Judgment 1. The prosecution case is that the accused 1 & 4, brothers and 2, 3 and 5 again brothers, were close relatives and jointly ran a concern by name Ranjith Rathna Match Works. Sixth accused is the Manager of such concern. As the accused persons failed to run their factory in keeping with the requirements of the Factories Act and Rules and engaged women-folk without providing them requisite protection and safety. On 11.06.2013 they negligently engaged women-folk to load sacks of match-sticks into a container box on a van when a fire broke out at 1.30 p.m. resulting in four women meeting instant death in the inferno. One other woman was grievously injured. The container box was damaged. A case was registered in Cr.No.396 of 2013 and pursuant to investigation, charge-sheet informing commission of offences under Sections 285, 286, 304(A) of I.P.C and Sections 9(B) (1)(a) of the Explosives Act has been filed. The case has been taken on file in C.C.No.152 of 2014 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No. I, Kovilpatti. The petitioners who are accused Nos.3 to 6 seek quash. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) and also perused the records and the typed set of papers. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in S.T.C.No.249 of 2013, arising out of a complaint preferred by the Inspector of Factories, informing the commission of offence under Section 41 r/w 61 (f) of Factories Act and Rule 61(g) because of the very same incident of 11.06.2013, the first accused K.T.Thilagarathnam had been informed to be the Manager, while the second accused was informed to be the occupier of the factory. In such case, the present petitioners who have nothing to do with the match firm were not accused. The first accused in the present case is the brother of the second accused, while the petitioners 2 to 4 are his cousins. Though they are thus related to the second accused, they are in no manner involved in the affairs of the concern, Ranjith Rathna Match Works. 4. Learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) would submit that the confessional statement of the 2nd accused informs of these petitioners being partners of Ranjith Rathna Fire Works. 5. Though they are thus related to the second accused, they are in no manner involved in the affairs of the concern, Ranjith Rathna Match Works. 4. Learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) would submit that the confessional statement of the 2nd accused informs of these petitioners being partners of Ranjith Rathna Fire Works. 5. The confession of the second accused having been made to a police officer cannot be used even against him as per Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 much less can it be against petitioners. An exception is provided in Section 27 of such Act, which reads thus: "27. How much of information received from accused may be proved. - Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act reads as follows: "30. Consideration of proved confession affecting person making it and other jointly under the trial for same offence. - When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession. Explanation. - "Offence" as used in this section, includes the abetment of, or attempt to commit, the offence." 6. We may consider the effect, if the confession of the 2nd accused is taken to be discovery of the fact of these petitioners being partners of the concern, Ranjith Rathna Match Works as if so, the same may be put against the petitioners when the requirements of Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act are met. This takes us to our earlier observation that there is no material other than the confession of the second accused to link these petitioners with the affairs of Ranjith Rathna Match Works. 7. In Bhuboni Sahu v. The King, AIR (36) 1949 Privy Council 257, the position has been explained thus: "4. This takes us to our earlier observation that there is no material other than the confession of the second accused to link these petitioners with the affairs of Ranjith Rathna Match Works. 7. In Bhuboni Sahu v. The King, AIR (36) 1949 Privy Council 257, the position has been explained thus: "4. The law in India relating to the evidence of accomplices stands thus:- Even before the passing of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it had been held by a Full Bench of the High Court of Calcutta in R. v. Elahee Buksh, (1866) 5 W.R. (Cr) 80 that the law relating to accomplice evidence was the same in India as in England. Then came the Indian Evidence Act which by S.133 enacts that: "An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person; and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice." Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, however, provides that: "The Court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars." Reading these two enactments together the Courts in India have held that whilst it is not illegal to act upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice it is a rule of prudence so universally followed as to amount almost to a rule of law that it is unsafe to act upon the evidence of an accomplice unless it is corroborated in material respects so as to implicate the accused; and further that the evidence of one accomplice cannot be used to corroborate the evidence of another accomplice. The law in India, therefore, is substantially the Same on the subject as the law in England, though the rule of prudence may be said to be based upon the interpretation placed by the Courts on the phrase "corroborated in material particulars" in illustration (b) to Section 114." With reference to Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, it has been explained in paragraph 9 as follows: "9. This section was introduced for the first time