Judgment : Debasish Kar Gupta , J. : This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of conviction dated March 21, 2014 and sentence dated March 24, 2014 passed by the learned Judge, Special Court IE Act, Additional District & Sessions Judge, Berhampore, Murshidabad in SSL No.359/2009. The appellant has been convicted for commissioning offence punishable under Sections 326/307 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the I.P.C.). The appellant is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life as also to pay a fine of Rs.5000/-. Further direction is given to set off the period of his imprisonment during pendency of the above trial against the above sentence. The backdrop of the case of prosecution is discussed in a nutshell hereunder:- A written complaint dated March 10, 2009 was submitted by one Smt. Mahamaya Mondal, widow of late Kanai Mondal, (PW 1) before the Inspector in charge Domkal Police Station, Domkal, District-Murshidabad. According to the above complaint, her son Basudev Mondal (PW 8) was a van rickshaw puller of Saraswati Sishu Mandir. The aforesaid PW 8 was returning home from Baniakhali by a cycle at about 13.30 hours. Near Sripatipur, one Furkan Sk, the appellant suddenly assaulted him with a “Henso” (sickle) on the left wrist, amongst other places of his body. The persons nearby had rushed to this spot and removed him to Islampur Rural Hospital after rescuing him from the attack of the appellant. The PW 8 was subsequently referred to Berhampur New General Hospital considering the injury sustained by him. According to the above letter of complaint one Suvendu Roy, Malay Ghosh and one Utpal Sengupta, apart from the above de facto complainant witnessed the above commission of offence by the appellant. On receipt of the above letter of complaint it was diarised on the same date at 21.25 hours. A formal FIR was lodged bearing Domkal P.S. FIR No.193/09 dated March 10, 2009 at 21.25 hours against the appellant for commission of offence punishable under Sections 326/307 of I.P.C. Inquest report (investigation report) was prepared by Sri Shyamal Kumar Ghosh, Sub-Inspector of Police, Domkal P.S., Murshidabad, (the Investigating Officer), on March 11, 2009 at 14.45 hours. According to the above report the wrist with five fingers of the PW 8 was detached from his left hand. According to the above report the wrist with five fingers of the PW 8 was detached from his left hand. The detached portion of left arm of the PW 8 was sent to the Berhampur Sadar Hospital, District-Murshidabad for post mortem examination. The post mortem examination had been conducted by Dr. Swapan Kumar Mondal (PW 7). The Post mortem report no.180 dated March 12, 2009 was prepared. According to the evidence of PW 7, the cause of detachment of the wrist of the left hand was chopping with sharp cutting weapon. The appellant was arrested on March 14, 2009. Charge-sheet no.119/09 dated May 15, 2009 was submitted before the learned Court below. Charge was framed against the appellant on April 19, 2010 for commission of offence punishable under Sections 326/307 of I.P.C. After taking into consideration 15 prosecution witnesses (out of whom PW 4, PW 10 and PW 14 declared hostile) as also the documentary evidences and the statement of the appellant recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. the impugned judgment order of conviction and sentence were passed against the appellant. It is submitted by Mr. Partha Sarathi Bhattacharyya, learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of the appellant that the charge framed against the appellant was not proved beyond all reasonable doubts for the following reasons:- (i) Conviction for committing offence punishable under Sections 326/307 simultaneously cannot be sustained in law. (ii) According to the evidence adduced by PW 3 he was only witness of the inquest report (investigation report) dated March 11, 2009 of detached portion of left arm of the PW 8. PW 4, PW 10 and PW 14 were declared hostile. Therefore, their evidences should not have been taken into consideration by the lower Court below. The medical examination report of PW 9, the Medical Officer of Islampur Rural Hospital, (Exbt.-5) did not contain the name of assailant and the particulars of the criminal case. It was also evident from the evidence adducing by PW 9 during cross-examination. So, the above medical examination report (Exbt.-5) should not be considered to corroborate with the inquest report (investigation report) dated March 11, 2009. (iii) During cross-examination the PW 7 (the doctor) who had conducted the post mortem, deposed that the detachment of a portion of the left arm might be caused due to putting his arm in a machine. So, the above medical examination report (Exbt.