JUDGMENT : Akil Abdul Hamid Kureshi, J. 1. These appeals arise out of common background and common judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 17-12-2009. We may refer to facts arising in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1180 of 2010. Background facts are as under: Appellant-The Madhavpura Mercantile Co-operative Bank Limited (hereinafter referred to as 'the Bank') is a society registered under the Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). According to the Bank the respondents in each of the Letters Patent Appeals were the members of the Bank and had availed loan/cash-credit facilities. In short, the respondents had borrowed money from the Bank, but failed to repay the same. The Bank, therefore, instituted arbitration proceedings in terms of the provisions contained in the said Act for recovery of the outstanding dues before the Arbitral Tribunal for recovery of a sum of Rs. 31 crores with interest. In such arbitration proceedings the respondents filed an application dated 17-12-2003 which was titled as 'Application raising preliminary contention regarding jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Tribunal'. Case of the defendants was that arbitral proceedings would lie only between a Multi-State Co-operative Society and its members. Defendants were never admitted to the membership of the Bank. Though, defendants applied for such purpose, neither the application was accepted by Bank nor acceptance was conveyed to them. It was pointed out that on 25-5-1998 defendant No. 1 made an application along with share application money of Rs. 5,00,001/-. As per sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 25 of the said Act, if such application is not accepted within four months, the same would be deemed to have been rejected. According to the defendants by 25-9-1998 since there was no acceptance of the application for membership by the Bank deeming fiction contained in sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 25 of the said Act would apply. Defendants therefore, prayed as under: "(A) Hon'ble Arbitral Tribunal may be pleased to allow this application, in the interest of justice; (B) Hon'ble Arbitral Tribunal may be pleased to rule on its own jurisdiction and be pleased to declare that the Hon'ble Arbitral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to entertain the present suit under the provisions of Sec. 84 of the Act, in the interest of justice; (C) Hon'ble Arbitral Tribunal may be pleased to grant such other and further relief as deemed fit in the interest of justice." 2. The Bank opposed such application by filing reply dated 25-2-2004 mainly taking the ground that onus lies on defendants to prove necessary facts and that they failed in doing so. 3. The defendants also filed written submissions in support of their application in which they reiterated their stand that their application for being admitted to the membership of the society was neither accepted nor such acceptance was communicated to them. It was contended that list of members produced by the Bank is a bogus one. 4. The Arbitrator by his order dated 2-6-2004 refused to terminate the arbitration on the ground urged by defendants. He noted that defendant No. 1 had along with his application dated 25-8-1998 for membership deposited application fee of Rs. 5,00,001/-. The arbitrator recorded the contention of the Counsel for the Bank that if the application for allotment of shares was not granted, the question would be, what shares did the defendants took to recover such sizable amount of share application money. The Arbitrator was of the opinion that the questions involved need further examination which can be done after both the sides produce evidence on record. He was alive to the opposition of the defendants that list of members produced by the Bank was not genuine. The Arbitrator therefore, in the final order, while refusing to accept the request of the defendants, decided to proceed further with arbitral proceedings and further ordered that all the disputes will be decided at the time of final disposal of the arbitration. 5. This order of Arbitrator dated 2-6-2004 was challenged by defendants in Special Civil Application No. 12092 of 2004. In the petition, in addition to reiterating the factual and legal proposition canvassed before the Arbitrator, the petitioners further contended that despite specific plea taken by the petitioners before the arbitrator, the Bank did not produce any material to suggest that decision was taken by the Bank on the application dated 25-5-1998 made by defendant No. 1 for being admitted as member of the Society and that such decision was communicated to the petitioners. It was contended that the Arbitrator ought to have decided the plea of the petitioners on merits and could not have deferred the decision till final disposal of the arbitral proceedings in view of the fact that no material or evidence was produced by the Bank with respect to the petitioners' plea of no decision and communication on the application for membership. 6. The Bank filed reply dated 22-5-2008 to the writ petition. In such reply, it was stated that on the application of the petitioner for membership the Board in its meeting dated 19-6-1998 took decision and the petitioner was admitted as a member as per rules of the society and was allotted shares. Resolution dated 19-6-1998 was produced along with the said reply. It was further contended that name of the petitioner was entered in share register, extract of entry of share register was produced. It was further submitted, that thereafter, the petitioner was also paid dividend to the tune of Rs. 71,250/- on 8-10-1999 for financial year 1998-1999. Further, dividend of Rs. 1,00,000/- was paid on 8-8-2000 for the financial year 1999-2000. The petitioner accepted such dividend which was payable in his capacity as member of the co-operative bank. The petitioner was thus, fully aware of the status of his membership. It was pointed out that the petitioner reflected the shares of the co-operative bank in Balance-Sheet dated 31-3-2001 under the heading, 'investments'. Copy of Balance-Sheet was also produced. It was further contended that the issue of admittance of the petitioner as member of the Bank cannot be decided at a preliminary stage. It was pointed out that under Sec. 16 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, Arbitrator would be empowered to rule on his own jurisdiction. 