JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. Since the issues arising for my consideration in all the captioned writ applications are more or less the same they were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. The petitioners were appointed to the post of Accountant, Deputy Accountant and Sub-Accountant in the finance Department of the State Government, pursuant to the advertisement dated 12th November, 2011, issued by the respondent No. 3. All the petitioners were appointed on the same day, i.e. 26th September, 2012 and worked on there respective posts, up to the passing of the impugned order dated 11th April, 2014. The services of the petitioners were abruptly terminated by passing the impugned order, on the ground that such action was being taken pursuant to the two orders passed by this Court, in two writ petitions filed by other persons. 3. The first order referred to in the impugned order is dated 08.08.2013, passed in Special Civil Application No. 12500/2013, wherein the Court has disposed of the petition, without entering into the merits of the case, by directing the respondents to decide the representations of the petitioners therein. The representations made by the petitioners in that petition pertained to certain errors in the key-answers in the examination conducted by the respondents, pursuant to the advertisement. 4. In the second petition, being Special Civil Application No. 14312/2013, an order was passed on 20.12.2013, disposing of the petition, with a clarification and observation that the respondent authority may endeavour to complete the process of revising the entire results and modifying the select-list accordingly, as expeditiously as possible and preferably within eight weeks of the passing of the said order. In that petition, the petitioners therein had prayed for the operation of the waiting-list dated 25.09.2012. 5. It may be noted that these petitions pertained to the pre-appointment stage, whereas the petitioners had already been appointed on 26.09.2012, and were not parties to either of the petitions. In the above mentioned orders of this Court, there is no reference to the termination of the services of the petitioners, as is being given to understand in the impugned order. 6. In the above mentioned orders of this Court, there is no reference to the termination of the services of the petitioners, as is being given to understand in the impugned order. 6. The second reason for the termination of the services of the petitioners as mentioned in the impugned order is that certain errors were discovered in the key answers to the question papers of the examination undertaken pursuant to the advertisement. The key-answers were revised and a fresh select-list was prepared on the basis of the revised key-answers, after the appointments of the petitioners. As the merit of the petitioners in the revised select-list was affected due to the modification of the select-list, it was decided that their services be terminated. 7. The chronology of events as under would make the picture very clear: "(a) 09.09.2012 Examination of Accountant, Deputy Accountant, was held between 10.30 a.m. to 12.00 a.m. and 3.00 p.m. to 5.00 p.m. respectively. (b) 15.09.2012 Examination for the post of Sub Accountant was conducted from 10.30 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. Number of the candidates who appeared (1) Accountant Group-I 19969 (2) Deputy Accountant Group-II 17148 (3) Sub Accountant Group-III 22844 (c) September 2012 Merit list prepared (d) September to October 2012 Appointments given to selected candidates. (e). October 2012 Answer keys posted on the website of the Finance Department. (f) Between Nov. 2012 to Sept. 2013 Various representations with regard to errors in the several answer keys posted on the website. (g) 10.01.2013 Meeting of the Joint Selection Committee convened and it was decided to seek the opinions of the paper setters. (h). 18.04.2013, 20.04.2013 & 21.05.2013 The opinions of the coordinators from the expert paper setters along with the revised answer keys was received through the coordinators (i) 05.08.2013 Joint Selection committee decided to convey to the Gujarat Technological University to prepare a revised list as per the corrected answer keys furnished by the coordinators. (j) 13.09.2013 GTU was directed to prepare the revised results. (k) 20.09.2013 GTU prepared the results as per the corrected answer keys and fresh merit list and waiting list was prepared by the Joint Selection Committee. Merit list was prepared of 89 candidates for various categories for General, SEBC, SC, ST and waiting list of 47 candidates for Accountant. (j) 13.09.2013 GTU was directed to prepare the revised results. (k) 20.09.2013 GTU prepared the results as per the corrected answer keys and fresh merit list and waiting list was prepared by the Joint Selection Committee. Merit list was prepared of 89 candidates for various categories for General, SEBC, SC, ST and waiting list of 47 candidates for Accountant. For Deputy Accountant Merit list of 100 selected candidates and a wait list of 72 candidates and For Sub Accountant merit list of 450 candidates and waiting list of 456 candidates was prepared. Particulars Accountant Deputy Accountant Sub Accountant Number of post as per Advertisement. 89 100 450 Number of candidates in Merit List 89 100 450 Number of candidates in waiting List 47 72 456 (l) 20.12.2013 This Court (Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.M. Thaker) was pleased to pass an order in SCA No. 14312 of 2013 seeking operation of the waiting list "learned AGP submitted that the process is in progress and the endeavour will be made to complete the process expeditiously. In view of the said reply by the respondent and submissions by learned advocate for the petitioners and learned AGP, present petition is disposed of with clarification and observation that the respondent authority may endeavour to complete the process undertaken by it as expeditiously as possible and preferably within about 8 weeks. It is further clarified that if the petitioners feel aggrieved upon declaration of revised result and preparation of select list or wait list, then present order shall not stand in way of the petition in taking out appropriate proceedings." (m) 10.01.2014 The Joint Selection Committee decided to cancel the earlier merit list and instructed Director of Accounts and Treasury to terminate the service of all the candidates. (n) 11.04.2014 Director of Accounts and Treasury terminated all selected employees. (o) 15.05.2014 Revised merit list, along with list of wait listed candidates as well as raised answer along with the opinions of the paper setters was published on the website of the Finance Department. (p) 24.04.2014 In Special Civil Application No. 6044 of 2014, challenging orders of termination, this Court (Coram: Hon'ble Smt. Justice Abhilasha Kumari) vide order dated 24.04.2014 directed 9 seats be kept vacant for the petitioners therein. (q) 22.07.2014 This Court (Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.R. Udhwani) permitted the State Government to operate the waiting list. 8. Mr. (p) 24.04.2014 In Special Civil Application No. 6044 of 2014, challenging orders of termination, this Court (Coram: Hon'ble Smt. Justice Abhilasha Kumari) vide order dated 24.04.2014 directed 9 seats be kept vacant for the petitioners therein. (q) 22.07.2014 This Court (Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.R. Udhwani) permitted the State Government to operate the waiting list. 8. Mr. Y.N. Oza, the learned senior advocate appearing for the petitioners vehemently submitted that the impugned action on the part of the State Government after a period of about one and half years from the date of there appointment is arbitrary and unreasonable. He submitted that after a period of about one and half years and that to without any basis for the same the key-answers could not have been revised and a fresh select list also could not have been prepared on the basis of the revised key-answers. He submitted that on account of the correction in the key-answers the merit of the petitioners in the revised select list got affected as a result there services were terminated. 9. Mr. Oza submitted that no where in the orders passed in the two writ-applications referred to above it has been mentioned that the services of the petitioners be terminated. It was argued that such statement in the impugned order is nothing but a deliberate misconstruction of the orders passed by this Court to cover up the actions of the respondents. 10. Mr. Oza submitted that for no fault of the petitioners there services have been terminated on the premise that the key-answers were subsequently found to be incorrect after their appointment, or that fresh key-answers were prepared and the select-list revised. 11. Mr. Oza submitted that the services of the petitioner deserve to be protected on the basis of the doctrine of Legitimate Expectation. Mr. 11. Mr. Oza submitted that the services of the petitioner deserve to be protected on the basis of the doctrine of Legitimate Expectation. Mr. Oza submitted that it is true that a candidate who finds a place in the select list as a candidate selected for the appointment to a civil post does not acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed in such post in the absence of any specific rule entitling him to such appointment but when a candidate is already appointed and starts working on the post then in such circumstances he would legitimately expect that his appointment is valid and his services could be terminated only in the event if the probationary period is not found to be satisfactory or on the grounds of any misconduct. 12. Mr. Oza also submitted that before passing the impugned order of termination, no show cause notice was issued to the petitioners and no opportunity of hearing was given. It was submitted that the petitioners being Government servants, are entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 13. Mr. Oza also submitted that the respondents have not been able to specifically explain the errors in the key-answers. He submitted that if there are two probable answers to a particular question and two answers are found in two different text books by two different authors then the candidate is justified in relying on either of the answer. He submitted that the revised key-answers were not published on the website of the respondents so as to make it known to the public at large the defect if any, by comparing both the key-answers. He submitted that the action of the respondents lack in bona fide. 14. Mr. Oza submitted that some of the petitioners were gainfully employed and had resigned from such employment as they were appointed by the State Government. He submitted that as on today many petitioners have rendered themselves unemployed. 