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2015 DIGILAW 874 (CAL)

Fultusi Roy v. State of West Bengal

2015-10-13

DEBASISH KAR GUPTA, MD.MUMTAZ KHAN

body2015
JUDGMENT Debasish Kar Gupta , J. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track 2nd Court, Jangipur, District- Murshidabad, in S.T. No.1 (3) 06 arising out of S.Sl. No.160/05 dated May 31, 2010. By virtue of the impugned judgment the learned Trial Court held that the prosecution failed to bring home the charge levelled against the respondent nos.2 to 13 under Sections 302/307/34 of Indian Penal Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as I.P.C.) beyond reasonable doubt. The respondent nos.2 to 13 (accused persons) were held not guilty of offence punishable under Sections 302/307/34 I.P.C. The backdrop of this appeal, in a nutshell, is as under:-On February 28, 2005 at about 17.10 hours one Fultusi Ray, wife of Shankar Ray, since deceased, submitted a letter of complaint to the Officer-in-Charge Suti Police Station, Augrangabad, Murshidabad. According to the above letter of complaint, at about 14.00 hours on that date Prasenjit Ray, son of her “bhasur” aged about 14 years, Gokul Sarkar, son of late Dilip Sarkar, involved themselves in quarrel while playing with marbles. As a consequence of the above quarrel the respondent nos.2 to 13 surrounded her husband Shankar Ray, since deceased. Bipul Ray (respondent no.2) hurled bombs on the husband of the appellant. As a result of such injury, the husband of the appellant died at the place of occurrence. Sri Manik Roy, her brother-in-law (PW 2), Smt. Bhagyabati Roy, her sister-in-law (PW 3) and Sujit Ray, son of her brother-in-law (PW 4), Lilim Ray, and Bhabani Roy, wife of Tripati Ray also sustained minor injuries at the place of occurrence. The respondent nos.2 to 13 fled away after the death of her husband. On receipt of the above complaint, Suti Police Station, Murshidabad made General Diary Entry no.985 on February 28, 2005 at 17.10 hours. Then in the above Police Station Suti P.S. FIR No. 27/05 dated February 28, 2005 was lodged against the respondent nos.2 to 13 alleging the commission of offence by them under Sections 302/326/34 of I.P.C. and Section 9 (B) (II) of the Indian Explosive Act (hereinafter referred to as I.E. Act) on that date. Sub-Inspector Sudhanshu Sekhar Mondal (PW 12), was appointed for investigation of the above case. Sub-Inspector Sudhanshu Sekhar Mondal (PW 12), was appointed for investigation of the above case. The surathal of the dead body of deceased Shankar Ray was conducted by the PW 12 on the above date and surathal report was prepared in respect of the dead body of aforesaid deceased Shankar Ray. According to the above report, the shape of the face could not be recognised and brain materials came out and injuries caused by bomb was seen on the left elbow and right hand. A rough sketch map with index of the place of occurrence was drawn by the Investigating Officer on the same date. According to the rough sketch map, the place of occurrence was Kameha Road, village-Bamuha, District-Murshidabad near house of one Shambhu Ray on one side and that of another Kripasindu Sarkar on the other side. Thereafter, the above dead body was forwarded to Jangipur S.D. Hospital, District-Murshidabad, on March 1, 2005 at 12.30 hours for post mortem examination. Dr. Samir Kanta Datta, Medical Officer of the above hospital, conducted post mortem examination. Post mortem report of the above dead body bearing no.43 dated March 1, 2005 was prepared by him. According to the above report, the scalp of the deceased was fractured, interior part of the scalp along with whole brain matter fractured, all bones of face were fractured and chest hair were found burnt. Doctor opined further that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. Charge-sheet no.75 dated June 10, 2005, was filed against the respondent nos.2 to 13 for commission of offence punishable under Sections 302/326/34 of I.P.C. and Section 9 (B) (II) of the I.E. Act. Charge was framed under two heads against the above respondents on March 9, 2006. The charge under first head was framed against the above respondents for commission of offence punishable under Sections 302/34 of I.P.C. and the charge under second head was framed against the above respondents for commission of offence punishable under Sections 307/34 of I.P.C. Evidences of 13 prosecution witnesses were recorded during the trial. Thereafter the respondent nos.2 to 13 had been examined and their respective statements were prepared under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. on April 26, 2010. Thereafter the respondent nos.2 to 13 had been examined and their respective statements were prepared under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. on April 26, 2010. The learned Court below passed the impugned judgment on May 31, 2010 acquitting the respondent nos.2 to 13 from the charge of commissioning of offence punishable under Sections 302/307/34 of I.P.C. It is submitted by Mr. Asish