7. The learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment dated 17-12-2009 allowed the petition. The learned Judge was of the opinion that reference to Sec. 16 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, was misconceived since the petitioner had never challenged jurisdiction of the Tribunal, but the case of the petitioner was that he cannot be subjected to proceedings before the Tribunal in view of statutory provisions contained in Sec. 84 read with Sec. 25(4) of the Act. It was observed that in view of the settled legal position, the point regarding applicability of the Act or jurisdiction against the defendants should be decided at preliminary stage. It was observed that in view of the settled legal position, the point regarding applicability of the Act or jurisdiction against the defendants should be decided at preliminary stage. It was observed that whenever the question of jurisdiction is raised the arbitrator is under a statutory obligation to decide such plea before proceeding further with the arbitral proceedings. It was further observed that the arbitrator has not given any finding on the plea as to the membership raised by the petitioners. It was held that deeming fiction as envisaged under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 25 of the Arbitration Act would apply. The contention of the Bank that the petitioner had received dividend was rejected on the ground that the petitioner cannot be stated to have derived any benefits from such payment as payment was not made at the instance of the petitioner, and it was always open for the Bank to recover the payment, if it was wrongly made. The learned Judge recorded that even on the date of deciding the matter the Bank was not in a position to produce any documents on record to show that the decision was communicated to the petitioner. It was concluded as under: "10.4. An endeavour is made by the respondents that no documentary evidence is available with the bank with regard to membership of the petitioners. This Court is of the view that if no documentary evidence was available, the bank ought not to have hurried to file arbitration proceedings. It would not be out of place to mention that the resolution of 1998 is produced for the first time before this Court." 8. It is this judgment of the learned Single Judge which the Bank assailed in the appeal. With minor deviations facts are similar in all cases. 9. Division Bench of this Court on 6-9-2012 while admitting the appeal passed the following interim order : "7.(i)....... ....... (ii) By interim order, operation and implementation of the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 17-12-2009 in the concerned Special Civil Applications is stayed with further observation and direction that the learned Arbitrator shall be at liberty to proceed for consideration of the matter on a limited point of 'membership' of the defendants with the plaintiff-Bank. He shall give opportunity of hearing to both the sides for leading evidence on such point. He shall give opportunity of hearing to both the sides for leading evidence on such point. After giving opportunity of hearing to both the sides, the learned Arbitrator shall be at liberty to pass appropriate decision, and thereafter, he shall not proceed with the suits unless leave is granted by this Court in the present Letters Patent Appeals." 10. Against such interim order the defendants approached the Supreme Court. Such interim order was stayed. Finally, S.L.P. came to be disposed of by order dated 3-7-2015, in which it was observed that: "We request the High Court to make earnest effort to dispose of L.P.A. Nos. 1180, 1181, 1182, 1183, 1184 of 2010 within six weeks time from today." 11. During the course of arguments of these appeals few further issues emerged. To bring on record some further materials, the appellant-Bank filed a further affidavit dated 24-8-2015 in which it has been stated that respondent No. 1, viz. original defendant No. 1 had filed undated application to the co-operative bank. However, before the Arbitrator, it was stated that the said application was dated 25-5-1998, it is stated that such application was approved by the Board of Directors in its meeting dated 19-6-1998, which in any case, was within four months even from the date of application considering to be 25-5-1998. It is further stated in this further affidavit that: "5. I state that the respondent No. 1 availed the Overdraft facility from the appellant-Bank for the first time after opening the Account amounting to Rs. 3.96 crores (approx.) on 6-6-1998. I state that the outstanding dues of the respondent No. 1 as on 31-3-2001 amounted to Rs. 23.63 crores. Amount recoverable as on 31-3-2015 would be approximately Rs. 66.38 crores. Annexed hereto and marked as Annexure-A is a copy of the Statement of Account of the respondent for the period from 2-3-1998 to 25-6-1998." 