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2015 DIGILAW 862 (CAL)

Pradip Kumar Hazra v. Sekhar Chandra Law

2015-10-08

DEBI PROSAD DEY, JYOTIRMAY BHATTACHARYA

body2015
JUDGMENT Debi Prosad Dey, J. This first appeal is directed against the judgement and decree passed by the learned Judge, 3rd Bench, City Civil Court being Title Suit No.2339 of 1982 dated 20th December, 2006 whereunder and whereby learned trial Judge has been pleased to dismiss the suit holding inter-alia that the suit is barred by law of limitation, that the plaintiff has not paid proper Court fees in respect of his claim to the property described in the schedule of the plaint, that the schedule given in the plaint is vague and indefinite and that plaintiff is not entitled to get any relief in terms of his claim in view of execution of a registered deed of lease by the defendant no. 1 in favour of defendant no.2. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Judge, the plaintiff has filed this first appeal on amongst other grounds that learned trial Judge could not appreciate the case of the plaintiff in it’s proper perspective and that learned trial Judge has failed to apply the correct principle of law in the given facts and circumstances of this case and that learned trial Judge has failed to consider that the defendant no.1 being privy to the contract has not examined himself and thereby defendant no.2 has had no authority to challenge the agreement for lease executed by and between the plaintiff and defendant no.1 The further case of the plaintiff is that the alleged deed of lease executed by defendant no.1 in favour of defendant no.2 is hit by the principle of concurrent lease and therefore learned trial Judge ought to have decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. In order to appreciate the rival claims between the parties, it is necessary to reproduce the case as made out in the plaint as well as in the written statement made out by the parties to this appeal. The plaintiff has filed the suit for specific performance of an agreement for lease and permanent injunction. One Kamal Kumari Law since deceased was the absolute owner of the property situated at 43 Kailash Bose Street, P.S.-Amherst Street, Calcutta- 700006. The plaintiff has filed the suit for specific performance of an agreement for lease and permanent injunction. One Kamal Kumari Law since deceased was the absolute owner of the property situated at 43 Kailash Bose Street, P.S.-Amherst Street, Calcutta- 700006. The plaintiff was inducted as a monthly tenant under Kamal Kumari Law, since deceased with regard to a portion of the said premises comprising of four garages with adjoining piece of land measuring about 03 Cottahs 11 Chittaks and 08 Square feet. On 24.11.1977 Kamal Kumari Law entered into an agreement with the plaintiff to grant him a lease in respect of the said portion of premises number 43 Kailash Bose Street, Calcutta, in which the plaintiff was inducted as monthly tenant on amongst the following terms and conditions. a. That the lease would be for the period of 99 years commencing from 23rd November, 1977 with the option of the plaintiff for renewal thereof for further period of 51 years at a rent of Rs.400/- per month. b. In case of enhancement of Municipal rates the plaintiff would pay his share towards enhanced Municipal rates. c. The plaintiff would be entitled to construct a multi stored building on the said premises for which the consent of lesser would be deemed to have been given. If necessary the lessor would accord consent for sanction of plan. d. The plaintiff was authorized to transfer the said lease hold premises by way of mortgage, gift or sub-lease without requiring any consent from the lessor. The terms and conditions of the said lease were incorporated in a draft lease with a sketch map signed by the plaintiff and by the said Kamal Kumari Law through her constituted attorney Shri Sujoy Kumar Ghosal. The terms and conditions of the said lease were incorporated in a draft lease with a sketch map signed by the plaintiff and by the said Kamal Kumari Law through her constituted attorney Shri Sujoy Kumar Ghosal. At the relevant point of time granting of lease in Calcutta exceeding 10 years requires prior permission from the competent authority under the urban land (Ceiling and Regulation Act 1976) and as such permission was expected to take some considerable time, the plaintiff and Smt. Kamal Kumari Law entered into an agreement in writing with the draft lease annexure thereof on 24th November, 1977 whereby Kamal Kumari Law agreed to execute and register the lease upon receiving necessary permission from the said competent authority and in the mean time allowed the plaintiff to hold the said premises number 43 Kailash Bose Street, Calcutta as a monthly tenant on the terms and conditions as recorded in the said draft lease. The aforesaid agreement was signed by her constituted attorney Shri Sujoy Kumar Ghosal and defendant no.1 also signed in that agreement as witness in his personal capacity. Immediately after entering into the said agreement for lease the plaintiff consulted the engineer regarding feasibility of construction of a multi stored building and was told by the engineer that the area of the land proposed to be demised would be insufficient for further construction. The plaintiff accordingly conveyed such difficulty to Smt. Kamal Kumari Law and she then agreed to provide some additional land measuring a little over 02 Cottahs with a garage in the proposed lease without demanding any additional rent. Accordingly on 26.12.1977 Kamal Kumari Law herself and through her said constituted attorney, Sujoy Kumar Ghosal entered into another agreement in writing with the plaintiff which may be called as supplementary memorandum to agreement of tenancy. Thus, the earlier agreement for lease dated 24.11.1977 was modified by incorporation in the demise some additional land with a garage and a fresh plan of the lease hold land was annexed with the said agreement. Sekhar Chandra Law also signed in the agreement dated 26.12.1977 as witness in his personal capacity. Thus, the earlier agreement for lease dated 24.11.1977 was modified by incorporation in the demise some additional land with a garage and a fresh plan of the lease hold land was annexed with the said agreement. Sekhar Chandra Law also signed in the agreement dated 26.12.1977 as witness in his personal capacity. The plaintiff was put in possession of the said additional space and garage in pursuance of such agreement and thereafter the plaintiff has constructed an additional story on the premises existing one storied garage numbering 5 on the strength of a plan sanctioned in the name of Smt. Kamal Kumari Law. Kamal Kumari Law died on 10.05.1978 before she could obtain necessary permission from the competent authority under the urban land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 and execute and register lease in respect of the suit property. The estate of Kamal Kumari Law thereafter vested in defendant no.1 namely Sekhar Chandra Law who claims to be the sole executor of the Will of Kamal Kumari Law (since deceased). The plaintiff requested defendant no.1 to execute and register the deed of lease after obtaining necessary permission from competent authority and defendant no.1 accordingly promised to do so after obtaining probate of the Will of the deceased Kamal Kumari Law. Curiously enough, the defendant no.1 never informed the plaintiff about the grant of probate in his favour or having taken any steps towards obtaining necessary permission from the competent authority, the Photostat copies of the rent bill of the said 5 garages along with the vacant place adjoining the garages compromising the suit premises, issued by Smt. Kamal Kumari Law during her lifetime through her constituted agent and