JUDGMENT : I.P. MUKERJI, J. BASIC FACTS: There was a limited company by the name of Anglo India Jute Mills Company Limited. On 19th May 2005, its name was changed to A.I.-Champdany Industries Limited, which is the defendant. It has its registered office at 25, Princep Street, Kolkata 700072. What is very significant in this case is that up till April 1994 the persons controlling the plaintiffs and Anglo India Jute Mills were the same. By 1987, Anglo India Jute Mills had become a sick industrial Company. Its affairs were referred to the Board for Financial Reconstruction. On 28th March 1989 a scheme was sanctioned by this Board to rehabilitate it. Now, the case of the plaintiffs is this. They had lent and advanced substantial sums of money to Anglo India Jute and made monetary deposits in it to be used for its business and/or rehabilitation. The evidence shows that these advances were made between 1987 and 1991. In these suits the plaintiffs claim back that amount together with interest as per the following: PARTICULARS Suit No. & Cause Title Principal Amount Interest Decree CS No. 220 of 2008 Arindam Investments Private Limited Vs. AI Champdany Industries Limited Rs.19,00,000/- Interest from January 1, 2004 to September 30, 2008 Rs. 13,53,750/- Rs.32,53,750/- CS No. 221 of 2008 Cosmopolitan Investments Limited Vs. AI Champdany Industries Limited Rs.1,30,00,000/- Interest from January 1, 2004 to September 30, 2008 Rs.92,62,500/- Rs.2,22,62,500/- CS No. 222 of 2008 Disciplined Investments Ltd. Vs. AI Champdany Industries Ltd. Rs.8,41, 391/- Interest from January 1, 2004 to September 30, 2008 Rs.5,99,493/- Rs. 14,40,884/- CS No. 223 of 2008 Duncan International (India) Ltd. Vs. AI Champdany Industries Ltd. Rs.1,45,17,389/- Interest from January 1, 2004 to September 30, 2008 Rs.1,03,43,638/- Rs.2,48,61,027/- CS No. 224 of 2008 Haldia Investment Company Ltd. Vs. AI Champdany Industries Limited Rs.82,69,273/- Interest from January 1, 2004 to September 30, 2008 Rs.58,91,857/- Rs.1,41,61,130/- CS No. 225 of 2008 New India Investment Corporation Limited Vs. AI Champdany Industries Limited Rs.24,04,189/- Interest from January 1, 2004 to September 30, 2008 Rs.17,12,983/- Rs.41,17,172/- The 1989 rehabilitation scheme did not work. Another scheme was sanctioned by the Board on 4th February 1994. New promoters stepped in to revive Anglo India Jute. The Board of Management of this company was taken over on 6th April, 1994 by Champdany Industries Limited (C.I.L.) and its associates. Another scheme was sanctioned by the Board on 4th February 1994. New promoters stepped in to revive Anglo India Jute. The Board of Management of this company was taken over on 6th April, 1994 by Champdany Industries Limited (C.I.L.) and its associates. At this point of time the commonness of the persons controlling the plaintiffs and Anglo India Jute ceased. The plaintiffs were controlled by the Goenkas whereas another group controlled Champdany Industries Limited. Obtaining an appropriate order from this court on 22nd March, 2006 Champdany Industries Limited amalgamated with the defendant. For the financial year ending 31st March, 1991 Anglo India Jute showed its liability to the plaintiffs as Rs. 386 crores on account of loans and fixed deposit. The frozen unsecured loans/deposits (inclusive of interest of Rs.42 lakhs) amounting to Rs.386 lakhs were as per the following: PARTICULARS Haldia Investments Ltd. Rs.8269273 Duncan International (India) Limited Rs.5486389 Disciplined Investments Limited Rs.841391 Globe Tea and Industries Limited Rs.2404189 Arindam Investments Limited Rs.1900000 Cosmopolitan Investments Limited Rs.13000000 Landale and Clark Limited (Whole owned subsidiary) Rs.6698420 Rs.3,85,99,662 Rounded off to Rs.386 lakhs The seventh creditor Landale and Clark Limited which obtained a loan of Rs.66,98,420, as per the above statement was a wholly owned subsidiary of Anglo India Jute. This subsidiary came to be controlled by the new promoters of Anglo India Jute. It was said that this loan was repaid by the Anglo India Jute to its subsidiary. That is why in their balance sheet the outstanding amount was reduced to Rs.319.02 lakhs. By its order dated 4th February, 1994 sanctioning the rehabilitation scheme, the Board declared in annexure-IV of its order that the unsecured loans received by Anglo India Jute from the plaintiffs and frozen till the year2003 would be Rs.386 lakhs. In their financial statement for the year ending 30th September, 1993 for 18 