12. Along with this affidavit, extracts of statement of accounts of the respondents for the period from 2-3-1998 to 25-6-1998 was produced to demonstrate that on 6-6-1998, respondent No. 1 availed overdraft facilities of Rs. 3.96 crore from the Bank. In reply to such affidavit respondents filed rejoinder dated 28-8-2015 contending that the amount transferred by the Bank to respondent No. 1 is not in the nature of loan. 13. On the basis of such material on record learned Advocate Mr. 3.96 crore from the Bank. In reply to such affidavit respondents filed rejoinder dated 28-8-2015 contending that the amount transferred by the Bank to respondent No. 1 is not in the nature of loan. 13. On the basis of such material on record learned Advocate Mr. Nandish Y. Chudgar for the appellant-Bank submitted that the Arbitrator was justified in not accepting the objection of the defendants at a preliminary stage and instead deciding to consider the same along with arbitral proceedings. In terms of Sec. 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, it was open for the Arbitrator to rule on his own jurisdiction. The question being a mixed question of law and facts could be adjudged only after full material was produced on record. The learned Single Judge committed serious error in allowing the application of the defendants and terminating the arbitral proceedings. Taking us through the material on record, the Counsel submitted that there was enough evidence to suggest that defendants were entered into membership of the co-operative bank on their applications being made for such purpose. This was done well within four months of statutory period prescribed in sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 25 of the said Act. The question of communication of such decision is pure question of fact and can be decided only after full evidence is brought on record. In any case, there was strong prima facie evidence to suggest that defendants were communicated such decision and that they acquiesced in the position of having been admitted to the membership of the co-operative bank. 14. Counsel pointed out that the following factual aspects emerge in individual Letters Patent Appeals. L.P.A. No. Date of application (as stated by defendants) Date of decision (As per affidavit filed in the High Court) Remarks 1180 of 2010 25-5-1998 19-6-1998 Loan amount of Rs. 3.96 crore disbursed on 6-6-1998. 1181 of 2010 21-3-2000 2-3-2000 Loan disbursed on 22-3-2000 to the Bank shown by the defendants in their accounts. Amount paid shown as share application money. 1182 of 2010 21-3-2000 2-3-2000 - do - 1183 of 2010 21-3-2000 2-3-2000 - do - 1184 of 2010 21-3-2000 2-3-2000 - do - 15. Counsel pointed out that the respondents in L.P.A. No. 1180 of 2010 have also received dividends for two successive years. Amount paid shown as share application money. 1182 of 2010 21-3-2000 2-3-2000 - do - 1183 of 2010 21-3-2000 2-3-2000 - do - 1184 of 2010 21-3-2000 2-3-2000 - do - 15. Counsel pointed out that the respondents in L.P.A. No. 1180 of 2010 have also received dividends for two successive years. However, in case of other respondents on account of restrictions imposed by the Reserve Bank of India looking to the weak financial condition of the Bank shortly after they became members, no such dividend could be paid. 16. On the other hand, learned Counsel Shri Mihir Thakore for the respondents submitted that the learned Single Judge committed no error. In the application made by the defendants-original petitioners before the Arbitrator, question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue was raised. Absence of any material whatsoever on record suggests that the mandatory requirement under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 25 of the said Act was not fulfilled. The Arbitrator was duty-bound to hold that the defendants were not admitted to the membership of the co-operative bank, and consequently, arbitration proceedings should have been dismissed. The Arbitrator committed serious error in postponing decision at the time of final disposal of the arbitral proceedings. If Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to entertain the arbitration proceedings, subjecting the defendants to full-fledged arbitral proceedings was wholly impermissible and would cause grave prejudice to them. 17. Counsel submitted that in absence of any evidence of the Bank having accepted the applications of the defendants for membership and in absence of any evidence of communication of such decision within the statutory period, deeming fiction as envisaged under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 25 of the said Act would apply. It would therefore, be deemed that such applications were rejected. Merely because the defendants might have availed of any borrowing facility from the Bank, would not alter the situation. He submitted that the amounts received by the defendants were not in the nature of loan, but were for the purpose of purchase of shares for and on behalf of the bank. 18. Counsel relied on several decisions in support of his contention that once a statute provides for a deeming fiction the moment, conditions necessary for application of such deeming fiction are established, the fiction must be applied and the Court would not allow its mind to boggle, such as: "(i) East End Dwelling Co. 18. Counsel relied on several decisions in support of his contention that once a statute provides for a deeming fiction the moment, conditions necessary for application of such deeming fiction are established, the fiction must be applied and the Court would not allow its mind to boggle, such as: "(i) East End Dwelling Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, reported in1951 HL (E) 109; and (ii) Textile Traders Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. P.K. Thakker Construction Pvt. Ltd., reported in 2004 (1) GLH 335 ." However, since with this legal proposition there is no dispute, we may not refer to all such decisions. 19. Before considering the rival contentions we may refer to the statutory provisions. Chapter IX of the said Act pertains to settlement of disputes. Section 84 of the said Chapter refers to 'Reference of disputes', which reads as under: "84. Reference of disputes:-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in nay other law for the time-being in force, if any dispute (other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by a Multi-State Co-operative Society against its paid employee or an industrial dispute as defined in clause (k) of Sec. 