15. Mr. Oza gave a breakup of the petitioners being affected as under: (i) three have been placed in the waiting list; (ii) eleven have lost their job; (iii) four petitioners appointed as accountants have been now made sub-accountants; (iv) the seniority of 33 petitioners have got affected. 16. 15. Mr. Oza gave a breakup of the petitioners being affected as under: (i) three have been placed in the waiting list; (ii) eleven have lost their job; (iii) four petitioners appointed as accountants have been now made sub-accountants; (iv) the seniority of 33 petitioners have got affected. 16. In such circumstances referred to above, it is prayed that the impugned order dated 11th April, 2014 deserves to be quashed and the petitioners should be once again reinstated to their particular posts on which they were appointed with the continuity in service and consequential benefits. 17. These application has been vehemently opposed by Ms. Manisha Lavkumar Shah, the learned Government Pleader. Ms. Shah submitted that the decision of the State Government to revise the select list on the basis of the revised/corrected key-answers could not be termed as arbitrary or unreasonable in any manner. Ms. Shah submitted that the errors in the key-answers were very apparent and having come to the notice of the State Government, it could not have overlooked the same. In such circumstances, it became imperative for the State Government to rectify the errors by preparing fresh key-answers. In the revised merit list that was prepared, some of the petitioners could not find place and therefore, their services had to be terminated. Some of the petitioners who were appointed as the accountant had to be placed as sub accountants. 18. Ms. Shah submitted that the entire exercise was under taken after seeking the opinion of the expert committee constituted by the State Government. Ms. Shah submitted that normally, the court should be slow to enter into the controversy which relates to the examinations or tests held for the appointment to a particular post. Ms. Shah submitted that the Court may not grant relief to the petitioners at the cost of the meritorious candidates whose merit has been ignored because of improper setting of papers or incorrect answers declared in the key-answers. According to Ms. Shah the petitioners secured marks by giving wrong answers and if that be so then the same could not have been ignored by the State Government. 19. She submitted that after a detailed review of the entire process the key-answers to certain questions were corrected and the merit was accordingly redetermined. According to Ms. According to Ms. Shah the petitioners secured marks by giving wrong answers and if that be so then the same could not have been ignored by the State Government. 19. She submitted that after a detailed review of the entire process the key-answers to certain questions were corrected and the merit was accordingly redetermined. According to Ms. Shah, may be in adopting such a process some of the petitioners might have gone down in the merit list as a result, there services were terminated and some of the petitioners were placed on the post of the sub-Accountant from Accountant. 20. She submitted that there being no merit in any of the writ applications the same be rejected. 21. In the course of the hearing of the writ-applications I thought fit to raise few questions for the Government to answer. 22. The questions which were raised by me were as under: (a) whether any Committee was constituted to frame the questions? If yes, who were the members of the Committee and who were the paper setters and coordinators? who had framed the questions? The answer to the above question has been given by filing an affidavit duly affirmed by the Deputy Secretary, Finance Department as under: "Answer. It is submitted that the then Chairman had confidentially entrusted the work of preparing questions and submitting the answer keys to the experts - paper setters through coordinators. I say and submit that there was a channel with respect to the questions and the answer keys which were called for. The experts - paper setters, who framed the questions and created question banks along with the answer keys, submitted the same to the coordinators. Thereafter, the coordinators forwarded the same to the Chairman. I say and submit that in all 3 coordinators were entrusted with the task of obtaining the question banks and the answer keys from different experts-paper setters. The questions which were obtained from the paper setters were in turn forwarded to the Chairman by the coordinators. The Chairman subsequently randomly selected the question papers for the examinations. It is submitted that except the coordinators, nobody else was in contact with the experts - paper setters. The questions which were obtained from the paper setters were in turn forwarded to the Chairman by the coordinators. The Chairman subsequently randomly selected the question papers for the examinations. It is submitted that except the coordinators, nobody else was in contact with the experts - paper setters. I say and submit that in order to maintain the secrecy and in order to see that the entire process is done confidentially so tat there is no scope of any leakage of the questions or question papers, this process was undertaken. I say and submit that since the names of coordinators and paper setters are usually not disclosed as a matter of practice in examinations conducted by recruitment agencies and other such departments also do not disclose the details, the names of the Chairman, the Coordinators as well as Experts - Paper Setters are therefore not annexed along with the present affidavit. However, since the authorities are duty bound to apprise the Hon'ble Court with the details, the deponent therefore requests that the same shall be produced in a seal cover at the time of hearing of the petition for the perusal of the Hon'ble Court." (b) who were the experts who again looked into the issue as regards the correctness of the key-answers? "Answer. I say and submit that on the receipt of the representations of the candidates with regards to the errors in the answer keys, the opinion of the very same experts - paper setters who had given the questions as well as the answer keys, was sought for through the coordinators who in turn forwarded the same to the Chairman." (c) who had prepared the first answer-keys? "Answer. I say and submit that the first answer keys were prepared by the experts - paper setters who had given question bank along with the answer keys." (d) who were the persons who had framed the questions and provided the answer keys? "Answer. I say and submit that as reiterated herein above, the details of the names of the experts-paper setters cannot be given by the authorities in order to maintain the secrecy and as a part of practice adopted in various examinations wherein the names of the experts-paper setters are usually not disclosed. "Answer. I say and submit that as reiterated herein above, the details of the names of the experts-paper setters cannot be given by the authorities in order to maintain the secrecy and as a part of practice adopted in various examinations wherein the names of the experts-paper setters are usually not disclosed. However, the deponent requests that the same shall be produced in a sealed cover for the kind perusal of the Hon'ble Court at the time of hearing. The intention behind not disclosing the names of the experts and the coordinators is not with respect to any mala fide intention on the part of the authorities but, it is only with a view to avoid any malpractice in future as the entire process is highly confidential and the authorities cannot take any risk with respect to the disclosure of the names of such experts-paper setters who would be also setting question papers in future for other examinations." (e) what was the basis of correcting the answer keys? "Answer. I say and submit that the Joint Selection Committee received representations with respect to the errors in the answer keys in respect to some questions. Therefore, the Joint Selection Committee obtained opinions from the experts - paper setters who had furnished the questions as well as answer keys to form the question banks through the coordinators to determine the correctness of the answer keys. I say and submit that the opinion of the experts - paper setters was received by the coordinator who subsequently forwarded the same to the Chairman of the Joint Selection Committee. Subsequently, it was placed before the Joint Selection Committee for its perusal and further decision." (f) On what materials the answer-keys were corrected? "Answer. I say and submit that the experts-paper setters who had framed the questions had also provided the answer keys to the respective questions. I say and submit that it is not that as if the authorities have taken questions from one set of experts - paper setters and obtained answers from another set of experts - paper setters. The experts - paper setters who had framed the questions had also forwarded the answer keys along with the questions. 23. On behalf of the State Government an additional affidavit has been filed duly affirmed by the Deputy Secretary, Finance Department, inter alia, stating as under:" "3. The experts - paper setters who had framed the questions had also forwarded the answer keys along with the questions. 23. On behalf of the State Government an additional affidavit has been filed duly affirmed by the Deputy Secretary, Finance Department, inter alia, stating as under:" "3. I respectfully say and submit that chronology with respect to the events are enumerated as follows: 3.1. 12.08.2011: General Administration Department vide Resolution No: Dt: 12/08/2011 exempted recruitment of class III post through Gujarat Subordinate Selection Board and Authorised Finance Department to recruit the class III post under Director of Account and Treasuries as one time measure. 3.2. 13.09.2011: Finance Department vide Resolution No:TSM/202011/4616/Gh Date: 13/09/2011 constituted a committee consisting of following members to carry out recruitment procedure including advertisement in news papers, invite applications from the candidates, to prepare merit list, decide centres of examinations, to prepare question papers, to conduct exam, to scrutinise answer papers and recommend candidates for appointments: (1) Additional Secretary (Budget) Chairman (2) Joint Secretary (Pension) Member (3) Director, Account and Treasury Member (4) Director, Pension and Provident Fund Member (5) Additional Commissioner, Commercial Tax Member 3.3. 12.11.2011: Advertisement for the post of Accountant, Deputy Accountant and Sub Accountant issue in leading news papers viz. Gujarat Samachar, Sandesh and Divyabhaskar and the same was also advertised on the website of the Finance Department. 