months published on 22nd June, 1995, for the year ending 31st March, 1995 for 18 months published on 4th November, 1995 and for the year ending 31st March 1996 for 12 months for the year ending 26th August, 1996, the liability was reduced to Rs. 319.02 lacs. These accounts were qualified by a note stating them to be disputed. These accounts were published by the new management. By a subsequent order made on 14th September 1998 the Board declared that the liability of Anglo India Jute to the extent of Rs. 319.02 lacs. These accounts were qualified by a note stating them to be disputed. These accounts were published by the new management. By a subsequent order made on 14th September 1998 the Board declared that the liability of Anglo India Jute to the extent of Rs. 386 lakhs to “the erstwhile promoters” could not be disputed. Against this order Anglo India Jute preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (A.A.I.F.R.) Before the appellate authority Anglo India Jute according to the records disputed the sum of Rs.319 lakhs as outstanding. The interest charge was 17.5% per annum whereas according to them 10% per annum should have been charged. Furthermore, part of it should have been free of interest. The new promoters after taking over the management of Anglo India Jute from the Goenka Group in April, 1994 realised that it had claims against the old promoters which they were entitled to adjust from their dues of Rs.319 lakhs. The prayer for reduction of interest was rejected by the Appellate authority. Just because Anglo India Jute then raised a counter claim against the erstwhile promoters of the defendant, did not mean that Rs.319 lakhs could be shown in their annual accounts as disputed according to the Appellate authority. This claim against the old promoters of the defendant was described by it as “self-seeking”. They could only be termed as dues according to the AAIFR if they were adjudicated upon and held to be so by any competent court. Only if Anglo India Jute obtained a decree to this effect could it set off this amount against its dues towards its unsecured creditors. In conclusion the AAIFR held that in the annual accounts, prepared for any financial year after the date of the order, the said unsecured loans and deposits of Rs.319 lakhs (rounded off) had to be acknowledged by Anglo India Jute as the undisputed, unsecured interest free loan deposits frozen upto the year 2003 according to the following : PARTICULARS Haldia Investments Ltd. Rs. 8269273 Duncan International (India) Limited Rs.54,86,389 Disciplined Investments Limited Rs.8,41,391 Globe Tea and Industries Limited Rs.24,04,189 Arindum Investments Limited Rs.19,00,000 Cosmopolitan Investments Limited Rs.1,30,00,000 Rs.3,19,01,242 The appeal was disposed of on 4th June, 1999. By its order dated 21st June, 2005 the Board directed Anglo India Jute to pay off the above amount to the plaintiffs. 8269273 Duncan International (India) Limited Rs.54,86,389 Disciplined Investments Limited Rs.8,41,391 Globe Tea and Industries Limited Rs.24,04,189 Arindum Investments Limited Rs.19,00,000 Cosmopolitan Investments Limited Rs.1,30,00,000 Rs.3,19,01,242 The appeal was disposed of on 4th June, 1999. By its order dated 21st June, 2005 the Board directed Anglo India Jute to pay off the above amount to the plaintiffs. On 17th August, 2005 the AAIFR dismissed the appeal preferred by the defendant from the order. On the ground the defendant was unable to pay the above debt the plaintiffs in or about August, 2004 filed winding up applications against them in this court. On 18th January 2006 the winding up applications were dismissed. On 13th September 2006 the plaintiffs preferred appeals from this order before a Division Bench of this court. On 02nd July 2008 the Appellate Court disposed of the appeal, as the defendant offered to secure the claim of the plaintiffs. The court directed furnishing of bank guarantees with the Registrar Original Side within 8 (eight) weeks from the date of the order. The plaintiffs were relegated to civil suits to be filed within 4 (four) weeks from the date of the order. The present suits were filed. In aid of the suits applications under Chapter XIII-A of the Original Side Rules were made. In those applications this court part decreed the suits. Appeals were preferred from that decree. The Appellate Court remanded the whole matter to this court for trial. ARGUMENTS:- Mr. Deb learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiffs made his submissions in a very simple and clear cut manner. The first hurdle that he tried to overcome was that of limitation. Money was lent and advanced between 1987 to 1991. Anglo India Jute was referred to the B.I.F.R. in 1987. It was released by the B.I.F.R. on 21st June 2005. Hence, automatically this period during which the company was under consideration by the period B.I.F.R. and the Appellate Authority is to be excluded in calculating the period of limitation for filing the instant suit. [Section22 (1) and (5) of the (Special Provisions) Act, 1985] Meanwhile on 19th July 2004 the defendant was declared a relief undertaking. It remained so, till May, 2006. The winding up applications were filed in August 2004 and finally disposed of by the Appeal Court on 02nd July 2008. On 26th September 2006 a self-injunction was sought by the plaintiffs against themselves. It remained so, till May, 2006. The winding up applications were filed in August 2004 and finally disposed of by the Appeal Court on 02nd July 2008. On 26th September 2006 a self-injunction was sought by the plaintiffs against themselves. It was granted by the court restraining it from filing a suit and continued till the disposal of the appeal Hence, if all these exclusionary periods are taken into account the suit was filed within the period of limitation, it was submitted. According to Mr. Deb the moment this amendment was granted the claim related back to the date of filing of the suits. Therefore, there was no question of limitation. Furthermore, learned Counsel submitted that there was no appeal from the order dated 28th February 2014. He said at any rate the whole claim of the plaintiffs now, was made in the plaint itself, if one read it carefully paragraph by paragraph. Mr. Deb submitted that a record of proceedings was maintained before the Board. This record dated 4th February 1994, was signed on behalf of the Anglo India Jute Mills Company Ltd. by Mr. A. Goenka Director and Mr. A.K. Sen consultant, on behalf of the Champdany Industries Ltd. by Ms. Lira Goswami Advocate and Mr. Advocate and Mr. D.K. Bubna Chief Executive. Now, Anglo India Jute having admitted the basic liability before the Board, it was wrongful on the part of the defendant to deny that liability. Mr. Deb relied on the SICCA, 1985. He said that any declaration made by the Board or A.A.I.F.R. was binding on the parties. The record of proceedings had been signed by on behalf of Anglo India Jute Mills Company Ltd. and Champdany Limited. Therefore, the defendant was bound by this admission. The provisions of SICCA stipulated that all persons who participated in the proceedings before the Board or A.A.I.F.R. were bound by its order. Anglo India Jute did not prefer any appeal from the order of the A.A.I.F.R. fixing liability on them. Hence, it was bound by its order. This authority had fixed the liability of this company. On the failure of the defendant to pay this amount the plaintiffs were constrained to file the suits. Anglo India Jute did not prefer any appeal from the order of the A.A.I.F.R. fixing liability on them. Hence, it was bound by its order. This authority had fixed the liability of this company. On the failure of the defendant to pay this amount the plaintiffs were constrained to file the suits. The defence which the defendant tried to put up in this suit was also urged by Anglo India Jute before the A.A.I.F.R. For example they urged before the A.A.I.F.R. that the cross-claim of the defendant against its old promoters should be taken into account. They also urged before the authority that the accounts were disputed and the notes to the accounts made this declaration. Despite this submission the Appellate Authority had directed Anglo India Jute to acknowledge the debt as an undisputed liability. Anglo India Jute had done so in obedience to the order of A.A.I.F.R. Now it is trying to reverse its stand and say that it was compelled to do so by A.A.I.F.R. Mr. Saha, learned Senior Counsel for the defendant took a very interesting point on limitation. He said that the claim of the plaintiffs as made out in the respective plaints was in relation to monies allegedly lent and advanced by them to Anglo India Jute, further, to the scheme sanctioned by the order of the B.I.F.R. dated 28th March, 1989. In reality a substantial portion of this alleged loans and advances was taken prior to this period, as would appear from the records. There was no claim for this in the plaint. It was sought to