Judgment 1. This Writ Petition has been filed seeking issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the entire records leading to the issue of Award No.5/94-95, dated 23.11.1994 on the file of the respondents and quash the same and direct the Tahsildar, Nagercoil, the 4th respondent herein to issue Patta in respect of the land in RS.3-12/5 in Nagercoil Village (Old S.No.1870-A) admeasuring an extent of 60 cents in favour of the petitioner. 2. According to the petitioner, the petitioner is the owner of the land in Survey No.RS.3-12/5 in Nagercoil Village (Old S.No.1870-A) admeasuring an extent of 60 cents by virtue of purchase under sale deed dated 31.12.1973 registered as Document No.18/1974. The vendor of the petitioner viz., Mrs.Pankajam had purchased the property as early as on 10.05.1971 under Document No.1756/71 from one Swaminathan Nadar. From the date of purchase, the petitioner had been in possession and enjoyment of the property and he has been the sole owner. According to him, in the year 1991 the property was sought to be acquired under Section 4(1) Notification dated 17.09.1991, declaration was made on 23.11.1992, publication was made in Thina Thoothu and Vettimalai on 23.11.1992, the substance published in the locality on 23.11.1992 and the award was passed on 24.11.1994. But his main contention is that neither the notice under Section 4(1) nor notice for 5(A) enquiry has been served on him. Whereas, notice was taken to the name of the petitioner's vendor's predecessor in title viz., Mr.Swaminathan Nadar. The said Swaminathan Nadar died even prior to the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and on the date of the notification itself the petitioner was the owner of the property. Therefore, no notification was issued on him. Therefore, the entire proceedings contemplated under the Act is per se illegal because he will be coming within the meaning of interested party under Section 5(A) of the Act. 3. Further, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that earlier the petitioner filed an application for grant of patta and also seeking for release of property which was not also considered. Since he was out of country, he was not aware of the proceedings. Earlier, he filed W.P.No.4354 of 2008 challenging Section 4 (1) notification dated 17.09.1991 and Section 6 declaration. Since he was out of country, he was not aware of the proceedings. Earlier, he filed W.P.No.4354 of 2008 challenging Section 4 (1) notification dated 17.09.1991 and Section 6 declaration. In that writ petition, the respondent filed counter stating that they have not taken possession of the petitioner's property and it is still with the petitioner. But, ultimately the Writ Petition was dismissed on 24.02.2012 only on the ground of latches. However, liberty was granted to the petitioner to seek for reconveyance of the land. Accordingly, he sent a letter on 24.04.2012 to the first respondent requesting to release the land and on the basis of the letter, a report was called from the Executive Engineer, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Tirunelveli. Even in that report, the Executive Engineer clearly stated that the petitioner's land has not been taken possession and the very scheme itself is not feasible and ultimately, the request made by the petitioner was rejected. 4. The main contention of the petitioner is that in the counter filed in the earlier Writ Petition, the main allegation was that the petitioner was a subsequent purchaser of the acquired land after the acquisition proceedings. But, according to the petitioner, he is the original owner right from the purchase viz., 31.12.1973 and his vendor who had purchased the land on 10.05.1971. Therefore, there is a fallacy on the enquiry conducted by the authority concerned and the counter filed by them. Above all those things, the petitioner came to understand about the new development in respect of the very adjoining land which is owned by one Kolammal and a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in W.A.No.3630 of 2004 by order dated 21.03.2011 had quashed the entire proceedings on two grounds viz., the proviso to Section 11(1) of the Land Acquisition Act has not been followed and no prior approval from the Government has been obtained and also earlier, the proceedings in respect of the other adjoining lands have already been quashed and the present set of facts is also identical. The dates and events and publications were similar. In view of the order passed in W.A.No.3630 of 2004 in respect of the very same adjoining land was quashed, the same would also apply to the facts of the present case. This, he came to know recently. The dates and events and publications were similar. In view of the order passed in W.A.No.3630 of 2004 in respect of the very same adjoining land was quashed, the same would also apply to the facts of the present case. This, he came to know recently. Therefore, the dismissal of the earlier writ petition which was only on the ground of latches cannot be a bar as per the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to consider the matter. Therefore, especially, in this case, when the petitioner is able to establish the very 4(1) notification was not served on him and coupled with the fact, the very scheme is almost given a goby. In fact, he also would contend that the department has even called back a compensation amount deposited by them. Further a new development has taken place. According to him, under Right to Information Act, he has received information from the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, dated 31.01.2014 stating that the land acquisition proceedings in respect of the petitioner's land itself has been cancelled. This vital factor has not been considered by the previous hearing or in the reference made by the petitioner. Therefore, he would only contend that when the award itself is passed without the prior approval of the Government and as per the judgment of the Division Bench which has been subsequently confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court also in respect of the acquisition proceeding challenged by the adjoining land owner. The new development has only taken place much later in the year 2007 and the Supreme Court rejected it only in the year 2008. Therefore, he would contend that the award passed on 23.11.1994 is in violation of Section 11 A of the Land Acquisition Act as the title and possession is still remain in the name of the petitioner the said fact is stated even in the counter. Therefore, the petitioner has filed this Writ Petition. 