Sanyal, learned advocate appearing for the appellant, that the impugned order of acquittal cannot be sustained in law for the following reasons:- (i) The learned Court below was in error in arriving at a conclusion that the prosecution made an attempt to build up a new story at the time of adducing evidence in deviation from FIR. The participation of the respondent nos.2 to 13 in commissioning of the offence was mentioned in the letter of complaint dated February 28, 2005. (ii) The participation of respondent nos.4 to 13 in commissioning of offence was also corroborated by the evidence of PW 2, PW 3, PW 4 and PW 6. The commissioning of offence by respondent no.2 of hurling bomb on the head of the victim on the basis of instruction of the respondent no.3, participation of the respondent no.4 to 13 causing injuries on the body of the victim other than the injury from blasting of bomb as also sustaining of injuries of different natures by PW 1, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4 were corroborated with the evidence of local witnesses PW 5, PW 8 and PW 9, having no interest in the matter amongst other evidence. No satisfactory reason is evident in the impugned judgment to disbelieve the above oral and documentary evidences. (iii) The commission of offences by Ashok Ray, the respondent no.3 were proved from the evidence adduced by Manik Ray (PW 2). According to the above evidence, the respondent no.3 directed other accused to kill the victim. As a result, the respondent no.2 hurled bomb on the victim causing fracture of skull particularly anterior part with fracture of whole brain matter which was the cause of death of victim due to heamorrhagic shock following the bomb blast. According to the evidence adduced by PW 2, splinters of that bomb caused injury of PW 2 himself, Bhagyabati Ray (PW 3), Bhabani Roy and Lilim Ray. According to the evidence adduced by PW 2, splinters of that bomb caused injury of PW 2 himself, Bhagyabati Ray (PW 3), Bhabani Roy and Lilim Ray. There was no scope for the learned Court below to disbelieve the above evidence in view of the injury of skull sustained by the victim. The decision making process of the learned Court below in passing the impugned judgment cannot be sustained in law due to ignorance of the above evidence. (iv) The cause of death of the victim as evident from the post mortem report as also from the evidence of the doctor (PW 6), who had prepared the post mortem report, was not considered by the learned Court below in its letter and sprit. (v) According to the evidence adduced by Sujit Kr. Roy (PW 4), respondent no.8 assaulted him with iron rod on his left shoulder at the time of committing the offence under reference. A bone of the shoulder of PW 4 had been fractured for which he was treated in Jangipur S.D. Hospital, District-Murshidabad. (vi) According to the letter of complaint dated February 28, 2005 submitted by PW 1, the respondent no.2, Bipul Ray involved himself in quarreling with the victim with bombs in his hands at the place of occurrence on February 28, 2005. The Investigating Officer (PW 12) of the case recovered live bombs from the heap of straw lying on the courtyard of residence of respondent no.2 on March 27, 2005 in between 16.15 to 16.25 hours on the basis of the information and with the assistance of the respondent no.2. The seizure list of live bombs recovered from the residence of the respondent no.2 was exhibited (Exbt.-5/B) in presence of Sri Manik Ray (PW 2) and Pranab Kumar Sarkar (PW 9) respectively. PW 9 was a local witness of the above seizure list having no interest in the matter. No satisfactory reason was assigned in the impugned judgment for disbelieving the above evidence. (vii) The learned Court below was in error in giving undue emphasis on the defence case ignoring the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses. The finding of the learned Court below that due to failure on the part of the PW 1 in recollecting whether the wearing of her deceased husband were stained with blood leads to erroneous conclusion to facilitate acquittal of the respondent nos.2 to 13. The finding of the learned Court below that due to failure on the part of the PW 1 in recollecting whether the wearing of her deceased husband were stained with blood leads to erroneous conclusion to facilitate acquittal of the respondent nos.2 to 13. The learned Court below was in error in misdirecting himself with regard to the question whether the victim came to the place of occurrence from Ferry Ghat. The learned Court below was in error in disbelieving the evidence of PW 1 to PW 5, PW 8 and PW 9 on the ground of variation of statements in respect of the above evidence. Casting of unnecessary doubt to the evidence of PW 8 and PW 9 leads to gross failure on the part of the learned Court below to arrive at a right conclusion in respect of commission of offence by the respondent nos.2 to 13 punishable under Sections 302/307/34 of I.P.C. It is submitted by Mr. Sanyal that examination of decision making process