JUDGMENT : Ashoke Kumar Dasadhikari, J. Order impugned dated 23rd February, 2012 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, 2nd Court at Howrah reversing the order of the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, 4th Court at Howrah, allowing petitioners' application under Order 7, Rule 11 (d) and under Order 7, Rule 10 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is under challenge in this revisional application. 2. Mr. Majumdar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the learned Trial Court after proper adjudication of the application filed for rejection and/or return of the plaint passed an order for returning the plaint on the ground of lacking jurisdiction since the plaintiff has made a prayer for declaration that the property is a public debottar property. He submits that the suit is not maintainable before the learned Trial Court and that is why the plaint was returned. 3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order of the plaintiff filed a miscellaneous appeal before the learned Appellate Court and the learned Appellate Court has reversed the order passed by the learned Trial Court and has come to a conclusion that the learned Trial Court has gone wrong and the order passed by the learned Court is not sustainable since the learned Trial Court without going into trial has come to a decision that the property is a public debottar property and the dedication is complete not partial. 4. Mr. Majumdar submits that from the averments made in the plaint it would be apparent and evident that the property is a public debottar property and the learned Trial Court also found on admission of plaint that it is a public debottar property. Therefore, the learned Trial Court was right in its decision allowing the application under Order 7, Rule 11 (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. Mr. Majumdar submits since it is a public debottar property covered under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure no suit is maintainable before the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division. He submits there is no wrong in the order passed by the learned Trial Court. He further submits that the learned Appellate Court is totally incorrect in its conclusion since no trial is necessary for determination of the status of the property since it is admitted by the plaintiff that the property is public debottar property. 6. Mr. He submits there is no wrong in the order passed by the learned Trial Court. He further submits that the learned Appellate Court is totally incorrect in its conclusion since no trial is necessary for determination of the status of the property since it is admitted by the plaintiff that the property is public debottar property. 6. Mr. Majumdar submits that since first prayer is for declaration of public debottar property, the learned Court ought to have proceeded on the basis of public debottar property and ought not to have entertained the appeal filed by the plaintiff. 7. Mr. Majumdar submits that the order impugned is not sustainable. He submits the order impugned passed by the learned Appellate Court must be set aside. 8. Mr. Banerjee, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the opposite parties submits that the scope of Section 92 is totally different. He submits that the prayers made in the plaint are not at all covered by that Section and the suit filed by the plaintiff even if it is admitted that the property is a public debottar is not coming within the scope and ambit of Section 92 since there is no dispute about trusteeship nor there is any prayer for removing any trustee; appointing a new trustee; or vesting any property in a trustee, etc. This is not at all a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9. Mr. Banerjee submits that the law is now well-settled if it is a suit for adjudication of a private right then the suit instituted by the plaintiff cannot be a suit under Section 92. 10. Mr. Banerjee referred the Hon'ble Apex Court judgement in case of (Swami Parmatmanand Saraswati and anr. v. Ramji Tripathi and anr.), reported in A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2141 wherein it was held that suit to remedy infringement of individual right or to vindicate private right is outside scope of Section 92. 11. Mr. Banerjee submits that the learned Trial Court has gone wrong without taking note of the provisions under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 12. Mr. Banerjee submits otherwise also the suit requires trial since it is adjudication of a private right. There are other and further prayers which were not looked at by the learned Trial Court. 13. Mr. Banerjee submits the revisional application is of no merit and therefore, it should be dismissed. 14. 12. Mr. Banerjee submits otherwise also the suit requires trial since it is adjudication of a private right. There are other and further prayers which were not looked at by the learned Trial Court. 13. Mr. Banerjee submits the revisional application is of no merit and therefore, it should be dismissed. 14. Considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. Although prayer for declaration of public trust was made but really the suit was moved for eviction of the opposite parties and for not giving any new electric connection to the suit premises. It is apparent and clear that this is a suit for vindication of private right only which do not come within the scope and ambit of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provision under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure is quoted hereunder :- "92. Public charities. – (1) In the case of any alleged breach of any express or construction trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate-General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the leave of the Court may institute a suit, whether contentious or not, in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate to obtain a decree – (a) removing any trustee; (a) appointing a new trustee; (a) vesting any property in a trustee; (cc) directing a trustee who has been removed or a person who has ceased to be a trustee, to deliver possession of any trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property; (a) directing accounts and inquiries; (a) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust; (a) authorising the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged; (a) settling a scheme; or (a) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require. (2) Save as provided by the Religious Endowments Act, 1863 (20 of 1863), or by any corresponding law in force in the territories which, immediately before the 1st November, 1956, were comprised in Part B States, no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub-section (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with the provisions of that sub-section. (2) The Court may alter the original purposes of an express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature and allow the property or income of such trust or any portion thereof to be applied press in one or more of the following circumstances, namely:- (a) where the original purposes of the trust, in whole or in part, - (i) have been, as far as may be, fulfilled; or (ii) cannot be carried out at all, or cannot be carried out according to the directions given in the instrument creating the trust or, where there is no such instrument, according to the spirit of the trust; or (a) where the original purposes of the trust provide a use for a part only of the property available by virtue of the trust; or (a) where the property available by virtue of the trust and other property applicable for similar purposes can be more effectively used in conjunction with, and to that end can suitably be made applicable to any other purpose, regard being had to the spirit of the trust and its applicability to common purposes; or (a) where the original purposes, in whole or in part, were laid down by reference to an area which then was, but has since ceased to be, a unit for such purposes; or (a) where the original purposes, in whole or in part, have, since they were laid down, - (i) been adequately provided for by other means, or (i) ceased, as being useless or harmful to the community, or (i) ceased to be, in law, charitable, or (i) ceased in any other way to provide a suitable and effective method of using the property available by virtue of the trust, regard being had to the spirit of the trust." 15. The same issue came up before the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Swami Paramatmanand Saraswati (supra) and it was held that the suit to remedy infringement of individual right or suit to vindicate private right is outside scope of Section 92. Paragraph 10 of the aforementioned judgement which is very relevant is quoted hereunder :- "10. A suit under Section 92 is a suit of a special nature which presupposes the existence of a public trust of a religious or charitable character. Such a suit can proceed only on the allegation that there was a breach of such trust or that the direction of the Court is necessary or the administration of the trust and the plaintiff must pray for one or more of the reliefs that are mentioned in the section. It is, therefore, clear that if the allegation of breach of trust is not substantiated or that the plaintiff had not made out a case for any direction by the Court for proper administration of the trust, the very foundation of a suit under the section would fail; and, even if all the other ingredients of a suit under Section 92 are made out, if it is clear that the plaintiffs are not suing to vindicate the right of the public but are seeking a declaration of their individual or personal rights of any other person of persons in whom they are interested, then the suit would be outside the scope of Section 92. A suit whose primary object or purpose is to remedy the infringement of an individual right or to vindicate a private right does not fall under the section. It is not every suit claiming the reliefs specified in the section that can be brought under the section but only the suits which, besides claiming any of the reliefs, are brought by individuals as representatives of the public for vindication of public rights, and in deciding whether a suit falls within Section 92 the Court must go beyond the reliefs and have regard to the capacity in which the plaintiffs are suing and to the purpose for which the suit was brought. This is the reason why trustees of public trust of a religious nature are precluded from suing under the section to vindicate their individual or personal rights. This is the reason why trustees of public trust of a religious nature are precluded from suing under the section to vindicate their individual or personal rights. It is quite immaterial whether the trustees pray for declaration of their personal rights of one or more defendants. When the right to the office of a trustee is asserted or denied and relief asked for on that basis, the suit falls outside Section 92." 16. Therefore, in my considered view, there is nothing wrong in the order passed by the learned Appellate Court. Further it is clear from the facts and prayers made in the plaint, the suit is not coming within the scope of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, there is no merit in this revisional application and the revisional application is, thus, dismissed.