Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 866 (GAU)

C. Lalngurpuii v. State of Mizoram

2015-07-20

M.R.PATHAK

body2015
JUDGMENT AND ORDER Manash Ranjan Pathak, J. Heard Mr. Zochhuana, learned or counsel, assisted by Mr. Lalchhanliana Khiangte learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. Also heard Ms. Melody L. Pachuau, learned Government Advocate, Mizoram appearing for the State respondent Nos. 1 to 5. 2. The petitioners are working as teachers and lecturers in various educational institutions of the state. Petitioner Nos. 1 to 6 are serving in various Government Middle Schools and High schools of the State, whereas the petitioner Nos. 7 to 22 are serving in different ad-hoc aided schools of the State. The petitioners obtained their B.Ed. degrees from Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad of Uttar Pradesh in a distant mode from the State. 3. As per the rules in force in the State, teachers/lecturers in schools with B.Ed./M.Ed. Degrees as trained teachers are entitled for higher scale of pay (trained scale) than their counter parts who do not possess said B.Ed./M.Ed. degrees. After obtaining their B.Ed. degrees, the petitioners approached the State respondents in the School Education Department for acceptance of their B.Ed. degree and to pay them higher scale of pay. 4. However, the respondents in the School Education Department refused to accept their said B.Ed. degree holding that the State Government in the School Education Department vide Circular No. 32012/20/99-EDN/Pt.(ii) dated 5th September, 2007 notified that on being clarified by the National Council for Teachers Education (NCTE, in short), the Teachers Educational Courses/Degrees leading to B.Ed./M.Ed. Degrees awarded by the Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad (BSP), Uttar Pradesh cannot be accepted as a valid qualification for the purpose of employment under the State Government of Mizoram or in any School, College or other Educational body aided by the State Government and accordingly informed the Director of School Education of the State to bring the said content to the notice of all concerned Government Institutions as well as Government Aided Institutions for information and guidance. 5. The petitioners submitted that the State Government in the School Education Department in pursuance of the aforesaid circular rejected their claim for acceptance of their said B.Ed. degree and further the state respondents degraded such teachers who enjoyed higher scale of pay by obtaining B.Ed. degree from the said institution i.e. Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad of Uttar Pradesh. 6. 5. The petitioners submitted that the State Government in the School Education Department in pursuance of the aforesaid circular rejected their claim for acceptance of their said B.Ed. degree and further the state respondents degraded such teachers who enjoyed higher scale of pay by obtaining B.Ed. degree from the said institution i.e. Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad of Uttar Pradesh. 6. It is submitted by the petitioners that though the State respondents in the School Education Department rejected their aforesaid claim on the basis of said Circular dated 05.09.2007, but by an Office Memorandum No. A.32012/20/99-EDN/Pt. dated 12th August 2009 accepted the B.Ed. degrees of 21 regular Lecturers of Higher Secondary Schools of the State, who obtained their B.Ed. degrees from said Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh as one-time settlement superseding the aforesaid Government Circular dated 05.09.2007 with the observation that their respective pay shall be regulated and re-fixed under the appropriate Fundamental Rules to be effective from the month when their pay was degraded. 7. The petitioners also submitted that subsequently, the State respondents in the School Education Department by another Office Memorandum No. A.32012/20/99-EDN/Pt. dated 22nd September 2009 accepted the B.Ed. degrees obtained by another 40 regular Lecturers of Higher Secondary Schools of the State, who obtained their B.Ed. degrees from said Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh as one-time settlement superseding the said Government Circular dated 05.09.2007 with similar observation as that of the above noted Office Memorandum dated 12.09.2009. The petitioners further submitted that in addition to the above by another Office Memorandum No. A.32012/20/99-EDN/Pt. dated 21st April, 2010 the State respondents in the School Education Department accepted the B.Ed. degrees of 31 more such regular Teachers/Lecturers of High Schools/Higher Secondary Schools of the State, who obtained their B.Ed. degrees from said Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh as one-time settlement superseding the aforesaid Government Circular dated 05.09.2007 with similar observation as that of the above noted Office Memorandum dated 12.09.2009. 8. Mr. Zochhuana, learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners submitted that since they are similarly placed with those 92 teachers/lecturers whose B.Ed. degrees obtained by them from said Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh have been accepted by the State Government as one-time settlement superseding the Government's own Circular dated 05.09.2007, as such petitioners' case should also be considered by the State respondents and also to consider their case sympathetically. Mr. degrees obtained by them from said Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh have been accepted by the State Government as one-time settlement superseding the Government's own Circular dated 05.09.2007, as such petitioners' case should also be considered by the State respondents and also to consider their case sympathetically. Mr. Zochhuana contended that the action of the State Government in the School Education Department, rejecting to accept petitioners' B.Ed. degrees obtained from Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh pursuant to the said Circular dated 05.09.2007 are arbitrary, discriminatory and unconstitutional as they have been treated unequally amongst the equals. 9. Hence this petition by the petitioners praying for a direction to the State respondents to accept their B.Ed. Degrees obtained from Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh by relaxing the said circular dated 05.09.2007, as done in case of the aforesaid 92 teachers/lecturers by the above noted three Office Memorandums. 