in the Evidence Act of 1872, and marks a departure from the Common Law of England. It will be noticed that the section applies to confessions, and not to statements which do not admit the guilt of the confessing party. This section was introduced for the first time in the Evidence Act of 1872, and marks a departure from the Common Law of England. It will be noticed that the section applies to confessions, and not to statements which do not admit the guilt of the confessing party. In the present case the Courts in India appreciated this, and ruled out statements made by certain of the accused which were self-exculpatory in character. The statement of Trinath was, however, a confession. Section 30 seems to be based on the view that an admission by an accused person of his own guilt affords some sort of sanction in support of the truth of his confession against others as well as himself. But a confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed come within the definition of "evidence" contained in Section 8 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver which is not subject to any of those infirmities. Section 80, however, provides that the Court may take the confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on which the Court may act; but the section does not say that the confession is to amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. The confession is only one element in the consideration of all the facts proved in the case; it can be put into the scale and weighed with the other evidence. Their Lordships think that the view which has prevailed in most of the High Courts in India, namely that the confession of a co-accused can be used only in support of other evidence and cannot be made the foundation of a conviction, is correct. Sir Valentine Holmes puts his case in this way. He relies on one of the examples given by the Evidence Act of the sort of facts to which the Court should have regard in applying illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. The example is in these terms : A crime is committed by several persons. A, B and C, three of the criminals, are captured on the spot and kept apart from each other. The example is in these terms : A crime is committed by several persons. A, B and C, three of the criminals, are captured on the spot and kept apart from each other. Each gives an account of the crime implicating D, and the accounts corroborate each other in such a manner as to render previous concert highly improbable." Sir Valentine contends that Triuath's confession was made independently of that of the approver, that neither he nor the approver had any reason for falsely implicating the appellant, and that the confession does afford sufficient corroboration to justify acceptance of the evidence of the approver, even if it does not amount to corroboration in material particulars within illustration (B) of Section 114. The evidence on record, however, does not support this argument. The confession of Trinath is a very short one and gives only the bare outline of the story. It discloses nothing which the police had not been able to ascertain from the approver, and affords no intrinsic evidence of its truth. It was, as already noted, retracted in the Sessions Court. Retraction of a confession by an accused is a common phenomenon in India. The weight to be attached to it must depend upon whether the Court thinks that it was induced by the consideration that the confession was untrue, or by realization that it had failed to secure the benefits the hope of which inspired it. Their Lordships will assume that the confession of Trinath was not weakened by its retraction. Even so, the approver and Trinath were, according to both their statements, working together on the day of the murder when they were summoned by the appellant to take part in the crime; they were arrested on the following day so they had had a day, in which they must have appreciated that they were under suspicion, in which to arrange their story. After their arrest they were for some two days in police custody before they were sent up together, and with other accused, to the Magistrate to have their confessions recorded, and there is no evidence that they were kept apart during this period. In that state of the evidence it is impossible to say that the approver and Trinath were kept apart from each other, and that their previous concert was highly improbable. In that state of the evidence it is impossible to say that the approver and Trinath were kept apart from each other, and that their previous concert was highly improbable. Sir Valentine Holmes has relied strongly on the case In Re B.K. Rajagopal, I.L.R. (1944) Mad. 308: A.I.R. (31) 1944 Mad. 117: 45 Cr. L.J. 373 F.B., in which the Court founded a conviction upon the evidence of an accomplice supported only by the confession1 of a co-accused. Their Lordships whilst not doubting that such a conviction is justified in law under Section 133 of the Evidence Act, and whilst appreciating that the coincidence of a number of confessions of co-accused all implicating the particular accused, given independently, and without an opportunity of previous concert, might be entitled to great weight, would nevertheless observe that Courts should be slow to depart from the rule of prudence, based on long experience, which requires some independent evidence implicating the particular accused. The danger of acting upon accomplice evidence is not merely that the accomplice is on his own admission a man of bad character who took part in the offence and afterwards to save himself betrayed his former associates, and who has placed himself in a position in which he can hardly fail to have a strong bias in favour of the prosecution; the real danger is that he is telling a story