ORDER Harsha Devani, J. 1. The appellant in this appeal under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') has challenged the order dated 20.03.2015, passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench 'C' (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal") in IT Appeal No. 350/AHD/2014 by proposing the following question, stated to be a substantial question of law: "Whether the Appellate Tribunal has substantially erred in law in setting aside the order of CIT passed u/s.263 of the Act cancelling the order passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act?" 2. The assessee is a company engaged in the business of providing natural gas compressors, air compressors and transport contractor. The assessee filed its revised return of income on 18.01.2011 declaring a total income of Rs. 4,24,37,290. The case was selected for scrutiny and thereafter, the assessment came to be framed under sub-section (3) of section 143 of the Act by an order dated 26.12.2011 determining the total income at Rs. 4,34,81,062. The Commissioner of Income Tax subsequently, upon examining the record of the assessment proceedings, noticed that the assessee had wrongly claimed deduction of Rs. 61,21,968 under section 35D of the Act towards public issue expenses incurred after commencement of the business, as according to him, in terms of the provisions of section 35D(1)(ii) of the Act, for assessment year 2008-09 such deduction was available to the assessee for extension of an industrial undertaking and that while quantifying disallowance of expenditure under section 14A of the Act read with rule 8D of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 interest expenditure was considered by the Assessing Officer at Rs. 41,32,115 instead of Rs. 2,62,65,901. The Commissioner of Income Tax was, therefore, of the view that the order passed by the Assessing Officer was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. He, accordingly, issued notice dated 26.09.2013 to the assessee calling upon it to show cause as to why appropriate order under section 263 of the Act should not be passed. After considering the reply as well as submissions advanced on behalf of the assessee, the Commissioner of Income Tax was of the view that the Assessing Officer had erred in allowing the deduction of IPO expenditure of Rs. 61,21,968 in contravention of the provisions of section 35D(1)(ii) of the Act and that the Assessing Officer had also erred in considering the interest expenses of Rs. 61,21,968 in contravention of the provisions of section 35D(1)(ii) of the Act and that the Assessing Officer had also erred in considering the interest expenses of Rs. 41,32,115 instead of Rs. 2,62,65,901 while quantifying the disallowance under section 14A of the Act. He, accordingly, held that the assessment order dated 26.12.2011, made under section 143(3) of the Act was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue and accordingly cancelled the assessment and directed the Assessing Officer to make fresh assessment of the total income of the assessee. Being aggrieved, the assessee went in appeal before the Tribunal, and succeeded. 3. Mrs. Mauna Bhatt, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is erroneous inasmuch as the Tribunal has failed to appreciate that the power under section 263 of the Act is intended to correct the wrong assessment made by the Assessing Officer. If the stand taken by the Assessing Officer were final, there was no need to have section 263 of the Act on the statute book. It was further submitted that the present case is not one wherein two views are possible on the issue. As regards the first issue before the Tribunal, the attention of the court was invited to the provisions of section 35D of the Act, which makes provision for amortisation of certain preliminary expenses. Referring to sub-clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of section 35D, it was pointed out that in the first year relatable to financial year 2006-07, the respondent-industry was not an industrial undertaking and therefore, was not entitled to the benefit under sub-clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of section 35D of the Act. It was submitted that deduction of an amount equal to one tenth of the expenditure incurred in connection with extension of the industrial undertaking would commence in the previous year in which the extension of the industrial undertaking is completed or the new unit commences the production or operation. It was submitted that in the first year when the assessee would become entitled to such benefit, the respondent-assessee was not an industrial undertaking and hence in the year under consideration the assessee was not entitled to the benefit under section 35D of the Act. It was submitted that in the first year when the assessee would become entitled to such benefit, the respondent-assessee was not an industrial undertaking and hence in the year under consideration the assessee was not entitled to the benefit under section 35D of the Act. It was submitted that subsequent amendment in the year 2009 deleting the word 'industrial' from clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of section 35D would not be applicable to the facts of the present case inasmuch as in the first year the assessee was not an industry and was not entitled to such benefit. It was submitted that, therefore, the Tribunal has erred in holding that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of amortisation under section 35D of the Act. 3.1. As regards disallowance under section 14A of the Act, it was submitted that the Tribunal has failed to appreciate the finding recorded by the Commissioner of Income Tax that the assessee had not maintained separate accounts for the purpose of investment and funds for business as well as investment activity fund used for common fund. Thus, the entire interest expenditure incurred by the assessee is attributable in some way or the other to earn exempt income. Therefore, while computing the quantum of disallowance of interest expenses under rule 8D(2)(ii), the figure of interest should be considered at Rs. 2,62,65,901 instead of Rs. 41,32,115. It was, accordingly, urged that the appeal merits consideration and the questions, as proposed, or as may be deemed fit may be formulated by this court. 