-5) should not be considered to corroborate with the inquest report (investigation report) dated March 11, 2009. (iii) During cross-examination the PW 7 (the doctor) who had conducted the post mortem, deposed that the detachment of a portion of the left arm might be caused due to putting his arm in a machine. Though the blood stained genji of the PW 8 was seized and the weapon of offence had been seized, the same were not sent for chemical analysis. (iv) PW 5 was a local witness. According to his evidence, the appellant was a mentally disoriented person. The above evidence of PW 5 was corroborated by the evidence of PW 6 that the appellant was a mentally disoriented person and he is in the habit of doing anything according to his willing. During cross-examination he denied that the appellant had assaulted the PW 8. He was not declared hostile after his examination in chief. (v) Though PW 15 claimed himself as eyewitness of commission of offence under reference by the appellant. He had arrived at the place of commission of offence after hearing noise from the place concerned. (vi) No motive for committing the offence by the appellant was proved. Reliance is place by Mr. Bhattacharyya on the decision of Ranjit Mondal & Ors. vs. The State of West Bengal reported in 2015 (1) Cal Cri LR 897. It is submitted by Mr. Pawan Kumar Gupta that the commission of offence by the appellant was proved beyond any reasonable doubt. Our attentions have been drawn towards the evidences of PW 6, PW 7 and PW 9 in support of his above submissions that the commission of offence by the appellant was proved. It is further submitted by him that the arrest memo of the appellant was signed by his mother and wife as witnesses. Therefore, his family structure supported the leading of social life by him which was contrary to the deposition of PW 4, PW 5, and PW 6 to the effect that he was a mentally disoriented person. It is further submitted by him that no material was brought on record to prove that the appellant was a mentally disoriented person. It is further submitted by Mr. It is further submitted by him that no material was brought on record to prove that the appellant was a mentally disoriented person. It is further submitted by Mr. Gupta that the statement of PW 8 (the victim) recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. It was corroborated with the medical report as also the evidence adduced by the aforesaid PW 13 and PW 15. Their evidences were corroborated by the deposition of PW 7 and PW 9. PW 7 was the Medical Officer of the Berhampur Sadar Hospital and PW 9 was the Medical Officer of Islampur Rural Hospital at the material point of time. Mr. Gupta reserves his comments with regard to invoking of Sections 326/307 simultaneously, so far as the conviction and sentence of the appellant is concerned. Having heard the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the parties in this appeal and considering the facts and circumstances of the same, we find the first issue which falls for our consideration is the propriety of the impugned order of convicting the appellant for commission of offence punishable under Sections 326 and 307 of the I.P.C. The provision of Section 307 of the I.P.C. deals with attempt to murder. The essential ingredients of the offence under the above provision are follows:- (i) The accused did some act; (ii) Such act was done with intention or knowledge that hurt was likely to be caused to the victim by the act. For the last part of the offence the accused be guilty of murder was under sentence of life imprisonment when he committed the offence. Further, when any person offending under this Section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is cause, be punished with death. The provision of Section 326 of the I.P.C. deals with voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapon or means having essential ingredients as follows:- (i) Accused caused grievous hurt; (ii) He caused it voluntarily; (iii) He caused it by any of the following means:- (a) by any instrument of shooting, stabbing or cutting; (b) by any instrument, if used as a weapon of offence likely to cause death; (c) by fire or heated substance; (d) by poisonous or corrosive substance; (e) by explosive substance; (f) by any substance deleterious to the human body to inhale or swallow; (g) by means of any animal. For the commission of offence under the above Section the accused shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and also be liable to fine. Therefore, whether the culpability of the accused would fall under Section 307 or 326 of I.P.C. would depend upon presence of distinguishable essential ingredients in a case of commission of offence under any of the above provisions. But essential ingredients of offences under both the aforesaid provisions, i.e. Sections 307 and 326 of the I.P.C. cannot be present in case of commission of one and same offence. So, the impugned order of conviction of the appellant for commission of offence punishable under Section 307 as also under Section 326 cannot be sustained in law and the same requires interference in this appeal to the extent as may be discussed in the later part of this judgment. Before considering the validity of the second ground for challenge we would like to take into consideration the object of recording statement of an accused under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. It has been held by the Apex Court in R. Shaji vs. State of Kerala, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 266 , that statement recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. is recorded by a learned Judicial Magistrate under oath. So, it