of the learned Trial Court to pass the impugned order of acquittal is permissible in this appeal. Mr. Asish Sanyal relied upon the decision of Jai Ram & Ors. vs. The State of U.P. reported in AIR 1976 SC 1005 and Brahm Swaroop & Anr. vs. State of U.P. reported in AIR 2011 SC 280 to submit that the function of the First Appellate Court is to examine the decision making process of the impugned judgment. Drawing our attention to the surathal report dated February 28, 2005, it is submitted by Mr. Sudip Ghosh, learned State advocate that the marks of injuries caused by bomb on the left elbow and right hand supported the defence case that the cause of death of the victim was an accident which occurred in course of preparing bomb by the victim. It is submitted by Mr. Ghosh that the learned Court below arrived at a conclusion that it was not established beyond reasonable doubt that the death of the victim was homicidal in nature. Taking into consideration the evidence of PW 6 the learned Court below arrived at a conclusion that the possibility of the death of the victim due to the blast of bomb at the time of preparing the same by him could not be ruled out. Taking into consideration the evidence of PW 6 the learned Court below arrived at a conclusion that the possibility of the death of the victim due to the blast of bomb at the time of preparing the same by him could not be ruled out. According to him, the learned Court below took into consideration the defence case also the evidence adduced by PW 6 in course of his cross-examination. According to Mr. Ghosh, the Trial Court took into consideration the evidence of PW 1 to 5, PW 8 and PW 9 to arrive at a conclusion that the prosecution made an attempt to develop a new story on the basis of the deposition of the above prosecution witnesses in deviation of the contents of the FIR. From the evidence of PW 1 it appeared that the distance of the place of occurrence from the place where she stood was 2 cubits. According to him, the PW 4 sustained injury which was fracture of bone. Therefore, his evidence with regard to assaulting him by the respondent no.8 with the help of lathi/iron rod and shabol could not be accepted. According to the evidence of PW 8, she witnessed chasing of the victim by the accused persons with deadly weapons but in course of the cross-examination she failed to recollect that the respondent no.2 was carrying bombs in his hands. According to Mr. Ghosh, admittedly the PW 9 (seizure list witness) could not identify the seized article. The allegation against the accused that there was previous grudge on the victim as appeared from the FIR was not proved. It is submitted by Mr. Ghosh that the learned Trial Court held it correctly that altercation in between minor boys in course of playing marbles could not be considered as cause of attacking the victim subsequently and to kill him. It is also submitted by him that the learned Court below took into consideration the time factors with regard to leaving the police station, making entry in the case diary and receipt of phone call to arrive at a conclusion that such evidence could not be relied upon. Mr. Anindya Lahiri, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent nos.2 to 13 adopted the submissions made on behalf of the State respondents, he submits that there was no conclusive proof of committing the offence under reference by the respondent nos.2 to 13. Mr. Anindya Lahiri, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent nos.2 to 13 adopted the submissions made on behalf of the State respondents, he submits that there was no conclusive proof of committing the offence under reference by the respondent nos.2 to 13. He repeated and reiterated that there was doubt with regard to the cause of death as to whether it was homicidal or accidental. It is further submitted by Mr. Lahiri that from the evidence adduced by the PW 12 in course of cross-examination that the seized Alamats were not sealed or labelled and the entire seized Alamats were not sent to the forensic expert or explosive expert for examination. Mr. Lahiri relied upon the decision of Dinesh Saha & Anr. vs. The State of West Bengal, reported in 2013 (1) CLJ (Cal) 38 and Kanhaiya Lal vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2014 (3) CLJ (SC) 110 in support of his above submissions. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties and have given our anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of this appeal. At the very outset, it is necessary to recollect the broad principles of law relating to the power of High Court under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. while hearing an appeal against a judgment and order or acquittal passed in a trial. The Privy Council in its decision of Sheo Swarup vs. King Emperor, reported in AIR 1934 PC 227 , considered exclusively the law in this regard. According to the above decision, no limitation has been imposed on the exercise of power of the High Court in this regard. Further it is open for High Court to review entire evidence on the basis of which the order of acquittal has been passed. But, the High Court is under obligation to give proper weight and consideration to such matters as follows:- (i) the view of Trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (ii) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (iii) the right of accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (iv) the slowness of an appellant court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witness. The above proposition of law laid down by the Privy Council has been repeated and reiterated by the Apex Court time and again. We find a concise statement of law on this issue from the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chandrappa vs. State of Karnataka,, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 and the relevant portion of the above judgment is quoted below:- “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order or acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” It will be useful for us to take into consideration the view expressed in the matter of Main Pal & Anr. vs. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 692 and the relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:- “12. vs. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in (2004) 10 SCC 692 and the relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:- “12. There is no embargo on the appellant court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. As a matter of fact, in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court as the court of first appeal is obligated to go into greater detail of the evidence to see whether any miscarriage has resulted from the order of acquittal, though it has to act with great circumspection and utmost care before ordering the reversal of an acquittal. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is case upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or not. (See Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. This position has been recently reiterated in Joseph v. State of Kerala, Devatha Venkataswamy v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., State of Punjab v. Phola Singh, State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh, State of U.P. v. Babu and Suchand Pal v. Phani Pal.” (Emphasis supplied) After considering the FIR, rough sketch map, the surathal report, the post mortem report, charge framed against the accused and evidence of thirteen prosecution witnesses and the statements of all the twelve accused persons (the respondent nos.2 to 13), the learned Court below arrived at a conclusion at the end of the day that the prosecution failed to bring home the charge levelled against the accused persons beyond all reasonable doubt mainly for following reasons, amongst other reasons:- (i) There was an attempt on the part of the prosecution to develop a new story during trial in deviation from the fact disclosed in FIR; (ii) There were vital contradictions in the evidence adduced by the prosecution witness; Taking into consideration the evidence adduced by the doctor (PW 6) who had conducted the post mortem on the body of the victim and the evidence of family members, the Trial Court arrived at a conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove beyond doubt that the death of the victim was homicidal and it was not an accident which had occurred consequent upon blasting the bomb at the time of preparation of the same by the victim. With regard to the first point of challenging the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, it is observed in the matter of Jitender Kumar vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2012) 6 SCC 204 that the main purpose of the FIR is to satisfy the police officer as to commission of a cognizable offence for him to conduct further investigation in accordance with law. The FIR itself is not the proof of a case, but is a piece of evidence which would be used for corroborating the case of the prosecution. The relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:- “18. The FIR itself is not the proof of a case, but is a piece of evidence which would be used for corroborating the case of the prosecution. The relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:- “18. The court has also to consider the fact that the main purpose of the FIR is to satisfy the police officer as to the commission of a cognizable offence for him to conduct further investigation in accordance with law. The primary object is to set the criminal law into motion and it may not be possible to give every minute detail with unmistakable precision in the FIR. The FIR itself is not the proof of a case, but is a piece of evidence which could be used for corroborating the case of the prosecution. The FIR need not be an encyclopaedia of all the facts and circumstances on which the prosecution relies. It only has to state the basic case. The attending circumstances of each case would further have considerable bearing on application of such principles