5. The fourth respondent has filed a counter clearly stating that the land is kept unutilized by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board due to the pendency of several Writ Petitions filed by some of the previous land owners against the land acquisition proceedings and for re-conveyance. Therefore, the petitioner has filed this Writ Petition. 5. The fourth respondent has filed a counter clearly stating that the land is kept unutilized by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board due to the pendency of several Writ Petitions filed by some of the previous land owners against the land acquisition proceedings and for re-conveyance. At the same time, they would also contend that among the acquired lands some of the undisputed portion of the land which was taken possession of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board were already allotted to the Special Task Force personnels. In the counter, they have also stated that the petitioner is a subsequent purchaser after the acquisition proceedings were initiated. They would contend that originally, the property was purchased by his vendor in the year 1971 and neither the petitioner nor his previous vendor has filed any objections. The transfer of patta was not considered only due to the delay and the land acquisition was done in accordance with the norms. Further, they would specifically state that in so far as the petitioner's land in T.S.No.3-12/5 is concerned, possession was not taken by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board because of the pendency of cases. They have sent notice only to the persons as per the revenue records at that point of time. 5(A) enquiry notice was served on the land owners and interested parties found in the revenue records and due enquiry was conducted. The Government have approved the draft declaration under Section 6 after over ruling the objection on 23.11.1992. The Draft Declaration was published in Government gazette on 23.11.1992 and the same was published in the locality in local dailies on 24.11.1992. After approval of the declaration under Section 6, the Government have issued order for acquisition under Section 7 was issued on 05.01.1993 the same was published on 15.02.1993. Notice to the interested persons were also served and after 5(A) enquiry, award was finally passed on 23.11.1994 and the award was properly intimated to the persons concerned. They would also mainly point out that the dismissal of earlier Writ Petition in W.P.(MD)No.4354 of 2008 on the ground of latches, is a bar for the present Writ Petition. In the counter, they would also state that the implementation of the scheme is kept in abeyance. Therefore, the question of re-conveyance does not arise. Therefore, the petitioner's request of reconveyance also was rejected. In the counter, they would also state that the implementation of the scheme is kept in abeyance. Therefore, the question of re-conveyance does not arise. Therefore, the petitioner's request of reconveyance also was rejected. They would also state that the remaining lands will be taken up for housing scheme after the final disposal of the pending litigations. 6. Heard Mr.P.Senthil Pandian, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr.S.Chandrasekar, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents 1, 2 and 4 as also Mr.K.Balasubramani, learned counsel for the third respondent/Tamil Nadu Housing Board. 7. The short points arise for consideration in this Writ Petition are: (i) The petitioner who is the original owner of the land to whom admittedly the land acquisition notice proceedings were not served. Whether he is entitled to seek for remedy before this Court? ii) In view of the order passed by the Division Bench in respect of identically placed person especially the adjoining land owner whose land were acquired in respect of the very same project and when the notification itself has been quashed, whether it will enure to the benefit of this petitioner also? 8. The writ petitioner is the owner of the property. He had purchased the said property in the year 1973 from the original owner viz., Mrs.M.Pankajam. Even in the counter filed by the Tahsildar, they have clearly stated that the vendor's name only finds place in the records. Admittedly, notice has been sent only to the vendor. The counter states that the petitioner being a subsequent purchaser after the notification, he will not be entitled to any other benefits nor that he can claim any right. But, admittedly, the petitioner has purchased the land in the year 1973 much before the acquisition proceedings started in the year 1991. Therefore, per se it is correct that the petitioner has not been informed anything about the acquisition proceedings. The next important point to be considered in this case is that the petitioner's adjoining land is owned by one Kolammal who had filed a writ petition in W.P.No.21093 of 1994 and the same was dismissed on the ground that award has been passed as early as on 23.11.1994 and the acquisition proceedings cannot be challenged after passing of the award. Therefore, the petitioner preferred an appeal in W.A.No.3630 of 2004 and a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court by order dated 21.03.2007 took into consideration that when the award was passed on the last date of prescribed period of limitation viz., on 23.11.1992 and there was no prior approval by the authority concerned. Even a fresh award at this juncture by the authority concerned is not permissible in accordance with law and hence, the entire acquisition proceedings initiated under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act are liable to be quashed. 