is called a substantive evidence which can be used for both corroboration and contradiction. The object of recording statement of a witness under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. is twofold as follows:- (i) To deter the witness from changing his stand by denying the contents of his previously recorded statement; and (ii) To tide over immunity from prosecution by the witness under the provision under reference. The relevant portion of the above judgment is quoted below:- “26. Evidence given in a court under oath has great sanctity, which is why the same is called substantive evidence. Statements under Section 161 CrPC can be used only for the purpose of contradiction and statements under Section 164 CrPC can be used for both corroboration and contradiction. The relevant portion of the above judgment is quoted below:- “26. Evidence given in a court under oath has great sanctity, which is why the same is called substantive evidence. Statements under Section 161 CrPC can be used only for the purpose of contradiction and statements under Section 164 CrPC can be used for both corroboration and contradiction. In a case where the Magistrate has to perform the duty of recording a statement under Section 164 CrPC, he is under an obligation to elicit all information which the witness wishes to disclose, as a witness who may be an illiterate, rustic villager may not be aware of the purpose for which he has been brought, and what he must disclose in his statements under Section 164 CrPC. Hence, the Magistrate should ask the witness explanatory questions and obtain all possible information in relation to the said case. 27. So far as the statement of witnesses recorded under Section 164 is concerned, the object is twofold; in the first place, to deter the witness from changing his stand by denying the contents of his previously recorded statement; and secondly, to tide over immunity from prosecution by the witness under Section 164. A proposition to the effect that if a statement of a witness is recorded under Section 164, his evidence in court should be discarded, is not at all warranted. (Vide Jogendra Nahak v. State of Orissa and CCE v. Duncan Agro Industries Ltd.)” From the statement of the victim (PW 8) recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. it was evident that the place of occurrence of the offence, time of occurrence of the offence as also the injury sustained by him were available therein. It was corroborated by the documentary evidences, i.e. inquest report dated March 11, 2009, post mortem report dated March 12, 2009, medical papers and documents of admission of the victim also his treatment in Islampur Hospital for his injury under reference. It was corroborated by the evidence adduced the PW 7 (the doctor who had conducted the Post Mortem Examination) and PW 9 (the doctor who had treated the victim in Islampur Hospital. It will not be out of context to observe that the attempt made in course of cross-examination of PW 9 to the effect that the injury of the nature under reference might be caused by a machine. It will not be out of context to observe that the attempt made in course of cross-examination of PW 9 to the effect that the injury of the nature under reference might be caused by a machine. The oral evidence as also the documentary evidences taken into consideration by the learned Court below and as discussed in the preceding paragraph hereinabove. It was not a case that the appellant put his hand in any machine, as a result of which an accident would happen giving unnecessary importance to the evidence of PW 7 adduced in course of cross-examination. More so, it has already been held by us in the judgment dated September 1, 2015 in the matter of Allauddin Khan vs. The State of West Bengal (in CRA 299 of 2014) that a man may lie but a document will never lie. The above principle of law was followed on the basis of a decision of this Court in the matter of Afzauddin Ansary & Ors. vs. The State of West Bengal, reported in 1997 (2) Crimes 53 Cal., and the relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:- “20. A well-known dicta has been laid down not only by the apex Court of our country but also by the Privy Council that a man may lie but a document will never lie. It is a well-known adage that one swallow does not make a summer but it is a case where one swallow makes a summer. The question arises in this way as it gyrates the whole issue where the evidence as to recognition is a subsequent creation by the machination of the Ansaries. Exhibit-5 the copy of the general diary book projects an unnatural shadow about recognition of any one of the appellants before us. A silence has been maintained in the said exhibit where none of the names of the appellants found their room in the general diary book. ……..” (Emphasis supplied) The impugned judgment requires interference with regard to the observations made by the learned Court below to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the detachment of left hand of the victim was an outcome of an accident considering the aforesaid evidence of the PW 9. ……..” (Emphasis supplied) The impugned judgment requires interference with regard to the observations