to a given situation. Reference in this regard can be made to State of U.P. v. Krishna Master and Ranjit Singh v. State of M.P.” In the case in hand, the place of commission of offence punishable under Sections 302/326/34 of I.P.C. and under Section 9 (B) (II) of the I.E. Act, its date and time, names of all the accused (the respondent nos.2 to 13), names of the persons other than the victim who had suffered injury were disclosed in the FIR under reference. Our attention has not been drawn to any finding of the learned Court below with regard to absence of statement of a basic case of commission of cognizable offence in the FIR under reference. Therefore, the learned Court below failed to consider the FIR and the ocular evidence in its proper perspective which could throw light on the controversy. In order to examine the decision making process of the learned Trial Court with regard to the second ground, it would not be out of context to take into consideration the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of H.P. vs. Lekh Raj, reported in (2000) 1 SCC 247 that discrepancy has to be distinguished from contradiction. In order to examine the decision making process of the learned Trial Court with regard to the second ground, it would not be out of context to take into consideration the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of H.P. vs. Lekh Raj, reported in (2000) 1 SCC 247 that discrepancy has to be distinguished from contradiction. Whereas contradiction in the statement of the witness is fatal for the case, minor discrepancy or variance in evidence will not make the prosecution’s case doubtful. The relevant portions of the above decision is quoted below:- “7. In support of the impugned judgment the learned counsel appearing for the respondents vainly attempted to point out some discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix and other witnesses for discrediting the prosecution version. Discrepancy has to be distinguished from contradiction. Whereas contradiction in the statement of the witness is fatal for the case, minor discrepancy or variance in evidence will not make the prosecution's case doubtful. The normal course of the human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident there may occur minor discrepancies, such discrepancies in law may render credential to the depositions. Parrot-like statements are disfavoured by the courts. In order to ascertain as to whether the discrepancy pointed out was minor or not or the same amounted to contradiction, regard is required to be had to the circumstances of the case by keeping in view the social status of the witnesses and environment in which such witness was making the statement. This Court in Ousu Varghese v. State of Kerala held that minor variations in the accounts of the witnesses are often the hallmark of the truth of their testimony. In Jagadish v. State of M.P. this Court held that when the discrepancies were comparatively of a minor character and did not go to the root of the prosecution story, they need not be given undue importance. Mere congruity or consistency is not the sole test of truth in the depositions. This Court again in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki held that in the depositions of witnesses there are always normal discrepancies, however, honest and truthful they may be. Such discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence, and the like. Such discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence, and the like. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal and not expected of a normal person.” (Emphasis supplied) Regarding the reason assigned in support of the conclusion, the learned Court below took into consideration that according to the evidence of PW 1, the PW 2, PW 3, PW 4 and PW 5 there was a doubt with regard to the cause of injury sustained by PW 4 as to whether it due to splinter of bomb or the respondent no.8 assaulted the PW 4 with an iron rod/sabol. The learned Court below did not make any attempt to ascertain as to whether the cause sustaining injuries by PW 4 was either of above sources or both the sources to arrive at a conclusion that the discrepancies under reference touched the root of the prosecution case. Regarding the next reason assigned by the learned Court below, in the instant appeal, the learned Court below observed that according to the evidence of PW 1, the cause of death of the victim was blasting of bomb hurled on his body by the respondent no.2 on instruction of the respondent no.3, though none of the accused sustained injury due to such explosion while the PW 1, PW 2 and PW 3 sustained injuries from the splinters of bomb and PW 4 sustained fracture injury on his left shoulder arising out of assault by the appellant no.8 with the help of iron rod. After considering the evidences of PW 1, PW 2, PW 3, PW 4 and PW 5 (family members of the victim) which were corroborated by the evidence of PW 8 and PW 9 (the local witnesses), the place of commission of offence, date and time