be introduced by way of an amendment of the plaint in 2014. By an order dated 28th February 2014, each of the plaintiffs was allowed to amend the plaint. They were permitted to add “and/or otherwise as recognised by scheme” after the words “scheme” in various parts of the plaint, to describe and quality this claim for this additional period. Mr. Saha said that the order said nothing as to whether the amendment related back to the date of filing of the plaints. Nothing to this effect has been specified in the order. In the absence of this it had to be taken as if this claim was introduced in 2014. For this reason, a substantial part of the claim in the plaints was barred by limitation, Mr. Saha submitted. Mr. Nothing to this effect has been specified in the order. In the absence of this it had to be taken as if this claim was introduced in 2014. For this reason, a substantial part of the claim in the plaints was barred by limitation, Mr. Saha submitted. Mr. Saha learned Advocate for the defendant tried to submit that initially the plaintiffs referred to the loans and advances made by the plaintiffs to the defendant after sanction of the scheme on 28th March 1989.The claim actually made in the plaint was also in respect of the alleged loans and advances made by the plaintiffs to the defendant prior to sanctioning the scheme. This case was not made out in the plaint. The plaintiff could only rely on the case made out in the plaint. He referred me to Order VI Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He said that the plaint should have contained all the material facts. The claim which the plaintiffs are trying to maintain is outside the scope of the suit as it includes pre-scheme loans and advances. He cited Vinod Kumar Arora v Surjit Kaur reported in (1987) 3 SCC 711 to argue that a party could not take a different stand from that in the pleadings. He backed up this argument by citing Syed and Company and Others v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others reported in 1995 Supp (4) SCC 422. Lack of material facts in the plaint was sufficient for dismissal of the suit, according to him citing Shri H.D. Vashishta v. M/s Glaxo Laboratories (I) Pvt. Ltd. reported in 1978 (1) SCC 170 . If the pleadings were not adequate the evidence could not be gone into according to Bondar Singh and Others v. Nihal Singh and Others reported in (2003) 4 SCC 161 and Rajgopal (Dead) by L.Rs v. Kishan Gopal and another reported in (2003) 10 SCC 653 , also referred to by him. The amendment of the plaints was made at the instance of the plaintiffs. By an order dated 28th February 2014, on their application the plaint was amended so as to include claims which were recognised by the scheme. According to learned counsel this amendment did not have any relation back effect and that it was hopelessly barred by limitation. The argument regarding limitation has been discussed above. Mr. By an order dated 28th February 2014, on their application the plaint was amended so as to include claims which were recognised by the scheme. According to learned counsel this amendment did not have any relation back effect and that it was hopelessly barred by limitation. The argument regarding limitation has been discussed above. Mr. Saha also contended that the dues were shown as disputed in the balance sheet of Anglo India Jute. He also tried to point out that this company had a cross-claim against its erstwhile promoters of the defendant. Therefore, it could not be said that the amount mentioned in the table above was a true reflection of what was due and payable by the defendant to the plaintiff. Learned Counsel said that apart from the record of the debt by the A.A.I.F.R. the plaintiffs had not been able to prove that it had lent and advanced the sums of money to Anglo India Jute. The plaintiffs did not have the evidence to prove its case. It could not prove how the money was transferred from the plaintiffs to the defendant, what amount was transferred, on what date and in what manner. In the absence of this evidence the case of the plaintiffs should not be believed. The order of the A.A.I.F.R. did not mean that the plaintiffs were excused from proving their case. The plaintiffs had failed to prove it. According to Mr. Saha there was no direct evidence of the loan having been received by Anglo India Jute. According to the director’s report of Anglo India Jute the debt was disputed. It was only shown as undisputed further to the directions of the