attorney Shri Sujoy Kumar Ghosal mentioning about the agreement dated 24th November, 1977 and 26.12.1977 showing the tenanted premises being 06 Cottahs 08 Chittaks and 24 Square Feet have been duly shown in the schedule of the plaint. Another Photostat copy of the rent bill has also been filed with the plaint. That some time in the month of December, 1979 the plaintiff came to know that the defendant no.1 that is Sekhar Chandra Law has granted lease in respect of building and structures comprising an area of 76 Cottahs of land at the premises number, 43 Kailash Bose Street, Calcutta-700006 to defendants no.2 from April, 1979 and the plaintiff was asked to pay rent to defendant no.2 from April, 1979. However, in spite of repeated request of the plaintiff none of the defendants enlightened the plaintiff regarding the terms of the said lease alleged to have been granted by defendant no.1 in favour of defendant no.2. The further case of the plaintiff is that he is entitled to get a declaration that the lease dated 19.11.1979, which has been executed by Sekhar Chandra Law, executor of the estate of Kamal Kumari Law (deceased), defendant no.1, in favour of defendant no.2 in respect of premises no. 43 Kailash Bose Street, Calcutta is void, illegal and not binding upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff is always willing and ready to pay the rent as per the conditions of the agreement of tenancy and the draft lease agreement. However, the plaintiff could not pay any rent since the plaintiff did not recognize any other person as landlord by virtue of the aforesaid agreements of the plaintiff and except Kamal Kumari Law (since deceased) or Sekhar Chandra Law being executor of the Will of Kamal Kumari Law. In the mean time defendant no.2 has filed a money suit being no.512 of 1982 against the plaintiff in the City Civil Court for a sum of Rs.15,200/- claiming arrear of rent in respect of the lease hold property of the plaintiff as landlord of the suit premises. The defendant no.2 also started construction of some buildings in the land adjacent to the suit property in collusion with defendant no.1 and was trying to encroach upon the suit property and the possession of the plaintiff there on. The plaintiff has already constructed two storied building in a portion of which the plaintiff has been residing with his family members. The activities of defendant no.2 has cast doubt on the right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the suit property. The cause of action of the suit arose on 07.09.1982. The plaintiff has already constructed two storied building in a portion of which the plaintiff has been residing with his family members. The activities of defendant no.2 has cast doubt on the right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the suit property. The cause of action of the suit arose on 07.09.1982. The plaintiff has thus filed a suit praying for a decree of direction to defendant no.1 to execute and register the said lease dated 24.12.1977 in respect of the suit property in terms of the agreement dated 24.11.1977 as modified by supplementary agreement dated 26.12.1977 and in case the defendant no.1 fails to execute and register the said lease, then to have the same executed and registered by the competent officer of the Court after modification consequent upon the death of the original owner of the suit property Smt. Kamal Kumari Law. Secondly, for a decree of declaration that the lease deed dated 19.11.1979 in respect of premises number 43 Kailash Bose Street, Calcutta executed and registered by Sekhar Chandra Law, executor to the estate of Smt. Kamal Kumari Law (deceased) the defendant no.1/respondent no.1 in favour of Mahesh Properties Private Limited the defendants no.2/ respondent no.2 is void, illegal, in-operative and not binding upon the petitioner. The plaintiff has also prayed for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from encroaching upon the suit property and from interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession there on. The further prayer of the plaintiff is mandatory injunction praying for demolishing any forcible and illegal construction made by the defendants/respondents or their main agent etc. on the suit premises. Injunction has also been sought for upon defendant no.2/respondent no.2 for restraining him from proceeding with money suit no.512 of 1982 at the City Civil Court at Calcutta. Defendant no.1 and 2/respondent no.1 and 2 contested the case in the trial Court by filing separate written statement denying all the material allegations contained in the plaint. The case of defendant no.1/respondent no.1 Sekhar Chandra Law in short is as follows:- i) That the suit is not maintainable in law and the suit is barred by law of limitation. ii) That the plaintiff has had no cause of action to file this case. The case of defendant no.1/respondent no.1 Sekhar Chandra Law in short is as follows:- i) That the suit is not maintainable in law and the suit is barred by law of limitation. ii) That the plaintiff has had no cause of action to file this case. The specific case of defendant no.1/respondent no.1 is that on 24.11.1978 defendant no.1 being executor and legal representative of Kamal Kumari Law (since deceased), agreed to grant to Shri Manik Chand Damani a lease of Kailash Bose Street for 99 years commencing on and from 01.12.1978. In pursuance of the said agreement a deed of lease in respect of the premises no.43 Kailash Bose Street was executed and registered in favour of Mahesh Properties Private Limited on 19th November, 1979. The premises so leased out to the defendant no.2/respondent no.2 include the portion of the land of the tenancy of the plaintiff, which comprised of 4 garages with land measuring 03 Cottahs 11 Chittaks and 08 Square Feet. Due intimation of the said agreement and the lease deed was given to the plaintiff and other tenants by this defendant. This defendant/respondent used to realise monthly rent of Rs.400/- from the plaintiff/appellant. However, this defendant/respondent stopped realising rent after March 1979 and directed the plaintiff to make payment of such rent from st April, 1979 to defendant no.2/respondent no.2. The rent so realised by this defendant, would however be duly adjusted. The plaintiff however never intended to make any payment of rent to defendant no.2/respondent no.2. The claim of the plaintiff on the basis of the two alleged unregistered agreement of tenancy dated 24.11.1977 and 26.12.1977 are not at all tenable in the eye of law. In view of the registered deed of lease executed by defendant no.1/respondent no.1 in favour of defendant no.2/respondent no.2, the plaintiff continued to be the monthly tenant as before under defendant no.2/respondent no.2 of 4 garages with land measuring 03 Cottahs 11 Chittaks and 08 Square feet and the plaintiff never acquired any right or interest under the said two agreements referred to above. The plaintiff/appellant is not entitled to construct on the basis of sanction granted in favour of Smt. Kamal Kumari Law and therefore the construction made by the plaintiff being illegal construction, is required to be demolished. The plaintiff/appellant in collusion with the constituted attorney of Smt. Kamal Kumari Law viz. The plaintiff/appellant is not entitled to construct on the basis of sanction granted in favour of Smt. Kamal Kumari Law and therefore the construction made by the plaintiff being illegal construction, is required to be demolished. The plaintiff/appellant in collusion with the constituted attorney of Smt. Kamal Kumari Law viz. Sujoy Kumar Ghosal has procured the signature of Kamal Kumari Law on the alleged agreement of tenancy fraudulently from the old lady without explaining her the contents there of. The plaintiff/appellant in a suit for specific performance has not come with clean