4. Opposing this appeal, Mr. Tushar Hemani, learned advocate for the assessee submitted that it is a settled legal proposition that if the view adopted by the Assessing Officer is a possible view, exercise of powers under section 263 of the Act is not warranted. It was pointed out that in the facts of the present case, unless the finding in respect of the first year when the benefit under section 35D of the Act had been obtained is disturbed, in the subsequent year it cannot be disturbed. It was pointed out that in the facts of the present case, unless the finding in respect of the first year when the benefit under section 35D of the Act had been obtained is disturbed, in the subsequent year it cannot be disturbed. In support of such submission, reliance was placed upon the decision of this court in the case of Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax v. Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Company Limited, (2013) 356 ITR 450 (Guj), wherein the court had recorded that it was an admitted position that the claim under section 35D of the Act did not arise for consideration for the first time and that since the last several years, the Assessing Officer had allowed such a claim. The court was of the view that the Tribunal, therefore, correctly held that such claim could not have been suddenly disallowed. Reference was made to the decision of this court in the case of Saurashtra Cement and Chemical Industries Limited v. CIT, (1980) 123 ITR 669 (Guj), wherein, in the context of excessive claim of tax holiday, the court held that the Income Tax Officer was not justified in refusing to continue the benefit of tax holiday granted to the assessee in the earlier years without disturbing the relief granted in the initial years. The court observed that the Income Tax Act recognises the principle of consistency. That in the facts of the said case for as many as 27 years, the Assessing Officer did not dispute certain claims and therefore, the Tribunal has correctly interpreted that the Assessing Officer has wrongly sought to reopen the assessment. It was submitted that, therefore, since the benefit under section 35D of the Act is not disturbed in the first year, the same cannot be disturbed in the subsequent years. It was contended that the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the claim has to be tested independently each year, is erroneous, inasmuch as, by virtue of the amendment in the statute the word 'industrial' has been deleted and therefore the assessee would be eligible for the benefit under clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of section 35D of the Act. It was submitted that, therefore, the view adopted by the Assessing Officer is not a patently erroneous view and is a permissible view and hence, the Commissioner of Income Tax was not justified in resorting to the provisions of section 263 of the Act. Insofar as disallowance under section 14A of the Act is concerned, reliance was placed upon the findings recorded by the Tribunal to submit that there is no infirmity in the view adopted by the Tribunal. 5. This court has considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the impugned order passed by the Tribunal as well as the order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax under section 263of the Act. From the facts, as noted hereinabove, it is evident that the Commissioner of Income Tax has invoked section263 of the Act on the ground that the assessee had wrongly claimed the deduction under section 35D of the Act as it was not an industrial undertaking within the meaning of such expression as envisaged under section 35D of the Act. From the facts as narrated hereinabove, it is manifest that in respect of financial year 2006-07 relatable to assessment year 2007-08 the assessee had been granted the benefit of amortization under section 35D(1) of the Act. The Tribunal has, in the impugned order, recorded that the first year of the claim under section 35D of the Act was for the assessment year 2007-08 and in that year the claim of the assessee had been accepted under section 143(1) and no action under section 147 or 263 of the Act had been taken in relation to the said assessment year. The Tribunal has further noted that according to the Commissioner of Income Tax, section 35D of the Act was only applicable to an industrial undertaking and that the activity of the assessee was not eligible for deduction under section 35D of the Act. The Tribunal took note of the fact that the word 'industrial' was omitted by Finance Act, 2008 with effect from 01.04.2009 and therefore, the benefit of section35D was also available to the assessees who were not industrial undertakings. The Tribunal has, accordingly, found that no material has been brought on record to demonstrate that the view taken by the Assessing Officer was not a permissible view. 6. The Tribunal has, accordingly, found that no material has been brought on record to demonstrate that the view taken by the Assessing Officer was not a permissible view. 6. From the findings recorded by the Tribunal and the facts as emerging from the record, it is evident that insofar as the benefit under section 35D of the Act is concerned, the respondent-assessee had claimed the benefit thereof in the assessment year 2007-08 and such claim had been allowed and was not disturbed subsequently. It is subsequently in the year 2009-10 that the Commissioner of Income Tax has taken the matter in revision under section 35D. As held by this court in the case of Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax v. Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Company Limited, (supra) when the claim has been granted by the Assessing Officer in respect of previous years, such claim cannot be disallowed subsequently without disturbing the decision in the initial year. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the view adopted by the Assessing Officer is not a plausible view. It is by now well settled that if two views are possible and the Assessing Officer has adopted one view, the same would not warrant exercise of the powers under section 263 of the Act. 7. The second issue on which the Commissioner of Income Tax has sought to take the assessment order in revision is that while calculating the disallowance under section 14A of the Act read with rule 8D(2)(ii) of the rules, the Assessing Officer had considered interest expenditure at Rs. 41,32,115/- instead of the entire interest expense of Rs. 2,62,65,901/-. on behalf of the assessee before the Commissioner it was contended that the investment in mutual fund was made out of funds available from IPO and no direct expenditure was incurred in relation to earning exempt income from investments. The Commissioner of Income Tax noted that though the Assessing Officer had invoked the provisions of section 14A read with rule 8D, he had not made any addition under rule 8D(2)(i) which shows that no expenditure had been considered as directly related to earning exempt income and that the Assessing Officer had disallowed part of the interest expenses under rule 8D(2)(ii). According to the Commissioner of Income Tax, the assessee had not maintained separate accounts for the purpose of investment and the funds for business as well as investment activity had been used from a common pool. He was therefore, of the view that the entire interest expenditure incurred by the assessee is attributable in some way or the other to earn exempt income and consequently, the interest expenditure should be considered as per the formula in rule 8D(2)(ii) of the rules. The Tribunal followed the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Gabrial India Ltd., (1993) 203 ITR 108 (Bom) wherein the court has inter alia held that cases may be visualised where ITO while making an assessment examines the accounts, makes inquiries, applies his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and determines the income either by accepting the accounts or by making some estimates himself. The Commissioner, on perusal of records, may be of the opinion that the estimate made by the officer concerned was on the higher side and, left to the Commissioner, he would have estimated the income at a higher figure than the one determined by the ITO. That would not vest the Commissioner with the power to re-examine the accounts and determine the income himself at a higher figure. It is because the ITO has exercised the quasi-judicial power vested in him in accordance with law and arrived at a conclusion and such a conclusion cannot be termed to be erroneous simply because the Commissioner does not feel satisfied with the conclusion. It may be said in such a case that in the opinion of the Commissioner the order in question is prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. But that by itself will not be enough to vest the Commissioner with the power of suo motu revision because the first requirement, namely, the order is erroneous, is absent. 8. In the facts of the present case, as is apparent from the findings recorded by the Commissioner of Income Tax, the Assessing Officer had invoked the provisions of section 14A of the Act read with rule 8D of the rules. The assessee submitted that mutual fund investment was made out of IPO proceeds. Investment in mutual funds of Rs. 8. In the facts of the present case, as is apparent from the findings recorded by the Commissioner of Income Tax, the Assessing Officer had invoked the provisions of section 14A of the Act read with rule 8D of the rules. The assessee submitted that mutual fund investment was made out of IPO proceeds. Investment in mutual funds of Rs. 14.78 crores was made out of funds lying idle till deployment in business for short term proceeds of Public Issue. Such mutual fund investments were redeemed as and when required for business operation. Dividend income claimed exempt was of Rs. 64,30,214/- consisting of dividend received from various mutual fund schemes invested as above. No direct expenditure was incurred in relation to receive income of dividend, as these investments were made out of temporary idle IPO proceeds. The Assessing Officer after considering the explanation given by the assessee was not satisfied with regard to the accounts of the assessee in relation to earning income that does not form part of the total income of the assessee company. He, accordingly, computed the expenditure incurred in relation to earning dividend income as per the provisions of section 14A read with rule 8D of the rules and disallowed interest expenditure of Rs. 41,32,115/- under rule 8D(2)(ii) of the rules. 9. Thus, the Assessing Officer after examining the issue and calling for the explanation of the assessee was not satisfied with the explanation of the assessee and computed the interest expenditure in terms of section 14A of the Act read with rule 8D of the rules. The Commissioner of Income Tax is of the opinion that he would have assessed the interest expenditure at a higher figure. Therefore, merely because another view is possible is not sufficient to invoke powers under section 263 of the Act. The view adopted by the Assessing Officer, being a plausible view, it cannot be said that the assessment order is erroneous so as to warrant exercise of powers under section 263 of the Act. In light of the above discussion, this court does not find any infirmity in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal so as to give rise to any question of law, much less, a substantial question of law warranting interference. The appeal, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed.