JUDGMENT Tapash Mookherjee, J: 1. The present appeal under Section 378 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on special leave by this Court is against an order of acquittal passed on 29.06.2013 by the Metropolitan Magistrate, 6th Court, Calcutta in Case No. C-15450/2011. The case was under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter described in short as N. I. Act). 2. Some relevant facts necessary for the decision of the appeal, in short, are stated below : 3. Jupiter Brokerage Services Ltd. a Public Limited Company, hereinafter described as the appellant/company was the complainant in the case before the Court of the Magistrate and Ektara Exports Pvt. Ltd. and its two directors, namely, Mahendra Kumar Patni and Anjani Kumar Shahi hereinafter described as the respondents/accused were the accused in the case. Both the aforesaid companies have their respective offices in the same premises at Shakespeare Sarani, Calcutta. It has been alleged by the appellant/ complainant that the respondents/accused company to discharge its existing liabilities issued five cheques amounting to Rs. 2,50,00,000.00 (Rupees Two Crores Fifty Lack only) in total, in favour of the appellant/complainant. All those cheques were drawn on Allahabad Bank, Elgin Road Branch, Calcutta. According to the appellant/complainant all those five cheques were deposited in due course within the time, in the account of the appellant/complainant. All those cheques were dishonoured and returned with note “insufficient fund” and the appellant/complainant received such information on 02.05.2011. Immediately thereafter, appellant/complainant sent a demand notice to the respondents/accused on 10.05.2011. The said demand notice was duly served upon the respondents/accused company on 12.05.2011. But in spite of such notice the respondents/accused failed and neglected to pay the amount in the cheques dishonoured. Nor had they sent any reply to the notice. Hence, the appellant/complainant filed the present case in the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta under Section 138 of the N. I. Act. 4. One Ajoy Agarwal, a director of the appellant/complainant, deposed in the case for the appellant/complainant. All relevant documents were also proved and brought on record. The memorandum and Article of Association of the appellant/complainant has been admitted for the respondent/accused. 4. One Ajoy Agarwal, a director of the appellant/complainant, deposed in the case for the appellant/complainant. All relevant documents were also proved and brought on record. The memorandum and Article of Association of the appellant/complainant has been admitted for the respondent/accused. Considering the evidence produced by the appellant/complainant learned Trial Court came to the conclusion that the transactions in question were loan transactions in substance and as the appellant/complainant had no licence for money lending, it is not legally entitled to realise the money from the respondents/accused and because of such reason learned Trial Court acquitted all the respondents/accused in the case. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with such judgment and order of acquittal the appellant/complainant filed the present appeal after obtaining special leave from the Court. 5. Learned Trial Court formulated the following points for decisions:- 1) “Whether the accused persons issued five cheques in favour of the complainant for payment of money? 2) Whether the cheques were presented to the bank within the period of six months from the date on which it was drawn or within the period of its validity? 3) Whether those cheques were returned by the bank unpaid? 4) Whether the complainant made a demand for the payment of the said amount by giving a notice in writing to the accused persons within thirty days? 5) Whether the accused did not pay the said money within fifteen days after receiving the notice? 6) Whether the accused persons drawn the cheque for the discharge of any debt or other liability? 7) Whether the loans advanced by the complainant without having a money lending licence is a legally enforceable debt or nor?” 6. The cheques in question were proved and marked Exhibit-3 to 3 / 4. In fact, the respondents/accused did not dispute the fact that all those cheques were issued by the respondents/accused. The fact that the cheques in question were deposited by the appellant/complainant within the prescribed period has not also been disputed. Exhibit -3 series are the cheques in question and Exhibit-4 series are the return memos and from those documents it is clear that all those cheques were returned unpaid because of insufficient funds in the drawer’s account, i. e., in the account of the respondents/accused. Exhibit- 5 is a demand notice. Exhibit- 6 series are the postal memos and Exhibit- 7 is a postal acknowledgement card. Exhibit- 5 is a demand notice. Exhibit- 6 series are the postal memos and Exhibit- 7 is a postal acknowledgement card. From Exhibit -7 it is found that the demand notice was duly served upon the respondents/accused. The respondents/accused never claimed that they paid any amount against those bounced cheques in response to the demand notice received by them. Learned Trial Court, therefore, decided the points No. 1 to 5 framed by it, in favour of the appellant/complainant. The decisions on the points have not been disputed during the hearing of the appeal. 