10. The State respondents have contested the matter by filing their affidavit. Ms. Melody L. Pachuau, learned Government Advocate on behalf of the respondents submitted that the authorities in the National Council for Teachers Education (NCTE) by its communication No. F.NRC/NCTE/ MISC/2007/9148 dated 18th June, 2007 informed the Directorate of School Education, Mizoram that Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh is not recognised by the NCTE for offering any teachers education programs and the teacher education degrees awarded by said Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh cannot be accepted as a valid qualification for purpose of employment under the Central Government, any State Government or University or in any School, College or other educational body aided by the Central or any State Government. In view of the above, the State Government in the School Education Department issued the said Circular dated 5th September, 2007. Though by the said Circular dated 05.09.2007 the Director of School Education, Mizoram was asked to make wide circulation of the same to bring the contents of the said circular to the notice of all concerned, but the Directorate of School Education vide No. A.60011/4/2001-DTE (EDN) dated 05.09.2008 circulated the same after a year of its issuance by the State Government in the School Education Department. Therefore, the State Government in the School Education Department by its clarification issued under No. B. 13011/17/2011-EDN dated 23rd September, 2011 informed the Director of School Education, Mizoram, Aizawl that as the said Circular dated 05.09.2007 was issued from the Directorate only on 05.09.2008, the said date should be reckoned as the cut-off date for giving effect of the said Circular dated 05.09.2007. 11. Ms. Melody L. Pachuau, learned State counsel on behalf of the respondents submitted that the NCTE is the apex body in Teachers Education in the country and on receipt of their clarification, the State Government in the School Education Department issued the Circular dated 05.09.2007, which was given effect from 05.09.2008 when the said Circular was issued by the concerned Directorate. 12. Ms. Melody L. Pachuau, Government Advocate also contended that the State respondents considered the case of said 92 teachers/lecturers of High Schools/Higher Secondary Schools of the State and issued the Office Memorandums dated 12.08.2009, 22.09.2008 and 21.04.2010 as one-time settlement after due consideration, since those teachers/lecturers obtained their B.Ed. degrees from Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh prior to 05.09.2008, the date when the said Circular dated 05.09.2007 was given effect by the respondents. Learned Government counsel submitted that the B.Ed. degrees obtained by the petitioners from Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh cannot be accepted as they obtained the said degree from the institute in question in the year 2010, after the said cut-off date 05.09.2008, which fact has not been denied by the petitioners. Ms. Melody L. Pachuau further submitted that as per the policy decision of the State Government, the Circular in question dated 05.09.2007 was issued and accordingly as per the policy of the State, the cut-off date of said Circular was determined. 13. The petitioners here in obtained their B.Ed. degrees from Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh in a distant mode after the Circular dated 05.09.2007 was given effect i.e. after 05.09.2008 and therefore the said circular applies to them. The said Circular dated 05.09.2007, which is a policy decision of the State Government, has not been challenged by the petitioners nor the same case under challenge in any processing. degrees from Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh in a distant mode after the Circular dated 05.09.2007 was given effect i.e. after 05.09.2008 and therefore the said circular applies to them. The said Circular dated 05.09.2007, which is a policy decision of the State Government, has not been challenged by the petitioners nor the same case under challenge in any processing. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basic Education Board, U.P. v. Upendra Rai, reported in (2008) 3 SCC 432 , has held that - "It is a well settled that Court cannot interfere with policy decision of the Government unless it is in violation of some statutory or constitutional provision. Grant of equivalence and/or relocation of equivalence is an administrative decision which is in the solar discretion of the authority concerned, and the Court does not have expertise in such matters. Hence it should exercise judicial restraint and not interfere in it." 14. The NCTE Act, 1993 is an act to provide for the establishment of National Council for Teachers Education with a view to achieving planned and coordinated development of teacher education system throughout the country, for regularisation and proper maintenance of norms and standards in the teacher education system and for matters connected therewith. The grant of recognition or affiliation to an institute is a condition precedent to running of the courses by the Institute. If either of them is not granted to the Institute, it would not be in a position to commence the relevant academic course. {Emphasis provided. 15. In the case of Maa Vaishno Devi Mahila Mahavidyalaya v. State of U.P., reported in (2013) 2 SCC 617 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that - "The NCTE Act is a special act enacted to cover a particular field i.e. teachers training education and, thus, has to receive precedence over other laws in relation to that field. No institution or body is empowered to grant recognition to any institution under the NCTE Act or any other law for the time being in force, except NCTE itself. Grant of recognition by the NCTE is a condition precedent to grant of affiliation by examining body to an institute. No institution or body is empowered to grant recognition to any institution under the NCTE Act or any other law for the time being in force, except NCTE itself. Grant of recognition by the NCTE is a condition precedent to grant of affiliation by examining body to an institute. NCTE is a supreme body and is vested with wide powers to be exercised with the aid of its expertise, in renting or refusing to grant recognition to an educational institution and it is the paramount body for granting approval/recognition not only for commencing fresh course but even for increasing intake." 