hand and as such he is not entitled to get equitable relief. The suit is apparently barred by the law of limitation. Defendant no.2/respondent no.2 is in lawful occupation and possession of the suit premises on the strength of a registered deed of lease and the said deed of lease has duly been acted upon to the knowledge of all concerned and the said deed of lease being valid and registered document cannot be challenged in this suit. The plaintiff/appellant was a tenant under the defendant and the status of the plaintiff/appellant as tenant remains unchanged. The defendant no.2/respondent no.2 has also supported the case of defendant no.1/respondent no.1. Defendant no.2/respondent no.2 has challenged the locus of the plaintiff/appellant in challenging his registered deed of lease. On the basis of the pleadings on record learned trial Judge has framed the following issues:- 1. Are the agreement for lease dated 24th Day of November, 1977 and the additional agreement dated 26th December, 1977 entered between the plaintiff and Smt. Kamal Kumari Law (since deceased) enforceable on the defendant No.1 being the Executor to the estate of Smt. Kamal Kumari Law? 2. Is the defendant No.1 legally bound to comply with all the terms and conditions as embodied in the agreements dated 24th day of November, 1977 and dated 26th December, 1977? 3. Had the defendant No.1 any legal right to execute the lease deed dated 19th November, 1979 in favour of the defendant No.2 during the period of subsistence of the lease dated 24th day of November, 1977 and 26th December, 1977 in respect of the self same property which had already been executed in favour of the plaintiff long before the execution? 4. 4. Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree for specific performance of contract upon having direction to the defendant No.1 to execute the register in the said lease dated 24th day of November, 1977 as modified by the supplementary lease agreement 26th December, 1977 in favour of the plaintiff? 5. To what other relief or reliefs the plaintiff is entitled? Additional Issues: 6. Is the suit barred by limitation? 7. Is the suit maintainable in its present form and law? 8. Has the plaintiff any cause of action to file the case? 9. Is the suit barred by the provision of Reliefs Act? 10.Is the suit barred by defect of parties? Learned trial Judge for the sake of convenience and brevity took up all the issues together and thereby disposed of the entire suit. The specific observation of learned trial Judge is that the agreements of the plaintiff/appellant are not registered. Secondly the agreement dated 26.12.1977 is without consideration and cannot be enforced by law. Learned trial Judge further observed that the schedules given in the agreement of tenancy i.e. Exhibit 1 and exhibit 1(a) do not tally with the schedule given in the plaint. Thirdly, the suit is barred by the law of limitation. Fourthly, though the plaintiff has prayed for a declaration in relation to the registered deed of lease of defendant no.2/respondent no.2 yet the plaintiff/appellant did not pay proper Court fees and the suit has also not been properly valued. Ultimately learned trial Judge dismissed the suit. The judgment and decree passed by learned trial Judge is under challenge before us. Learned Advocate Mr. Aniruddha Chatterjee appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that learned trial Judge has failed to appreciate that the suit under reference is not barred by the law of limitation. Learned Advocate Mr. Chatterjee pointed out that the issue with regard to limitation was finally disposed of by learned trial Court by its order no.105 in absence of the defendant/respondents, since the defendants/respondents did not appear at the time of hearing of that issue before learned trial Judge. Mr. Chatterjee learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant further contended that the defendants had filed an application for recalling the said order but the said application was not disposed of. Mr. Chatterjee learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant further contended that the defendants had filed an application for recalling the said order but the said application was not disposed of. The defendant/respondent did not prefer any cross objection against such findings of the trial Court and thus should be prevented from challenging the said matter. Mr. Chatterjee further contended that learned trial Court has erroneously held that the suit is barred by the law of limitation. Mr. Chatterjee appearing on behalf of the plaintiff/appellant contended that agreements for lease were executed by Kamal Kumari Law and Sekhar Chandra Law was also present as witness to such agreements for lease. Unfortunately Sekhar Chandra Law did not examine himself on dock on oath and did not challenge the said agreements. In that view of this case, the defendant no.2/respondent no.2 has had no locus standi to challenge the said agreements since they were not party to those agreements. In short the defendant no.2/respondent no.2 not being a privy to the contract, that was executed by and between the plaintiff and Kamal Kumari Law, has had no locus standi to challenge those agreements. Mr. Chatterjee further contended that during the existence of the agreement for lease of the plaintiff/appellant, another lease agreement and deed were executed covering the land of the plaintiff/appellant. Mr. Chatterjee vehemently submitted that the subsequent deed of lease in favour of defendant no.2/respondent no.2 is hit by the principle of concurrent lease and therefore the said lease deed ought to have been declared void and in-operative in view of the principle of concurrent lease enunciated by our High Court in very many decisions. Mr. Chatterjee learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiff/appellant has further contended that the possession in respect of the suit premises was delivered to the plaintiff/appellant in terms of the agreements of lease mentioned here in above and accordingly in terms of the doctrine of part performance contained in Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, the plaintiff/appellant is entitled to get his right declared in respect of the suit premises. Mr. Chatterjee further pointed out that the case of the defendants/respondents as made out in their respective written statements is based on inconsistent pleas and thereby the entire case of the defendants/respondents should not be believed. It is submitted by Mr. Mr. Chatterjee further pointed out that the case of the defendants/respondents as made out in their respective written statements is based on inconsistent pleas and thereby the entire case of the defendants/respondents should not be believed. It is submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that in one hand the defendants/respondents have denied the very existence of the agreements of the plaintiff on the ground of fraud but simultaneously they have admitted the existence of such an agreement in their respective written statements and thereby such plea of the defendants/respondents being mutually destructive should have been ignored by the learned trial Judge. Mr. Chatterjee further contended that the defendants/respondents shall not be permitted to take inconsistent pleas which could be mutually destructive of each other. Thus, the alternative pleas of the defendants/respondents being mutually destructive shall not be looked into by the Court. Learned senior Advocate Mr. S. P. Roy Chowdhury appearing on behalf of defendant no.2/respondent no.2 vehemently contended that learned Advocate for the plaintiff/appellant has tried to confuse the Court by blending the concept of lease as well as the concept of specific performance of contract in his argument in order to save the case of the plaintiff/appellant. Mr. Roy Chowdhury