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) touching the constitution, management or business of a Multi-State Co-operative Society arises- (a) among members, past members and persons claiming through members, past members and deceased members, or (b) between a member, past member and persons claiming through a member, past member or deceased member and the Multi-State Cooperative Society, its board or any officer, agent or employee of the Multi-State Co-operative Society or liquidator, past or present, or (c) between the Multi-State Co-operative Society or its board and any past board, any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent or past employee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased employee of the Multi-State Co-operative Society, or (d) between the Multi-State Co-operative Society and any other Multi-State Co-operative Society, between a Multi-State Co-operative Society and liquidator of another Multi-State Co-operative Society or between the liquidator of one Multi-State Co-operative Society and the liquidator of another Multi-State Co-operative Society, such dispute shall be referred to arbitration. (2) For the purpose of sub-sec. (2) For the purpose of sub-sec. (1), the following shall be deemed to be disputes touching the constitution, management or business of a Multi-State Co-operative Society, namely: (a) a claim by the Multi-State Co-operative Society for any debt or demand due to it from a member or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of a deceased member, whether such debt or demand be admitted or not; (b) a claim by a surety against the principal debtor where the Multi-State Co-operative Society has recovered from the surety any amount in respect of any debt or demand due to it from the principal debtor as a result of the default of the principal debtor, whether such debt or demand is admitted or not; (c) any dispute arising in connection with the election of any officer of a Multi-State Co-operative Society. (3) If any question arises whether a dispute referred to arbitration under this Section is or is not a dispute touching the constitution, management or business of a Multi-State Co-operative Society, the decision thereon of the arbitrator shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court. (4) Where a dispute has been referred to arbitration under sub-sec. (1), the same shall be settled or decided by the arbitrator to be appointed by the Central Registrar. (5) Save as otherwise provided under this Act, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to all arbitration under this Act as if the proceedings for arbitration were referred for settlement or decision under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996." Under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 84 of the said Act, any dispute touching the constitution, management or business of a Multi-State Co-operative Society, between a member, past member and person claiming through member, past member or deceased member and Multi-State Co-operative Society, its Board or officer, agent or employee of the Multi-State Co-operative Society would be referred for arbitration. Under Clause (a) of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 84 of the said Act, a claim by the Multi-State Co-operative Society for any debt or demand due to it from a member or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of a deceased member, whether such debt or demand be admitted or not, would be deemed to be touching the constitution, management or business of a Multi-State Co-operative Society. In context of these provisions question of membership of the defendants becomes relevant. Section 3(n) of the said Act defines 'member' as under: "(n) 'Member' means a person joining in the application for the registration of a Multi-State Co-operative Society and includes a person admitted to membership after such registration in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the Rules and the bye-laws." Section 25 of the said Act pertains to persons who may become members. Sub-section (1) of Sec.25 of the said Act provides for eligibility of person to be a member of Multi-State Co-operative Society. Sub-section (3) of Sec. 25 of the said Act provides that, "Any person eligible for membership of Multi-State Co-operative Society may, on his application, be admitted as a member by such society." Sub-section (4) of Sec. 25 of the said Act which is significant for us reads as under: "Every application for admission as a member of a Multi-State Cooperative Society shall be disposed of by such society within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the application, and the decision of such society on the application shall be communicated to the applicant within fifteen days from the date of such decision: Provided that if the application is not disposed of within the period aforesaid, or the decision is not communicated within a period of fifteen days of the expiry of the aforesaid period of four months, the Multi-State Co-operative Society shall be deemed to have made a decision, on the date of expiry of such period, refusing admission to the applicant." As per sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 25 of the said Act every application for admission as a member of a Multi-State Co-operative Society would have to be disposed of by the society within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the application. Decision so taken would be communicated to the applicant within 15 days of the date of such decision. Proviso to sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 25 of the said Act, provides that if application is not disposed of within the period aforesaid, or the decision is not communicated within a period of fifteen days of the expiry of the aforesaid period of four months, the society shall be deemed to have made a decision, on the date of expiry of such period, refusing admission to the applicant. 