AIFR which the company had to obey. Mr. Saha raised another interesting point. He said that the admissions which were made by Anglo India Jute related to the period when the plaintiffs were in control of this company. An admission, to be relevant or admissible had to be made against one’s self-interest. Since the person controlling the plaintiffs and Anglo India Jute were the same when the alleged admission was made, those statements could not be taken as admission at all as they served the interest of the maker i.e. the plaintiff and was not against their interest. An admission, to be relevant or admissible had to be made against one’s self-interest. Since the person controlling the plaintiffs and Anglo India Jute were the same when the alleged admission was made, those statements could not be taken as admission at all as they served the interest of the maker i.e. the plaintiff and was not against their interest. I was referred to Smt. Krishnawati v. Shri Hans Raj reported in AIR 1974 SC 208 and Nalam Pattabhiram Rao and others v. Mandavilli Narayanamoorthy and others reported in AIR 1922 PC 102 . Mr. Saha also said that admission in books of account, financial statements etc., were not conclusive and cited some authorities Chandradhar Goswami and Others vs. Gauhati Bank Ltd. reported in AIR 1967 SC 1058 ; Central Bureau of Investigation vs. V.C. Shukla and Others reported in (1998) 3 SCC 410 . ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS: First of all let me consider the effect of a scheme sanctioned by the Board and the A.A.I.F.R. and order passed by these authorities, sanctioning it. Take a look at Section 18(8) of the SICA, 1985. It enacts that on and from the date of coming into operation of the sanctioned scheme, it shall be binding on the sick industrial company and the transferee company and also on their shareholders, creditors, guarantors, employees etc. The scheme could provide for change in management of the sick industrial company (Section 18(1) (b) of the Act). It shall come into effect on the date specified by the Board (See 18(4) of the said Act). Now, at the time of sanctioning the scheme or at a time contemporaneous thereto the Board thought that the earlier management of Anglo India Jute was unable to implement the earlier scheme of 1989. It invited a change in its management, as a result of which, the new management took control of the company. As discussed before, the order of the Board and the subsequent order of A.A.I.F.R. tabulated the loans and advances granted by each of the plaintiffs to Anglo India Jute. The order of A.A.I.F.R. dated 4th June 1999 directed that these loans and advances were to be shown as undisputed by Anglo India Jute. The alleged dues of this company from the old promoters of A.I.J.M.L. were to be enquired into adjudicated upon separately. The order of A.A.I.F.R. dated 4th June 1999 directed that these loans and advances were to be shown as undisputed by Anglo India Jute. The alleged dues of this company from the old promoters of A.I.J.M.L. were to be enquired into adjudicated upon separately. The loans and advances tabulated as due and payable by Anglo India Jute to the plaintiffs aggregating to Rs.3,19,01,242 were to stand on a separate footing. By an order made on 21st June 2005 the Board directed the defendant to make repayment of the dues tabulated in the order of the A.A.I.F.R. dated 4th June 1999. As we have seen earlier, the record of proceedings was signed inter alia by Anglo India Jute Mills Company Ltd. and Champdany Industries Limited, accepting the above figure, before the Board. Regulation 14(4) of Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction Regulations 1987, clearly provides that any proceedings signed by the Chairman shall be conclusive evidence of the record of proceedings. Therefore, under section 18(8) of SICA, 1985 the defendant, Champdany Industries Ltd. and Anglo India Jute Mills Company Ltd. cannot say after the signing of the record of proceedings that it is not binding on them. It is also on record that for the financial year ending 31st March, 1991 Anglo India Jute Mills Co. Ltd. reflected this liability of Rs. 386 crores to the plaintiffs, in its balance sheet. It was only after the new management assumed control from 4th April, 1994, that the company started showing the same liability as disputed, in a qualifying note appended to the accounts. Section 25 of the said Act provides at any person aggrieved by any order of the Board