contended that the right of tenancy of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of 3 Cottahs 11 Chittaks and 08 Square feet remain unaffected but the plaintiff/appellant did not acquire any right or interest in respect of the property said to have been covered by alleged second agreement of lease being exhibit 2, since the said agreement is void for want of consideration and hit by section 25 of the Contract Act. Mr. Roy Chowdhury further contended that the lease of defendant no.2 has not been affected on account of alleged second agreement of tenancy/lease since no lease was effected by such alleged agreement i.e. exhibit 2. It is submitted by learned Advocate for defendant no.2/respondent no.2 that the validity and legality of such agreement (exhibit 2) has to be decided in order to accept the case of the plaintiff/appellant. If the agreement in question i.e. exhibit 2 is valid and legal in that event the plaintiff/appellant is definitely entitled to get a decree for specific performance of such agreement. If the agreement in question i.e. exhibit 2 is valid and legal in that event the plaintiff/appellant is definitely entitled to get a decree for specific performance of such agreement. On the contrary, in the given facts and circumstances of this case and having regard to the legality and validity of the agreements under reference, learned Advocate for respondent no.2 submitted with force that the plaintiff/appellant is not at all entitled to get a decree for specific performance of contract in terms of such agreements since the agreements under reference are vitiated by fraud, mis-representation and are hit by section 25 of Contract Act and section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. Learned senior Advocate Mr. Roy Chowdhury further contended that the suit is absolutely barred by law of limitation and article 54 of the Limitation Act comes into play in determining the period of limitation available to the plaintiff/appellant to file the suit under reference. Article 54 of Limitation Act provides 3 years towards the period of limitation from the date fixed for the performance, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has noticed that such performance has been refused by the defendant. Referring article 54 of the Limitation Act, Mr. Roy Chowdhury, learned senior Advocate contended that defendant no.1/respondent no.1 by his letter dated 21st May, 1979 duly intimated the factum of refusal of such contract to the plaintiff/appellant and therefore the plaintiff/appellant has had specific knowledge about refusal of his alleged agreement atleast from the month of May, 1979 but the plaintiff/appellant did not take any step for enforcement of any such agreement within 3 years from the month of May, 1979. Secondly, the registered deed of lease was executed by defendant no.1/respondent no.1 in favour of respondent no.2/defendant no.2 on 19.11.1979. Therefore, the plaintiff/ appellant ought to have filed the suit within 18.11.1979 in order to save the limitation. That having not been done, the suit of the plaintiff/appellant is absolutely barred by the law of limitation, in view of the fact, that the plaintiff/appellant has filed such suit in the month of December, 1982. Learned Advocate further contended that Sujoy Kumar Ghosal alleged constituted Attorney of Kamal Kumari Law is the master mind in getting exhibit 2 prepared by the plaintiff/appellant and thereby the plaintiff/appellant has manufactured exhibit 2 without consideration. In reply to the argument of learned Advocate for the plaintiff/appellant Mr. Learned Advocate further contended that Sujoy Kumar Ghosal alleged constituted Attorney of Kamal Kumari Law is the master mind in getting exhibit 2 prepared by the plaintiff/appellant and thereby the plaintiff/appellant has manufactured exhibit 2 without consideration. In reply to the argument of learned Advocate for the plaintiff/appellant Mr. Roy Chowdhury contended that the order no.105 whereby learned Court below has primarily decided that the suit is not barred by the law of limitation, cannot attain finality since the said matter was challenged and learned trial Judge decided to take up the matter at the time of final disposal of the suit by order no.113. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that learned trial Judge has specifically decided and disposed of the issue of limitation in his judgment by holding that the suit is barred by the law of limitation. Therefore the respondent no.2/defendant no.2 has had the authority or sanction of law in supporting such decision of learned trial Judge even without filing any cross objection in terms of Order 41 Rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Code. Learned senior Advocate further pointed out that section 107 of the Civil Procedure Code also gives ample jurisdiction to the respondent/defendant to agitate the said issue of limitation before the Court of appeal. Learned trial Judge observed that the suit is barred by the law of limitation and the issue of limitation has been decided against the plaintiff/appellant, on that score also, the defendant/respondent has had every right to defend such decision of learned trial Judge which was disposed of in favour of defendant/respondent. Mr. Roy Chowdhury further contended that section 3 of the Limitation Act also gives ample jurisdiction to the Court to decide the law of limitation, whether or not the issue of limitation has been raised by the defendant/respondent. Mr. Roy Chowdhury further contended that the defence of subsisting lease is not available to the plaintiff/appellant since by the alleged agreement the tenancy right of the plaintiff/appellant has been accepted at a monthly rent of Rs.400/-in respect of 03 Cottahs 11 Chittaks 08 square feet of land. Secondly there was no consideration in respect of the second agreement (exhibit 2) though an additional area of land measuring 02 Cottahs 13 Chittaks 16 square feet was included. That goes to show that the said agreement (exhibit 2) is without consideration and is hit by section 25 of the Contract Act. Secondly there was no consideration in respect of the second agreement (exhibit 2) though an additional area of land measuring 02 Cottahs 13 Chittaks 16 square feet was included. That goes to show that the said agreement (exhibit 2) is without consideration and is hit by section 25 of the Contract Act. Moreover, section 20(2) of Specific Relief Act also stands as bar to implement such agreement in view of the fact that the plaintiff/appellant had an unfair advantage over the defendant/respondent in respect of that agreement and such agreement being void ab-initio, and in-equitable cannot be enforced for specific performance. Learned senior Advocate Mr. Roy Chowdhury also contended that the written statement of defendant no.2 is not mutually destructive but the defendant/ respondent is entitled to take in-consistent pleas in defending his case. It is submitted that fraud and mis-representation has been pleaded by defendant no.1 as well as by defendant no.2 in respect of agreement under reference and nowhere in the written statement the defendants have ever admitted the existence of such agreements. Therefore, the plea/pleas taken by the respondent/defendants in their respective written statement is/are not mutually destructive. On the contrary the plaintiff/appellant is not entitled to get a decree on the basis of such written statements of the respondents/defendants. The plaintiff/appellant must prove his own case on the strength of his plaint and necessary documents. The written statement of the defendant/respondent will in no way help the plaintiff/appellant in proving his case. Learned senior Advocate Mr. Roy Chowdhury has referred Section 9, Section 14(C), Section 20(2)(a) (c) of Specific Relief Act in support of his contention. It is