9. The Division Bench clearly pointed out that as per the first proviso to Section 11(A) no award shall be made by the Collector without the prior approval of the Government or of such officer as prescribed when it is not the case of the respondents that at any point of time, the Government permitted the Collector to make award without prior approval, particularly, in the acquisition proceedings in question. Further, it is also stated that as per G.O.Ms.No.1027, Revenue Department, dated 25.09.1992, the Government delegated the power to approve both the pre-valuation statement and award for payment of compensation not exceeding Rs.20 lakhs with the Collector/Additional District Collector-District Revenue Officers. As per the said Government Order, the pre-valuation statements and awards for payment of compensation in excess of Rs.20 lakhs shall be approved by the Commissioner for Land Acquisition. After getting records they found out that there was proceedings on 23.11.1994 therein instructions were issued by the District Revenue Officer to the Land Acquisition Officer to pass an award and requested to send proposal for ratification along with copy of the award. In that context, they have referred to a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in State of U.P. v. Rajiv Gupta ((1994) 6 SCC 686) wherein it has been held as follows: "6. Section 11 postulates of conducting an enquiry and making the award by the Collector. The first proviso envisages that "no award shall be made by the Collector under sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf". Section 11 postulates of conducting an enquiry and making the award by the Collector. The first proviso envisages that "no award shall be made by the Collector under sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf". It is common knowledge that exercising the power under the first proviso, the appropriate Government made rules or statutory orders or instructions whatever be the nomenclature, they have make an award up to a particular pecuniary limit without prior approval either of the appropriate Government or an officer authorised by the approval of the State Governments in that behalf. If the award exceeds the limit, prior award made in violation thereof, renders the award non est and void as it hinges upon the jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Collector or Officer. No doubt, Mr.Markandeya is right that the State had not produced before us rules or orders issued under the first proviso to Section 11 that the Land Acquisition Officer shall not make an award exceeding one crore of rupees without prior approval of the Commissioner, namely, Commissioner, Board of Revenue. But nonetheless, there is a statutory inhibition by first proviso to Section 11 that the prior approval either of the appropriate Government or of an officer which the appropriate Government authorises in that behalf, is mandatory for making an award. It is a condition precedent". Following the abovesaid Supreme Court judgment and other judgments the Division Bench of this Court has held as follows: "21. The above statutory provisions viz., sections 11 and 11-A of the Act as well as the judicial pronouncements make it clear that (i) the award under section 11 of the Act has to be passed within a period of two years from the date of last mode of publication of declaration under section 6 of the Act; (ii) prior approval by the Government or the authorised authority is mandatory while passing award; and (iii) passing the award beyond the prescribed period and without the prior approval of the Government or prescribed authority vitiates the entire acquisition proceedings. 22. Mr. 22. Mr. S.Kasikumar, learned counsel appearing for the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, by drawing our attention to various decisions of Apex Court as well as this Court, vehemently contended that the present writ petition, which was filed after passing of the award, is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. We are conscious of the fact that the Supreme Court as well as this Court in many decisions held that no writ petition should be entertained after passing of the award under the Land Acquisition Act, [vide: (i) AIR 2000 SC 671 (Municipal Council, Ahmednagar vs. Shah Hyder Beig); (ii) (2002) 7 SCC 712 (Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur vs. Bheru Lal); (iii) (2005) 3 CTC 1 (Ramalingam vs. State of Tamil Nadu rep. By Secretary to the Industries Department, Chennai 9); (iv) (2005) 3 CTC 666 (The Secretary, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Nandanam, Madras vs. The State of Tamil Nadu rep. By the Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban Development Department, Chennai 9.); and (v) (2005) 3 CTC 691 (S. Harshavardhan vs. State of Tamil Nadu) 23. However, when there is a defect in passing of the award it would be possible for the aggrieved person to point out the same only after