3.4 Pursuant to the advertisement dated 12.11.2011, online applications were invited by the Joint Selection Committee, Finance Department through internet on its website ojas.guj.nic.in. With respect to the advertisement issued by the department, following are the details of the candidates who had applied and appeared for different posts: Post Candidates applied Candidates appeared Accountant Group-I 42958 19969 Deputy Accountant Group-II 35415 17148 Sub Accountant Group-III 44777 22844 3.5. 09.12.2011 Vide finance department letter dated 09.12.2011 Registrar G.T.U. was intimated to conduct the said exam. 3.6. 09.09.2012 The examination for the recruitment of Accountant, Deputy Accountant was taken by Gujarat Technology University on behalf of the department. The timings was 10.30 a.m. to 12.00 a.m. and the timings for the examination of Deputy Accountant was that from 3.30 p.m. to 5.30 p.m.. 3.7. 16.09.2012: Examination for the post of Sub Accountant was conducted and the timings of the same were from 10.30 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. was conducted. 3.8. Results: Results of the examination were declared in September 2012 and merit list was prepared. 3.9. 3.7. 16.09.2012: Examination for the post of Sub Accountant was conducted and the timings of the same were from 10.30 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. was conducted. 3.8. Results: Results of the examination were declared in September 2012 and merit list was prepared. 3.9. September-October, 2012 Appointments were given to the selected candidates. Details of the appointments given for different post are as follows: Accountant Group- I 87 Deputy Accountant Group- II 93 Sub Accountant Group- III 373 The petitioners were granted appointments to different post. 3.10 October, 2012 In order to have transparency and for convenience for all the candidates who had appeared in the examination, the actual answer keys were provided on the website of the Finance Department. Some of the candidates had also requested for providing answer keys. 3.11. Pursuant to the publication of answer keys on the website of the Finance Department, several representations were received. Approximately, 15 candidates made representations alleging that there were errors in some of the answer keys posted on the website. 3.12. 10.01.2013 Since the representation with respect to errors in the answer keys were received, the representation were placed before the Joint Selection Committee. In the meeting of the committee, it was decided to take opinion of the papers setters. A copy of the minutes of the meeting are annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-R-II. 3.13. On behalf of Chairman of the Joint Selection Committee, a communication was forwarded confidentially to the coordinator of the examiner-paper setters seeking their opinion. The opinion of the coordinator of papers setters-examiners were received on 18.04.2013, 20.04.2013 and 21.05.2013. A copy of the said communications are annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-R-III (Colly.). 3.14. 05.08.2014 Meeting of the Joint Selection Committee took place. In the said meeting, the Joint Selection Committee decided to convey to Gujarat Technology University (GTU) to prepare a revised result as per the corrected answer keys given by the coordinator of papers setters. 3.15. 13.09.2013 A communication was addressed to the GTU to prepare revised results. A copy of the communication is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-R-IV. 3.16. 20.09.2013 GTU prepared the result and corrected answer keys and forwarded the same to Chairman of Joint Selection Committee on 20.09.2013. On receipt of the revised result as per revised answer keys, fresh merit list and waiting list were prepared by Joint Selection Committee. 3.17. A copy of the communication is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-R-IV. 3.16. 20.09.2013 GTU prepared the result and corrected answer keys and forwarded the same to Chairman of Joint Selection Committee on 20.09.2013. On receipt of the revised result as per revised answer keys, fresh merit list and waiting list were prepared by Joint Selection Committee. 3.17. 10.01.2014 Joint Selection Committee decided to cancel the earlier merit list and prepared new merit list as per the revised result and also instructed Director of Account and Treasuries to terminate the service of all candidates. A copy of the minutes of the meeting is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-R-V. 3.18. 17.02.2014 Joint Selection Committee decided to give appointment to the candidates as per new merit list. 3.19. 11.04.2014 Director of Account and Treasuries, Gandhinagar terminated all selected employees including petitioners. 3.20. 17.04.2014-22.04.2014 New merit list of the candidates Group I, II and III was published in the office of the Director of Account and Treasuries. A copy of the new merit list is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-R-VI. 3.21. 24.04.2014 Order passed by this Hon'ble Court in Special Civil No. 6044 of 2014 whereby way of interim order, permitted to operate merit list after keeping certain post vacant for the petitioners. 3.22. 15.05.2014 Revised merit list along with the waiting list of Group I to II, as well as reply to the queries raised by candidates with opinion of paper setters was published on the website of Finance Department. 3.23 28.05.2014 The selected candidates as per new merit list for the post of Accountant Group-I, Deputy Accountant Group-II were given appointments. 3.24. 29.05.2014 The selected candidates as per new merit list for the post of Sub Accountant Group-III were given appointments. 3.25 22.07.2014 This Hon'ble Court had vide order dated 22.07.2014 permitted to operate the waiting list. Pursuant to direction of the Hon'ble Court, waiting list of second revised result has been operated and candidates are given appointment. 3.26. It is submitted that the candidates whose names were appearing in the merit list were called for resuming their duties. However, due to some reasons any candidate did not remain present, as much as three notice were given to such candidates. It is submitted that after the select list was exhausted, waiting was subsequently operated. Accordingly, out of 50 petitioners 36 petitioners are already appointed and have joined the duty. However, due to some reasons any candidate did not remain present, as much as three notice were given to such candidates. It is submitted that after the select list was exhausted, waiting was subsequently operated. Accordingly, out of 50 petitioners 36 petitioners are already appointed and have joined the duty. Last appointment order for Account Group I and Deputy Accountant Group II is issued on 15/04/2015, and Sub Accountant Group III is issued on 9/2/2015. A copy of the chart indicating the details of the positions petitioner for different post as per the earlier list and revised list is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-R-VII I say and submit that out of total 13 petitions, 3 petitioners are in waiting list. It is further stated that so far as 11 petitioners out of Special Civil Application No. 6044 of 2014, 6413 of 2014 and Special Civil Application No. 6889 of 2014 is concerned, they did not even find any place in waiting list even as per revised results. A copy of chart indicating the details is annexed herewith as annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-VIII. 4. I respectfully say and submit that after uploading revised result, answer keys and merit lists and waiting lists on website of the Finance Department, some candidates vide their representations pointed out that there are errors in revised answer keys and requested to again revise the results. As the answer keys were revised after seeking an opinion of the paper-setters and appointments were already given to the merit lists candidates, the State Government has decided not to accept the demand of the candidates. 5. I say and submit that one Candidate for the post of Deputy Accountant, Shri Jitendra K. Solanki has filed a petition being Special Civil Application No. 9439/2014 before this Court, demanding revision of answer keys. Wherein detailed affidavit in reply has been filed by the Finance Department. The said petition is pending for the adjudication before this Hon'ble Court. 6. I further say that as reiterated earlier the Joint Selection Committee sought an opinion of the Paper-setters. The paper-setters opined that answer keys to the following questions were found to be erroneous and/were required to be rectified: Vernacular Matter 24. The said petition is pending for the adjudication before this Hon'ble Court. 6. I further say that as reiterated earlier the Joint Selection Committee sought an opinion of the Paper-setters. The paper-setters opined that answer keys to the following questions were found to be erroneous and/were required to be rectified: Vernacular Matter 24. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the State Government was justified in correcting the key-answers after a period of about one and half years from the date of the appointments and prepare a fresh merit list based on the same. 25. Normally, the courts will be slow to enter into a controversy which relates to examinations or tests held for recruitment to a particular post. In the matter of examination, the examination authorities must be trusted to hold the examinations in a fair and proper manner and interference by the court must be in the rarest of rare cases where the court is satisfied that the examination has been held in such a manner that it has resulted in arbitrary results so that the examination or the test held and the result declared has not resulted in the test of merit but has left much to the luck or chance of the candidates concerned. There are, however, exceptions to this rule and in exceptional circumstances courts have interfered to grant relief to the meritorious candidates whose merit has been ignored because of improper setting of papers or incorrect answers declared in the key-answer. I may refer to two decisions of the Supreme Court on this question. In the case reported in AIR 1983 SC 1230 Kanpur University v. Samir Gupta, the question that arose for determination has been succinctly posed in the first part of the judgment of the learned Chief Justice as follows :" "If a paper setter commits an error while indicating the correct answer to a question set by Him, can the students who answered that question correctly be failed for the reason that though their answer is correct, it does not tally with the answer sent by the paper setter to the University as the correct answer?" 