made by the learned Court below to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the detachment of left hand of the victim was an outcome of an accident considering the aforesaid evidence of the PW 9. With regard to the question as to whether the appellant a mentally disoriented person, it is true that the PW 4, PW 5 and PW 6 adduced evidence to the effect that the appellant was a mentally disoriented person. After considering the aforesaid evidences we find that according to PW 4 (who was declared a hostile witness) the appellant was partially insane for last ten years. The PW 5 deposed that the appellant was a mad person. According to PW 6, he was a mad person and he was in a habit of doing anything which he wants. But the learned Court below ignored that no documentary evidence was brought on record in support of the above oral evidence that in opinion of any medical expert the appellant was a mad or insane person. No treatment paper in support of the above submission was brought on record. That apart, we find substance in the submissions made on behalf of the State respondents that the appellant had been leading a family life and he got married. The mother and wife of the appellant put their signature in the arrest memo as witnesses. Therefore, the decision making process of the learned Court below to arrive at a conclusion with regard to doubt the appellant being a mentally disoriented person requires further consideration. The medical examination report (Exbt.-5) was prepared by PW 9 in connection with the injury sustained by the PW 8. There was no scope to incorporate the names of the assailants or the number of criminal case concern in the medical examination report prepared in the prescribed proforma. That apart, the same was exhibited as a proof of treatment of the injuries sustained by the PW 8. The same had no nexus with the commission of offence by the assailants or the criminal case initiated in relation to such commission of offence. That apart, the same was exhibited as a proof of treatment of the injuries sustained by the PW 8. The same had no nexus with the commission of offence by the assailants or the criminal case initiated in relation to such commission of offence. It is necessary to point out here that the inquest report (investigation report) dated March 11, 2009 was prepared in respect of detached portion of wrist with five fingers of lift hand of the PW 8 and the same had no nexus with the above medical examination report (Exbt.-5) under reference to prove the commission of offence by the assailants in a criminal case. With regard to the question of motive of the appellant to commit the offence under reference we find from the deposition of PW 14 that the brother of the appellant got injury from dashing of a van rickshaw and consequent thereupon he was admitted in a hospital. So, the appellant committed the offence under reference on the basis of his belief that the respondent no.8 caused that injury, as alleged. Nothing is available from the evidence (either oral or documentary) that there was an incident causing hurt to the brother of the appellant by the van rickshaw of the victim (PW 8). On the other hand, PW 8 deposed during his cross-examination that he was not acquainted with the appellant and he had the occasion to meet him for the first time on the date of occurrence of the incident. Therefore, the decision making process of the learned Trial Court to take into consideration the above evidence adduced by the PW 14 was erroneous. In view of the discussions and observations made hereinabove that there is no scope to quash and set aside the entire impugned judgment, order of conviction and sentence. The impugned judgment requires interference to the extent as directed hereunder. The impugned order of conviction punishable under Section 307 of the I.P.C. is quashed and set aside. The order of conviction of the appellant for committing offence punishable under Section 326 of the I.P.C. remains unchanged with modification of the sentence. The impugned sentence is modified to the extent to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten (10) years but the fine of Rs.5000/- as imposed by the impugned sentence is enhanced to Rs.50,000/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for a further period of six (6) months. The impugned sentence is modified to the extent to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten (10) years but the fine of Rs.5000/- as imposed by the impugned sentence is enhanced to Rs.50,000/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for a further period of six (6) months. If the fine amount is realised, 50% of that amount will be given to the victim as compensation. Needless to point out that the period of imprisonment as altered in this appeal shall be subject to adjustment of the period of imprisonment already undergone by the accused since last arrest. This appeal is, thus, allowed partially to the extent as directed hereinabove. Let this judgment together with the Lower Court’s records be sent back to the learned Court below expeditiously with a direction to take necessary steps accordingly. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties, on priority basis.