passing of the award. The general principle that no writ petition would be entertained after passing of the award is inapplicable when the aggrieved person points out that the award is defective, particularly when the mandatory condition of prior approval as per First Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act was not satisfied and the award was not passed within the prescribed period of two years from the date of last mode of publication of 6 declaration. No doubt, the said challenge should be made within a reasonable time and if there is enormous delay, the same cannot be entertained. As pointed out earlier, in the case on hand, the proceedings of the District Revenue Officer dated 23.11.1994 clearly show that prior approval was not obtained before passing of award on 23.11.1994 and in fact, the District Revenue Officer permitted the Land Acquisition Officer to pass award and get it ratified later, which is not permissible as prior approval is mandatory. As rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, it is not an empty formality and it is the duty of the Government or the authorised authority to verify all relevant details commencing from notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act and ending with fixation of compensation with reference to various aspects. 24. In the light of the above discussion, we accept the submission of the learned senior counsel for the appellant and hold that inasmuch as the award passed on 23.11.1994 without prior approval of the Government or the authorised authority is bad and in view of the fact that the same was passed on the last day of prescribed period of limitation, the entire acquisition proceedings stand lapsed. Even a fresh award at this juncture by the Land Acquisition Officer is not permissible in accordance with law and hence, the entire acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed. 10. Further, in regard to compliance of prior approval by the State Government or its authorised authority, they have also relied on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in N.Boman Behram v. State of Mysore [ 1974 (2) SCC 316 ] and Yusufbhai Noormohamed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat [ (1991) 4 SCC 531 ] . 11. They have also relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court viz., 1. Paramaraj v. State of Tamil Nadu [ 1999 (3) CTC 715 ]. 2. Ramanujam, N.D. v. The State of Tamil Nadu [ 2006 (1) CTC 51 ]. 12. Therefore, the Division Bench of this Court came to a conclusion in so far as the proceedings initiated in respect of the very same notification for the adjoining land, the acquisition itself is wrong mainly on the ground that there was no prior approval as contemplated under proviso to Section 11(A) of the Act. The main argument was that the same will also apply to the petitioner herein. Now, let us compare the dates and other relevant details regarding the acquisition notice. In fact, in the affidavit itself the petitioner has extracted as follows: Land acquisition proceedings in respect of Kolammal's land: [Kolammal (deceased by LRs.) and Anr. v. State of T.N. and Ors. (AIR 2007 MADRAS 258)] 17.09.1991 - Section 4(1) Notification 23.11.1992 - Declaration under Section 6 in G.O.Ms.No.787 Housing and Urban Development Department. 23.11.1992 - Publication in Thina Thoothu, Vettimalai. v. State of T.N. and Ors. (AIR 2007 MADRAS 258)] 17.09.1991 - Section 4(1) Notification 23.11.1992 - Declaration under Section 6 in G.O.Ms.No.787 Housing and Urban Development Department. 23.11.1992 - Publication in Thina Thoothu, Vettimalai. 23.11.1992 - Substance Publication in Locality 24.11.1994 - Award Land acquisition proceedings in respect of petitioner's land: 17.09.1991 - Section 4(1) Notification GO Ms.1208 Housing and Urban Development Department. 23.11.1992 - Declaration under Section 6 in G.O.Ms.No.786 Housing and Urban Development Department. 23.11.1992 - Publication in Thina Thoothu, Vettimalai. 23.11.1992 - Substance Publication in Locality 24.11.1994 - Award No.5/94-95 The above said facts are not disputed by the authority concerned. Therefore, both the cases are identical and the facts in both the case are one and the same. Therefore, the argument of the petitioner that the present case will come very well within the ambit of the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the Writ Appeal which is subsequently confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, is clearly correct. Furthermore, he brought to the notice of the Court that as against the order passed in the Writ Appeal, the Housing Board took the matter in appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) No.7353 of 2008 which was dismissed at the admission stage itself due to the delay. Therefore, the acquisition proceedings in so far as the notification have become final as the acquisition proceedings has been set aside. Therefore, definitely, the petitioner, who is the owner of the adjoining land whose land also acquired in violation of proviso to Section 11(A) of the Act, would enure to the benefit of the petitioner. When there is no prior approval and if the award is not passed within the prescribed period of two years, the very notification itself is lapsed. In this connection, the learned counsel also would rely upon the judgments which is given after the Division Bench judgment viz., Rajinder Singh Bhatti v. State of Haryana [ (2009) 11 SCC 480 ] wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court elaborately discussed about the proviso to Section 11(A) of the Act and categorically stated as follows: 24.From the perusal of Section 11, particularly the first proviso thereto, it is apparent that the approval of the appropriate Government to the award proposed by the Collector is mandatory. In other words, it is imperative for the Collector to seek previous approval of the appropriate Government to the award that he proposes to make unless the case is covered by Section 11(2). If an award under Section 11 is not made by the Collector within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse under Section 11-A. 27. In the context of Section 48, the word “withdraw” is indicative of the voluntary and conscious decision of the Government for withdrawal from the acquisition; statutory lapse under Section 11-A is entirely different. The object of Section 11-A is to arrest delay in making award. An obligation is cast on the Collector under Section 11-A to make the award within the time prescribed therein failing which statutory consequence follows, namely, acquisition proceedings lapse automatically. 