might prefer an appeal to the Appellate Authority within 45 days from the date of receipt of a copy of the same. Section 26 is very important. It enacts that no order passed under the Act is appealable except as provided in the Act. No Civil Court has jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Appellate Authority or the Board is empowered by the said act to determine. According to the scheme of the Act the order of the A.A.I.F.R. is final and binding and cannot be called into question in any civil court. Therefore once the said order was passed by A.A.I.F.R. on 4th June 1999, it became final and binding. According to the scheme of the Act the order of the A.A.I.F.R. is final and binding and cannot be called into question in any civil court. Therefore once the said order was passed by A.A.I.F.R. on 4th June 1999, it became final and binding. Of course any person feeling aggrieved could have approached this High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or could have invoked the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136. No such proceeding has been filed. Therefore, I hold that the defendant is bound by the liabilities recorded in the order of A.A.I.F.R. as payable to each of the plaintiffs. Now, the question that statements in accounts or financial statements are not conclusive, plainly does not arise. Now, I come to the point of limitation. In my opinion, too much importance was sought to be placed by Mr. Saha on paragraph-4 of the plaint, as if the entire cause of action was pleaded in that paragraph. If the whole plaint is scrutinised, you will find that there is enough foundation in it for the entire claim of the plaintiffs on account of loan, advance, deposit etc.. made to the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant. Hence, the plaint includes pre-scheme and post-scheme loans and advances, made between 1987 and 1991. These loans and advances were declared to be payable by the Board and AAIFR. In 1987 Anglo India Jute Mills Co. Ltd became a sick industrial company under SICA 1985. It was released by BIFR on 21st June, 2005. On 19th July, 2004 it was declared a relief undertaking by the Government of West Bengal. It appears that it ceased to be a relief undertaking in 2006. On 26th September, 2006 a self- injunction was passed by this court in the winding up applications filed by the plaintiffs against the defendant. On 2nd July, 2008 the winding up applications were disposed of by the appeal court by directing the plaintiffs to file their respective suits within eight weeks from that date. The present suits were filed in or about October, 2008. No part of the claim of the plaintiffs (see 22 (1) (5) of SICA 1985) with section 15 of the Limitation Act, 1963) is barred by the laws of limitation. The present suits were filed in or about October, 2008. No part of the claim of the plaintiffs (see 22 (1) (5) of SICA 1985) with section 15 of the Limitation Act, 1963) is barred by the laws of limitation. In view of my above findings it also cannot be said that the claims not included in the plaint were sought to be introduced by evidence or amendment. The whole claim of the plaintiffs, in my opinion, has been sufficiently pleaded in the plaint, with adequate details. Ramji Purshottam (dead) by Lrs. And Others v. Laxmanbhai D Kurlawal (dead) by Lrs. And another reported in (2004) 6 SCC 415 does not apply. Now I will discuss how far the plaintiffs have been able to maintain their claim from the evidence and other records of proceeding before the Board and A.A.I.F.R. The plaintiffs examined one witness. His name is Om Prakash Chandak. He is the Director of some of the plaintiff companies. In questions Xn-45,55,56,57 in examination-in-chief he referred to a handwritten chart prepared by a Anjan Kumar Chakrabarty who was working with the plaintiffs as well as with Anglo India Jute Mills Co. Ltd. Mr.Chandak looked after the internal audit. Mr. Chandak deposed that Chakrabarty had compiled this statement on the basis of the books of accounts of the “relevant companies” (Xn-49). The books were no longer available (Xn-50). The chart/ charts were prepared between 1994 and 1995. Mr. Chandak also proved the correctness of the annual reports for the year ended 1987 – 1988. Now, let us see Mr. Chandak had to say in cross-examination. He said that at the material point of time, J.P. Goenka was the Chairman of Anglo India Jute Mills Company Limited. The plaintiffs were its associates (XXn-144). He