which in its general outline is true, and it is easy for him to work into the story matter which is untrue. He may implicate ten people in an offence, and the story may be true in all its details as to eight of them, but untrue as to the other two, whose names have been introduced because they are enemies of the approver. This tendency to include the innocent with the guilty is peculiarly prevalent in India, as Judges have noted on innumerable occasions, and it is very difficult for the Court to guard against the danger. An Indian villager is seldom in a position to produce cogent evidence of alibi. This tendency to include the innocent with the guilty is peculiarly prevalent in India, as Judges have noted on innumerable occasions, and it is very difficult for the Court to guard against the danger. An Indian villager is seldom in a position to produce cogent evidence of alibi. If he is charged with having taken part in a crime on a particular night when he was in fact asleep if his hut, or guarding his crops, he can only rely, as a rule, on the evidence of his wife, members of his family, or friends to support his story, and their evidence is interested and not likely to carry weight. The only real safeguard against the risk of condemning the innocent with the guilty lies in insisting upon independent evidence which in some measure implicates each accused. This aspect of the matter was well expressed by Sir George Rankin in Ambicacharan Roy v. Emperor, 35 C.W.N. 1270 at p. 1274 : (A.I.R. (18) 1931 Cal. 697 : 33 Cr.L.J. 19 S.B.). 8. In Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1184 the Constitution Bench has held as follows: 12. As we have already indicated, this question has been considered on several occasions by judicial decisions and it has been consistently held that a confession cannot be treated as evidence which is substantive evidence against a co-accused person. In dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution relies upon the confession of one accused person against another accused person, the proper approach to adopt is to consider the other evidence against such an accused person, and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustain the charge framed against the said accused person, the court turns to the confession with a view to assure itself that the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is right. As was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty, ILR 38 Cal 559 at p. 588 a confession can only be used to "lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused". As was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty, ILR 38 Cal 559 at p. 588 a confession can only be used to "lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused". In Peryaswami Noopan v. Emperor, ILR 54 Mad 75 at p. 77: (AIR 1931 Mad 177 at p. 178), Reilly J., observed that the provision of S. 30 goes not further than this : "where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if, believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in s. 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence." In Bhuboni Sahu v. King, 76 Ind. App 147 at p. 155 : ( AIR 1949 PC 257 , at p. 260) the Privy Council has expressed the same view. Sir. John Beaumont who spoke for the Board observed that "a confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed come within the definition of "evidence" contained in S. 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is not subject to any of those infirmities. Section 30, however, provides that the Court may take the confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on which the court may act; but the section does not say that the confession is to amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. The confession is only one element in the consideration of all the facts proved in the case; it can be put into the scale and weighed with the other evidence." It would be noticed that as a result of the provisions contained in S. 30, the confession has no doubt to be regarded as amounting to evidence in a general way, because whatever is considered by the court is evidence; circumstances which are considered by the court as well as probabilities do amount to evidence in that generic sense. Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of the provisions of S. 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by S. 3 of the Act. Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of the provisions of S. 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by S. 3 of the Act. The result, therefore, is that in dealing with a case against an accused person, the court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused person; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. That, briefly stated, is the effect of the provisions contained in s. 30. The same view has been expressed by this Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1952 SCR 526 : AIR 1952 SC 159 where the decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu's 76 Ind. App. 147 ( AIR 1949 PC 257 ) has been cited with approval" 9. In the instant case, the confession of the second accused of these petitioners being partners, amounts to nothing while the contention that the petitioners have nothing to do with the concern Ranjith Rathna Match Works is strengthened by the fact that Accused 1 and 2 have been shown as Manager and owner/occupier of the concern in connected prosecution for offences under the Factories Act and these petitioners have not been arrayed as accused in such case. 10. This Criminal Original Petition is allowed and the proceedings in C.C.No.152 of 2014 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No. I, Kovilpatti as against these petitioners is quashed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.