7. In fact, the main defence of the respondents/accused was not on any of the aforesaid issues. The main defence of the respondents/accused as agitated by the learned Advocate for the respondents/accused during the hearing of the appeal was that the transactions in question were simple lending of money for which the appellant/complainant had no valid licence and hence the provisions of Section 138 or 139 of the N. I. Act is not attracted in the case. Learned Trial Court accepted such contention of the respondents/accused and dismissed the appellant/complainant’s case on such ground only. 8. Let the nature of the transaction in question be ascertained first. Admittedly the respondents/accused issued five cheques amounting to Rs. 2,50,00,000.00 (Rupees Two Crores Fifty Lack only) in total, in favour of the appellant/complainant. In para 3 of the complaint it is stated that “the accused persons in view of their confirmation of accounts for the period of st April, 2010 to 31st March, 2011 and against that existing liabilities issued the following cheques ......... ”. However, Sri Ajoy Agarwal, a director of the appellant/complainant in his evidence added that because of their old relations the money was given as accommodation loans to the respondents/accused to overcome their financial crunch. Sri Agarwal on his first day of cross examination admitted that lending money was one of the businesses of their company and that no collateral security was taken from the respondents/accused for the loan given. He further admitted that the alleged loan was given to the respondents/accused with interest. Sri Agarwal on his first day of cross examination admitted that lending money was one of the businesses of their company and that no collateral security was taken from the respondents/accused for the loan given. He further admitted that the alleged loan was given to the respondents/accused with interest. However, subsequently Sri Agarwal by his recall tried to deviate from his earlier stand, stating that money lending was not a business of their company and their company dealt in business of shares only and that their company lends money only to its directors and officers and to others only in rarest occasions. Such a gross deviation was surely to avoid the consequence of his earlier admissions and hence it should not be given much importance to. 9. Exhibit – A is the memorandum and Articles of association of the appellant/complainant. Clause- 8 of it clearly says that lending money out of the company’s surplus find is one of the objects of the company. P.W.- 1 during his cross examination narrated the matter further. According to him the balance sheet for the year ending 31st March, 2011 reflected that the total investment of their company was 11,67,63,000.00 (rupees eleven crores sixty seven lakh sixty three thousand only) out of which Rupees Eight crores eleven lakh four thousand nine hundred and eight only, was the value of the loans and advances. He further stated that during the same year, their company earned Rs. 13,32,877.00 (Rupees thirteen lakh thirty two thousand eight hundred seventy seven only) as interest on loan while their company earned only Rs. 35,379.00 (Rupees thirty five thousand three hundred seventy nine only) as dividends. From such facts and figures it is clear that the main business of the appellant/complainant is money lending. 10. One or two isolated transactions of loan between two persons cannot be treated as money-lending transactions. But in the present case there were five transactions on five different dates and a huge amount, i. e., Rupees 2,50,00,000.00 (Rupees Two Crores Fifty Lack only) in total, is involved in those five transactions. It is not understandable as to why such a huge amount was paid by the appellant/complainant to the respondents/accused without any specific and separate agreement. The explanation that the money was paid as accommodation loan because of good relationship between the directors of the two companies is not convincing. It is not understandable as to why such a huge amount was paid by the appellant/complainant to the respondents/accused without any specific and separate agreement. The explanation that the money was paid as accommodation loan because of good relationship between the directors of the two companies is not convincing. As discussed above, money-lending is a primary business of the appellant/complainant. In the circumstances it can be said without any hesitation that the transactions in question were money-lending transactions. 11. Admittedly the appellant/complainant has no money-lending licence. 