CPC and is barred by Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The petitioner carried the matter in Second Appeal No. 1022 of 2003 before this Court. By means of the judgment dated 21 September 2010, this Court allowed the second appeal and restored the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 30 May 1996 decreeing the suit. Concededly, the effect of the litigation before the Civil Court is that the order dismissing the petitioner from service stands set-aside. 7. The respondents in compliance of the judgment of this Court reinstated the petitioner in service by issuing a letter dated 3 March 2011 and in pursuance whereof the petitioner resumed his duty since 14 March 2011 at G.C., C.R.P.F., Rampur. However, he was paid his salary for the months of April, May and June 2011 by fixing it at the minimum of the pay scale. This was admittedly on the basis of an office order dated 26 March 2011, which mentions that the pay-band for the post held by the petitioner is Rs. 5200 - 20,200, Grade Pay Rs. 2000/- and his pay is being fixed at the minimum of the pay-band at Rs. 6460/- and grade pay Rs. 2000/-. It was followed by another office order dated 21 June 2011 by which it is held that since in the order of the Court, there is no specific direction with regard to the salary payable to the petitioner during the period he remained out of service and therefore, such period is being regularised, but with the rider that for the period between 5 June 1992, when he was dismissed from service until 13 March 2011, he shall not be entitled to salary on the principle of ‘no work no pay’. The petitioner by seeking amendment in the writ petition has challenged the validity of the orders dated 26 March 2011 and 21 June 2011 and has also prayed for a mandamus directing the respondents to accord all consequential benefits for the period 13 June 1990 until 13 March 2011 by treating him to be in service during the said period. A further prayer has been made for a direction to the respondents to pay his arrears of all emoluments from 20 June 1988 to 12 June 1990, the period during which he was under suspension on account of arrest in the criminal case. 8. The main submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order of dismissal dated 5 June 1992 having being set-aside by the Court on merits, he became entitled for full pay and allowances for the period he remained out of service, as a result of such order. In this regard, reliance has been placed on Rule 54-A of the Fundamental Rules. 9. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents though does not dispute that the order of dismissal was set-aside on merits by the Civil Court, has placed reliance on Fundamental Rule 54(5) in contending that the absence from duty cannot be treated as period spent on duty unless the competent authority specifically directs in this behalf. It is further submitted that during the period the petitioner had not worked, he is not entitled to any salary on the principle of ‘no work no pay’. 10. These submissions fall for consideration by this Court. 11. The relevant part of Rule 54-A of the Fundamental Rules, as is relevant, is reproduced below : “54-A (1) Where the dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement of a Government servant is set aside by a Court of Law and such Government servant is reinstated without holding any further inquiry, the period of absence from duty shall be regularised and the Government servant shall be paid pay and allowances in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (2) or (3) subject to the directions, if any, of the Court. (2)(i) Where the dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement of a Government servant is set aside by the Court solely on the ground of non-compliance with the requirements of clause (1) or clause (2) of article 311 of the Constitution, and where he is not exonerated on merits, and no further inquiry is proposed to be held, the Government servant shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (7) of rule 54, be paid such amount (not being the whole) of the pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired or suspended prior to such dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, as the competent authority may determine, after giving notice to the Government servant of the quantum proposed and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him in that connection within such period (which in no case shall exceed sixty days from the date on which the notice has been served) as may be specified in the notice. (ii) The period intervening between the date of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement including the period of suspension preceding dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, and the date of judgment of the Court shall be regularised in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-rule (5) of Rule 54. (3) If the dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement of a Government servant is set aside by the Court on the merits of the case, the period intervening between the date of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement including the period of suspension preceding such dismissal, removal, or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, and the date of reinstatement shall be treated as duty for all purposes and he shall be paid the full pay and allowances for the period, to which he would have been entitled, had he not been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired or suspended prior to such dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be.” 12. The Fundamental Rule 54-A deals with a situation where the order of dismissal or removal or compulsory retirement of a Government servant is set-aside by a Court of law and such Government servant is reinstated without holding any further inquiry. The Fundamental Rule 54-A deals with a situation where the order of dismissal or removal or compulsory retirement of a Government servant is set-aside by a Court of law and such Government servant is reinstated without holding any further inquiry. According to clause (1), the period of absence from duty of such employee shall stand regularised and such Government servant becomes entitled for pay and allowances in accordance with sub-rules (2) and (3), subject to the directions, if any, of the Court. Admittedly, in the instant case, apart from declaring the order dated 5 June 1992 dismissing the petitioner from service as null and void, the Civil Court has not issued any further direction with regard to pay and allowances. Consequentially, the same has to be determined in accordance with sub-rule (2) and sub-rule (3) of Rule 54-A. Sub-rule (2) becomes applicable when the employee is not exonerated on merits but on ground of non-compliance with the requirements of Clause (1) or Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution and no further inquiry is proposed to be held against such Government servant. In such cases, it is left to the competent authority to determine the quantum of the amount payable to such employee, after due notice to him. However, sub-rule (3) deals with a situation where the order of dismissal is set-aside on merits and in such cases, the period intervening between the date of dismissal including the period of suspension preceding such dismissal and the date of reinstatement is to be treated as duty for all purposes and such an employee shall be paid full pay and allowances for the period, to which he would have been entitled, had he not been dismissed from service. 