26. While considering the question, it was observed that none can accuse the teacher of not knowing the correct answer to the question set by him. But occasionally not enough care is taken by the teachers to set questions which are free from ambiguity and to supply key answers which are correct beyond reasonable controversy. The court then considered the questions and the suggested answers and came to the conclusion that some of the answers given were demonstrably wrong. The Court observed that the key answer should be deemed to be correct unless it is proved to be wrong and that it should not be held to be wrong by a process of reasoning or by a process of rationalisation. It must be clearly demonstrated to be wrong, that is to say, it must be such as no reasonable body of man well versed in a particular subject would regard as correct. If there was a case of doubt, one would unquestionably prefer the key answer. But if the matter is beyond the realm of doubt it would be unfair to penalise the students for not giving an answer which accords with the key answer, that is to say, with an answer which is demonstrated to be wrong. 27. Having found that some of the answers were demonstrably incorrect, the court considered the question as to what relief could be granted to the concerned candidates. The High Court in that case had found that the respondents had not been awarded marks for the questions correctly answered by them though those answers were not in accordance with the answers given by the paper setter in the key answer which were demonstrated to be wrong. The Supreme Court directed that they should be granted those marks and the answer books be reassessed. It was not disputed in that case that if the answer books were reassessed the respondents would be entitled to be admitted to the M.B.B.S. course. In that view of the matter, the Supreme Court confirmed the directions given by the High Court in regard to the reassessment of the particular question and the admission of the respondents to the M.B.B.S. course. 28. Similar situation arose in the case reported in AIR 1984 SC 1402 , Abhijit Sen v. State of U.P. This was also a case where the key answer to one of the questions was demonstrated to be wrong. 28. Similar situation arose in the case reported in AIR 1984 SC 1402 , Abhijit Sen v. State of U.P. This was also a case where the key answer to one of the questions was demonstrated to be wrong. The court, after noticing the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kanpur University case (supra), observed as follows : "Suffice it to say that this Court has expressed therein a clear and categorical view that if the ''key answer' (i.e. the answer which the paper-setter has supplied to the University as the correct answer and which has been fed into the computer) is shown to be demonstrably wrong, that is to say, such as no reasonable body of men well versed in the particular subject would regard it as correct and if the answer given by a student is correct if regard be had to acknowledged textbooks or books which the students were expected to read and consult before appearing for the test it would be unfair to penalise the student for not giving an answer which accords with the 'key-answer' that is to say with an answer which is demonstrated to be wrong." After applying these principles, the court, while considering the question as to the relief to be granted, held that in a situation where both the answers, namely, one given by the candidate concerned as well as the key-answer supplied by the paper setter were found to be wrong with reference to the correct answer as determined by the court, no relief could be granted to the concerned candidate. Applying that principle one of the appellants before the Supreme Court was denied any relief because even though the answer in the key-answer supplied by the paper setter was found to be wrong, since the answer given by the appellant was also wrong. He, therefore, could not get any relief. Another student, however, who had given the correct answer which was not in accordance with the answer given in the key-answer, was granted relief because the key answer was found to be demonstrably incorrect." 29. He, therefore, could not get any relief. Another student, however, who had given the correct answer which was not in accordance with the answer given in the key-answer, was granted relief because the key answer was found to be demonstrably incorrect." 29. The principle that emerges from these two decisions is that, if the key answer is shown to be demonstrably wrong and the answer given by the student concerned is correct, the student concerned should not be penalised for not giving an answer which accords with the key-answer, that is to say, with an answer which is demonstrated to be wrong. 30. The case in hand, is somewhat peculiar. The answers given by the petitioners initially were declared to be correct but latter on it was realised that there was a mistake in the key-answers and therefore, the same was corrected. As a result, the earlier answers given by the petitioner to a particular question were found to be incorrect and accordingly the marks were deducted. This affected their merit and some of the petitioners had to go home after putting in about one and half years of service. Some of the petitioners have been placed in the waiting list and few have been demoted. 31. I should also not overlook the fact that ultimately it is the team of experts in the subjects that looked into the matter and reached to the conclusion regarding the key-answers. The question therefore is whether the State Government should have overlooked the same without disturbing the appointments or they were justified in effecting the necessary corrections and revising the select list. It comes to this that although on account of the correction in the key-answers the petitioners might have been affected yet at the same time it is possible that some of the candidates would get benefited with the correction in the key-answers. The action of the State Government may appear to be quite harsh for the petitioners but at the same time the correction was also very much necessary and justified in the overall view of the matter. It is very unfortunate that such a mistake occurred and that to when the key-answers were prepared by a team of experts. Ordinarily, this should not happen because it would affect the career of a candidate to a great extent. It is very unfortunate that such a mistake occurred and that to when the key-answers were prepared by a team of experts. Ordinarily, this should not happen because it would affect the career of a candidate to a great extent. A meritorious candidate at times may have to suffer whereas a candidate although gives a wrong answer would get the marks for the same. 32. Therefore, should I condemn the action of the State Government as a whole in rectifying its mistake and more particularly when the mistake has been rectified with the help of the expert bodies. 33. At least one thing is very clear that I should not on my own undertake the exercise to determine which of the answers is correct. I do not possess the expertise in the subject of accounts. Therefore, all these questions should be left best for the experts to take care of. Even the petitioners have not been able to adduce any cogent, convincing or reliable materials to make good their case that the answers they had given to the questions were correct and revision or correction in the answer keys was not necessary or warranted. 34. It is now well settled by various decisions of the Supreme Court that the findings of the expert bodies in technical and scientific matters would not ordinarily be interfered with by courts in the exercise of their power under Article 226 of the Constitution or by the Supreme Court under Article 136 or 32 of the Constitution. For this proposition, reliance can be placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Systopic Laboratories (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Dr. Prem Gupta & Ors. (1994) Suppl.(1) SCC 160. Paragraphs 19 and 20 of this decision clearly give the answer on the question whether the findings of expert body in technical and scientific matters can be interfered with by the Court either under Article 226 or under Article 32 or 136 of the Constitution. 35. The role of statutory expert bodies on education and role of Courts are well defined by a simple rule. If it is a question of educational policy or an issue involving academic matter, the Court keep their hands off. If any provision of law has to be interpreted, applied or enforced, with reference to or connection with education, the courts will step in. In Dr. If it is a question of educational policy or an issue involving academic matter, the Court keep their hands off. If any provision of law has to be interpreted, applied or enforced, with reference to or connection with education, the courts will step in. In Dr. J.P. Kulshreshta v. Chancellor, Allahabad University, reported in (1980) 3 SCC 418 , the Supreme Court observed: "Judges must not rush in where even educationists fear to tread.. While there is no absolute bar, it is a rule of procedure that courts should hesitate to dislodge decisions of academic bodies." 36. In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, reported in (1984) 4 SCC 27 the Supreme Court has reiterated:(Para 29) ".... the Court should be extremely reluctant to substitute its own views as to what is wise, prudent and proper in relation to academic matters in preference to those formulated by professional men possessing technical expertise and rich experience of actual day-today working of educational institutions and the departments controlling them." 37. In the case of Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission v. Mukesh Thakur and another, (2010) 6 SCC 759 , the Supreme Court held as under: "It was not permissible for the High Court to examine the question papers and answer sheets itself, particularly, when the Commission had assessed the inter se merit of the candidates. If there was a discrepancy in framing the question or evaluation of the answer, it could be for all the candidates appearing for the examination and not for Respondent 1 only. It is a matter of chance that the High Court was examining the answer sheets relating to Law. Had it been other subjects like Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics, we are unable to understand as to whether such a course could have been adopted by the High Court. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that such a course was not permissible to the High Court." 38. Had it been other subjects like Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics, we are unable to understand as to whether such a course could have been adopted by the High Court. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that such a course was not permissible to the High Court." 