submitted that defendant/respondent no.1 has terminated such agreements on 21.05.1979 and thereafter the lease deed was registered in the month of November, 1979 by defendant no.1/respondent no.1 in favour of defendant no.2/respondent no.2. It is apparent from such agreement(exhibit 2) that no consideration was fixed for adding 02 Cottahs 13 Chittaks 16 square feet of land. That clearly goes to show that the plaintiff has been given unfair advantage over the defendant no. It is apparent from such agreement(exhibit 2) that no consideration was fixed for adding 02 Cottahs 13 Chittaks 16 square feet of land. That clearly goes to show that the plaintiff has been given unfair advantage over the defendant no. 1/respondent no.1 and thus the said agreement is not enforceable by law being inequitable for enforcement in terms of Section 20(2)(a)(c), Rs.400/- was fixed towards rent of 03 Cottahs 11 Chittaks and 08 square feet of land but no rent was fixed for additional 02 Cottahs 13 Chittaks 16 square feet land thus the said agreement is void for want of consideration in terms of Section 25 of the Contract Act. The following documents have been admitted in evidence on behalf of the plaintiff/appellant. 1. Memorandum of Agreement of Tenancy dated 24.11.77. 1(a). Draft copy of lease date 24.12.77. 2. Supplementary Memorandum of Agreement of Tenancy dated 26.12.77. 3. Challan for deposit of money dated 27.7.79(Ext. mark only) 3(a). Challan for deposit of money dated 10.3.80(Ext. mark only) 4. Receipt bearing No.6379 dated 28.5.80(Ext. mark only) 4(a). Receipt bearing No.5378 dated 28.5.80(Ext. mark only) 5. Receipt dated 8.3.78(Ext. mark only) 5(a). Receipt dated 1.2.78(Ext. mark only) 5(b). Receipt dated 28.4.78(Ext. mark only) 5(c). Receipt dated 30.3.78(Ext. mark only) 6. Signatures of Sujoy Kr. Ghosal in rent receipts. Series. (Ext. mark only) 7. Letter dated 15.5.78. 8. Letter dated 9.5.78. 9. Letter. 10. Estimate of Mr. P. K. Banerjee dated 1.2.80(Ext. mark only) 11. Receipt of money. 12. Letter dated 30.5.79. 12(a). Letter dated 2.10.81. 13. Letter dated 20.8.82(Ext. mark only) 14. Assessment Book of C.M.C.(Ext. mark only) 15. Certified copy of Power of Attorney dated 20.9.74. 15(1). Xerox copy of Power of Attorney dated 20.9.74. A. Letter dated 21.5.79. B. Summon to witness. C. Deed of Conveyance dated 19.11.79. The plaintiff/appellant examined himself as PW1 in the trial Court. Sujoy Kr. Ghosal is the plaintiffs witness no.2. Gopi Krishna Damani examined himself as defendant’s witness no.1 in the trial Court. Exhibit A is the letter addressed to the plaintiff by defendant no.1/respondent no.1 whereby the defendant no.1/respondent no.1 had intimated the plaintiff/appellant about under going of a lease agreement with defendant no.2/respondent no.2 and the letter is dated 21.05.1979. Exhibit B is summons to witness. Gopi Krishna Damani examined himself as defendant’s witness no.1 in the trial Court. Exhibit A is the letter addressed to the plaintiff by defendant no.1/respondent no.1 whereby the defendant no.1/respondent no.1 had intimated the plaintiff/appellant about under going of a lease agreement with defendant no.2/respondent no.2 and the letter is dated 21.05.1979. Exhibit B is summons to witness. Exhibit C is the registered deed of conveyance dated 19.11.1979 whereby the entire 76 Cottahs of land at 43 Kailash Bose Street was leased out in favour of respondent no.2 by respondent no.1. Learned Advocate for the appellant vehemently contended that the issue of limitation was finally disposed of by learned trial Court by its order no.105. Though the defendants/respondents filed an application for recalling the said order but the said application was never disposed of by learned trial Court and thus the issue of limitation was finally decided by learned trial Judge. The defendant/respondent did not prefer any cross objection against such decision of the trial Court and therefore the defendant/respondent would not be permitted to challenge such decision of learned trial Judge in matters of limitation. Learned Advocate Mr. Chatterjee referred to the following decisions in support of his contention reported in (2003)9 SCC 606 (Banarsi and others vs. Ram phal) and 1979(3)SCC 578 (N. Jayaram Redy and another vs. Revenue Divisional Officer and Land Acquisition Officer Kurnool). We have gone through both the decisions. The apex Court has decided the appeal Court’s power under Order 41 Rule 33 read with Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code. It has been decided by the apex Court that appeal lies against the decree and not against judgment or any findings of the trial Judge. The Court of appeal while dismissing the appeal, should not and could not modify the decree under Order 41 Rule 33 of Civil Procedure Code, in absence of any cross-appeal or cross-objection, praying for such modification. In the case under reference the respondent/defendant has relied on the decision arrived at by learned trial Judge in respect of the issue of limitation and the respondents have supported the decision of learned trial Judge regarding the issue of limitation. Therefore, the respondent may safely support the judgment of learned trial Judge on the issue of limitation without filing any cross objection. Therefore, the respondent may safely support the judgment of learned trial Judge on the issue of limitation without filing any cross objection. Decisions referred to here in above by learned Advocate for the plaintiff/appellant are not at all applicable in the given facts and circumstances of the case under reference since the issue of limitation has been specifically decided by learned trial Judge while considering other issues and therefore the defendant/respondent have had sufficient scope of supporting such issue before the Court of appeal even without preferring any cross objection. Moreover, the defendants/respondents cannot prefer any appeal against mere findings of the trial court. The proposition of law in this regard has been clearly spelt out by our apex Court in the decision reported in AIR 1974 SC 1126 (Smt. Ganga Bai vs. Vijay Kumar and Ors.). It has been decided by apex Court that no appeal lies against mere findings of the Court unless provided by law and appeal lies only against decree passed by learned trial Judge. The submission of learned Advocate for appellant in respect of concurrent lease also does not hold good. Learned Advocate for the appellant has referred to the following decisions in support of his contention about concurrent lease viz. i) AIR 1981 Calcutta 37(Sanwarmal Goenka vs. Soumyendra Chandra Gooptu, (2002)(2) Calcutta High Court Notes 627(Swapan Kumar Dutta vs. Dharam Chand Jaiswal, 2005(2) Calcutta High Court Notes 519 (Sambhunath Mitra vs. Khaitan Consultant Limited and 2008(2) Calcutta High Court Notes 445(Prabhat Kumar Paul vs. Lakshmi Janardan Thakur). There is absolutely no confusion with regard to the proposition of law enunciated by our High Court with regard to the principle of concurrent lease. The principle of concurrent lease how far available to the plaintiff has to be determined on the basis of the nature of agreements filed by the plaintiffs for enforcing specific performance of such agreements. Let us now examine the nature of the agreements filed by the plaintiff/appellant in order to determine whether the registered deed of lease of defendant no.2/respondent no.2 is hit by the principle of concurrent lease as enunciated by other coordinate bench of this High Court. Let us now examine the nature of the agreements filed by the plaintiff/appellant in order to determine whether the registered deed of lease of defendant no.2/respondent no.2 is hit by the principle of concurrent lease as enunciated by other coordinate bench of this High Court. It is apparent from exhibit 1, 1(a) and exhibit 2 that the said documents