12. Money-lending without licence is not totally barred or prohibited by the Bengal Money-Lender’s Act, 1940. The Bengal Money-Lender’s Act, 1940 is basically a Regulatory Act and it regulates the business of money-lending. Section 8 of the said Act says that after certain date notified in the official gazette no money-lender shall carry on the business of money-lending unless he holds an effective licence. But the provision is not mandatory. According to provision in Section 13 of the said Act, if a money-lender without having any money-lending licence files a Suit for recovery of a loan such a Suit should be stayed until the money-lender does not pay in prescribed manner such penalty and within such period as may be fixed by the Court and if the penalty thus imposed is not paid by the money-lender/plaintiff then only the Suit should be dismissed. So, according to the provisions in Bengal Money-Lender’s Act, 1940, money-lending without licence is not itself an illegal Act. 13. It has been held by this High court in the case of Samarendra Nath Das – versus – Suprio Moitra reported in 2006 (3) C.H.N. 518 cited by Mr. Ganguly that in a case under Section 138 of the N. I. Act the point for consideration is whether the acts alleged against the accused attracts the offence under Sections 138 of the N. I. Act, or not and it is not relevant to consider whether the person issuing the cheque has any money-lending licence or not and such a point may be raised only in a Suit or proceeding under money-lenders Act. 14. 14. Section 139 of the N. I. Act says “presumption in favour of holder.- it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability”. 15. Explanation -to Section 138 says, “For the purposes of this section, ‘debt or other liability’ means a legally enforceable debt or other liability”. 16. Mr Dwavedi argued that in the present case the debt/liability is not a legally enforceable debt/liability and hence the presumption in Section 139 of the N. I. Act is not available to the appellant/complainant. He further argued that the presumption under Section 139 of the N. I. Act does not include a legally enforceable debt or liability. He relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case reported in 2008 CRI L. J. 1172, (Krishna Janardhan Bhat- versus – Dattatraya G. Hegde). He also cited the following decisions to support his contentions I) AIR 2009 SC (supp) 2022 (Jugesh Sehgal – versus – Shamsher Singh Goti), II) 2002 CRI L. J. 3193 (Shridi Sai Steel, Balu Complex and others, etc. – versus – State of A. P. and another), III) 2010 CRI L. J. 2871 (Rangappa – versus – Mohan), IV) 2009 CRI L. J. 3777 (Sanjay Mishra – versus – Kanishka Kapoor @ Nikki and Anr.), V) 2010 CRI L. J. 1217 (Anil Baburao Kataria – versus – Purshottam Prabhakar Kawane) . 17. On the contrary Mr Ganguly argued that whether the appellant/complainant has any money-lending licence or not is not a matter to be considered in a case under Section 138 of the N. I. Act as the presumption under Section 139 of the N. I. Act is there in favour of the appellant/complainant. He further argued that the presumption under Section 139 of the N. I. Act includes the presumption of legally enforceable debt or other liability also. He relied upon the decision in (2011) 1 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 184 (Rangappa- Versus- Sri Mohan). Mr Ganguly also cited the following decisions. I) 2002 C. Cr. L. R. (SC) 59 (K. N. Beena – versus – Muniyappan and anr.), II) 2002 C. Cr. He relied upon the decision in (2011) 1 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 184 (Rangappa- Versus- Sri Mohan). Mr Ganguly also cited the following decisions. I) 2002 C. Cr. L. R. (SC) 59 (K. N. Beena – versus – Muniyappan and anr.), II) 2002 C. Cr. L. R. (SC) 62 (Rajinder Prasad – versus – Bashir and Ors.), III) 1999 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1284 (K. Bhaskaran – versus – Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and another) on the point. 18. In Krishna Janardan Bhat’s case (supra) the transaction was against the provision in Section 269- SS of the Income Tax Act because of which the transaction was considered to be bad in law. In that case, the principle was also laid down that Section 139 of the N. I. Act merely raises a presumption that the cheque in question has been issued for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability and under the said provision there is no presumption that the ‘debt or other liability is a legally enforceable debt or other liability’. However, the principle thus laid down was subsequently considered as incorrect by a larger bench in the case of Rangappa – versus – Sri Mohan (supra). In that case it has been held that the presumption under Section 139 of the N. I. Act does include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability also. 19. In the case of Jugesh Sehgal- versus – Shamsher Singh Gogi, (supra) the cheque was not signed by the accused at all. Similarly in the case of Shridi Sai Steel, Balu Complex and others, etc.- versus – State of A. P. and another, (supra) the cheque in question was discounted in the complainant-Bank and naturally the cheque was not issued by the drawer directly in favour of the complainant-Bank. The case of Sanjay Mishra- versus – Kanishka Kapoor @ Nikki and Anr.’s case (supra) was a case falling under Bombay Money-Lender’s Act, 1946 according to which money-lending without licence under the aforesaid Act is prohibited. So, none of the facts or situations in the cases cited by Mr Dwivedi and narrated above has any relevancy in the present case. 20. It has been discussed above that the money-lending without licence is not totally barred or prohibited by the Bengal Money-Lender’s Act, 1940. 21. So, none of the facts or situations in the cases cited by Mr Dwivedi and narrated above has any relevancy in the present case. 20. It has been discussed above that the money-lending without licence is not totally barred or prohibited by the Bengal Money-Lender’s Act, 1940. 