38. A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, in the case of Rashid Suhail Siddiqui v. State of M.P. has explained the law as under: "Before entering into the examination of the aforesaid questions and its correctness or otherwise, it would be proper to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kanpur University v. Samir Gupta, AIR 1983 SC 1230 , wherein in similar circumstances, the Supreme Court stated that the key answer should be assumed to be correct unless it is proved to be wrong and that it should not be held to be wrong by an inferential process of reasoning or by a process of rationalisation. It must be clearly demonstrated to be wrong, that is to say, it must be such as no reasonable body of men well versed in the particular subject would regard as correct. It is also stated that if it is found that the question is wrong on the basis of text books and authorities, it would be penalising the students for not giving art answer which accords with the key answer which is demonstrated to be wrong. It has been further observed by the Supreme Court as under: "Secondly, a system should be devised by the State Government for moderating the key answers furnished by the paper setters. Thirdly, if English questions have to be translated into Hindi, it is not enough to appoint an expert in the Hindi language as a translator. The translator must know the meaning of the scientific terminology and the art of translation. Fourthly, in a system of 'Multiple Choice Objective type test' care must be taken to see that questions having an ambiguous import are not set in the papers.." Still more guidance can be obtained from Abhijit Sen v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 SC 1402 , wherein it has been held that the answer given by the student should be found to be correct as determined by the Court. Merely because both the answers, namely, the one given by the student as well as the key-answer, were found to be wrong with reference to the correct answer as determined by the Court, the student cannot succeed Further, we may also refer to the decision of this Court, in Anjali Saxena v. Chairman, P.E.B. 1990 MPLJ 81, wherein it has been held where the key answer is correct and some other answer is also correct, the key answer should be accepted. For the said purpose, we may also refer to another decision of this Court in Ku Monica Singhai v. State of M.P., M.P. No. 2576 of 1992." 39. In the above referred judgment of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the Bench further held as under: "Q. No. 21In which of the following is Vitamin B1 found? Answers : (A) egg (B)Milk (C)Meat (D)Yeast KEY ANSWER D The argument of the petitioner in that all the answers ABCD contained Vitamin B. He has relied on General Studies Manual issued by U.P.S.C. Civil Services Preliminary Examinations, 1991. As against this, the learned Additional Advocate General has brought to our notice the statement contained in Year Book 1991, Competition Success Review Series at page 430, which reads: "Vitamin B1 complex is found in yeast, green vegetables, cereals, etc...... The argument of the petitioners is that all the four answers would be correct. On the other hand, the learned Additional Advocate General submits that what is required to be seen is which is the nearest to the key answer, that is to day, yeast contains the highest proportion of Vitamin B1. Reliance is placed on judgment of this Court reported in Anjali v. Chairman, P.E.B., 1990 MPLJ Page 80, wherein it has been held that: "It may be that the answer ticked as correct by them may not be wholly wrong or may even be closely correct to the key answer, but then, as we have pointed out above, unless the key answer is demonstrated to be 'wrong', the key answer should be accepted as the correct answer." In the said view of the matter, in the instant case, the key answer is taken to be correct and there is no infirmity in the same." 40. In the over all view of the matter I do not find any palpable illegality or arbitrariness in what was done by the State Government. 41. Let me now deal with the argument canvassed on behalf of the petitioners as regards the doctrine of legitimate expectation. 42. Let me consider whether the petitioners are entitled to any relief solely on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. 43. Legitimate in legal parlance means that which is lawful, legally recognised by law or according to law Expectation means the act or the instance of expecting or looking forward something expected or hoped for probability of an event and expectation is most often relatable to one prospect. In Halsburys Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume-I(I) 151 legitimate expectations finds mention of the following : "A person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way of an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice. The existence of a legitimate expectation may have a number of different consequences; it may give locus standi to seek leave to apply for judicial review; it may mean that the authority ought not to act so as to defeat the expectation without some overriding reason of public policy to justify its doing so; or it may mean that, if the authority proposes to defeat persons legitimate expectation, it must afford him an opportunity to make representations on the matter. The Courts also distinguish, for example in licensing cases, between original applications, applications to renew and revocations; a party who has been granted a licence may have a legitimate expectation that it will be renewed unless there is some good reason not do so, and may therefore be entitled to greater procedural protection than a mere applicant for grant." 44. The Courts also distinguish, for example in licensing cases, between original applications, applications to renew and revocations; a party who has been granted a licence may have a legitimate expectation that it will be renewed unless there is some good reason not do so, and may therefore be entitled to greater procedural protection than a mere applicant for grant." 44. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, AIR 1994 SC 988 has pointed out that the concept of legitimate expectation first stepped into the English Law in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, (1969) 2 Ch 149 , wherein it was observed that an alien who had been given leave to enter the United Kingdom for a limited period had a legitimate expectation of being allowed to stay for the permitted time and if that permission was revoked before the time expires, that alien ought to be given an opportunity of making representations. Thereafter the concept has been considered in a number of cases. In A.G. of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu, (1983) 2 AC 629, Lord Fraser said that the principle that a public authority is bound by its undertakings as to the procedure it will follow, provided they do not conflict with its duty, is applicable to the undertaking given by the Government of Hong Kong to the respondent that each case would be considered on its merits. In Council of Civil Services Union v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 All ER 935, a question arose whether the decision of the Minister withdrawing the right to Trade Union membership without consulting the staff which according to the appellant was his legitimate expectation arising from the existence of a regular practice of consultation, was valid. It was contended that the Minister had a duty to consult the staff as per the existing practice and that though the employee did not have a legal right, he had a legitimate expectation that the existing practice and that though the employee did not have a legal right, he had a legitimate expectation that the existing practice would be followed. On behalf of the Minister on the basis of the evidence produced, it was contended that the decision not to consult was taken for reasons of national security. On behalf of the Minister on the basis of the evidence produced, it was contended that the decision not to consult was taken for reasons of national security. The Court held as under: An aggrieved person was entitled to invoke judicial review if he showed that a decision of a public authority affected him by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which in the past he had been permitted to enjoy and which he could legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to enjoy either until he was given reasons for its withdrawal and the opportunity to comment on those reasons or because he had received an assurance that it would not be withdrawn before he had been given the opportunity of making representations against the withdrawal. Noticing, however, Of late the doctrine of legitimate expectation is being pressed into service in many cases particularly in contractual sphere while canvassing the implications underlying the administrative law, The Supreme Court has proceed to add, Since we have not come across any pronouncement of this Court on this subject explaining the meaning and scope of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, we would like to examine the same a little more elaborately at this stage, and put the questions, who is the expectant and what is the nature of the expectation? When does such an expectation become a legitimate one and what is the foundation for the same? What are the duties of the administrative authorities while taking a decision in cases attracting the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The Supreme Court has thereafter answered the above as follows: 28. Time is a three fold present: the present as we experience it, the past as a present memory and future as a present expectation. For legal purposes, the expectation cannot be the same as anticipation. It is different from a wish, a desire or a hope nor can it amount to a claim or demand on the ground of a right. However earnest and sincere a wish, a desire or a hope may be and however confidently one may look to them to be fulfilled, they by themselves cannot amount to an assertable expectation and a mere disappointment does not attract legal consequences. A pious hope even leading to a moral obligation cannot amount to a legitimate expectation. However earnest and sincere a wish, a desire or a hope may be and however confidently one may look to them to be fulfilled, they by themselves cannot amount to an assertable expectation and a mere disappointment does not attract legal consequences. A pious hope even leading to a moral obligation cannot amount to a legitimate expectation. The legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law of custom or an establishment procedure followed in regular and natural sequence. Again it is distinguishable from a genuine expectation. Such expectation should be justifiably legitimate and protectable. Every such legitimate expectation does not by itself fructify into a right and therefore it does not amount to a right in the conventional sense. 