are in the form of agreements and such documents were never registered and the instant suit has been filed for specific performance of such agreements by Kamal Kumari Law(since deceased) or by her heirs or legal representatives. Accordingly, it may safely be stated that such un-registered agreements did not create any lease hold right in respect of the property under reference in favour of the plaintiff/appellant. The plaintiff/appellant did not acquire any lease hold right with regard to the property under reference on the strength of the aforesaid unregistered agreements. In order to invoke the principle of concurrent lease in the given facts and circumstances of this case it is necessary to accept exhibit 1, exhibit 1(a) and exhibit 2 as a document of lease. It is apparent from the pleadings on record that the tenancy right of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of 3 Cottahs 11 Chittaks 08 square feet has been admitted by the parties to this suit. Therefore it may safely be stated that the plaintiff/appellant is a monthly tenant at the rate of Rs.400/- in respect of the aforesaid land in question. The claim of the plaintiff/appellant with regard to the additional area of land covered by exhibit 2 cannot be accepted on the ground that the said agreement is without any consideration and accordingly the said agreement is a void agreement for want of consideration under Section 25 of the Contract Act. Secondly, the aforesaid agreements have also been cancelled by defendant no.1/ respondent no.1 by his letter dated 21.05.1979 vide exhibit A. The plaintiff/appellant duly acknowledged the receipt of such letter dated 21st Day of May 1979 and sent reply to defendant no.1/respondent no.1 through his learned Advocate Mr. B. D. Mukherjee by letter dated 30th May, 1979 vide exhibit 12. That goes to show that letter dated 21.05.1979 exhibit A was duly served upon the plaintiff/appellant. B. D. Mukherjee by letter dated 30th May, 1979 vide exhibit 12. That goes to show that letter dated 21.05.1979 exhibit A was duly served upon the plaintiff/appellant. Therefore, the force of such agreement, if there be any has been terminated by exhibit A. The limitation with regard to such agreement thus started on and from the month of May, 1979. Moreover, exhibit 2 i.e. the agreement regarding additional area is void and hit by Section 25(2) of the Contract Act. The said agreement is also not enforceable by law in view of specific bar contained in Section 20(2)(a)(b) of Specific Relief Act. Therefore, the plaintiff/ appellant did not acquire any lease hold interest in the property under reference and accordingly the question of concurrent lease does not come into play. The plaintiff/appellant cannot get any benefit on the ground of concurrent lease and the submission of learned Advocate on that score fails. The further case of the plaintiff/appellant is that defendant no.1 never challenged exhibit 1, 1(a) and (2) on dock and accordingly defendant no.2/respondent no.2 not being a party to such agreement, has had no locus standi to challenge the said agreements in appeal. In this regard, decision reported in 2005(6) SCC 733 (Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal and others) has been referred to by learned Advocate for the plaintiff/appellant. The apex Court has specifically observed that the stranger to the contract, namely respondents no.1 and 4 to 11 tried to establish their independent and adverse to the title of respondent no.2 and 3 and thus they were neither necessary nor proper parties and were not entitled to join as party defendants in the suit for a specific performance for contract of sale. It has further been observed by the apex Court that the necessary parties are those persons in absence of whom no decree can be passed by the Court or that there must be a right to some relief against some party in respect of the controversy involved in the proceedings and proper parties are those persons, whose presence before the Court would be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit although no relief in the suit was claimed against such person. It is apparent from the materials on record that respondent no.1 executed a registered deed of lease in respect of the entire land at 43, Kailash Bose Street including the tenancy of the plaintiff/appellant. The plaintiff/appellant has impleaded respondent no.2 being subsequent lease holder of the land for value on the strength of a registered lease deed. No effective decree can be passed in absence of the defendant no.2/respondent no.2. Therefore the respondent no.2 is a necessary party in the case under reference. It is apparent from the materials on record that defendant no.1/respondent no.1 had contested the suit by filing written statement. The witnesses of plaintiff/appellant have been cross examined by defendant no.1/respondent no.1. The respondent no.1 duly challenged the legality and validity of the agreements under reference and therefore it cannot be said that the defendant no.1/respondent no.1 never challenged the legality and validity of the agreements of the plaintiff/appellant. The facts of the case under reference are not similar to the facts of the case of the decision reported in 2005(6) SCC 733 (Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal and Ors. Defendant no.2/respondent no.2 is not a stranger but he has been impleaded as defendant no.2/respondent no.2 at the behest of the plaintiff/appellant in order get an effective decree in respect of his claim to the suit property. Hon’ble Supreme Court in a decision reported in 2000(2) Supreme Court Cases 428 (Ram Awadh and Achhaibar Dubey and another) has been pleased to hold that it is open to any defendant to contend and establish that the mandatory requirement of Section 16(c) of Specific Relief Act has not been complied with and it is for the Court to determine whether it has or has not been complied with and depending upon it’s conclusion, would decree or decline to decree in the suit. Therefore, it may safely be stated that defendant no.1 and 2/respondent no.1 and 2 have specifically challenged the said agreements and in view of the decisions reported in 2000(2) Supreme Court Cases 428(Ram Awadh and Achhaibar Dubey and another), defendant no.2/respondent no.2 has definitely had locus to challenge such agreement. Therefore, it may safely be stated that defendant no.1 and 2/respondent no.1 and 2 have specifically challenged the said agreements and in view of the decisions reported in 2000(2) Supreme Court Cases 428(Ram Awadh and Achhaibar Dubey and another), defendant no.2/respondent no.2 has definitely had locus to challenge such agreement. In order to support his contention regarding mutually destructive plea in the written statement learned Advocate for the plaintiff / appellant has referred to the following decision reported in 1996(11) SCC 690 (Shrimani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee vs. Jaswant Singh) and 2008(7) SCC 85 (Gautam Sarup vs. Leel Jetly and Ors.). Hon’ble apex Court has categorically stated that the defendant is entitled to take an alternative plea in his written statement but such alternative pleas, however, cannot be mutually destructive to each other. At the risk of repetition, we would like to point out the submission of learned Advocate for plaintiff/appellant with regard to such mutually destructive pleas in the written statement of defendant no.1 and 2. However, on careful consideration of the written statements of defendant no.1 and 2/respondent no.1 and 2 we did not find any such mutually destructive pleas in the written statement. The specific plea of both the respondents right from the beginning is that the agreements under reference have been created at the behest of the alleged constituted attorney Sujoy Kr. Ghoshal and the said agreements cannot be enforceable by law. Hon’ble apex Court in a decision reported in 2014 (2) SCC 269 (Union of India and others vs. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society limited and others) has specifically held that in a suit for declaration of title and possession the plaintiff could only succeed on the strength of his own title and that could be done only by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the onus on it, irrespective of the question whether the defendants prove their case or not. In other words, the plaintiff must succeed on the basis of its own strength and not on the weakness of the defendant. Therefore, the plaintiff/appellant is required to prove it’s case on the strength of his own documents and pleadings and the case of the plaintiff cannot be decreed on the basis of the mutually destructive pleas in the written statement or on the weakness of the case of the defendants/respondents. Therefore, the plaintiff/appellant is required to prove it’s case on the strength of his own documents and pleadings and the case of the plaintiff cannot be decreed on the basis of the mutually destructive pleas in the written statement or on the weakness of the case of the defendants/respondents. Lastly, learned advocate for the plaintiff/appellant has relied on the doctrine of part performance as contained under Section 53 A of the Transfer of Property Act in view of the possession of the plaintiff/appellant over the suit land. In support of his contention learned Advocate for the plaintiff/appellant has relied on the following decisions reported in (2002)3 SCC 676 (Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi and another vs.Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi) and 1969(3) SCC 120 (Nathulal vs. Phoolchand). Hon’ble apex Court in the aforesaid decisions has pointed out certain conditions which are required to be fulfilled if a transferee wants to defend or protect his possession under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The said certain conditions, which are required to be fulfilled if a transferee wants to defend or protect his possession under Section 53-A of the Act, as directed by apex Court, may be reproduced below:- 1. There must be a contract to transfer for consideration of any immovable property. 2. The contract must be in writing, signed by the transferor, or by someone on his behalf. 3. The writing must be in such words which the terms necessary to construe the transfer can be ascertained. 4. The transferee must in part performance of the contract take possession of the property, or of any part thereof. 5. The transferee must have done some act in furtherance of the contract and 6. The transferee must have performed or be willing to perform his part of the contract. We are, therefore, of the opinion that if the conditions enumerated above are complied with, the law of limitation does not come in the way of a defendant taking plea under Section 53-A of the Act to protect his possession of the suit property even though a suit for specific performance of a contract is barred by limitation. It is therefore apparent that some conditions are required to be fulfilled by the plaintiff/appellant in order to get the protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. It is therefore apparent that some conditions are required to be fulfilled by the plaintiff/appellant in order to get the protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. The contract to transfer any immovable property must be for some consideration and terms necessary to construe the transfer can be ascertained and must be in writing. It is settled principle of law that the protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act is available only as a shield. Since the dispute regarding availability of this protection to possession under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act is a foreign consideration in the suit for Specific Performance of Contract, we feel it unnecessary to discuss the said issue in this appeal. The said issue is left to be decided by the Court at the appropriate stage as and when such issue will be raised before this appropriate Court at the appropriate time. Let us now consider the legality and validity of the documents exhibited on behalf of the plaintiff/appellant i.e. exhibit 1, exhibit 1(a) and exhibit 2. So far exhibit 2 is concerned we have already stated that exhibit 2 is not a document to be enforced by law. It is apparent that the Plaintiff’s witness no. 1 has proved exhibit 1 and exhibit 1(a) and exhibit 2. It is apparent from the evidence of plaintiff’s witness no. 1 that the said documents were prepared in the office of Mr. Mukherjee, learned Advocate of plaintiff/appellant. All the documents were exhibited and admitted in evidence with objection. Curiously enough, learned trial Judge while dealing with those documents at the time of disposing the suit did not consider the objection raised by the defendants in admitting the aforesaid documents. Plaintiff’s witness no. 1 was not present, when such documents were prepared in the office of learned Advocate Mr. B.D. Mukherjee. There is absolutely no evidence with regard to the contents of such documents and that is why objection was raised at the time of admitting such documents in evidence. There is absolutely no cogent explanation with regard to the contents of such documents. It is incumbent upon the Court concerned to explore the contents of those documents while deciding the legality and validity of such documents. There is absolutely no cogent explanation with regard to the contents of such documents. It is incumbent upon the Court concerned to explore the contents of those documents while deciding the legality and validity of such documents. In absence of any such evidence it may safely be stated that such documents cannot be looked into for want of sufficient evidence towards the contents of such documents. However, the evidence of PW1 may be accepted with regard to the signatures of the parties to these agreements. But the evidence of PW1 is not sufficient to accept the contents of such documents. Curiously enough the said documents have not been confronted with plaintiffs witness no.2 who happens to be one of the signatories of such documents during his examination in chief. Plaintiffs witness no.2 Sujoy Kr. Ghosal said to be the constituted attorney of Kamal Kumari Law(since deceased) did not whisper anything in his examination in chief with regard to exhibit 1, 1(a) and 2. On the contrary, plaintiff’s witness no.2 has simply proved the power of attorney executed by Kamal Kumari Law. We find from the lower Court record that the original power of attorney was marked exhibit - 15 and thereafter the original power of attorney was withdrawn by replacing a certified copy of the said exhibit, for the reasons best known to the plaintiff/appellant. Learned trial Judge did not consider the legality and validity of such agreements which were marked with objection for want of sufficient evidence and accordingly we have no hesitation to say that the contents of the said documents were never exhibited in accordance with law and such documents should not have been marked exhibit in it’s entirety excepting the signatures of plaintiff/appellant and the signature of Sekhar Chandra Law. It also appears from the aforesaid document that in order to identify the suit land plan ‘A’ and plan ‘B’ were annexed with those documents but such plans were not exhibited for want of evidence. It also appears from the aforesaid document that in order to identify the suit land plan ‘A’ and plan ‘B’ were annexed with those documents but such plans were not exhibited for want of evidence. In that view of this case it may safely be stated that the suit property cannot be ascertained without having the specific plan annexed with those documents