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2015 DIGILAW 862 (RAJ)

State of Rajasthan v. Devkinandan Lata

2015-04-16

ANUPINDER SINGH GREWAL

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JUDGMENT : Anupinder Singh Grewal, J. The State of Rajasthan through the instant petition has challenged the order passed by the competent authority under the Payment of Wages Act dated 26.7.1997 (Annex.2) in PWA Case No. 285/1996 and the order passed in appeal by the District Judge on 2.4.2002 (Annex.4) in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 60/1998. 2. The respondent No. 1 had preferred an application under section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 stating therein that he had not been paid by the appellant for the period from 1.3.1994 till 31.12.1994 although he was employed at a monthly salary of Rs. 1,300/-. The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act while allowing the application of the respondent-applicant directed that a sum of Rs. 13,000/- as outstanding wages, Rs. 13,000/- as compensation and Rs. 200/- as expenses of the claim be made to him. 3. The Authority had relied upon the evidence of the respondent-applicant as well as two witnesses PW2 and PW-3 that he had done the work of operating and repairing electric motors. He had also done motor winding and repairing in the department. He had not been paid the salary with effect from 1.3.1993 till 31.12.1994 whereon he was removed by an oral order. Thereafter, he had been doing the work of the department but not on a regular monthly salary basis. PW-2 Rasrulla Khan as well as PW-3 Phatumal had also supported the claim of the applicant by stating that he had been working under Assistant Engineer, Nohar for the said period at a salary of Rs. 1300/- which was not paid to him. The authority had also condoned the delay in preferring the application by accepting the explanation put forth by the applicant that he had earlier been taking up the matter with higher officers who had orally assured that the payment would be made. 4. The order of the competent authority was challenged by the petitioner-appellants in appeal before the District Judge, Hanumangarh. There was a delay of about a year in preferring the appeal which has not been condoned while dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation vide order dated 2.4.2002. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has contended that the delay on the part of the State in preferring the appeal should have been condoned as it had been sufficiently explained. 6. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has contended that the delay on the part of the State in preferring the appeal should have been condoned as it had been sufficiently explained. 6. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has contended that the order of the Appellate Court is under the facts and circumstances perfectly justified especially when the State has not been able to make out sufficient cause for condoning the delay. 7. There is no gainsaying that the expression "sufficient cause" is not to be interpreted in a pedantic manner: It has to be construed liberally to ensure that the ultimate cause of justice is not subverted. Nevertheless, it has to be borne in mind that with efflux of time certain rights accrue to the other party and it is at times difficult on too harsh to set the clock back. 8. It is also well settled that some latitude is permissible while condoning the delay on the part of the State as after all it is the public cause which is being served. The States bureaucratic machinery with its characteristic red tapism including procedural note making and file pushing is often found wanting in preferring appeals within limitation. It is apposite of refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, 2013 (12) SCC 649 wherein while considering earlier judgments on the subject the principles applicable for condonation of delay were laid down:- 21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1 There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the Courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2 The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper sprit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3 Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal, the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4 No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the Counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.3 Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal, the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4 No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the Counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5 Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6 It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the Courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.- 21.7 The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8 There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9 The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the Courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10 If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the Courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11 It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13 The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. 21.13 The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1 An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful, concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the Courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2 An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3 Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4 The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters. 9. In the instant case, the explanation furnished by the petitioner-appellants for condoning the delay of about a year in preferring the appeal is that the official who was pursuing the litigation on their behalf committed suicide and they learnt about the decision only on receipt of notice from Court for recovery of the amount. The explanation put forth by the appellants on the face of it appears attractive but a deeper scrutiny reveals its hollowness. It is evident from the record that although employee of the appellant State namely Bhagirath Sharma committed suicide in July, 1997 but nobody had been appearing on behalf of the appellants since 9.4.1997. On an earlier occasion, Assistant Engineer (Sub. Div.), Nohar had himself appeared in the Court when reply to the application was filed. The final order was passed on 26.7.1997. The appellants have stated that they learnt about the order only on 31.3.1998. The amount of Rs. 26,200/- was deposited with the treasury on 27.7.1998 whereafter the appeal was filed on 10.08.1998. 10. Thus, the negligence of the appellants extends far beyond July, 1997 when the official who was pursuing the case is said to have expired. The appellants have stated that they learnt about the order only on 31.3.1998. The amount of Rs. 26,200/- was deposited with the treasury on 27.7.1998 whereafter the appeal was filed on 10.08.1998. 10. Thus, the negligence of the appellants extends far beyond July, 1997 when the official who was pursuing the case is said to have expired. It cannot he countenanced that the working of the entire department is dependent on one employee and it would come to a standstill on his non-availability. 11. Therefore, the explanation furnished by the State has rightly been rejected by the Appellate Court. The reasoning of the Appellate Court while refusing to condone the delay in preferring the appeal cannot be faulted. It appears to have been taken after taking into account all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, there is no illegality in the order of the Appellate Court warranting interference by this Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. 12. Additionally, it is apt to bear in mind that the application for stay of the impugned orders was filed during the pendency of the instant petition which was rejected by this Court on 26.8.2003. Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has stated that the payment has already been made to the respondent. It would, thus, be too harsh and inequitable at this stage to recover the amount from the respondent in case the matter is decided against him on merits. The respondent, belongs to the lower strata of employees as he had been working as electrician. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. Petition dismissed.