admitted that the records were not available (XXn-149). Loans and advances were made by cheques which were encashed (XXn154). The loans and advances were admitted before the BIFR by Anglo India Jute Mills Company Limited (XXn-157). The type written statement of Mr. Chandak was prepared from his handwritten statement (XXn-172). Anglo India Jute Mills Company Limited did not dispute the loan before the BIFR but disputed the same in their balance sheet. Even the statement of account could not be produced from the Mercantile Bank or Hong Kong Bank as they do not maintain records of transaction which are eight years old or more (XXn-198). Anglo India Jute Mills Company Limited did not dispute the loan before the BIFR but disputed the same in their balance sheet. Even the statement of account could not be produced from the Mercantile Bank or Hong Kong Bank as they do not maintain records of transaction which are eight years old or more (XXn-198). The plaintiffs never had to prove the loan before the BIFR as it was always admitted by Anglo India Jute Mills Company Limited (XXn205). In my opinion, the plaintiffs have been able to adduce enough evidence to show that sums were lent and advanced by them to Anglo India Jute. The entire evidence adduced by the plaintiffs has to be gone into. Apart from the statements prepared by Mr. Chakrabarty at the instance of Mr. Chandak, the plaintiffs were able to show the clear admission made by Anglo India Jute in the record of proceedings before the BIFR, admission made in the balance sheet of Anglo India Jute for the financial year ending 31st March, 1991 and the declaration by the BIFR and AIFR in their respective orders that this money had in fact been lent and advanced by the plaintiffs to this company. I refuse to accept the submission that the above documents cannot be taken as admission because they are in favour of the persons making it. A corporation has to be taken as a separate entity different from its shareholders or directors. Even if the shareholding and control of the plaintiffs and Anglo India Jute were with the same persons, nevertheless an admission made by a company in its corporate character binds it. At any rate, the persons now in control of the defendant took over the company with full knowledge of the aforesaid liability in its balance sheet as adjudged by the Board and AAIFR. Now, they cannot turn around taking shelter under these technical matters. The points of defence which were taken before me were also taken before the AAIFR. For example, it was urged before that authority that the Board was compelling Anglo India Jute to declare in their balance sheet that the debt of the plaintiffs was not disputed. This question was gone into by the AAIFR which ruled that the debt could not be disputed. For example, it was urged before that authority that the Board was compelling Anglo India Jute to declare in their balance sheet that the debt of the plaintiffs was not disputed. This question was gone into by the AAIFR which ruled that the debt could not be disputed. The AAIFR directed the company to pay the amount tabulated in its order and not to show it as disputed, in the balance sheet. In the records of proceedings between the BIFR and AAIFR the debts which were adjudicated upon by the Board as due and payable to the plaintiffs were admitted. It was even argued before the AAIFR that the present management of the defendant had counter claims against the old promoters and that they should be allowed to set up the counter claims against the claim of the plaintiff. The AAIFR specifically ruled that the above debt of Rs.3,19,01,242 lakhs had to be shown by Anglo India Jute as a liability and that it should be paid to the plaintiffs. Whatever are sought to be set up as an issue or issues in these suits have already been raised before the Board and AAIFR and adjudicated upon by these bodies. These orders have become final by non-preferment of any appeal. It is true that the plaintiffs have not been able to produce any documents to support the transaction. But what has been produced by the plaintiffs have to be evaluated along with the oral evidence of Mr. Chandak. The plaintiffs have been able to prove from the records of proceeding before the BIFR and AAIFR, its orders, the balance sheet, the statement of accounts and so on that monies were lent and advanced by them to Anglo India Jute. These loans were not repaid by them. The Board and AAIFR declared this loan to be outstanding and