13. In the instant case, as noted above, the order of dismissal dated 5 June 1992 has been declared null and void by the Civil Court, after recording a categorical finding that the charge against the petitioner that he overstayed the leave without due intimation to the authority, has not been found to be correct. This is an adjudication on the merits of the charge and the effect of the aforesaid finding is that the order of the dismissal dated 5 June 1992 has to be treated as null and void and of no consequence for all practical purposes. This is an adjudication on the merits of the charge and the effect of the aforesaid finding is that the order of the dismissal dated 5 June 1992 has to be treated as null and void and of no consequence for all practical purposes. Consequentially, sub-rule (3) of the Fundamental Rules 54-A shall become squarely applicable to the case of the petitioner. He, would thus be entitled for full pay and allowances for the period he remained out of service, as a result of the order of dismissal dated 5 June 1992. 14. Now reverting to the contention of learned counsel for the respondents, it is noticeable that Fundamental Rules 54 deals with an entirely different situation namely, where a Government servant, who has been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired, is reinstated as a result of an appeal or review being allowed. Even in such cases, sub-rule (2) provides that where there is clear exoneration of the Government servant, he would be paid full pay and allowances except in cases where the authorities are of the opinion that the termination of the proceedings instituted against the Government servant had been delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant. Although, Clause (ii) of the sub-rule (2) of Rule 54-A makes sub-rule (5) of Rule 54 applicable to cases covered by sub-rule (2), but in the instant case, as noted above, the case of the petitioner is covered by sub-rule (3) as it is a case of order being set-aside on merits, and thus sub-rule (5) of Rule 54 cannot be applied to the petitioner in determining his rights and entitlements to pay and allowances, during the period he remained out of service. 15. In view of the above, in my considered opinion, Fundamental Rule 54(5) will have no application to the facts of the instant case. 16. 15. In view of the above, in my considered opinion, Fundamental Rule 54(5) will have no application to the facts of the instant case. 16. Since the effect of the findings of the Civil Court is that the order of dismissal dated 5 June 1992 stand set-aside on merits, the petitioner becomes entitled for full pay and allowances during the period he remained out of service, as a result of such order i.e. from 5 June 1992 to 13 March 2011 and the office order dated 21 June 2011 in so far as it disentitles the petitioner to the salary during the period he remained out of service on the principle of ‘no work no pay’ cannot be sustained in law. 17. However, it is noticeable that at the time when the petitioner was dismissed from service on 5 June 1992, he was continuing under suspension on the basis of an order dated 20 June 1988 on account of involvement in a criminal case No. 97 of 1988, (subsequently registered as Sessions Trial No. 447 of 1993) under Sections 307, 336, 504 IPC, Police Station Raunahi, district Faizabad. Admittedly, on the basis of the involvement of the petitioner in the said criminal case, no disciplinary proceedings were ever initiated against him. The sessions trial ultimately concluded with the acquittal of the petitioner by judgment dated 1 December 1994 (as noted by the trial Court in its judgment dated 30 May 1996 and has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents). In Union of India v. Rajive Kumar, 2003(6) SCC 516 , the Apex Court has held that an order of suspension passed on the ground of arrest of an employee in a criminal case for more than 48 hours would not come to an end automatically and the competent authority has to apply its mind whether such order is to be revoked during the pendency of the criminal case or not. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently contended that even in view of the order of suspension dated 20 June 1988, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to full salary. 18. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently contended that even in view of the order of suspension dated 20 June 1988, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to full salary. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner faced with the aforesaid situation filed a supplementary-affidavit sworn by the petitioner whereby, the petitioner has undertaken to give up his claim for full salary for the period starting from 20 June 1988, when he was placed under suspension, in view of his arrest in the criminal case, until his discharge by the Sessions Court vide judgment dated 1 December 1994. 19. Learned counsel for the respondents has very fairly admitted that even in the eventuality the suspension dated 12 August 1988, on ground of involvement of the petitioner in the criminal case, is deemed to have continued after 5 June 1992, it could not have gone beyond 1 December 1994, the date when the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case. Further, it has not been disputed before the Court that though the petitioner during this period would be entitled to subsistence allowance alone, but such period has to be counted for all other purposes. In view of the above stand by the learned counsel for the parties, I further hold that during the period 20 June 1988 to 1 December 1994, the petitioner would only be entitled to subsistence allowance, on his furnishing the required certificate of non-engagement as required under law, but such period shall count for all other purposes. 20. It is noticeable that under the order of 26 June 2011, the respondents after reinstating the petitioner had fixed his pay at the minimum in the pay scale by excluding the period he was out of service as a result of dismissal order dated 5 June 1992. This in my opinion cannot be sustained as the services rendered by the petitioner during the period he remained out service as a result of dismissal order dated 5 June 1992 stands regularised and he became entitled for full pay and allowances for such period, in view of Fundamental Rule 54-A(3). Accordingly, the order dated 26 March 2011 fixing his salary at minimum in the pay scale also stands quashed. 21. As a result of the above discussion, it is directed that the period starting from 5 June 1992 till 13 March 2011 shall be treated to be period spent on duty. Accordingly, the order dated 26 March 2011 fixing his salary at minimum in the pay scale also stands quashed. 21. As a result of the above discussion, it is directed that the period starting from 5 June 1992 till 13 March 2011 shall be treated to be period spent on duty. The petitioner shall be entitled to full pay and allowances for such period except for the period starting 20 June 1988 to 1 December 1994 during which period, he shall only be entitled for subsistence allowance, subject to his complying with all other legal requirements, in this regard. It is stated at the Bar by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had retired on 30 April 2014. In view of the above, the respondents shall now calculate his pension by treating him to be in continuous service until he attained the age of superannuation and pay him all arrears of salary including the arrears of subsistence allowance for the period noted above, expeditiously and preferably within a period of two months from the date of production of certified copy of this order before the second respondent. 22. Writ petition stands allowed to the extent indicated above. 23. No order as to the costs. ———————