JUDGMENT 1. - This petition has been filed challenging the order dated 2-4-2014 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal Kota (hereinafter 'the Appellate Rent Tribunal') allowing the appeal filed by the respondent-non-applicant-tenant (hereinafter 'the tenant') and remanding the matter to the Rent Tribunal Kota (hereinafter 'the Tribunal'). Also under challenge is the order dated 30-9-2013 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal allowing tenant's application under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC. 2. A perusal of the order dated 30-9-2013 indicates that while exercising power for reasons purportedly analogous to grounds under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC, the Appellate Rent Tribunal has overlooked its raison d' etre. Order 41, Rule 27 CPC, inter alia provides that a party to an appeal shall not ordinarily be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court except where the court from whose decree the appeal has been preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within its knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced before the decree appealed against was passed. Similarly when the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other like substantial cause it can allow additional evidence. Sub-rule 2 of Rule 27 Order 41 CPC incorporates a safeguard in it that wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, it “shall record the reasons for admission of such evidence”. It is thus evident that the admission of additional evidence at the stage of the appeal is an exception to the rule, and unless conditions set out in Order 41, Rule 27 CPC or analogous thereto are satisfied, no such evidence can be admitted. The power of the Appellate Court to admit additional evidence are thus circumscribed and not at large to be exercised at its ipse dixit. Proprio vigore for the Appellate Rent Tribunal exercising summary appellate jurisdiction. The power of the Appellate Court to admit additional evidence are thus circumscribed and not at large to be exercised at its ipse dixit. Proprio vigore for the Appellate Rent Tribunal exercising summary appellate jurisdiction. This court cannot countenance a situation where the Appellate Rent Tribunals can be set free to admit additional evidence without any limitation, recklessly allow additional evidence in the course of an appeal and consequently seriously set back the object of the legislature encapsulated in Section 19(8) of the 2001 Act which provides that Appeals against the orders of Rent Tribunal be disposed of within 180 days of Service on the opposite party. 3. The counsel for the resp-tenant (hereinafter 'the tenant') argued obviously as an after thought, with the tenant himself invoking the provisions of Order 41, Rule 27 CPC before the Rent Tribunal, that Order 41, Rule 27 CPC does not attract to the proceedings under the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (hereinafter 'the 2001 Act'). That is indeed so but, yet the Appellate Rent Tribunal can in any event draw on the content of the said provision analogously on the grounds of equity, justice and good conscience when an application to submit additional evidence is moved before it. 4. A perusal of the order dated 30-9-2013 by the Appellate Rent Tribunal allowing the tenant's application purporting as one under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC, indicates that in respect of a petition for eviction filed in the year 2006 which was allowed by the Rent Tribunal on 24-4-2008, an application under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC for bringing on record additional evidence was moved on 1-10-2010. The only ground in support of the application was that for the duration of proceedings before the Rent Tribunal the agreement of dealership dated 1-2-1991 (sought to be produced as additional evidence) was not readily available with the tenant, and further that in the course of cross examination before the Rent Tribunal the landlord had admitted that the petrol pump over the tenanted premises was being run since 1954 and since 1991 in the name of M/s. Kewal Prakash and Company - a partnership firm in which the landlord seeking eviction on the lease deed dated 10-1-1985 having been determined by efflux of time, had only a 50% share, with her two sons having 25% shares each. In my considered opinion, these two aspects, which prevailed with the Appellate Rent Tribunal do not even remotely establish that the tenant had exercised due diligence in leading “evidence” well within its control during the proceedings before the Rent Tribunal. The dealership agreement dated 1-2-1991, which was in the estimation of the tenant relevant for determination of the question as to whether the lease agreement between the parties executed on 10-1-1985 had been determined by efflux of time with the passage of contracted 20 years, ought to have been filed before the Rent Tribunal. Non filing was quite apparently for reasons of lethargy and negligence wholly contra distinguished from the pre condition of “due diligence” required for allowing additional evidence at the appellate stage. Further the Appellate Rent Tribunal while allowing the application under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC has not recorded its reasons. Aside of aforesaid, it is quite apparent that the Appellate Rent Tribunal has confused the lease deed executed on 10-1-1985 between the landlord and tenant with the dealership agreement dated 1-2-1991 between M/s. Kewal Prakash & Company and HPCL, in recording that the landlord had terminated the lease deed dated 1-2-1991, when in fact it was not at all the case set up by the landlord. The case of the landlord for the tenant's eviction set up before the Rent Tribunal was on the ground of determination of the lease deed dated 10-1-1985 with reference to Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act by efflux of time. 5. Mr. Anuroop Singhi, counsel for the landlord, has rightly pointed out that for a landlord-tenant dispute in which the eviction of the tenant under the provisions of the 2001 Act was sought, the dealership agreement dated 1-2-1991 between the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and M/s. Kewal Prakash & Company was wholly irrelevant and used only as a spanner in the wheel by the tenant by resort to Order 41, Rule 27 CPC with the sole intent of creating confusion and delaying the final adjudication of the eviction petition filed by the landlord in 2006. 6. Ms. Kasliwal, appearing for the tenant, submits that the dealership agreement dated 1-2-1991 was relevant for the adjudication of the eviction petition laid by the landlord with reference to the lease agreement dated 10-1-1985. 6. Ms. Kasliwal, appearing for the tenant, submits that the dealership agreement dated 1-2-1991 was relevant for the adjudication of the eviction petition laid by the landlord with reference to the lease agreement dated 10-1-1985. She submits that the landlord was a partner with 50% shares in M/s. Kewal Prakash & Company and two other partners both her sons, had the remainder 25% share each, the firm had a contractual relationship with the tenant HPCL. She submits that the Appellate Rent Tribunal, in its discretion and wisdom has concluded that the dealership agreement dated 1-2-1991 was relevant for the adjudication of the landlord-tenant dispute even with reference the lease deed dated 10-1-1985 and no interference by this court with the said order is required in the exercise of its superintending jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Constitution of India. 7. In my considered opinion, the additional evidence allowed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal by its order dated 30-9-2013 taking on record dealership agreement dated 1-2-1991, is wholly unsustainable as from the material on record it was not established by the respondent tenant that it had exercised due diligence in exhibiting or seeking to exhibit the document in issue before the Rent Tribunal or had been prevented from so doing despite all due diligence. The reasons for the tenant not filing the dealership agreement dated 1-2-1991 in evidence before the Rent Tribunal were absolutely vague and even casual. As indicated herein above, the eviction petition was laid by the landlord in the year 2006 and was decided by the Rent Tribunal on 24-4-2008. Thereafter on the mere say of the tenant before the Appellate Rent Tribunal that the said dealership agreement dated 1-2-1991 was relevant for the dispute in issue, but could not be filed for reasons for its earlier non-availability, it was taken on record as additional evidence. Counsel for the landlord has rightly submitted that the said dealership agreement dated 1-2-1991 was readily available with the tenant or in any event should have been so, being the tenant's own document, and bringing on record the same at the stage of appeal in the year 2013, was a mere strategy to confuse the issue and delay the final determination of the eviction proceedings. Consequently the very legal foundation for taking on record the dealership agreement dated 1-2-1991 as additional evidence in the dispute between the landlord-tenant arising out of lease deed dated 10-1-1985 was absent. Further even otherwise the dealership agreement dated 1-2-1991 is not relevant to the eviction petition as laid by the landlord on the ground that the lease deed dated 10-1-1985 had been determined on lapsing of the 20 years lease period in the aggregate as provided for, by efflux of time. It is also important to note that the impugned order dated 30-9-2013 does not even set out prima facie reasons as to how the dealership agreement dated 1-2-1991 between HPCL and M/s. Kewal Prakash & Co., where the landlord was a partner was relevant in a landlord tenant dispute in an eviction petition founded on the lease deed dated 10-1-1985 having expired. 