of occurrence of that offence, cause of death (blasting of bomb on the body of the victim) were ignored by the learned trial judge at the time of arriving at the conclusion discussed in preceding paragraph. For the purpose of examining propriety of the next observation of the learned Court below we find that it has been decided by this High Court in Afzaddin Ansary & Ors. For the purpose of examining propriety of the next observation of the learned Court below we find that it has been decided by this High Court in Afzaddin Ansary & Ors. vs. The State of West Bengal, reported in 1997 (2) Crimes 53 Cal., that a man may lie but a document will never lie. The relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:- “20. A well-known dicta has been laid down not only by the apex Court of our country but also by the Privy Council that a man may lie but a document will never lie. It is a well-known adage that one swallow does not make a summer but it is a case where one swallow makes a summer. The question arises in this way as it gyrates the whole issue where the evidence as to recognition is a subsequent creation by the machination of the Ansaries. Exhibit-5 the copy of the general diary book projects an unnatural shadow about recognition of any one of the appellants before us. A silence has been maintained in the said exhibit where none of the names of the appellants found their room in the general diary book. ……..” (Emphasis supplied) We find that according to post mortem report dated March 1, 2005, the cause of death was haemorrhagic shock arising out of fracture of skull particularly anterior part of skull and evacuation of whole brain matter, fracture of all bones of the face, burning of chest hair. We are of the opinion that critical analysis of the above documentary evidence should have been undertaken by the learned Trial Court taking into consideration another documentary evidence, namely surathal report instead of hypothetical discrepancy regarding cause of death (homicidal or accident) giving undue weightage to the evidence of the PW 6 adduced in course of cross-examination that in case of accident similar severe injury may cause. The relevant fact was not taken into consideration by the learned Court below to arrive at a conclusion in this regard on the basis of the settled proposition of law as discussed hereinabove. The relevant fact was not taken into consideration by the learned Court below to arrive at a conclusion in this regard on the basis of the settled proposition of law as discussed hereinabove. It would not be out of context that the learned Court below ignored the evidence that the place of commission of offence was Kameha Road, village-Bamuha, District-Murshidabad, near the house of one Sambhu Ray on one side and that of another Kripasindhu Sarkar on the other side as also other factor to examine as to whether it could be a place of preparing bomb? That apart, it should have been considered by the learned Court below on the basis of relevant evidence on record that injuries of skull, face and a minor portions of hands and in absence of major injury of hands could how far create a presumption in favour of an accident at the time of preparation of bomb. Considering the distinguished facts and circumstances relating to the issues involved in the decisions of Dinesh Saha (supra) and Kanhaiya Lal (supra) do not help the respondent nos.2 to 13. Considering the facts and circumstance, which is discussed above, we are of the opinion that the relevant factors as appear from the oral and documentary evidence on record, which could throw light on the controversy, were not considered in its proper perspective or lost sight of by the trial court. The learned Court below discharged its function considering the evidence casually in a slip shot manner. The impugned judgment was passed without making an attempt to analyse the evidence on record critically and objectively. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal are quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded back for decision afresh after reappreciation of evidence which are already available on record as also for consideration of other important aspects which are overlooked as discussed hereinabove. However, it will be open for the learned Court below to consider the prayer of either party for adducing further evidence, if any, in accordance with law. Let it be recorded that we have not arrived at any conclusion finally in respect of any point on merit and all those points have been kept open for consideration by the learned Court below afresh. This appeal is, thus, allowed. Let the Lower Court’s records be sent back expeditiously. Let it be recorded that we have not arrived at any conclusion finally in respect of any point on merit and all those points have been kept open for consideration by the learned Court below afresh. This appeal is, thus, allowed. Let the Lower Court’s records be sent back expeditiously. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties, on priority basis.