20. 20. A few interesting aspects emerge from the provision of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 25 of the said Act. In the main body of this sub-section duty is cast upon Multi-State Co-operative Society to take decision on the application by any person for admission as a member of the society within four months from the date of receipt of the application. Further duty of the society is to communicate such decision on the application to the applicant within 15 days of the decision. In a given case therefore, if a decision is taken by the society within one month from the date of application for membership such decision would have to be communicated within 15 days from such decision. Whereas, as per the proviso, deeming fiction of refusing admission to the applicant would arise only after full period of four months for taking decision expires and further period of 15 days have passed thereafter. In the example given above, after taking decision within one month of receipt of the application, if it is communicated to the applicant a month later, the co-operative society may be breaching the requirement of communication of the decision within 15 days of taking it; nevertheless, the deeming fiction provided in the proviso will not apply. Thus, prima facie view possible would be that what is sacrosanct is the decision to be taken by co-operative society within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the application for membership. Whether the requirement of the communication thereof within the stipulated period is mandatory or directory, and whether strict compliance would be needed or substantial compliance would suffice, are the issues which immediately arise. To reiterate, the main body of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 25 of the said Act requires the bank to communicate the decision, whether positive or negative, on the application made by a person for membership within 15 days of taking such a decision. Whereas, deeming fiction under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 25 of the said Act would arise only after full period of four months available for the co-operative society to take decision is over and further period of 15 days has passed. 21. We are not inclined to give final verdict on these issues for the reasons stated hereinafter. Adverting to the facts of the case before Arbitration Tribunal, the defendants raised preliminary objection to its jurisdiction. 21. We are not inclined to give final verdict on these issues for the reasons stated hereinafter. Adverting to the facts of the case before Arbitration Tribunal, the defendants raised preliminary objection to its jurisdiction. It is not the case of the defendants that arbitrator had no authority to decide on its own jurisdiction. The Arbitrator ruled that in view of the facts on record such decision cannot be taken at a preliminary stage, final decision can be rendered only when Arbitration proceedings are decided. This was certainly an option open to the arbitrator. Contrary to what was observed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment, if the question of jurisdiction was not possible to be decided as a preliminary issue, if evidence was needed to be brought on record, if issue was a mixed question of law and facts and could not be adjudged at preliminary stage, without aid of full evidence being brought on record, it was certainly for the Arbitrator to defer decision thereon instead of deciding the issue at the preliminary stage. Having disagreed with the learned Single Judge on this preliminary question, the sole question that needs to be answered is whether the Arbitrator committed an error in deferring decision to a later point of time. 22. In this context, we have seen prima facie material on record. According to the bank decisions were taken on applications filed by the defendants for membership, in each case well within four months from the date of such applications. Matching resolutions have been produced on record. The case of the Bank is the applications were made which were undated; however, going by the dates claimed by the defendants also the decisions were within the statutory period. In some cases, the resolutions of the Bank were even prior to the date of applications. Defendants dispute even authenticity of such resolutions. They point out that in some cases membership has been granted even before applications were made by the defendants. The bank further points out that in one case the defendants received dividends for two consecutive years and in case of others no such dividend could be paid, because restrictions were imposed by the Reserve Bank of India. They point out that in some cases membership has been granted even before applications were made by the defendants. The bank further points out that in one case the defendants received dividends for two consecutive years and in case of others no such dividend could be paid, because restrictions were imposed by the Reserve Bank of India. The bank also points out that the company showed the share application money in its account as paid towards share application which would clearly demonstrate that the defendants acquiesced with the situation that they were admitted to the membership of the co-operative bank. 23. We also notice that in all cases, sizable amounts were received by the defendants from the Bank. According to the Bank such amounts were in the nature of loans or cash-credit facilities. In either case, amounts would become borrowings by defendants. According to the defendants such amounts were neither released by way of loan nor mere granting