8. I also find no force in the submission of counsel for the tenant that the writ petition challenging the order dated 30-9-2013 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal Kota is not maintainable for the reason that it states to have been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance placed by her on the judgments in case of Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, [ (2010)8 SCC 329 ] and Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, [2015 SCC Online SC 170] is inapposite as the said judgments on the point underscored by counsel are not applicable to the facts of the present case. A perusal of the writ petition indicates that, even though it purports to be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as indicated in the subject matter, yet the prayer clause of the petition indicates that a challenge has been made to order dated 30-9-2013 whereby the dealership agreement dated 1-2-1991 has been ordered to be taken on record as additional evidence and also to the order dated 2-4-2014 whereby the matter has been remanded to the Rent Tribunal. Evidently the petitioner has not invoked the original jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but its superintending and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Further this court, in the exercise of its powers, can also treat the petition to be one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India where warranted in the facts of a given case. Further this court, in the exercise of its powers, can also treat the petition to be one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India where warranted in the facts of a given case. It is so in the instant case. 9. For reasons of the foregoing discussion, I would set aside the order dated 30-9-2013 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal. It is so directed and the order stands set aside. 10. As far as the order dated 2-4-2014 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal is concerned, whereby the matter has been remanded to the Rent Tribunal for determination of issue No.1 relevant to validity of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 I am of the considered view that in there no occasion to interfere therewith to the extent of remand only in view of provisions of Order 41, Rule 25 CPC, which provide that the Appellate court may frame an issue and refer the same for trial to the subordinate court whose decree is appealed from in the event of situations referred in Order 41, Rule 25 CPC aforesaid obtaining. 11. From the pleadings on record it is evident that in the written statement the respondent tenant had categorically stated that even though notice dated 22-12-2005 purporting to be under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 had been received, yet it was not a valid notice as it was addressed to the Chief Manager Udaipur, a post which did not at all exist in the HPCL. Mr. Singhi, counsel for the landlord has however submitted that notice having been received in the office of the respondent tenant, the mere fact of it having been addressed in the name of a non-existent officer, cannot render it ineffective or invalid. It has been further submitted that in cases of determination of lease by sheer efflux of time under clause (a) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 even a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Act of 1882, is not required. And the filing of an eviction petition suffices. Support for the contention is sought to be found in the judgment of this court in case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, [RLW 2011(3) Raj. 2284] . 12. And the filing of an eviction petition suffices. Support for the contention is sought to be found in the judgment of this court in case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, [RLW 2011(3) Raj. 2284] . 12. Having heard counsel for the parties, I am of the considered view that on the basis of the tenant's defence, for whatever its worth, an issue as to the validity of the notice dated 22-12-2005, under Section 106 of the Act of 1882 was made out and the Rent Tribunal not having framed the issue and decided it, it was in the discretion of the Appellate Rent Tribunal to have the said issue decided in accordance with law by the Rent Tribunal and make a remand for the purpose. In this view of the matter, I am not inclined to interfere with the remand order dated 2-4-2014 to that extent, but the observations in the said order relating to the tenant's application under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC are set aside for the reasons recorded for setting aside the order dated 30-9-2013 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal detailed herein above. 13. To sum up, the impugned order dated 30-9-2013 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal Kota taking on record additional evidence under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC is quashed and set aside. The writ petition against the order dated 2-4-2014 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal Kota remanding the matter to the Rent Tribunal Kota is dismissed in the manner stated herein above. 14. However taking into consideration that the eviction petition was laid in the year 2006, the Rent Tribunal Kota is directed that following the remand of the matter pursuant to order dated 2-4-2014 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal Kota, the petition before it be expeditiously decided and in any event not later than three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order. Adjournments if any whenever sought shall be entertained only on an application in writing and allowed for the following day or two when absolutely necessary on good reason found by the Tribunal. 15. The writ petition stands disposed of accordingly.Petition disposed of. *******