29. It has to be noticed that the concept of legitimate expectation in administrative law has now, undoubtedly, gained sufficient importance. It is stated that Legitimate expectation is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the courts for the review of administrative action and this creation takes it place beside such principles as the rules of natural justice, unreasonableness, the fiduciary duty of local authorities and in future, perhaps, the principle of proportionately. A passage in Administrative Law, Sixth Edition by H.W.R. Wade page 424 reads thus: These are revealing decisions. They show that the courts now expect Government department to honour their published statements or else to treat the citizen with the fullest personal consideration. Unfairness in the form of unreasonableness here comes close to unfairness in the form of violation of natural justice, and the doctrine of legitimate expectation can operate in both contexts. It is obvious, furthermore, that this principle of substantive, as opposed to procedural, fairness may undermine some of the established rules about estoppel and misleading advice, which tend to operate unfairly. Lord Scarman has stated emphatically that unfairness in the purported exercise of a power can amount to an abuse or excess of power, and this seems likely to develop into an important general doctrine. Another passage at page 522 in the above book reads thus: It was in fact for the purpose of restricting the right to be heard that legitimate expectation was introduced into the law. Another passage at page 522 in the above book reads thus: It was in fact for the purpose of restricting the right to be heard that legitimate expectation was introduced into the law. It made its first appearance in a case where alien students of scientology were refused extension of their entry permits as an act of policy by the Home Secretary, who had announced that no discretionary benefits would be granted to this sect. The court of Appeal held that they had no legitimate expectation of extension beyond the permitted time and so no right to a hearing, though revocation of their permits within that time would have been contrary to legitimate expectation. Official statements of policy, therefore, may cancel legitimate expectation, just as they may create it, as seen above. In a different context, where car-hire drivers had habitually offended against Airport Byelaw's, with many convictions and unpaid fines, it was held that they had not legitimate expectation of being heard before being banned by the Airport authority. There is some ambiguity in the dicta about legitimate expectation, which may mean either expectation of a fair hearing or expectation of the licence or other benefit which is being sought. But the result is the same in either case; absence of legitimate expectation will absolve the public authority from affording a hearing." 45. In some cases a question arose whether the concept of the legitimate expectations is an impact only on the procedure or whether it also can have a substantive impact and if so to what extent. Att. Gen. for New South Wales v. Quin, (1990)64 Australian Law Journal Reports 327 is a case from Australia in which this aspect is dealt with. In that case the Local Courts Act abolished the Courts of Petty Sessions and replaced them by Local Courts. Section 12 of the Act empowered the Governor to appoint any qualified person to be a Magistrate in the new Courts system. Mr. Quin, who had been a Stipendiary Magistrate in charge of a Court of Petty Sessions under the old system applied for, but was refused, an appointment under the new System. That was challenged. The challenge was upheld by the appellate Court on the ground that the Selection Committee had taken into account an adverse report on him without giving a notice to him of the contents of the same. That was challenged. The challenge was upheld by the appellate Court on the ground that the Selection Committee had taken into account an adverse report on him without giving a notice to him of the contents of the same. In the appeal by the Attorney General against that order before the High Court, it was argued on behalf of Mr. Quin that he had a legitimate expectation that he would be treated in the same way as his former colleagues considering his application on its own merits. Coming to the nature of the substantive impact of the doctrine, Brennan, J. observed that the doctrine of legitimate expectations ought not to unlock the gate which shuts the Court out of review on the merits and that the Courts should not trespass into the forbidden field of the merits by striking down the administrative acts or decisions which failed to fulfil the expectations. In the same case Mason, C.J., was of the view that if substantive protection is to be accorded to legitimate expectations that would encounter the objection of entailing crucial interference with administrative decisions on the merits by precluding the decision-maker from ultimately making the decision which he or she considers most appropriate in the circumstances. 46. In R.V. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Redudock, (1987) 2 All ER 518, Taylor, J. after referring to the ration laid down in some of the above cases held thus: "On these authorities I conclude that the doctrine of legitimate expectation in essence imposes a duty to act fairly. Whilst most of the cases are concerned, as Lord Roskill said, with a right to be heard, I do not think the doctrine is so confined. Indeed, in a case where ex hypothesi there is no right to be heard, it may be thought the more important to fair dealing that a promise or undertaking given by a Minister as to how he will proceed should be kept. Of course such promise or undertaking must not conflict with his statutory duty or his duty, as here, in the exercise of a prerogative power. I accept the submission of counsel for the secretary of State that the respondent cannot fetter his discretion. By declaring a policy he does not preclude any possible need to change it. Of course such promise or undertaking must not conflict with his statutory duty or his duty, as here, in the exercise of a prerogative power. I accept the submission of counsel for the secretary of State that the respondent cannot fetter his discretion. By declaring a policy he does not preclude any possible need to change it. But then if the practice has been to publish the current policy, it could be incumbent on him in dealing fairly to publish the new policy, unless again that would conflict with his duties. Had the criteria here needed changing for national security reasons, no doubt the respondent could have changed them. Had those reasons prevented him also from publishing the new criteria, no doubt he could have refrain from doing so. He had even decided to keep the criteria but depart from them in this single case for national security reasons, no doubt those reasons would have afforded him a defence to judicial review as in the GCHQ case." 47. In Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, (1971) 2 Queen Bench Division 175, Lord Denning observed as under: "If a man seeks a privilege to which he has no particular claim such as an appointment to some post or other then he can be turned away without a word. He need not to be heard. No explanation need be given; see the cases cited in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1969) 2 Ch 149 , 170-171. But if he is a man whose property is at stake, or who is being deprived of his livelihood, then reasons should be given why he is being turned down, and he should be given a chance to be heard. I go further. If he is man who has some right or interest, or some legitimate expectation of which it would not be fair to deprive him without a hearing, or reasons given, then these should be afforded him, according as the case may demand." 48. When a challenge is made on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the Supreme Court pointed out, that the same would not give scope to claim relief straight way from the administrative authorities in the absence of any crystallised right. When a challenge is made on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the Supreme Court pointed out, that the same would not give scope to claim relief straight way from the administrative authorities in the absence of any crystallised right. The protection of such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise or the position changes at the last minute e.g. change in the policy, amendment in the rules and regulations etc. In other words, where a persons legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then the decision-maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest. 49. A person who puts forward his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in the first instance, most satisfy that there is a foundation and thus has the locus standi to make such a claim. In considering the same several factors which give rise to such legitimate expectation must be present. The decision taken by the authority must be found to be arbitrary, unreasonable and not taken in public interest. If it is a question of policy, even by way of change of the policy, the Court may refuse to interfere with such decision. In a given case whether there are such facts and circumstances, giving rise to the legitimate expectation, would be primarily a question of fact. If these tests are satisfied and if the Court is satisfied that a case of legitimate expectation is made out then the next question would be whether the failure to give an opportunity of hearing before the decision of affecting such legitimate expectation is taken, has resulted in failure of justice and whether on that ground the decision should be quashed. If that be so then what should be the relief is again a matter which would be dependent on the several factors. 50. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra) has quoted from Schmidt's case ( 1969(2) Ch 149 ): ".......... If that be so then what should be the relief is again a matter which would be dependent on the several factors. 50. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra) has quoted from Schmidt's case ( 1969(2) Ch 149 ): ".......... If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of rights guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse or violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well known grounds attracting Article 14but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. It can be one of the grounds to consider but of the Court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violative of these principles warranting interference. It depends very much on the facts and the recognised general principles of administrative law applicable to such facts and the concept of legitimate expectation which is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the Courts for the review of administrative action, must be restricted to the general legal limitations applicable and binding the manner of the future exercise of administrative power in a particular case. If follows that the concept of legitimate expectation is not the key which unlocks the treasury of natural justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shuts the Court out of review on the merits, particularly when the element of speculation and uncertainty is inherent in that very concept. As cautioned in Attorney General for New South Wales case the Courts should restrain themselves and restrict such claims duly to the legal limitations. It is a well meant caution. Otherwise a resourceful litigant having vested interests in contracts, licences etc., can successfully indulge in getting welfare activities mandated by a directive principles thwarted to further his own interest. The caution, particularly in the changing scenario, becomes all the more important. 51. It is a well meant caution. Otherwise a resourceful litigant having vested interests in contracts, licences etc., can successfully indulge in getting welfare activities mandated by a directive principles thwarted to further his own interest. The caution, particularly in the changing scenario, becomes all the more important. 51. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi 2006 (4) SCC 1 referred to the circumstances in which the doctrine of legitimate expectation can be invoked thus:(Para 37) "The doctrine can be invoked if the decisions of the administrative authority affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn." 52. Another Constitution Bench, referring to the doctrine, observed thus in the Confederation of Ex-servicemen Associations v. Union of India 2006 (8) JT 547 : "No doubt, the doctrine has an important place in the development of Administrative Law and particularly law relating to 'judicial review'. Under the said doctrine, a person may have reasonable or legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no right in law to receive the benefit. In such situation, if a decision is taken by an administrative authority adversely affecting his interests, he may have justifiable grievance in the light of the fact of continuous receipt of the benefit, legitimate expectation to receive the benefit or privilege which he has enjoyed all throughout. Such expectation may arise either from the express promise or from consistent practice which the applicant may reasonably expect to continue." "In such cases, therefore, the Court may not insist an administrative authority to act judicially but may still insist it to act fairly. Such expectation may arise either from the express promise or from consistent practice which the applicant may reasonably expect to continue." "In such cases, therefore, the Court may not insist an administrative authority to act judicially but may still insist it to act fairly. The doctrine is based on the principle that good administration demands observance of reasonableness and where it has adopted a particular practice for a long time even in absence of a provision of law, it should adhere to such practice without depriving its citizens of the benefit enjoyed or privilege exercised." 53. Thus, from the above at least one thing is clear that no relief should be granted solely on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. 54. In the case of Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, AIR 1994 SC 988 , the Supreme Court pointed out that if a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of right guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 of the Constitution of India, but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke those principles and that it can be one of the grounds to consider, but the Court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violative of those principles warranting interference. The Court also held that it depends very much on the facts and the recognised general principles of the administrative law applicable to such facts and the concept of legitimate expectation, must be restricted to the general legal limitation applicable and binding the manner of the future exercise of administrative power in a particular case. The court said (at p.1021, para 36): "It follows that the concept of legitimate expectation is "not the key which unlocks the treasury of natural justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shuts the Court out of review on the merits", particularly when the element of speculation and uncertainty is inherent in that very concept." 55. The court said (at p.1021, para 36): "It follows that the concept of legitimate expectation is "not the key which unlocks the treasury of natural justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shuts the Court out of review on the merits", particularly when the element of speculation and uncertainty is inherent in that very concept." 55. In the case of Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, AIR 1993 SC 1601 , the Supreme Court made the following observations extracted hereunder: "In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law. A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is 'fair play in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision-making process in all State actions. To satisfy this requirement of non-arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely to be affected by the decision or else that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but provides for control of its exercise by judicial review." "The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision-making process. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision-making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent." 56. Thus, it may be true that every candidate once appointed in the post and permitted to work for a period of one and half years may have a legitimate expectation that his services would now be continued as his appointment in the post was valid. However, this by itself would not mean that at a later stage having regard to the exigencies like in the present case the Government cannot act accordingly. The legitimate expectation may come in various forms and owe there existence to different kinds of circumstances. By and large they arise in exercise of contract, distribution of largess by the Government or any other similar situation. The existence of a legitimate expectation may have different consequences; it may give locus standi to seek leave to apply for judicial review, it may mean that the authority ought not to act so as to defeat the expectation without some overriding reason of public policy to justify its doing so. The doctrine of legitimate expectation does not give scope to claim relief straightway from the administrative authorities as no crystallised right as such is involved. The protection of such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In short where a person's legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then the decision-maker should justify the denial of such substantive protection by showing some overriding public interest. Therefore, even if substantive protection of such expectation is contemplated that does not grant an absolute right to a particular person. It simply ensures the circumstances in which that expectation may be denied or restricted. Therefore, even if substantive protection of such expectation is contemplated that does not grant an absolute right to a particular person. It simply ensures the circumstances in which that expectation may be denied or restricted. Legitimate expectation being less than a right operates in the field of public and not private law and to some extent such legitimate expectation ought to be protected though not guaranteed. 57. I may set at rest the issue of legitimate expectation quoting the observations made in the case of the Attorney General for New South Wales' case (1960) 64 Aus LJR 327. "To strike down the exercise of administrative power solely on the ground of avoiding the disappointment of the legitimate expectations of an individual would be to set the courts adrift on a featureless sea of pragmatism. Moreover, the notion of a legitimate expectation (falling short of a legal right) is too nebulous to form a basis for invalidating the exercise of a power when its exercise otherwise accords with law." If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of right guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power of violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well known grounds attracting Article 14 but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles." 58. The last question I need to address is what relief should be granted to the petitioners to balance the equities. In this regard I may quote with profit a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Abhishek Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2013 (4) SCC 690 . 59. In the afore-noted case an advertisement was issued, by the Bihar State Staff Selection Commission inviting applications from the eligible candidates for appointment against 2268 posts of Junior Engineer (Civil) out of which 1057 posts were in the open merit category. The selection process, comprised of a written objective type examination, held by the Staff Selection Commission. The Commission prepared a select list of 210 successful candidates including 143 appellants based on the performance of the candidates in the examination. The evaluation of the answers scripts was, however, assailed before the Patna High Court. The selection process, comprised of a written objective type examination, held by the Staff Selection Commission. The Commission prepared a select list of 210 successful candidates including 143 appellants based on the performance of the candidates in the examination. The evaluation of the answers scripts was, however, assailed before the Patna High Court. In the writ petition filed by the unsuccessful candidates, a learned Single Judge of the High Court referred the "Model Answer Key" to the experts. The Model Answers were examined by the two experts who found several such answers to be wrong. Based on the report of the said two experts, a learned Single Judge of the High Court held that 41 model answers out of 100 were wrong. The learned Single Judge on that basis held that the entire examination was liable to be cancelled and so also the appointment made on the basis thereof. 60. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, the appellants filed LPA before the Division Bench of that High Court. The Division Bench partly allowed the appeal holding that the model answers in respect of 45 questions out of 100 were wrong. The Division Bench modified the order passed by the learned Single Judge and declared that the entire examination need not be cancelled as there was no allegation of any corrupt motive or malpractice in regard to the other question papers. A fresh examination in the Civil Engineering paper only was, according to the Division Bench, sufficient to rectify the defect and prevent injustice to any candidate. The Division Bench further held that while those appointed on the basis of the impugned selection should be allowed to continue until publication of the fresh result, any one of those who had failed to make the grade on the basis of the fresh examination should be given a chance to appear in another examination to be conducted by the Staff Selection Commission. The judgment of the Division Bench was assailed before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed in paras 16, 17 and 18 as under: "The submissions made by Mr. Rao are not without merit. Given the nature of the defect in the answer key the most natural and logical way of correcting the evaluation of the scripts was to correct the key and get the answer scripts reevaluated on the basis thereof. The Supreme Court observed in paras 16, 17 and 18 as under: "The submissions made by Mr. Rao are not without merit. Given the nature of the defect in the answer key the most natural and logical way of correcting the evaluation of the scripts was to correct the key and get the answer scripts reevaluated on the basis thereof. There was, in the circumstances, no compelling reason for directing a fresh examination to be held by the Commission especially when there was no allegation about any malpractice, fraud or corrupt motives that could possibly vitiate the earlier examination to call for a fresh attempt by all concerned. The process of re-evaluation of the answer scripts with reference to the correct key will in addition be less expensive apart from being quicker. The process would also not give any unfair advantage to anyone of the candidates on account of the time lag between the examination earlier held and the one that may have been held pursuant to the direction of the High Court. Suffice it to say that the reevaluation was and is a better option, in the facts and circumstances of the case." "That brings us to the submission by Mr. Rao that while reevaluation is a good option not only to do justice to those who may have suffered on account of an erroneous key being applied to the process but also to writ petitioners-respondents 6 to 18 in the matter of allocating to them their rightful place in the merit list. Such evaluation need not necessarily result in the ouster of the appellants should they be found to fall below the 'cutoff' mark in the merit list. Mr. Rao gave two reasons in support of that submission. Firstly, he contended that the appellants are not responsible for the error committed by the parties in the matter of evaluation of the answer scripts. The position may have been different if the appellants were guilty of any fraud, misrepresentation or malpractice that would have deprived them of any sympathy from the Court or justified their ouster. Secondly, he contended that the appellants have served the State efficiently and without any complaint for nearly seven years now and most of them, if not all, may have become overage for fresh recruitment within the State or outside the State. Secondly, he contended that the appellants have served the State efficiently and without any complaint for nearly seven years now and most of them, if not all, may have become overage for fresh recruitment within the State or outside the State. They have also lost the opportunity to appear in the subsequent examination held in the year 2007. Their ouster from service after their employment on the basis of a properly conducted competitive examination not itself affected by any malpractice or other extraneous consideration or misrepresentation will cause hardship to them and ruin their careers and lives. The experience gained by these appellants over the years would also, according to Mr. Rao, go waste as the State will not have the advantage of using valuable human resource which was found useful in the service of the people of the State of Bihar for a long time. Mr. Rao, therefore, prayed for a suitable direction that while reevaluation can determine the inter se position of the writ petitioners and the appellants in these appeals, the result of such reevaluation may not lead to their ouster from service, if they fell below the cutoff line." "There is considerable merit in the submission of Mr. Rao. It goes without saying that the appellants were innocent parties who have not, in any manner, contributed to the preparation of the erroneous key or the distorted result. There is no mention of any fraud or malpractice against the appellants who have served the State for nearly seven years now. In the circumstances, while inter se merit position may be relevant for the appellants, the ouster of the latter need not be an inevitable and inexorable consequence of such a reevaluation. The reevaluation process may additionally benefit those who have lost the hope of an appointment on the basis of a wrong key applied for evaluating the answer scripts. Such of those candidates as may be ultimately found to be entitled to issue of appointment letters on the basis of their merit shall benefit by such reevaluation and shall pick up their appointments on that basis according to their inter se position on the merit list." 61. Such of those candidates as may be ultimately found to be entitled to issue of appointment letters on the basis of their merit shall benefit by such reevaluation and shall pick up their appointments on that basis according to their inter se position on the merit list." 61. While allowing the appeals, the Supreme Court directed as under: (1) answer scripts of candidates appearing in 'A' series of competition examination held pursuant to advertisement No. 1406 of 2006 shall be got reevaluated on the basis of a correct key prepared on the basis of the report of Dr. (Prof.) CN Sinha and Prof. KSP Singh and the observations made in the body of this order and a fresh merit list drawn up on that basis. (2) Candidates who figure in the merit list but have not been appointed shall be offered appointments in their favour. Such candidates would earn their seniority from the date the appellants were first appointed in accordance with their merit position but without any back wages or other benefit whatsoever. (3) In case writ petitioners-respondent nos. 6 to 18 also figure in the merit list after reevaluation of the answer scripts, their appointments shall relate back to the date when the appellants were first appointed with continuity of service to them for purpose of seniority but without any back wages or other incidental benefits. (4) Such of the appellants as do not make the grade after reevaluation shall not be ousted from service, but shall figure at the bottom of the list of selected candidates based on the first selection in terms of advertisement No. 1406 of 2006 and the second selection held pursuant to advertisement No. 1906 of 2006. (5) Needful shall be done by the respondent - State and the Staff Selection Commission expeditiously but not later than three months from the date a copy of this order is made available to them." 62. Mr. Oza, the learned senior advocate submitted that I should follow the direction No. 4 issued by the Supreme Court afore-noted. He submitted that the petitioners may not be ousted on the basis of the revised merit list, but they may be placed at the bottom of the list of the selected candidates based on the revised merit list. 63. As against the above, Ms. He submitted that the petitioners may not be ousted on the basis of the revised merit list, but they may be placed at the bottom of the list of the selected candidates based on the revised merit list. 63. As against the above, Ms. Shah pointed out that the perusal of the cut off marks for each of categories viz. General, SC, ST, OBC (Male & Female) would reveal that in so far as 11 petitioners are concerned even if they are placed below the last meritorious candidate i.e. at the bottom of select list, they would still fall short in the order of merit and there may be several candidates having procured marks higher than the petitioners who would be entitled to be considered. For example, in case of Jitendra K. Bharvani, Petitioner no. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 6044 of 2014 for the post of Accountants, his marks are 116. The cut off marks for consideration in the General Category (Male) is 122.5 and the cut off marks in the waiting list is 120.5. If the petitioners is to be placed at the end of the select list considering that 19,969 candidates appeared in the examination for accountant cadre, there may be several candidates who have secured marks between 120.5 to 116. Thus, out of 50 petitioners before the Court, 17 of those who applied for the posts are concerned, they are out of the select list, in the order of merit, in terms of the marks secured as per the revised select list. It is submitted that placing them at the end of the select list also would amount to denying consideration to the other candidates who are more meritorious than the petitioners. 64. In view of what has been submitted by Ms. Shah, the learned G.P. it is difficult for me to grant the relief in terms of the direction No. 4 of the Supreme Court judgment referred to above. In so far as the seniority of all the appointees pursuant to the revised select list is concerned the same should be in terms of the fresh appointments. Since the very foundation of the earlier appointment was based on incorrect assessment no right would accrue in favour of the appointees on the ground of having worked for a period of about one and half years. Since the very foundation of the earlier appointment was based on incorrect assessment no right would accrue in favour of the appointees on the ground of having worked for a period of about one and half years. Any indulgence on my part at this stage would defeat the rights of those candidates who ought to have been considered at the relevant time for having given the correct answers. 65. In such circumstances referred to above, it is not possible or rather not permissible for me to grant any relief though it is true that the petitioners were innocent parties who have not, in any manner, contributed to the preparation of the erroneous key or the distorted result. 66. In the result, all the petitions fail and are hereby rejected. Order accordingly.