29. As noticed above, the Land Acquisition Collector moved the Government seeking its approval for the proposed award. This was imperative as per the first proviso to Section 11. The Government considered the matter and did not approve the proposed award. When no such approval was granted by the Government, the Collector could not have made the award and in fact he did not. As a result thereof, the acquisition proceedings lapsed. The lapse of acquisition proceedings in the circumstances under Section 11-A cannot and would not amount to withdrawal from acquisition by the Government under Section 48(1). We answer Point (1) in the negative. Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically stated that statutory lapse under Section 11 (A) is a special feature. When it is proved that there was no such approval granted by Government, the Collector could not have made the award itself and hence, the acquisition proceedings gets lapsed. Therefore, in a lapsed award future transaction cannot be taken in so far as another person viz., the petitioner who is also placed under similar circumstances especially when his land has not been taken possession of. This principle would equally apply to the facts of this case. 13. Further, in Kunwar Pal Singh v. State of U.P. [ (2007) 5 SCC 85 ] the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “17. This principle would equally apply to the facts of this case. 13. Further, in Kunwar Pal Singh v. State of U.P. [ (2007) 5 SCC 85 ] the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “17. The provisions of Section 11-A are intended to benefit the landowner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the date of the declaration under Section 6. In ordinary course, therefore, when the Government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration under Section 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A, the proceedings will lapse. The period of two years referred to in Section 11-A shall be computed by counting from the last of the publication dates, as per the prescribed modes of publication. 18. In the present cases, as noted above, the appellants and other landholders filed civil miscellaneous writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in the year 1985 whereby and whereunder they have challenged combined notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act issued by the State Government. The High Court vide order dated 14-1-1988 partly allowed the writ petitions. It appears from the record that MDA and some claimants feeling aggrieved, filed separate sets of appeals against the judgment dated 14-1-1988 in this Court. This Court allowed Civil Appeal No. 1828 of 1985 filed by MDA and dismissed the appeals of the claimants. By judgment dated 19-9-19961, this Court set aside the order of the High Court and directed the Collector to make awards within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of the order of this Court. Finally, the Collector made an award on 18-9-1998 which came to be challenged by the appellants before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad inter alia on the ground that the award was made beyond the period as envisaged under Section 11-A of the Act. The High Court, as noted above, has held: “The Collector in the award (Annexure P-4) specifically refers 13-8-1985 as the date of publication of notification under Section 6. The High Court, as noted above, has held: “The Collector in the award (Annexure P-4) specifically refers 13-8-1985 as the date of publication of notification under Section 6. Accepting this as the last date of publication and the fact that stay was operating since 2-8-1985 till 19-9-1996, we hold that the award passed on 18-9-1998 was within the limitation as envisaged by Section 11-A of the Act and as such the proceedings initiated for acquisition do not lapse.” 19. In our view, the order of the High Court is not legal and justified. The Division Bench seems to have committed a patent error, despite the decisions of this Court in Eugenio Misquita v. State of Goa (which does not appear to have been brought to its notice). While applying the ratio in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Markant Singh this Court in Eugenio Misquita2 observed at SCC p. 52, para 9 as under: “[The publication under Section 6(2) of the Act] is for a different purpose, inter alia, for reckoning the limitation prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act. This construction is supported by the language employed in Section 6(2) of the Act. In particular, the word ‘hereinafter’ used in Section 6(2) will amply prove that the last of the series of the publication referred to under Section 6(2) is relevant for the purposes coming thereafter, namely, for making award under Section 11-A. The language employed in second proviso to Section 6(1) also supports this construction.” 