of loan or cash-credit facilities would amount to admittance of the borrowers as members of the co-operative bank. In this context, we may refer to sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 66 of the said Act, which reads as under: "A Multi-State Co-operative Society, other than a co-operative bank, shall not make a loan to a member on the security of his share or on the security of a non-member." Sub-section (2) of Sec. 66 of the said Act reads as under: "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1), a Multi-State Cooperative Society may make a loan to a depositor on the security of his deposit." Section 68 of the said Act further provides that: "Save as provided in Secs. 66 and 67, the transaction of a Multi-State Co-operative Society with any person other than a member, shall be subject to such prohibition and restrictions, if any, as may be specified in the bye-laws." Prima facie, it would emerge that barring certain exceptions as may have been carved out in bye-laws, it was not open for the bank as a Multi-State Co-operative Society to grant any loan to a non-member. Disbursement of amounts in favour of defendants, if they are established to be in the nature of loan, would further enhance the case of the bank that they were admitted to the membership of the co-operative bank. 24. Disbursement of amounts in favour of defendants, if they are established to be in the nature of loan, would further enhance the case of the bank that they were admitted to the membership of the co-operative bank. 24. Sub-section (4) of Sec. 25 of the said Act does not envisage any specific mode of communication of decision by co-operative society on an application by any person for being admitted as its member. What is important is that decision should be taken and communicated within the time prescribed. The Bank has produced documents to prima facie suggest such decisions were contemporaneously taken. There are other material facts and circumstances to indicate that such decisions were acted upon by the bank as well as by defendants. When statute does not require any precise mode of communication, nor prescribes that such communication must be in writing, the following questions would arise for consideration: "(i) Whether such decision was communicated even if orally? (ii) Whether defendants were in know of the decision, whether communicated or not? And (iii) Whether their conduct would amount to acquiescence in situation that they were made members of the co-operative bank?" Above are some of the intricate questions which would have to be answered while taking up the contention of the defendants that requirement of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 25 of the said Act were not fulfilled, and therefore, their application for membership must be deemed to have been rejected. All these questions cannot be answered without full-fledged trial. The Arbitrator was perfectly justified in giving full opportunity to both the sides to produce evidence in this respect along with trying the arbitral proceedings. All these questions are predominantly questions of facts. When the defendants filed application before the Arbitrator full materials were not even brought on record. As noted some materials were produced before the learned Single Judge. Even before us further facts came to light. The learned Single Judge committed serious error in terminating the Arbitration proceedings when Arbitrator himself had not taken final decision. As noted, the request of the defendants before the arbitrator was to decide the issue of jurisdiction as preliminary issue. It was prayed that the Tribunal should rule on its own jurisdiction and declare that it has no jurisdiction to entertain proceedings under Sec. 84 of the said Act. As noted, the request of the defendants before the arbitrator was to decide the issue of jurisdiction as preliminary issue. It was prayed that the Tribunal should rule on its own jurisdiction and declare that it has no jurisdiction to entertain proceedings under Sec. 84 of the said Act. If the learned Single Judge was of the opinion that the Arbitrator should not have linked this question with final disposal of arbitral proceedings, at the best, direction could have been given to the arbitrator to decide the issue as a preliminary issue. Instead the learned Single Judge took up the issue for consideration and decision on merits. It is not the question of jurisdiction of the learned Single Judge to do so, but question of propriety. In facts of the case, as noted, the parties did not have full opportunity to produce materials on record. Full facts were thus, not available. In any case, the issues as we have noted are far more intricate and are in nature of complex questions of facts. 25. In the result, we do not think that Arbitrator committed any error. The learned Single Judge ought not to have interfered with the order. 26. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is therefore, set aside. Arbitrator shall decide all the issues unmindful of the observations we might have made which are purely prima facie in nature and are made only in order to support the view of the Arbitrator that correct decision can be taken only upon full opportunity to both the sides and it would not be possible to dissect the question of jurisdiction from the merits of the claim of the bank. All the Letters Patent Appeals are allowed and disposed of accordingly. Interim relief is vacated. 27. At this stage, learned Counsel for the respondents requested that this judgment be stayed for a reasonable period to enable them to file further appeals. Even after this judgment and vacation of stay, surely the Arbitrator is not likely to proceed in hot haste and decide proceedings within a short time. In any case, it is provided that first hearing of the revived arbitral proceedings would not be fixed earlier than 15th October, 2015.