payable by them. This is enough to fix the defendant with liability. It does not matter whether Mr. Chandak has been able to produce any document or not. There is a strong preponderance of evidence to suggest the grant of loans and advances by the plaintiffs to the defendant as claimed in the respective plaints. Now, I come to the last point raised on behalf of the defendant. It relates to issue estoppel or resjudicata. In my opinion, the point is without any merit. There is a strong preponderance of evidence to suggest the grant of loans and advances by the plaintiffs to the defendant as claimed in the respective plaints. Now, I come to the last point raised on behalf of the defendant. It relates to issue estoppel or resjudicata. In my opinion, the point is without any merit. The orders of the Board and AAIFR could be viewed to be declaratory in nature. The Board or the AAIFR unlike the High Court does not have the machinery to enforce its order. The only remedy available to the plaintiffs was filing a writ application, complaining of violation of the appellate authority’s order. Therefore the plaintiffs had no option but to seek a decree from this court in terms of those orders. In my opinion, the Board and the AAIFR had comprehensively decided the case in favour of the plaintiffs. Furthermore, the proceeding which were earlier filed in this court, were winding up applications. As we all know any findings in a winding up application are prima facie. On this prima facie finding the appeal court had remanded the matter to the trial court. After filing of the suit this court decided the Chapter-XIIIA application. That decision over turned by the appeal court by directing this court to rehear the matter again. Therefore I fail to see how this point of issue estoppel can arise at all. Neither do I understand how Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar and Others reported in 1964 SC 993, Forward Construction Co. and others v. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.), Andheri and others reported in AIR 1986 SC 391 and Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar and Another reported in 2005 (1) SCC 787 apply. The defendant has no defence whatsoever to claim of the plaintiffs. Each of the plaintiffs is entitled to a decree as follows: Suit No. & Cause Title Principal Amount Interest Decree CS No. 220 of 2008 Arindam Investments Private Limited Vs. AI Champdany Industries Limited Rs.19,00,000/- Interest from January 1, 2004 to September 30, 2008 Rs. 13,53,750/- Rs.32,53,750/- CS No. 221 of 2008 Cosmopolitan Investments Limited Vs. AI Champdany Industries Limited Rs.1,30,00,000/- Interest from January 1, 2004 to September 30, 2008 Rs.92,62,500/- Rs.2,22,62,500/- CS No. 222 of 2008 Disciplined Investments Ltd. Vs. AI Champdany Industries Ltd. Rs.8,41, 391/- Interest from January 1, 2004 to September 30, 2008 Rs.5,99,493/- Rs. 13,53,750/- Rs.32,53,750/- CS No. 221 of 2008 Cosmopolitan Investments Limited Vs. AI Champdany Industries Limited Rs.1,30,00,000/- Interest from January 1, 2004 to September 30, 2008 Rs.92,62,500/- Rs.2,22,62,500/- CS No. 222 of 2008 Disciplined Investments Ltd. Vs. AI Champdany Industries Ltd. Rs.8,41, 391/- Interest from January 1, 2004 to September 30, 2008 Rs.5,99,493/- Rs. 14,40,884/- CS No. 223 of 2008 Duncan International (India) Ltd. Vs. AI Champdany Industries Ltd. Rs.1,45,17,389/- Interest from January 1, 2004 to September 30, 2008 Rs.1,03,43,638/- Rs.2,48,61,027/- CS No. 224 of 2008 Haldia Investment Company Ltd. Vs. AI Champdany Industries Limited Rs.82,69,273/- Interest from January 1, 2004 to September 30, 2008 Rs.58,91,857/- Rs.1,41,61,130/- CS No. 225 of 2008 New India Investment Corporation Limited Vs. AI Champdany Industries Limited Rs.24,04,189/- Interest from January 1, 2004 to September 30, 2008 Rs.17,12,983/- Rs.41,17,172/- Each of the plaintiffs is entitled to simple interest on the above decretal sum @ 10% p.a. from 1st October, 2008 till the date of this decree and at the same rate from the date after the decree till the date of payment. Each of the suits is decreed accordingly. The department is directed to draw up and complete the decree expeditiously. Certified photocopy of this Judgment and order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities. Later: On the prayer of Mr. Saha, I order stay of execution of this decree till 30th November, 2015 to give an opportunity to his client to prefer an appeal therefrom and to obtain stay thereof.