28. In the light of the settled principles of law in Eugenio Misquita, GM, Deptt. of Telecommunications and Bihar State Housing Board5 the entire acquisition proceedings for acquiring the land of the appellants culminating in the award made on 18-9-1998 after the period contemplated in Section 11-A of the Act shall lapse completely.” 14. In Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat and another [ (1991) 4 SCC 531 ] the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly stated that acquisition will lapse if it is not passed within the period of two years time. 15. Therefore, from the plethora of decisions, it is very clear that compliance of proviso to Section 11(A) of the Act is a mandatory one. In this case, in the very same award was passed in violation of proviso to Section 11(A) of the Act. 15. Therefore, from the plethora of decisions, it is very clear that compliance of proviso to Section 11(A) of the Act is a mandatory one. In this case, in the very same award was passed in violation of proviso to Section 11(A) of the Act. Therefore, the decision rendered in the Writ Appeal filed by the adjoining land owner which was confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court would definitely apply to this case also as the dates and events in both the case are same especially when the admitted case is that the possession has not been taken from the petitioner till date. 16. Apart from this, certain other vital factors also has to be considered in this case viz., in so far as the petitioner's land is concerned, it stands in a different footing from others. It is admitted in the counter filed in this case and also in the counter filed in the earlier writ petition that the possession of the land has not been taken till date. There is no dispute over the same. In fact, in the counter, it has been specifically stated that in the above said acquired lands, the land comprised in T.S.No.N-3/12.5 alone was not taken into possession by the TNHB because of the pendency of case. But with regard to the others in the above mentioned survey numbers possession was taken and allotted to the STF personnel. Further, it is stated that the Tamil Nadu Housing Board who is the beneficial body has not acquired nor taken possession of the property. The petitioner has also sought information under the Right to Information Act from the Housing Board. In the reply given by the Housing Board in respect of the very same notification, No Objection Certificate has already been issued to one Ayyamperumal Pillai and C.Rajam. Further, the Managing Director, Housing Board himself by his D.O.Letter No.L.A.(SPL) 5/29430/09, dated 20.08.2009 sought for refund of the amount from the Sub Court which has been deposited for acquisition of the land on the ground that the acquisition proceedings were quashed by various Courts. Further, in the reply given under the Right to Information Act vide letter dated 28.04.2011 it has been stated that the very land which has been acquired under the proceedings has been stated to be cancelled. Further, in the reply given under the Right to Information Act vide letter dated 28.04.2011 it has been stated that the very land which has been acquired under the proceedings has been stated to be cancelled. The answer given to the question is extracted as under: “TAMIL” Therefore, the very acquisition proceedings in so far as the petitioner's land is concerned, has been dropped or cancelled as it is lapsed. Further, in the report of the Executive Engineer, dated 29.05.2012, it is stated that the land in S.F.No.N-3/12-5 alone has not taken possession and the balance lands alone were allotted to the Special Task Force Personnels. It is also admitted in that report that the land is found with grown up thorns and bushes and fenced with barbed wire surrounding the land. In fact, in that report is was recommended to release the land from acquisition. Contrary to all those things, by letter dated 12.09.2012, the request for No Objection Certificate and for grant of patta was rejected. Therefore, these factual matrix would clearly indicate that the petitioner's land even though originally it was acquired by 4(1) notification, till date the possession has not been taken and the respondents themselves have admitted that the very scheme has not been carried out. 18. In these background, now we will have to see the impact of the earlier Writ Petition. The earlier Writ Petition was filed on the ground that no notice was issued to him. He was not aware of the acquisition proceeding as he was out of country. But, all these points were raised in the earlier Writ Petition but that was not considered only on the ground of latches. At that point of time, the petitioner was not aware of the ruling passed by this Court in respect of the very same notification issued for acquisition of the adjoining land. The Division Bench has clearly pointed out that once proviso to Section 11(A) is not followed, the entire proceedings lapses. Therefore, this is totally a different cause of action. Lapse can be pointed out at any point of time. 19. The Division Bench has clearly pointed out that once proviso to Section 11(A) is not followed, the entire proceedings lapses. Therefore, this is totally a different cause of action. Lapse can be pointed out at any point of time. 19. Further, the learned counsel for the petitioner would also rely upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Laxman Pandya v. State of U.P. [ (2011) 14 SCC 94 wherein it has been categorically held that dismissal of the Writ Petition challenging the acquisition proceedings cannot be a bar in view of the special circumstances that the very acquisition has been lapsed because award was not made within 2 years of coming into force of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. In that case also earlier they filed a writ petition challenging the very acquisition. In that case, the petitioner filed a writ petition and the same was dismissed for default on 10.09.1990 and another writ petition was dismissed on 18.11.1997. But, notwithstanding the dismissal of the writ petitions, the respondents neither took possession of the acquired land nor award was passed within the prescribed period under Section 11(A) of the Act. Subsequently, in the year 2000, they filed another writ petition on the ground that their possession is sought to be disturbed. In that writ petition, they have prayed for a declaration that the acquisition proceedings will be deemed to be lapsed because award was not passed within two years of coming into force of the Land Acquisition Act. It has been specifically stated in another Writ Petition that in spite of the writ petition having been dismissed as early as on 16.11.1997, no proceeding were undertaken by the respondents even thereafter to either take possession of the land or deliver the award in respect of the proceeding under acquisition since period has crossed more than three years, the entire proceedings have lapsed. It was challenged by the Government. Earlier writ petitions were dismissed on different dates. In the earlier writ petitions dispossession was stayed. Therefore, they could not take possession. But, they would also contend that they had no knowledge of the dismissal of the Writ Petition. It was challenged by the Government. Earlier writ petitions were dismissed on different dates. In the earlier writ petitions dispossession was stayed. Therefore, they could not take possession. But, they would also contend that they had no knowledge of the dismissal of the Writ Petition. In that case the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: 13.The moot question which arises for consideration in these appeals is whether the High Court was justified in refusing to quash the acquisition proceedings despite the fact that the award was not made within the period prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act. That section reads as under: “11-A. Period within which an award shall be made.—(1) The Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within the period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation.—In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.” 18.As a sequel to the above discussion, we hold that the respondents knew about the dismissal of the writ petitions filed by the appellants in 1990 and 1997 respectively and yet they failed to take possession of the acquired land and pass an award within the period prescribed under Section 11-A. 19. We are also of the view that dismissal of CMWP No. 1769 of 1982 and CMWP No. 14885 of 1982 should not have affected adjudication of the writ petitions filed in 2000 because the two sets of writ petitions were based on different causes. In the first batch of writ petitions, the appellants had questioned the notification issued under Section 4(1) read with Section 17 and the declaration issued under Section 6(1) read with Section 17. In the first batch of writ petitions, the appellants had questioned the notification issued under Section 4(1) read with Section 17 and the declaration issued under Section 6(1) read with Section 17. In those petitions, they neither had the opportunity nor could they claim that the acquisition will be deemed to have lapsed due to non-compliance with Section 11-A because by the time the writ petitions were filed, Section 11-A had not even been enacted. Thus, dismissal of the writ petitions filed in 1982 for default or otherwise did not operate as a bar to the filing of fresh writ petitions in 2000 for grant of a declaration that the acquisition proceedings will be deemed to have lapsed due to non-passing of an award within the period prescribed under Section 11-A. Once the writ petitions filed in 1982 were dismissed, the stay order passed by the High Court stood automatically vacated and there was no impediment in the passing of award, which the competent authority failed to do for more than ten years in the first case and more than three years in the second case. The possession of the acquired land also continued with the appellants till May 2000 when attempts were made to dispossess them. Therefore, the conclusion recorded by the High Court that the land stood vested in the State is clearly erroneous. 20. Therefore, the earlier Writ Petitions which have been dismissed only on the ground of latches cannot be a bar in view of the specific order passed by the Division Bench which was confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the very notification itself has lapsed in respect of the adjoining land owner would also be enure the benefit to the petitioner. In any view of the matter, in a similar circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has passed order holding that dismissal of the earlier writ petitions cannot be a ground when it is a question of entire proceedings has been lapsed which was not considered in the earlier writ petition. When the two sets of different facts pleaded, definitely, the prayer in the writ petition as sought for can be granted. When the two sets of different facts pleaded, definitely, the prayer in the writ petition as sought for can be granted. Therefore, in view of the acquisition of the land itself has lapsed as per the Division Bench judgment which was confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Award No.5/94-95, dated 23.11.1997 is quashed and consequently, the petitioner is also entitled to get patta in respect of his land. 21. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.