21. In the case of K. N. Beena (supra) it has been held that under Section 118 of the N. I. Act unless the contrary is proved, it is presumed that the negotiable instrument (including the cheque) has been made or drawn for consideration. Similarly, under Section 139 of the N. I. Act there is a presumption that unless the contrary is proved the holder of the cheque has received the cheque for discharge in whole or in part of a debt or liability. A similar view has also been expressed in K. Vaskaran’s case (supra). 22. There cannot be any dispute to the fact that the presumptions both in Section 118 and 139 of the N. I. Act are rebuttable presumptions. In the present case the only point for rebuttable of such presumptions for the respondents/accused is that the transactions in question are illegal transactions as the appellant/complainant has no money-lending licence. As held earlier, lending money without having a money-lending licence itself is not prohibited under the Bengal Money-Lender’s Act, 1940. So, the presumptions in favour of the appellant/complainant stand unrebutted. The respondents/accused cannot, therefore, escape from the liability under Section 138 of the N. I. Act, especially when there is no denial of the fact that the respondents/accused issued the cheques in question which were dishonoured due to insufficient fund in the account of the respondents/accused. 23. So, from the foregoing discussion it is clear that the Trial Court’s views are erroneous in law. In result, the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court cannot be sustained. 24. In view of the decisions recorded above the order passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 6th Court, Calcutta on 29.06.2013 in case No. C- 15450/2011 acquitting the respondents/accused is hereby set aside. All the respondents/accused are found guilty of the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and all the respondents/accused are convicted accordingly. 25. A case under Section 138 of the N. I. Act is a summons- case. So, hearing the convicts on the point of sentence is not needed. 26. All the respondents/accused are found guilty of the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and all the respondents/accused are convicted accordingly. 25. A case under Section 138 of the N. I. Act is a summons- case. So, hearing the convicts on the point of sentence is not needed. 26. Section 138 of the N. I. Act has been introduced to improve the efficacy of the Banking system for the smooth functioning of the commercial world. So, any lenient view on the point of sentence is bound to frustrate the main object of the provision in Section 138 of the N. I. Act. 27. The total value of the cheques involved in the case is rupees 2,50,00,000.00 (Rupees Two Crores Fifty Lakh only). The cheques were issued in the year 2011. The recipients of the cheques, i. e., the appellant/complainant has by this time suffered huge losses on account of the loss of interest, at least. That apart, the appellant/complainant has incurred huge expenses for the legal battle also. The appellant/complainant should, therefore, be adequately compensated for those financial losses. So, in addition to the substantive sentence prescribed in Section 138 of the N. I. Act, compensation should also be awarded in favour of the appellant/complainant under Section 357 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The amount of such compensation is assessed as rupees 3,50,00,000.00 (rupees three crore and fifty lakh only) which should be paid by the respondents/accused company as well as by its two directors individually. 28. Accordingly, all the respondents/accused are found guilty of the offence under Section 138 of the N. I. Act. Respondents/accused number 2 and 3, namely, Mahendra Kumar Patni and Anjani Kumar Shahi are sentenced to suffer Simple Imprisonment for six months each. They are also directed to pay compensation to the appellant/complainant under Section 357 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure @ rupees 50,00,000.00 (rupees fifty lakh only) each, in default, they will suffer Simple Imprisonment for two months more. The respondents/accused company, i. e., respondent number 1 is also directed to pay compensation to the appellant/complainant for an amount of rupees 2,50,00,000.00 (rupees two crore and fifty lakh only) under Section 357 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure within two months from this date failing which the amount would be realised from the company according to the provisions in law. 29. Puja Vacation will intervene. 29. Puja Vacation will intervene. Hence, respondents/accused number 2 and 3 are directed to surrender before the Trial Court within two months from this date to serve out the sentence mentioned above, failing which the Trial Court will take appropriate actions against them as per law. 30. The appeal is allowed in terms of the orders above. 31. The L. C. R. along with a copy of this judgment and order be sent to the Trial Court at once, if necessary, by special messenger. 32. A plain copy of this judgment and order duly countersigned by the A. C. O. of the Court be also furnished to the respondents/accused at the earliest. 33. Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the learned Counsels for the parties upon compliance of all formalities.