16. In a case where without any prior affiliation and recognition from the NCTE the concerned Institute admitted the students and imparted education with regard to B.Ed. degree, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of NCTE v. Venus Public Education Society, reported in (2013) 1 SCC 223 , has held that - "As has been laid down in many a pronouncement of this Court that without recognition from NCTE and affiliation from the University/examining body, the educational institution cannot admit the students. An educational institution is expected to be aware of the law. The students who take admission are not young in age. They are graduates. They are expected to enquire whether the institution has recognition and affiliation. If we allow ourselves to say so, the institution had given admission in a nonchalant manner. Possibly, its functionaries harboured the idea that they had incomparable fertile mind. The students who had taken admission possibly immersed with the idea that ignorance is bliss. It is also necessary to state that the institution had the anxious enthusiasm to commercialize education and earn money forgetting the factum that such an attitude leads to a disaster. The students exhibited tremendous anxiety to get a degree without bordering for a moment whether their effort, if any, had the sanctity of law. Such it issuance only bring nemesis. It would not be wrong to say that this is not a case which put the institution or the students to choose between Scylla and Charybdis. On the contrary, both of them were expected to be Argus-eyed. The basic motto should have been "transparency''. Unfortunately, the sedition betrayed the trust of the students and the students, in a way, atrophied their intelligence. The institution decidedly exhibited characteristics of carelessness. On the contrary, both of them were expected to be Argus-eyed. The basic motto should have been "transparency''. Unfortunately, the sedition betrayed the trust of the students and the students, in a way, atrophied their intelligence. The institution decidedly exhibited characteristics of carelessness. It seems that they had forgotten that they are accountable to law. The students, while thinking "vision of hope'', chose to play possum. The law does not countenance either of the ideas. Hence, the plea propounded which anxiety, vehemence and desperation on behalf of the respondent is not acceptable and accordingly we are unhesitatingly repeal the same." 17. That in a case where the respondent-authority passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated, the Hon'ble Apex Court came to a conclusion that it can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. In the case of Chandigarh Administration and another v. Jagjit Singh and another, reported in (1995) 1 SCC 745 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held - "8. We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, if it can be called one, on which the writ petition has been allowed by the High Court is unsustainable in law and indefensible in principle. Since we have come across many such instances, we think it necessary to deal with such pleas at a little length. Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extra-ordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. The extra-ordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal / unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again. The illegal / unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law - indeed, wherever it is possible, the court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law - but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the court is not condoning the earlier illegal act / order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioner's case is similar to the other person's case. But then why examine another person's case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the court and seeking the relief. It is not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into correctness of the order made or action taken in another person's case, which other person is not before the Court nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course - barring exceptional situations - would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents as understood in the judicial world. (What is the position in the case of orders passed by authorities in exercise of their quasi-judicial power, we express no opinion. That can be dealt with when a proper case arises)." 18. From the above, it is observed that the Circular dated 05.09.2007 of the State respondents in the School Education Department given effect from (cut-off date) 05.09.2008 are policy decisions of the State Government and unless it is proved that the same is in violation of the statutory/Constitutional provisions and the said policy being not under challenge, as such the Court shall not interfere with the said policy decisions of the State Government. Moreover, the State respondents by its Circular dated 05.09.2007 accepted the B.Ed. degrees of those 92 teachers/lecturers, working under the State Government in various educational institutions, since they obtained their B.Ed. degrees from Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh prior to the said Circular dated 05.09.2007 came into force. The cases of the present petitioners are of different footing and are not similar to those 92 teachers/lecturers, who are also not parties to the proceeding in hand, as the petitioners herein obtained their B.Ed. degrees from the said institution in question after the aforesaid Circular dated 05.09.2007 came into force. 19. For the reasons aforesaid, the Court is of the view that action of the respondents in the present case in rejecting the B.Ed. degrees of the petitioners obtained by them from Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh after the said Circular dated 05.09.2007 came into force, cannot be said to be illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and unconstitutional. 20. Hence this petition being devoid any merit stands dismissed. No order as to costs.