and the description of the suit property given in the schedule of the plaint also has had no bearing with regard to the aforesaid plan, showing the actual description of the suit property and which were not exhibited and accepted in the case under reference. It is also apparent from the material on record that Kamal Kumari Law died on 10.05.78 and the aforesaid agreements were executed a few months prior to her death. The specific case of plaintiff/appellant is that he has constructed buildings over such land with the permission of Kamal Kumari Law/Sekhar Chandra Law. The plaintiff has admitted in his cross examination that he had started such construction after the death of Kamal Kumari Law. The plaintiff/appellant has also failed to show that Sekhar Chandra Law had ever given any permission to the plaintiff/appellant for construction over the land in question. Curiously enough the plaintiff/appellant has proved a good number of documents said to have been issued /granted by plaintiff’s witness no.2. Plaintiff’s witness no.2 Sujoy Kr. Ghosal did not whisper about such documents on dock. Therefore, the said documents said to have been executed by Sujoy Kr. Ghosal cannot be accepted as valid documents. Sujoy Kr. Ghosal plaintiffs witness no.2 would have identified those exhibits in order to remove the said objection raised by the defendants/respondents. That having not been done, the objection raised by the defendants/respondents at the time of admission of such documents became absolute and such documents cannot be looked into for want of sufficient evidence to prove such documents. The suit is for specific performance of the agreements said to have been executed by and between the plaintiff/appellant and the predecessor in interest of defendant no.1/respondent no.1. It is well settled principle of law that the relief under Specific Relief Act is equitable relief and the Court has got discretionary power to adjudge the said discretionary relief in terms of the provisions contained in Specific Relief Act. It is well settled principle of law that the relief under Specific Relief Act is equitable relief and the Court has got discretionary power to adjudge the said discretionary relief in terms of the provisions contained in Specific Relief Act. The other co-ordinate bench of this Court has spelt out in the decision reported in AIR 1985 Calcutta 233(Sunil Chandra Ghosh vs. Hemendra Kr. Deb) that in a case for specific performance of contract, where not only the terms of the contract itself but also the mental condition of the defendants, the absence of any independent legal advice of the defendant, the presence of heirs of the defendants and in-adequacy of the price mention in the second contract so that the contract, which is one sided, should not be enforced and that damages should constitute adequate relief in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The alleged second agreement is without consideration and the rent of the tenanted premises has been fixed at Rs.400/- per month only. Kamal Kumari Law said to have executed such agreements a few months before her death. The plaintiff/appellant has admitted in his evidence that he has been collecting rent to the tune of Rs.3800/- per month from the tenants in respect of the building, constructed by the plaintiff/appellant over the vacant land. That clearly goes to show that the alleged agreements were one sided and the said agreements were not at all fair in estimating the fairness of such agreements. Moreover, it is apparent from discussions made in the forgoing paragraphs that the plaintiff/appellant could not prove the contents of the agreements (exhibit 1, 1(a) and 2). Accordingly, the said agreements cannot be admitted in evidence in its entirety. Secondly the remaining documents exhibited on behalf of the plaintiff/appellant were not at all confronted with the maker of such documents i.e. plaintiff’s witness no.2 and learned trial Court has failed to consider the objection on behalf of the respondents at the time of admission of the aforesaid documents. Thirdly, the suit is definitely barred by the law of limitation for the reasons stated above. Fourthly, the benefit of the principle of concurrent lease is not available to the plaintiff/appellant in view of the discussions made here in above. Thirdly, the suit is definitely barred by the law of limitation for the reasons stated above. Fourthly, the benefit of the principle of concurrent lease is not available to the plaintiff/appellant in view of the discussions made here in above. On careful consideration of the materials on record as well as the case of the parties to this lis a peculiar situation is apparent on the face of the pleadings on record. There is no dispute that the plaintiff/appellant has been possessing more than 06 Cottahs of land. There is absolutely no dispute with regard to the tenancy of the plaintiff/appellant with respect to 03 Cottahs 11 Chittaks 08 square feet. Therefore, the tenancy of the plaintiff/ appellant in respect of 03 Cottahs 11 Chittaks 08 Square feet land is secured and the plaintiff/appellant can maintain his possession with regard to that portion of land in exercise of his right of tenancy or on the strength of his tenancy right. However, the added area measuring about 02 Cottahs 13 Chittaks 16 square feet the plaintiff could not prove his right to possess over such added area on the strength of the document viz. Exhibit 2 which cannot be construed to be a valid document for giving any sort of right to the plaintiff in respect of such added area. However the plaintiff/appellant has been possessing the entire area covering more than 06 Cottahs by adding the added area to his tenancy by way accretion which was acknowledged by his landlord by issuing rent receipt for both the original tenancy and the added area after realizing rent for the both and has constructed buildings there on. It is apparent from the evidence from the plaintiff/appellant himself that he has been collecting rent to the tune of Rs.3800/- per month from the tenants. We have been asked to decide the enforceability of the aforesaid agreements of the contract and not to decide and determine the status of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of land in question. Thus, we restrain ourselves from making any comment with regard to the status of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the property under reference. We thus hold that the aforesaid agreements of the plaintiff have not been properly admitted in evidence and the said agreements cannot be enforced by law. Thus, we restrain ourselves from making any comment with regard to the status of the plaintiff/appellant in respect of the property under reference. We thus hold that the aforesaid agreements of the plaintiff have not been properly admitted in evidence and the said agreements cannot be enforced by law. Learned Advocate for the plaintiff/appellant has drawn our attention to the manner of disposal of the suit by learned trial Judge. We find that learned trial Judge disposed of all the issues at a time on the basis of some scattered evidences on record and did not adhere to the principles of law in matters of writing judgment. We hope and repose trust on the District Judiciary to decide the matters in accordance with law and the judgment under reference of learned trial Judge, being an exception to the general trend of disposal, we do not like to make any comment on that score. In the premises set forth above we do not find any merit in appeal for the reasons stated above and accordingly the appeal fails. The judgment and decree passed by learned trial Judge in title suit no.2339 of 1982 are hereby affirmed. The CAN application being 4623 of 2015 is also disposed of. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties as expeditiously as possible.